Local Government in Ewedome, British Trust Territory of Togoland (Ghana), 1922-1974. by Yayoh, Wilson Kwame
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EWEDOME, BRITISH TRUST TERRITORY OF 
TOGOLAND (GHANA), 1922-1974
BY
WILSON KWAME YAYOH
THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN 
STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
IN PARTIAL FUFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
APRIL 2010
ProQuest Number: 11010523
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010523
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
DECLARATION
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for Students of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or 
part by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the 
published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the 
work which I present for examination.
SIGNATURE OF CANDIDATE
S O A S  lTb r a r y
ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the development o f local government in the Ewedome region of 
present-day Ghana and explores the transition from the Native Authority system to a 
‘modem’ system of local government within the context o f colonization and 
decolonization. The decolonization process and the transition to local councils in the 
region from the 1950s brought in its wake a change in power relations, as individuals 
and groups at the local level began a stmggle over status and political space within the 
new local government structure. As the decolonization process necessitated a change in 
the trusteeship status o f the region, the development o f local government suffered a 
severe jolt, as local councils became battlegrounds for the fight for and against the 
integration of the trust territory into independent Ghana. The thesis argues that while the 
Native Authorities of the colonial period were inefficient and incapable o f advancing 
the development of a modem society, the successor local councils proved to be far more 
inept and corrupt than the bodies they came to replace. Excessive politicisation of local 
government structures alienated many citizens to the extent that local councils failed to 
follow in the tradition of serving as a focal point for harnessing the enthusiasm and 
energy of rural folk in the region.
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Figure 1: A MAP OF VOLTA REGION SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL TOWNS IN THE
STUDY AREA
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FIGURE 2: THE AMALGAMATED STATES IN EWEDOME
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FIGURE 3: A MAP OF VOLTA REGION SHOWING LOCAL COUNCILS IN 1955
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FIGURE 4: A MAP OF VOLTA REGION SHOWING DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES IN
EWEDOME IN 2006
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ABBREVIATIONS
AEC All-Ewe Conference
CCC Chief Commissioner of the Colony
DC District Commissioner
JPC Joint Provincial Council
JTC Joint Togoland Council
NA Native Authority
NAO Native Authority Ordinance
NRS Natural Rulers Society
PMC Permanent Mandate Commission
SDC Senior District Commissioner
TU Togoland Union
TC Togoland Congress
TVT Trans-Volta Togoland
GLOSSARY OF EWE TERMS 
ablode freedom 
agblekofe farm hut/hamlet 
atamkayi linguist’s sword 
du (pi. dnwo) town 
duko (pi. dukowo) state 
dusimefia right-wing chief 
fia chief
fiaga paramount chief 
fome family 
hotsui cowrie shell 
Mawu God
megbefia rear-guard chief 
miamefia left-wing chief 
ngogbefia advance-guard chief 
omanhene (Akan) paramount chief 
sa lineage
togbe chief or an old man 
tro lesser god
tronua (pi. tronuawo) traditional priest 
tsami linguist
twafohene (Akan) vanguard chief
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the development of the Native Authority system of British colonial 
administration in the Ewedome region of Ghana and its transition to a ‘modem’ system of 
local government in the post-colonial period, from the 1920s to the 1970s. From the 1880s 
to 1914, Ewedome formed part of German Togo, and after the First World War, it became 
part of the League of Nations Mandated Trust Territory of Togoland under British colonial 
rule. This chronological span was chosen because formal British occupation of Ewedome 
started in 1922 and the study traces the history of local government up to 1974, when local 
councils were completely abolished. The scope of the study, however, expands a little 
beyond what the title suggests. It begins with the pre-colonial period to help the reader 
understand the nature of the traditional political organization before analysing the 
transformation that followed in the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. Similarly, 
the concluding section briefly extends the narrative up to the 1990s in order to give an 
overview of local government to the present.
I refer to the Native Authority (NA) system as local government because it represented 
what Mahmood Mamdani has called a ‘decentralised arm of the colonial state’, although 
the type of local government conceived and implemented at the time was limited in its 
composition to the chiefly enclave and lacked the credentials of a ‘modem’ democratic type 
of local government.1 In his recent Local Government in Ghana, Massing traces the origin
1 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy o f  Late Colonialism  
(Princeton, 1996), p. 52.
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of local government to the inception of indirect rule.2 Indeed, the Warrant Chief system 
instituted in Iboland in southeastern Nigeria in the 1890s ‘came into being as a definite 
instrument of local administration’.3 The NA system thus granted traditional rulers a wide 
range of executive and judicial powers compatible to a more advanced system of local 
government. Parker sees the creation of NAs in Accra as an attempt to shore up the power 
and authority of chiefs within a structure of colonial rule, giving practical meaning to the 
ideology of indirect rule.4 According to Rathbone, chiefs in the Gold Coast Colony were 
expected to construct and maintain roads, ‘ensure the tidiness and sanitary respectability of 
their towns and villages, pay for the labour for these tasks, act as licensing authorities for 
market traders, letter writers, purveyors of medicine’ and the like.5 These are essentially 
local government functions. He asserted that ‘until 1940, Ghanaians were governed by a 
dual system - central government and local government - which was called Native 
Administration’.6 To talk about indirect rule or the NA system of administration in colonial 
Africa, therefore, is to talk about local government.
In the era of the slave trade in West Africa, Europeans called the region between the 
Volta River and the Bight of Benin the Slave Coast, and Ewedome formed part of its 
interior hinterland.7 Ewedome thus occupied an ambiguous frontier between the Gold Coast 
and the Slave Coast, forming part of the Volta basin economy. From the first half of the
2 Andreas W. Massing, Local Government Reform in Ghana: Democratic Renewal or Autocratic Revival? 
(Saarbrucken, 1994), p. vii.
3 A. E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891-1929 (London, 1972), p. 43.
4 John Parker, Making the Town: Ga State and Society in Early Colonial Accra (Porthsmouth, NH, 2000), p. 
226.
5 Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics o f  Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60 (Oxford, 2000), 
p. 13.
6 Ibid, p. 11.
7 A. B. Ellis, The Ewe-Speaking People o f  the Slave Coast o f  West Africa: Their Religion, Manners, Customs, 
Law and Language (London, 1890), p. 1; Robin Law, The Slave Coast o f  West Africa 1550-1750: The Impact 
o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society (Oxford, 1991), p. 14.
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nineteenth century, the area began to appear in European sources as Krepi or Crepee.8 The 
term ‘Krepiland’ is unsatisfactory because it is a corruption of the name Peki by the Danes, 
the first Europeans to establish trading contact with the area. Until about 1850, Peki was the 
most influential political unit in this region. But ‘Krepiland’ was more than just the state of 
Peki, the exact delimitation of which historians find difficult. Wilks refers to Krepi at one 
point as ‘the Ewe country’ and at another as a group of towns and states east of the Volta.9 
Law’s description of Krepiland includes Anlo and the coastal town of Keta.10 Akyeampong 
referes to Krepi as the ‘northern Eweland’.11 Recent researchers prefer the name Ewedome, 
which is more accurate when one wants to narrow the focus on the northern Ewe. In fact, 
the Ewe-speaking people call the area occupied by the northern Ewe, ‘Ewedome’ and the 
people who occupy the area are called Ewedometowo - literally meaning ‘occupants of the 
valley’. The area began to appear in British administrative documents from 1850, when 
Britian took over trading activities from the Danes.
Mountains known as the Togo-Atakora ranges succeed one another from south-east to 
north-west in the region,.The Volta River forms the western boundary of the area, 
separating Ewedome from the Gold Coast. The area is highly heterogeneous and witnessed 
a complex migration of people from all directions throughout the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth centuries. It is made up of Ewes, Guans and the so-called Togo remnant
8 G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents o f  Ghana History, 1807-1957 (London, 1964), p. 441.
9 Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution o f  a Political Order (Cambridge, 
1975), p. 57 and 772.
10 Law, Slave Coast, p. 14-15.
11 Emmanuel Akyeampong, Between the Lagoon and the Sea: An Eco-Social History o f  the Anlo o f  
Southeastern Ghana: c. 1850 to Recent Times (Athen, OH, 2001), p. 41. Collier intimated that the inability o f  
earlier sources ‘to clearly define Krepi could be interpreted as an indication o f its lack o f relative 
significance’. See Katharine Alexandria Collier, ‘Ablode: Networks, Ideas and Performance in Togoland 
Politics, 1950-2001’, PhD Thesis, University o f  Birmingham (2002), p. 4. The exact extent o f Krepiland was 
an issue o f contention between Britain and Germany in the 1880s. See Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, p. 
441.
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groups, the Ewes being the dominant ethnic group. Therefore, in the context of this 
particular work, Ewedome includes those non-Ewe states found within the area.
The region has a complex historical past. Although the British on the Gold Coast had 
contact with Ewedome from the 1850s, it was not until 1886 that they began to take steps to 
assert their political control over the area. In that year, the Gold Coast government brought 
56 chiefs from Ewedome and beyond to Peki and made them sign an agreement, known as 
the Krepi Bond, to recognise the chief of Peki, Diega, as ‘head chief of Krepi.12 All the 
chiefs who appended their signatures were given British flags, a move designed to forestall 
possible German expansion from the coast.13 British influence over Ewedome through Peki 
from 1886 to 1890 was vague, but it provided grounds for making claims over the territory. 
The Anglo-German partition in 1890, however, ceded a greater part of Ewedome to the 
Germans.14 The area of Ewedome which went to the British was integrated into the Gold 
Coast colony while the greater portion became part of German Togo. Following the First 
World War, the partition between Britain and France in 1922 saw the southern-western part 
of German Togo becoming part of a British mandated teritory under the League of Nations 
and was officially known as the Southern Section of British Mandated Togoland. It later, in 
1947, became a Trust Territory under the United Nations. According to Bourret, the 
population of this area in 1948 was 170,000, about half of the population of the whole of
12 For the full list o f  the chiefs who signed the bond, see A. K Asem, History ofAwudome (Tema, 1982), p. 
40-43.
13 See Madeline Manoukian, The Ewe-Speaking People o f  Togoland and the G old Coast (London, 1952), p. 
30.
14 For details about about the concession made by Britain to Germany, see Metcalfe, Great Britain and  
Ghana, p. 445.
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British Togoland.15 The development of local government started with the formal British 
occupation of the area in 1922, with the move to effect important political changes.16
Ewedome has not received much attention from historians, who are only now beginning 
to fill this void in the history of Ghana. Recent scholarly works by Benjamin Lawrance and 
Paul Nugent have dealt with the issue of the so-called ‘amalgamation’ of native states under 
British colonial rule and the disputes that this engendered in Ewedome.17 The focus of 
Nugent’s book is on the Ghana-Togo border, but it extends into the issue of amalgamation 
in the southern section of British Togoland. Lawrance also discusses amalgamation and its 
related chieftaincy disputes in Asogli state. Yet amalgamation has not been traced 
systematically to its logical conclusion: the evolution of local government. The success or 
otherwise of the policy of amalgamation needs to be analysed within the broader context of 
the development of local government in the area. Important questions remain unanswered.
For example, how exactly did the NAs work? How did they perform their executive, 
judicial and legislative functions? Did the NAs function only as agents of the colonial state, 
pandering only to the whims of their colonial masters? Alternatively, did they also act as 
agents of development by mobilizing the inhabitants to undertake important communal 
projects? What specific ordinances were applied to the territory and what was the 
philosophy behind those ordinances? How did indigenous laws, traditions and values 
accommodate and/or conflict with new legislation and the changing roles of the traditional 
authorities? What impact did the NAs make on the overall socio-economic and political
15 F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919-1957 (Oxford, 1960), p. 243.
16 Michael D. Callahan, Mandates and Empires: The League o f  Nations and Africa, 7 97 4-7 95 7 (London,
1999), p. 3.
17 Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie o f  the 
Borderlands since 1914 (Athens, OH, 2002); Benjamin N. Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dome: Traditions and 
Petitions in the Ho-Asogli Amalgamation, British Mandated Togoland, 1919-39’, Journal o f  African History, 
46 (2005), p. 243-267.
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development of the territory? Finally, what was the nature of the transition to local councils 
in the post-colonial period? It is important to know how local council areas were created; 
bearing in mind the protests that greeted the creation of amalgamated states. Finally, the 
working of the new local councils from 1951 to their abolition in 1974 is relevant in 
exploring change and continuity in the development of local government in Ewedome. It is 
the attempt to provide answers to these questions that sets this study apart from earlier 
works on Ewedome. The study goes deep into the nitty-gritty of local government in the 
region.
The existing literature on local government in Ghana makes very scanty or no reference 
to Ewedome. Since 1964, the only authoritative book on the history of local government in 
Ghana was by J. K. Nsarkoh and it reads as though Ewedome and the broader southern 
Togoland did not exist at all.18 The book traced the history of local government from 1859, 
when the Municipal Ordinance for Cape Coast was passed, up to the enactment of the 1951 
local government ordinance. However, it made no reference whatsoever to the contribution 
of Ewedome or the southern section of British Togoland to the history of local government 
in Ghana. Andreas Massing’s work on local government in Ghana published in 1994 
focused mainly on the Northern Territories.19 Part of the introduction to the book reads: 
‘until independence Ghana was itself a federation: of Gold Coast Colony (since the 1830’s), 
Ashanti Colony (since 1874) and the Northern Territories (since 1891), each unit
0C\comprising several ethnic groups’. Conspicously missing is the fact that British Togoland 
was integrated into the Gold Coast in the 1950s. It is not surprising therefore that the book 
paid no attention to the development of local government in the Ewedome region.
18 J. K. Nsarkoh, Local Government in Ghana (Accra, 1964).
19 Massing, Local Government, 1994.
20 Ibid, p. vii.
15
The most recent work on local government, Amposah and Boafo-Arthur’s edited 
collection Local Government in Ghana, has been written by social scientists with a focus 
on the 2002 local elections. The book studied twelve selected districts out of the one 
hundred and ten districts in Ghana and only Kpando District in the present-day Volta 
Region was included in the study.21 The history of local government in Ewedome did not 
feature in this book. This obvious neglect of Ewedome and the southern section of British 
Togoland in the narratives on the development of local government in Ghana epitomises 
what Nugent describes as ‘entrenched marginality of the region within Ghanaian studies’ 22 
Skinner also observed that Dennis Austin’s work on political developments in Ashanti and 
northern areas were ‘more detailed and more convincing than that of Ewe and Togoland 
politics’.23 The antecedents of the German period made the creation of NAs and the 
transition to a ‘modem’ local government in the area novel. Until 1949, local government 
laws which operated in the territory were different from those applied to the rest of the 
colony. It was only in that year that an attempt was made to bring the ordinances operating 
in the territory in line with those in the Gold Coast. Even with the coming into being of 
single local government legislation in 1951, the actual processes of developing local 
councils in the Trust Territory were different from what pertained in the Gold Coast 
because of the differential historical contexts.
21 For the most recent collection o f essays on local government in Ghana, see Nicholas Amposah and Kwame 
Boafo-Arthur (eds.), Local Government in Ghana: Grassroots Participation in the 2002 Local Government 
Elections (Accra, 2003). In the general political history o f Ghana, passing references are made to the southern 
section o f British Togoland in the discussion o f  local government, particularly in David Apter, Ghana in 
Transition (Princeton, 1963); Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960 (Oxford, 1964); and Rathbone, 
Nkrumah and the Chiefs.
22 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 50.
23 Kate Skinner, ‘Agency and Analogy in African History: The Contribution o f Extra-Mural Studies in 
Ghana’, History in Africa, 34 (2007), p. 292.
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Historians, moreover, have often treated local government as a peripheral issue that 
should be the concern of political scientists. The apparent apathy towards local government 
is summed up in Rathbone’s statement that ‘local government appears to lack the drama of 
the politics of the national arena and its actors are much less frequently well-known names; 
moreover, dealing with it requires mastering reams of sleep-inducing legislation and 
command of its pettifogging particularities’.24 No wonder that historical research on 
decolonisation is limited largely to national institutions and on such themes as national 
liberation and political party activities.25 Consequently, the systematic study of the 
evolution of ‘modem’ form of local government, an essential part of the decolonization 
process at the local level, has been obscured and, at times, completely ignored by 
historians. Yet, local government was a direct product of indirect rule. It is one of the 
enduring legacies of colonialism, particularly in former British colonies. It passed from the 
colonial era into the independence period without much question. Similarly, the overall 
impact of decolonization on rural communities remained relatively unexplored, for the 
focus has been on urban centres and the national level. What my study does is to explore 
the transition from colonial indirect rule through ‘Native Authorities’ to post-colonial ‘local 
government’.
Also neglected has been the specific role that the United Nations Trusteeship Council 
and its Visiting Missions played in the decolonization effort and the transition to a 
‘modem’ form of local government in the Trust Territories. In Ewedome, the role of the
24 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 8.
25 The point that ‘local political developments do take on a different complexion when viewed from the local 
rather than from the national perspective’, is made in Barbara J. Callaway, ‘Traditional Local Politics: 
Tradition in Local Government Elections in Aba, Nigeria; Keta, Ghana’, African Studies Review, 3 (1972), p. 
406.
25 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 8.
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Trusteeship Council has been seen only in terms of the integration of the territory into the 
Gold Coast, and then Ghana. By so doing, the very important role of the council in 
decolonization at the local level became shrouded in the Ewe unification problem. Yet, the 
council was instrumental in the transformations that took place in Ewedome from 1946 to 
independence in 1957. The demand by the council for the democratization of the NA 
system was an essential part of the process of decolonization.
In line with the overall policy of indirect rule, the British government introduced the 
policy of amalgamation in the 1920s-30s. The principles of the policy as espoused by 
Lugard were based on the recognition only of big states. It meant therefore that all smaller
9 f\chiefdoms should merge to form larger entities. In other words, ‘indirect rule was 
premised on culturally homogeneous territorial “tribes” ruled by chiefs’.27 After the First 
World War, British colonial thought swung towards a closer embrace of African cultural 
values and institutions. It was this change of attitude that led to the conception of the idea 
of indirect rule.28 The call was for what Gold Coast colonial anthropologist, R. S. Rattray, 
described as ‘the retention of all that was best in Africa’s own past culture’.29 It is 
important to note that Rattray was talking here specifically about Akan culture, especially 
Asante, and it was an Akan model that provided the template for colonial admistrators in 
their application of the NA system to other places like Ewedome. Economic historians trace
26 Raymond Bangulo Bening, Ghana: Regional Boundaries and National Integration (Accra, 1999), p. 258; 
Massing, Local Government Reform, p. 5; Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making o f  History in Northern 
Ghana (Edinburgh 2006).
27 Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits o f  Invention in British Colonial Africa’, Journal o f  
African History, 44 (2003), p. 16.
28 For an analysis o f the anatomy o f indirect rule, see Prosser Gifford, ‘Indirect Rule: Touchstone or 
Tombstone for Colonial Policy?’, in Prosser Gifford and W. A. Roger Louis (eds.), Britian and Germany in 
Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, 1967), p. 351-391. For the specific area o f  
Ewedome, see Togoland Report o f 1936, p. 6.
29 The background to the conception o f the idea o f indirect rule is covered in R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and  
Constitution (Oxford, 1929), p. vii.
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the extension of the idea of indirect rule to the depression of the late 1930s, which led to a 
cut in colonial expenditure, and the Geneva Convention of 1930, which outlawed forced 
labour. All this made indirect rule very important in facilitating the raising of revenue 
locally through traditional authorities thereby offloading some of the effects of the 
depression.30
Recent research by historians such as Spear, Allman and Parker, and Lentz have, 
however, demonstrated how important local leaders and other intermediaries or brokers 
have been in determing how the processes of introducing indirect rule unfolded in British 
colonial Africa.31 Colonial authorities often depended on local authorities to implement 
such a policy not only because they wanted to legitimise their rule but, most importantly, 
customs and traditions of the people were seen to form its bedrock. Local leaders, in turn, 
used their incorporation into the indirect rule system as a means to strengthen their position. 
This thesis shows that in the Ewedome region, the historical relationship that certain 
dominant local leaders had with first the Germans and then the British had an impact on 
shaping amalgamated states. The influential leaders saw the policy of amalagamation as an 
opportunity for mobilizing connections to consolidate their own political positions. In his 
1977 thesis, for example, Brown demonstrates how the chief of Kpando spearheaded the
39formation of Akpini NA in 1928 and got officials to endorse it.
30 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The P ast o f  the Present (Cambridge, 2002), p. 18.
31 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 3-27; Jean Allman and John Parker, Tongnaab: The History o f  a West 
African God  (Bloomington, 2005), p. 194-205; Carol Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making o f  History in Northern 
Ghana (Edinburgh, 2006), p. 86. See also, Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. 
Roberts (eds.), Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making o f  Colonial Africa 
(Wisconsin, 2006), p. 6.
32 David Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area o f  Ghana, 1925 to 1969: A Study o f the Influence o f  Central 
Government and National Politics upon Local Factional Competition’, PhD Thesis, University o f  
Birmingham, 1977, p. 33-34.
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In Ewedome, Togoland identity and politics fits into the broader debate on how 
colonialism created nations and new identities. In the pre-colonial era, the notion of identity 
in Ewedome appeared to be flexible because of the heterogenous nature of the region. Each 
ethnic group, both Ewe and non-Ewe alike, maintained their distinct cultural identity. 
Following the standardization and promotion of Ewe language through the church and the 
school system, Ewe identity was promoted above others in Ewedome. Subsequent British 
occupation and the creation of NAs led to a further reification of Ewe identity. Minority 
ethnic groups were incorporated into the amalgamated states thereby making the notion of 
Ewe identity more static and less flexible.
Present-day scholars have critically examined the nature and dynamics of indirect rule in 
Africa and have found it to be riddled with contradictions and ambiguities. NAs were thus 
seen as colonial inventions that ‘often lacked traditional legitimacy’.34 Mamdani’s major 
problem with indirect rule was that it left the NAs without any democratic checks and 
balances on the authority of the chiefs. While Meyer, for instance, sees the operation of 
the NA system of administration in the face of the emergence of educated citizens in 
Ewedome as contradictory, Berman described the whole system as ‘the grassroots 
foundations of colonial domination’.36
To Spear, these criticisms of the use of chiefly power by the colonial officers are 
attributable to the failure by historians to engage with ‘the historical development and the
33 On the specific case o f how how colonial policies created the notion o f Ewe identity over a wider 
geographical area, see Benjamin N. Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”: Periurban Colonialism in 
Togo’s Eweland, 1900-1960 ( Rochester, 2007), p. 26. For the wider African experience on how colonialism  
made the notion o f  ethnicity and identity more fixed and real, see Erik Gilbert and Jonathan T. Reynolds, 
Africa in World History (New Jersey, 2008), p. 328.
34 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p.3.
35Mamdani, Citizens and Subjects, p. 54.
36 Birgit Meyer, Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among the Ewe in Ghana (Edinburgh, 1999), 
p. 15; Bruce J. Berman, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics o f  Uncivil Nationalism’, 
African Affairs, 97 (1998), p. 315.
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complexity of the interpretative process involved’.37 He notes further that the contradictions 
identified with indirect rule ‘were rarely without local historical precedents’. In his view, 
colonial political structures were oftem ‘developed in response to local conditions’.39 The 
use of NAs was only a means of securing acceptability of the institutions on which the 
colonial officers placed their reliance. That, in the words of Hailey, was an important 
consideration which applied ‘not only to the initial recognition of NAs, but to their 
subsequent adaptation to the more advanced requirement of modem rule’.40 As Rathbone 
puts it, at the time, ‘chiefly power was the best and, almost certainly, the only guarantee of 
what the British deemed to be law and order’.41 He considers NA administration to be of 
pragmatic importance, and the best system to be adopted during the inter-war period, 
though ‘it was not perceived as optimally efficient’ 42 Even in municipal towns such as 
Accra and Cape Coast, earlier experiments in ‘modem’ forms of local government in the 
early 1900s, as noted by Rathbone, proved to be unsuccessful and a vindication of the 
reliance on NAs.43
This thesis argues that in Ewedome until the late 1940s, when sufficient literate 
members were forthcoming, it seemed to the administrative officers that no practical 
alternative existed to the system of indirect rule based on the existing indigenous political 
structures.44 Writing about NA authorities in Tanganyika in the 1920s, Iliffe notes that
37 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 4.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Lord Hailey, Report on Native Administration and Political Development in 
British Africa, 1940-42. p. 14-15.
41 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 10.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p. 11.
44 Skinner notes how Ewedome region lagged behind French Togoland and the Gold Coast in terms o f  
education. She observes that while leaders o f political groups in the French Togoland and the Colony were 
graduates from Western universities, those o f Ewedome were only graduates from teacher training colleges.
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opposition to chiefs came only from areas with ‘exceptional education and wealth’.45 It was 
after 1949, when anti-colonial sentiments were crystalising into a movement against the 
established order in the Colony, that the NAs in Ewedome became subjects of anti-colonial 
attack. It was then that it became apparent that the NAs were unsuitable to meet the 
escalating developmental problems of the post-war world. In other words, it was the 
inability of the colonial state to tackle spiralling post-war development and welfare 
problems that drove on the transfer of power to African nationalists 46
In Ewedome, the political trajectory of decolonisation became complicated with the 
intensification of Togoland politics from 1949-50. Togoland politics here refers to the 
increasing awareness among the different ethnic groups in Togoland of their shared 
colonial experience and, for that matter, a common identity. In other words, Togoland 
politics was a discourse that sought to mobilise the collective identity of the inhabitants of 
the former German colony as a basis for promoting Togoland nationalism. This 
phenomenon, which started in the 1930s, reached new heights by the 1940s as the Gold 
Coast began to witness tumultuous political developments. Attempts to salvage local 
government from the ravages of anti-colonialist attack led to series of reforms which 
culminated eventually in the demise of NAs in 1951.
However, as this thesis argues, the new local councils proved to be no more democratic 
than the NAs that they replaced. Attempts by the nationalist Convention People’s Party 
(CPP) and succeeding governments to control local government units led to the packing of 
councils in Ewedome with party functionaries. Divide and rule tactics made the
See Kate Skinner, ‘Reading, Writing and Rallies: The Politics o f  “Freedom” in Southern British Togoland, 
1953-1956’, Journal o f  African H istory, 48 (2007), p. 141.
45 John Iliffe, A Modern History o f  Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), p. 328.
46 This point is well articulated in Cooper, Africa since 1940, p. 20-37.
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proliferation of local councils a disturbing feature of local government in Ewedome. This 
coupled with excessive centralisation, corruption and ineptitude rendered local councils 
inefficient, thereby dashing the hopes of the youth who had been the driving force behind 
the change from the old NA system. The abolition of local councils in 1974 made the local 
government units in Ewedome remote from the citizens.
Research for this thesis involved the collection of primary sources from archives in 
Accra, Ho and, Koforidua, all in Ghana, the National Archives in London, and from the 
Rhodes House Library, Oxford, UK. These were combined with the collection of oral 
history and personal reminiscences in the study area. According to Prins, personal 
reminiscence is oral evidence which is specific to the informant, and such evidence brings 
freshness and a wealth of detail which is often not documented.47 Oral history and personal 
reminiscences were even more important for this research because in the fit of anti- 
Nkrumahist enthusiasm following the 1966 coup, many documents were burnt in the study 
area in an attempt to obliterate the memories of CPP rule. I found Henige’s model of 
validating oral history very useful as a way of minimising distortions and exaggerations.4.8 
My interviewees were mostly chiefs, elders and those who were eyewitnesses to some of 
the historical processes. The selection of the interviewee was not based on statistical norms. 
In other words, the guiding principle was the role which the interviewees played in 
historical events.
Among the difficulties encountered in the collection of primary data, research at the 
archive in Ho was the most problematic. At Ho, one encountered loose sheets of papers,
47 Gwyn Prins, ‘Oral History’ in Peter Burke (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Cambridge,
2001), p. 139.
48 For details about the three ways o f showing the independence o f oral tradition, see David Henige, ‘Oral 
Tradition as a Means o f Reconstructing the Past’, in John Edward Philips (ed.), Writing African History 
(Rochester, 2005), p. 185.
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most of which were were not filed. This made it extremely difficult to state the title and file 
numbers in the citation of documents. Yet, these loose papers contained valuable material 
which were crucial for this study. This, coupled with poor ventilation and inadequate 
facilities, made research at the archive a difficult task. Some of the interviews were 
conducted in 2000 when I was involved in the collection of stool histories in the Volta 
Region of Ghana for Institute of African Studies (IAS), University of Ghana. The 
transcripts and recordings can be accessed at the IAS by future researchers.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides some brief historical 
background in an attempt to show the cultural heterogeneity and political fragmentation of 
the region and the transformative impact of nineteenth-century conflicts in creating 
Ewedome. This is important in understanding the subsequent history of colonial rule, the 
reshaping of the political landscape and the development of local government. Chapter 2 
examines the creation of NAs from the 1920s up to the political watershed of 1948; the 
starting point of decolonization. It examines the negotiations over the Togo mandate up to 
its final settlement in 1923. The chapter details a sequence of research carried out by 
colonial officials and anthropologists and demonstrates how the findings informed the 
formulation of colonial policy in the region. It shows the relevance of local agents in the 
move to implement the findings of those reports and in shaping amalgamated states in the 
region.
Chapter 3 examines how the NAs performed their judicial, executive and legislative 
functions. It argues that the NAs, despite their inefficiencies, laid the foundation for the 
development of a ‘modem’ system of local government in Ewedome. They set the tone for 
mobilizing the inhabitants for local developmet projects, the promotion of education and
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the design of a system of rate collection. Their financial records, administrative procedures 
and rudimentary judicial system were important in facilitating a transition to the new local 
councils in 1951.
Chapter 4 examines the gradual decline of NAs in Ewedome. It looks at how social and 
political change in Ewedome from the 1940s exposed their weaknesses and led to the rise 
of anti-chief and anti-NA sentiments in the region. The chapter shows that the activities of 
the Ewe Presbyterian Church, the increase in the number of educated youth (with its 
concomitant generational divide), the presence of UN Visiting Missions from 1949, the 
emergence of Ewe nationalism and Togoland politics as well as the spill-over effect of CPP 
activism in the Gold Coast proper were some of the factors that weakened the NA system. 
Post-war challenges thus called for a complete change of the system of governance at the 
local level.
Chapter 5 looks at the surge in ‘Ewe nationalism’ and the fight for and against the 
integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast in the 1950s. Specifically, the chapter 
examines the interaction between Ewe/Togoland politics with local government, including 
the articulation of national politics with local-level politics and their adverse effects on the 
development of local government in Ewedome. The chapter argues that the Togoland 
unification issue sowed the seed for the excessive politicization of local councils that 
became a feature of local government system in Ewedome in the first decade of 
independence. The chapter demonstrates how the unification problem brought the 
machinery of local government in the region to a virtual standstill in 1951-1956.
The final chapter focuses on local government in the post-independence era. The chapter 
brings the Ghana-wide story of local government up to date and shows how that unfolded
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in Ewedome. It examines attempts by the CPP to marginalize chiefs through direct 
persecutions and the introduction of reforms that sought to destroy the authority and power 
of traditional leaders. This led to the proliferation of small, unwieldy local councils. It 
shows how the material on CPP-chief antagonism in Ewedome fits into and extends 
Rathbone’s analysis in his Nkrumah and the Chiefs, which focuses on the Colony and 
Asante. It argues that excessive politicization by successive governments rendered local 
councils ineffective and led to their eventual demise in 1974. The chapter ends with an 
overview of the present state of local government in Ewedome, following the introduction 
of District Assemblies in 1989.
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CHAPTER ONE
EWEDOME IN THE PRE-COLONIAL AND GERMAN COLONIAL PERIODS
The pre-colonial history of Ewedome is largely the history o f a number of different small 
independent political units or chiefdoms rather than the history7 of a geographical area. Its 
chequered history is shaped by the migration of different ethnic groups, particularly the 
dominant Ewe, to the area, Akan contact from the eighteenth century, the missionary 
encounter and colonial conquest. From the eighteenth century, this heterogeneous region was 
subjected to transformational forces of all kinds. This chapter attempts to paint a brief picture 
of what Ewedome looked like on the eve of British colonisation. It reviews migration 
histories and proceeds with an examination of the nature of the pre-colonial political 
structure. It then analyses the impact of Akan contact and the transformation brought about 
by missionary activities, including the super-imposition of Ewe culture on autochthonous 
groups. The chapter concludes with an overview of the first European contact and the brief 
German colonial period from the 1880s to 1914.
Review of Migration History
The history of the migration of the Ewes to their present homes came down to us 
through oral tradition. Oral traditions relating to origin of ethnic groups are full o f 
embellishment. Many ethnic groups tend to shroud their origin in myth in order to enhance 
their status among other groups or to legitimise their claim to territory. For example, when 
the early colonial official, Captain C.C. Lilley, was collecting oral histories in the southern 
section of British Togoland in the 1920s, the people of Akpafu told him that they came
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from heaven.1 We have similar story about of the first King of Accra who was said to have 
come from the sea. Others link their origin to ancient Egypt, Ethiopia and the like in their 
bid to bask in the glories of those ancient civilizations as a means of legitimising their 
authority.3 Consequently, the process of reconstructing the history of such people becomes 
a tortuous one.
The Ewes of Ewedome, like the other Ewes to the south, trace their origin to Ketu in 
Yorubaland in present-day south-western Nigeria. From Ketu, they moved in two 
directions, with one group settling at Tado on the Mano River and then migrating to Notsie, 
now in the Republic of Togo.4 The other group went south-west and found a settlement 
known as Dogbonyigbo.5 This second group, made up of Anlos and Behs, later joined their 
kinsfolk at Notsie.6 With time, the Notsie settlement grew in size and population under 
their king, Agokoli. It is difficult to posit a precise date for these historical events but some 
writers suggest they must have taken place between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.7
The popular view that resonates through the traditions of all Ewe states in the Volta 
Region of Ghana is that a ‘mass migration’ from Notsie was occasioned by the cruelty of 
Agokoli, coupled with the mysterious disappearances of people within the walled city of 
Notsie.8 One popular story which typifies the often trumpeted cruelty of Agokoli involved
1 C.C. Lilley, ‘A Short History ofNkonya Division in the Ho District’, Gold Coast Review, 1 (1923), p. 118.
2 Carl Christian Reindorf, History o f the G old Coast and Asante (Basel, 1895), p. 4
3 For an analysis o f the origin o f the Ga, see Parker, Making the Town, p. 8.
4 Some stretched the tradition to a place they called Amedzofe in the easternmost point o f  the Niger. See 
Manoukian, Ewe-Speaking People, p. 12. A brief account o f the migration story is also found in National 
Archives, Kew, London C096/724/2, Annual Report on British Mandated Sphere o f  Togoland 1922-21, p.
42. All CO papers cited in this thesis are at the National Archives, Kew, London. [Hereafter, NA].
5 NA CO 96/724/2, Annual Report, p. 42.
6 Ibid.
7 Ewe Newsletter, 31 May 1945, p. 1.
8 Ansah K. Asamoah, The Ewe o f  South-Eastern Ghana and Togo on the Eve o f  Colonialism  (Tema, 1986), p. 
7-8. Festivals are celebrated throughout Eweland to recount the ‘mass exodus’. The tradition o f  Ho states that 
it was the people o f Bankoe who led the exodus from Notsie and that the dagger which their leader used to 
lead all the Ewes from Notsie is still in the possession o f the people o f Ho-Bankoe. See PRAAD/A ADM
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the demand he made to the people to make clay rope and to use their feet to mash the clay 
in which thorns had been inserted.9 The Bremen missionaries and other writers such as Ellis 
first recorded these migration traditions in the nineteenth century.10 Also, in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, colonial officials such as Rattray, Le Lievee and Lilley 
also collected oral traditions in the territory, many of which were replete with the Notsie 
migration traditions.11 Later writers have all used these original written accounts and 
interpreted them in different ways. It is, however, simplistic to assume that there was a 
‘mass migration’ and that all the people that identify themselves today as Ewes in 
Ewedome migrated from Notsie. Even more interesting is the claim by some Guan people 
in Ewedome that they too migrated from Notsie. This brings the validity of the whole 
migration story into question, in view particularly of Debrunner’s comment that the claim 
by some ethnic groups that they migrated from Notsie emanated from the wish to have 
sprung from the legendary Notsie which was being used as a unifying myth by the Ewes.12
In recent years, the interpretations of African migration traditions have shifted, as can be 
seen from Nugent’s, works on the Ewes, Parker’s analysis of the migration traditions of the
39/1/54, Ho Native Affairs, 14 March to 26 November 1943. Debrunner quotes the nineteenth-century 
Bremen Missionary Spieth as saying that the defeat o f  Akwamu in 1833 was due partly to the raising o f this 
dagger o f the Hos against Akwamu as a curse. See H. Debrunner, A Church between Colonial Powers 
(London, 1965), p. 16.
9 D. E. K. Amenumey, The Ewe in Pre-colonial Times (Accra, 1986), p.3; Dennis Laumann, ‘The History o f  
the Ewe o f  Togo and Benin from Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial Times’ in Benjamin N. Lawrance and Francis 
Agbodeka (eds.), The Ewe o f  Togo and Benin (Accra, 2005), p. 16; Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and
“Nation”, p. 27. Remnants o f the walls o f  Notsie (which are now tourist attractions) are living relics o f  its 
historical past.
10 For details, see Ellis, Ewe-Speaking People, p. 1-13.
11 For recorded oral traditions o f the states in Ewedome, see RAG/H RAO2073, R. S. Rattray, A History o f  
the Tribal Divisions o f the District o f Misahohe and o f  the Sub-District o f Ho and o f Kpando, 1915; 
PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, P. D. Le Lievee, An Essay on Tribal History o f the Kpando Division, 19 April 
1924; Lilley, ‘A Short History o f  the Nkonya Division’, p.108.
12 Debrunner, A Church, p. 41.
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Ga and Law’s work on the Slave Coast.13 Most often, population movements are inscribed 
in local oral traditions as discrete historical events and linear movements often triggered by 
specific political circumstances, such as ‘the cruelty of Agokorli’, and recalled using 
mnemonic devices such as the story of the thorns in the clay. These traditions, which were 
later written down as such by missionaries, early colonial officials, and local literates are 
still interpreted literally by most local people and by some scholars. These traditions, 
however, need not be interpreted in such a literal way. Instead, they should be seen more as 
ways of remembering what in fact were probably broader and longer-term population 
shifts, social changes and political struggles.14 According to Nugent, for example, the Ewes 
did not migrate from Notsie en masse as most of the accounts seek to portray. Nugent uses 
their repeated relocation during the course of their migration to buttress his argument that 
the movement of people into Ewedome region and beyond was a likely part of a more 
gradual population shift spanning at least two centuries.15
Moreover, the reality is that not all the Ewe-speaking states presently inhabiting 
Ewedome were part of the Ewe stock that migrated from the east. In 1915, when Rattray 
was collecting oral traditions in Eweland, the people of Matse told him that they were 
originally Twi-speaking people. They said they helped the Akwamus in fighting the Ewes 
because they, the people of Matse, and the people of Akwamu belong to the same race. It 
is also on record that the people of Matse did not fight against the Asantes in 1869 for the
13 Paul Nugent, ‘A Regional Melting Pot: The Ewe and their Neighbours in the Ghana-Togo Borderlands’, in 
Lawrance and Agbodeka (eds.), The Ewe o f  Togo and Benin (Accra, 2005). See also Parker, Making the 
Town, p. 8; Law, Slave Coast, p. 27.
14 Nugent attributes the popularization and superimposition o f the Notsie story on the traditions o f non-Ewe 
states in Ewedome to the handiwork o f  the Bremen missionaries. See Nugent, ‘Regional Melting Pot’, p. 34. 
For details about the degree o f  assimilation o f the Guans into the Ewe culture, see Amenumey, The Ewe, p.
19.
15 For an analysis o f the Ewe migration story and population movements in Ewedome, see Nugent, ‘Regional 
Melting Pot’, p. 38; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 16-18.
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same reason.16 Some families in Matse were said to have moved away as a result of a 
dispute and founded Wusuta in the present day Kpando District of the Volta Region. A 
minute of the Akpini State Council meeting in 1945 indicates that these original Wusuta 
settlers were in fact matrilineal and that they had strong Akan connections.17 In a report 
submitted to the PMC in Geneva in 1939, it was stated that people of Have came from 
Asini on the Gold Coast and are today to be found among the Ewe. They lost their original 
language altogether and now speak the former.18
Writing to the Acting Commissioner of Eastern Province on 13 December 1945, the 
District Commissioner of Ho intimated that during the Asante invasion of Ewedome in 
1869, Wusuta was for three years the headquarters of the Akwamu army.19 In the same 
vein, the people of Tokokoe (another Ewe state) in Ho District told Rattray that they came 
from Aburi in the Gold Coast. This story was reaffirmed by a petition which the people of 
Tokokoe sent to the Governor of the Gold Coast in 1934 concerning stool disputes in 
Tokokoe. In the said petition, they traced their origin to Aburi in Akwapim and said they 
arrived in Ewedome before the coming of the Germans.20 It follows, therefore, that from 
about the fifteenth century to the seventeenth century, the region referred to as Krepiland 
(of which Ewedome is a part) witnessed the influx of people from the west and east to the 
extent that the area became what Nugent refers to as ‘a regional melting pot’.21 The arrival 
of the Ewes by the late seventeenth century and the people of Agotime (an Adangme
16 RAG/H RAO/2073, Rattray, Tribal Divisions.
17 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/285, Akpini Native Affairs, Minutes o f  State Council Meeting, 10 December 1945.
18 NA C096/746/7, Report to the PMC in Geneva, October 1938.
19 RAG/H Case No. 48/2, Amalgamation o f  Divisions in Togoland 1945; Collier, ‘Ablode ’, p. 15.
20 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/286, Ho Native Affairs, Petition from the Division o f  Tokokoe, 12 April 1934.
21 Nugent, ‘Regional Melting Pot’, p. 29. Collier also attributed the ‘ethnographic complexity o f the region to 
the wars that took place between neighbouring African states in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries’. Collier, ‘A b l o d e p. 2.
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people) by about the 1680s made the area highly heterogeneous.22 Awatime, Logba, 
Nyangbo and Tafi are non-Ewe states located right within the heart of Ewedome. This 
demonstrates that the Ewes could not completely conquer the former; neither were they 
able completely to assimilate them.23
From Notsie, the Ewes began to move westwards and started peopling their present 
homes. Just as the date for the beginning of the migration of the Ewes remains obscure, so 
also is the date for their arrival in their present locations a contentious issue among 
historians. It was first intimated that the Ewe began to occupy their present home by the 
middle of the seventeenth century.24 In 1997, Amenumey revised this date and suggested 
later sixteenth or early seventeeth century as probable dates.25 Law challenged the putative 
mid-seventeenth century dating and suggested early fifteenth century. He based his 
assertion on his analysis of the genealogies and king-lists recorded in the Whydah tradition, 
which he describes as ‘simplified and foreshortened’.26 He further argued that ‘the 
indigenous societies and polities which had to cope with the impact of the growth of 
European trade on the coast from mid-sixteenth century onwards were therefore more 
probably of considerable antiquity and solidarity than of recent establishment’.27 Writing 
later in 2001, Akyeampong disagreed with Law and stood by the mid-seventeenth century
22 Ellis. Ewe-Speaking People, p. 8. The people o f  Agotime are o f  Ga stock and they emigrated after the 
destruction o f the old kingdom o f  Accra by the Akwamu in 1680. See M. B. K. Darkoh, ‘Note on the 
Peopling o f the Forest Hills o f the Volta Region o f Ghana’, Ghana Notes and Queries, 11 (1970), p. 9. The 
Adangme were refugees from Akwamu wars o f  expansion in the 1680s. See Law, Slave Coast, p. 226; Sandra 
E. Greene, Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: A History o f  the Anlo-Ewe 
(London, 1996), p. 20.
23 W. K. Yayoh, ‘Krepi States in the 18th and the 19th Centuries’, Transactions o f  the Historical Society o f  
Ghana, 2 (2002), p. 69. Each Guan state and Togo remnant group within Ewedome and indeed within the 
whole o f present-day Volta Region has a dialect and traditions peculiar to it.
24 See Amenumey, The Ewe, p. 7; Asamoa, Ewe o f  South-Eastern Ghana and Togo, p. 5.
25 D. E. K. Amenumey, ‘A Brief History’ in Francis Agbodeka (ed.), The Ewes o f  Southeastern Ghana, V ol.l 
(Accra, 1997), p. 16.
26 Law, Slave Coast, p. 31.
27 Ibid, p. 32.
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dating.28 This was followed by Lawrance, who emphatic about the mid-seventeenth century 
dating in his recent work on the Ewe in the urban and rural areas under French
90colonialism. This shows that research on the migration tradition of the Ewes is 
inconclusive and largely speculative.
The Ewes who occupied Ewedome came through the northern and central routes.30 The 
settlement of the Ewes in Ewedome, their present localities, was not achieved without a 
fight from the autochthons, referred to by linguists as speakers of ‘Togo-remnant 
languages’.31 Research based on linguistic evidence has shown that these autochthons are 
of Guan extraction. Painter’s glottochronology of the Kwa group of languages shows Guan 
as ‘a group of closely related languages spoken by people living in Ghana’.32 The 
movement of these Guan people was as a result of a series of attacks by the Akans from the 
sixteenth century. The traditions of the Ewes are unanimous on the fact that when they 
arrived in the territory, they met some autochthons and had to push them away from the 
area. The people of Peki claim they met the people of Akpafu and Lolobi and drove them 
away. Similarly, Awudome also claimed that on their arrival from Notsie they met, fought 
and drove the people of Akpafu and Lolobi from their present homes.33 The people of 
Kpando were said to have met a man called Kperi at the place the former now occupy and 
drove him and his people away. The place was then named ‘Kperi-fe-do’ (the deserted
28 Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon, p. 27.
29 Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 27.
30 For a detailed description o f the routes o f migration by the Ewes, see Manoukian, Ewe-Speaking People, p. 
12; Asamoa, Ewe o f  South-Eastern Ghana and Togo, p. 8.
31 Laumann, ‘The History o f  the Ewe’, p. 17. Interviews with Togbe Delume VH, Ve Deme, 10 August 2007, 
Togbe Akom, Gbefi, 9 August 2000.
32 See C. Painter, ‘The Guan and West Africa Historical Reconstruction’, Ghana Notes and Queries, 9 (1966), 
p. 58.
33 Asem, History o f  Awudome, p. 2.
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place of Kperi). It was the corruption of the name ‘Kperi-fe-do’ that gave Kpando its 
present name.34
Although the Notsie tradition cannot be taken as wholly true, it is still relevant in the 
reconstruction of the history of the Ewe people. Law is right when he states that traditions 
of migration are at best ‘metaphor expressing ...various forms of cultural and political 
influences [and that they] do suggest the existence of a sense of common identity and 
shared historical experience of subjugation to the power of successive dominant states’,
i f
such as Akwamu and Asante. One can conclude that since the autochthonous groups lived 
in the midst of Ewe states, they acquired this tradition about coming from Notsie. 
Missionary activities coupled with colonial policies set in motion a process of Ewe cultural 
diffusion which saw the Ewe language dominating the languages of the autochthons. What 
is sure is that by the mid-seventeenth century, the Ewe-speaking people of Ewedome had 
emerged as a distinct ‘cultural and linguistic entity’ in the region vaguely referred to as 
Krepiland.36 The migration story is important in accounting for the cultural heterogeneity 
and political fragmentation of the region. This will in turn illuminate our understanding of 
subsequent history of colonial rule and the particularity of the development of local 
government in Ewedome.
Society and Economy
The early settlements of the Ewes in Ewedome were very few and scattered. Each 
lineage led by its religious leader founded a du (settlement or town). It is therefore common
34 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/42, Le Lievee, Essay on the Tribal History o f  the Kpando Division, p. 2.
35 Law, Slave Coast, p. 30.
36 Ibid, p. 21-22.
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to find some of the duwo (towns) named after the leaders who founded them. In some 
cases, the names of the duwo had their roots in some miraculous feat that those religious 
leaders were said to have performed in the course of their journey to their present 
locations. Others were named in relation to something peculiar to that settlement or town. 
With time, an offshoot of the original du developed as some of its inhabitants moved to 
establish new settlements due either to internal squabbles or for want of better land.38 The 
original settlement then became the fiadu  (capital town). There were some original 
settlements which were able to hold together and no offshoots developed out of them. This 
explains why in Ewedome, some pre-colonial states (dukowo) are made up of only one du 
whereas others are made of two or three duwo.
Cultural peculiarities and the degree of political autonomy tended to be more 
pronounced in those areas where the offshoots developed further away from the fiadu. For 
example, during the later part of the nineteenth century, the people of Fodome moved from 
Abutia, their parent settlement in the Ho district, and got separated from the latter not only 
by the distance between them, but also.by the Togo-Atakora ranges.39 In contrast, some off­
shoots developed quite close to the original du thereby forming a cluster of settlements, 
such as Gbi-Nyigbe (Peki), Gbi-Dzigbe (Hohoe), Kpando and Ho. In those close 
settlements, the various component duwo maintained close connection with the fiadu  even 
though each du had some degree of political autonomy.
37 For a survey o f such cases in Ewedome, see Yayoh, ‘Krepi States’, p. 70.
38 For a detailed account on how towns developed in Ewedome, see Manoukian, Ewe-Speaking People, p. 31.
39 This event is marked by the celebration o f Yorveawo festival by the people o f  Abutia and Fodome. Abutia 
and Fodome dukowo are now made up o f  five and eight towns respectively. Interviews conducted with Togbe 
Gbedegbleme III, paramount chief o f  Fodome and Togbe Kottoh IV, chief o f Fodome Woe, 7 December 
2007.
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Each Ewe duko (state) showed very interesting variations in the Ewe language. The 
dialect of each duko deferred considerably in both ‘tonally and segmentally interesting
» 4 0ways .
Gilbert Ansre attempted some classification of the Ewe language in which he identified 
seven of what he referred to as dialects clusters.41 From Ansre’s analysis we get a picture of 
the rather dramatic linguistic transformations that occurred among the Ewes since their 
arrival in their present homes. Even within a cluster so identified, lexical and phonological 
variations were highly noticeable. The variations were so remarkable that each duko was 
easily identifiable by the dialect of the Ewe language peculiar to it. The distances, 
topography and cultural peculiarities then became barriers to cooperation among the 
various states. At the time of the British contact in 1850, there were as many as 40 
independent dukowo ‘comprising 116 towns’ in Ewedome.42
Initially, the administration of the du was in the hands of tronuawo (priests) who were 
believed to be appointed by Mawu (the creator God) through trowo (the lower gods). The 
chief-priests, according to the traditions of the Ewes, took decisions based on the 
interpretation of the outcome of rituals that they performed. Though there is no evidence to 
substantiate the process by which chief-priests were elected, oral traditions suggest that 
prior to the 1870s, the Ewes of Ewedome developed politico-religious institutions in which 
the office of the chief was held by a priest43 According to the early colonial official, F.
40 Herbert Frederic Walker, ‘Topics in Ewe Phonology’, PhD Thesis, University o f California (1971), p. 1.
41 For details on this classification see Gilbert Ansre, ‘The Ewe Language’ in Kojo Gavua and Francis 
Agbodeka (eds.), A Handbook o f  Eweland, Vol. 2 (Accra, 2000), p. 24. Among the more centralized Ewes o f  
southeastern Ghana, five dialects o f the Ewe language were identified in F. K. Atakpa, ‘The Ewe Language’ 
in F. K. Agbodeka (ed.), A Handbook o f  Eweland, Vol. 1 (Accra, 1997), p. 28. The number o f  small 
independent dukowo varies from time to time and different documents have different figures.
42 Amenumey, The Ewe, p. 81.
43 E.Y. Eduamah, Ewe Traditions (Legon, 1965), p. 1-16; Interviews conducted with Togbe Buame, Chief o f  
Hohoe Bla; the elders o f Togbe Hodo of Anfoega; Togbe Dagadu, paramount chief o f  Kpando all in 2000.
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Crowther, ‘there is cause to believe that the office of the fia  (chief) among the Ewes was 
originally held by a fetish priest’.44 He went further to allude to the tradition of Notsie 
which indicates that the king of Notsie where the Ewes claimed to have come from was the 
head priest of the Notsie fetish.45
The people of Ewedome were not culturally homogeneous. Custom and rituals varied 
from one state to another. However, certain similarities make it possible to give a general 
picture of the social organisation. At the base of the social structure was the nuclear family 
made up of a man, his wife (or wives) and children. Then, there was the extended family 
made up of a number of closely related nuclear families who traced descent to one paternal 
ancestor. These closely related patrilineal families formed a fame (lineage) and a number of 
lineages formed a sa (clan). A number of clans formed a du.46 The head of a family was 
responsible for the wellbeing of the members of the family and he was answerable to the 
lineage head. The lineage head served as a link between the living and the dead. He 
controlled all lineage property and consulted all the family heads before taking any major 
decisions on behalf of the lineage. The Ewes are generally patrilineal, but they did not 
discount matrilineal ties completely. Matrilineal ties were duly acknowledged and 
accommodated within the patrilineal structures. Maternal relatives could have access to 
land and enjoy other benefits (nyrienu) with the permission of family and lineage heads.47
The dominant economic activity of Ewedome was farming. The various duwo (towns) 
started as an agblekofe (farming village) and developed gradually into larger settlements.
Togbe Adom IX, Agate, 5 July, 2000. The much publicized Danyibakaka festival o f  the people o f Kpando, 
which recounts the role played by chief-priests who led them to their present homes, attests to this assertion.
44 F. G. Crowther, ‘The Ewe Speaking People’, G old Coast Review, 2 (1927), p. 11.
45 Ibid. We shall return to this topic later.
46 Ansa Asamoa, ‘Social Institutions’, in Gavua and Agbodeka (eds.), Handbook, Vol. 2, p. 48.
47 Ibid.
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Farming was mainly subsistence and the focus was on food crop production, such as yam, 
rice, vegetables, plantain, cotton and palm oil. Among the crops, yam was the most 
honoured. Rituals and other social activities heralding the harvest of fresh yam remain big 
celebrations in some states of Ewedome today. Cotton production for domestic markets 
predated colonialism.48 That the region exported some cotton from the 1860s is well 
enough known.49 To these were added maize, cassava, sweet potatoes and other American 
crops introduced from the seventeenth century by Europeans.50 Fishing was a lucrative 
business among states living along the Volta River. Hunting was also a very important 
economic activity in pre-colonial and early colonial times. Wild animals such as elephants 
and bush pigs were very common in the area. Hunting was done on a group basis. Hunters 
came together to organise hunting expeditions from December to April, during which time 
dry conditions made it easier to hunt the animals. Apart from hunting, it was common to 
find each family keeping domestic animals such as fowls, goats, sheep and rabbits.
The traditional economic activities were primarily farming, fishing and hunting, but 
some states emerged along trade routes and developed into commercial centres. An 
important trade route that developed through the territory was from Salaga in the northern 
savana zone through Krachi, Kpando and on to Ada and Accra on the coast.51 Another 
linked Ho to Keta, the port on the Anlo coast.52 Goods on these routes were conveyed to the 
marketing centres by porterage. Handicraft activities such as basketry, blacksmithing and 
pottery were common. Kpando, for example, was famous for its pottery production. The
48 Donna J. E. Maier, ‘Persistence o f  Precolonial Patterns o f  Production: Cotton in German Togoland, 1800- 
1914’ in Allen Isaacman and Richard Roberts (eds.), Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Portsmouth, 1995), p. 76 & 78.
49 Ibid, p. 76.
50 Law, Slave Coast, p. 45.
51 Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry and Krepi Politics’, p. 201.
52 Anlo refers to the Ewe-speaking people occupying the coastal littoral to the south o f Ewedome.
53 Domestic slaves and pawns served as porters on long distance commercial routes.
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medium of exchange in pre-colonial times was the barter system. With the coming of 
Europeans and the commercialization of trade, the use of hotsui (cowry shells) as currency 
became widespread.54
The Danes were the first Europeans to have contact with Ewedome.55 As noted in the 
Introduction, it was the Danes who in the early eighteenth century gave the name Krepi to 
the area occupied by the northern Ewes. Debrunner noted that Peki was placed under the 
protection of the Danish government because of the expansion of Akwamu and Dahomey.56 
At the time Dagadu I of Kpando ascended the throne in the 1830s, the Danes had already 
had a long tradition of trade contacts with Ewedome.57 The coming of the Danes increased 
trading activities in the hinterland of Ewedome. Danish merchants travelled upstream on 
the Volta to states such as Aveme and Kpando to exchange goods such as guns, gunpowder
co
and beads for rubber, salt and palm oil. Kea also noted that before 1750, a lot of ivory was 
exported from Krepiland through the Danish fort at Keta.59 Johnson pointed out that slaves, 
cotton, palm oil and pottery were brought down the river Volta to the coast at Ada and 
Accra in large quantities from states such as Kpando, Aveme and Torkor in the late 
nineteenth century.60 Ewedome thus made a significant contribution to the lower Volta 
basin economy of in pre-colonial times.
54 Law, Slave Coast, p. 49.
55 This is contrary to the view expressed by Gavua that ‘interaction between the Northern Ewes [Ewes o f  
Ewedome] and Europeans was initiated by Germans in the nineteenth century’. See Kojo Gavua, ‘A Brief 
History’ in Gavua and Agbodeka (eds.), Handbook, Vol. 2, p. 15.
56 Debrunner, A Church, p. 68.
57 Date taken from the Funeral Brochure for the late Dagadu VII, April 2007, p. 42.
58 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, Le Lievre, ‘The Kpandu’, p. 23.
59 R. A. Kea, ‘Akwamu-Anlo Relations, c. 1750-1813’, Transactions o f  the Historical Society o f  Ghana, 10 
(1969), p. 60.
60 Marion Johnson, ‘Asanti East o f the Volta’, Transactions o f  the Historical Society o f  Ghana, 8 (1965), p. 
48.
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Ewedome from 1733 to 1890
From 1733 to 1874, external events brought about considerable transformations in the 
political institutions of Ewedome. Akwamu dominance o f Ewedome from 1733 to 1833, 
followed by Asante invasion from 1869 to 1874, had a profound impact on the region. 61 
Akwamu emerged as the most powerful Akan state in the hinterland of the eastern Gold 
Coast in the second half of the seventeenth century.62 Wilks notes that Asantehene Osei 
Tutu I learned about war and statecraft from Akwamu and Denkyira in the the seventeeth 
century.63 Akwamu conquered the kingdom of Accra and the coast down to the Volta in 
1677-80 and dominated that region until it in turn was defeated and driven across the Volta 
by the Akyem kingdoms and others in 1730.64 By relocating east of the Volta in 1730, 
Akwamu became the first Akan state to come into direct contact with Ewedome.65 Being 
warlike and powerful, they reorganised themselves and began a series of attacks on 
Ewedome from 1733. Peki bore the brunt of the Akwamu onslaught because they and 
Awudome were contiguous to the area occupied by Akwamu. In the process, Peki was 
completely absorbed into Akwamu to the extent that the chief of Peki became the 
Twafohene (vanguard) of the Akwamu military order, which accounted for Peki’s role in 
the Akwamu contingent at the famous battle of Katamanso in 1826.66
61 On how the shift in the balance o f power among the Akan states in the Gold Coast in the first half o f  the 
eighteenth century affected Ewedome, see Collier, ‘Ablode ’, p. 5-18.
62 Details about Akwamu’s position as a major regional power are noted in Law, Slave Coast, p. 25-26.
63 Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p. 110.
64 Crowther, ‘Ewe Speaking People’, p. 16; Law, Slave Coast, p. 26.
65 For an account on Akwamu-Krepi relations, see Asem, History o f  Awudome, p. 4-8.
66 C. W. Welman, The Native States o f  the G old Coast: History and Constitution, I, Peki (London, 1924), p. 8. 
Peki’s role in Akwamu’s military establishment is also recorded in Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 2; 
Johnson, ‘Ashanti East o f the Volta’, p. 36.
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By 1760, Akwamu had established control over Ewedome and went further to expand to 
areas such as Agu in present-day Togo.67 The segmentation of the Ewes was a major 
limitation to any concerted effort to thwart Akwamu’s expansionist designs. Peki’s 
absorption into Akwamu’s politico-military set up made it possible for the latter to use Peki
/TO
as an instrument o f overrule in Ewedome. Every state of Ewedome was made to pay 
annual tribute in men or cash of twelve shillings.69 Ewedome was drawn into the Atlantic 
slave trade after the Dutch, the English, the Danes and the French began to compete with 
the Portuguese on the West African coast in the mid seventeenth century. This was the 
period when the coastline from the Volta eastwards to Dahomey became known as the 
Slave Coast.70 From the eighteenth century, Ewedome became a major source of slave 
supply because of Akwamu invasion and the increase in the demand for slaves by 
Europeans slave dealers.71 Fynn noted how ‘extremely important’ the area east of the Volta
79up to Krepiland was to the slave trade as a result of Akwamu’s exploitation. Rodney also 
showed how Akwamu’s expansion to the east of the Volta served to stimulate the trans- 
Atlantic slave trade.73
Akwamu’s decision to invade Ewedome was motivated by a shift of interest away from 
gold to slaves in the early part of the eighteenth century, a period that saw a further increase
67 Akwamu residents were said to have been established at Agu. See Debrunner, A Church, p. 52. According 
to J. D. Fage, Akwamu’s power extended further to Whydah in 1702. See Fage, Ghana: A Historical 
Interpretation (Madison, 1961), p. 53.
68 Welman, Peki, p. 13.
69 R.A. Kea, ‘Akwamu-Anlo Relations’, p. 3.
70 Debrunner, A Church, p. 21.
71 Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 2; Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon, p. 43.
72 J. K. Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbours, 1700-1807 (London, 1971), p. 127.
73 Walter Rodney, ‘Gold and Slaves on the Gold Coast’, Transactions o f  the Historical Society o f  Ghana, Vol. 
10 (1969), p. 15. See also Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 28
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in slaving activities in Ewedome.74 The increase in the number of slaves supplied by 
Akwamu from Ewedome to the Danes made the latter re-open their lodge at Keta in 1748.75 
The period also saw the influx of Portuguese and Brazilian slave traders to the Anlo coast.76 
The Anlos, who served as intermediaries in this trade, bought slaves from Akwamu and 
sold them to the Danes.77 Kea stated that Akwamu’s invasion of Ewedome was beneficial 
‘to the mercantile interest of the Danes and the coastal middlemen like the Anlo’. Other 
intermediaries exchanged salt and European goods in high demand in Ewedome for 
slaves.79 As the profit from the trade in slaves from Ewedome region increased, the Danes 
opened another lodge at We and transformed their lodge at Keta into a fort in 1784.80
Q 1
Brydon notes that Dzokpe in the heart of Ewedome was a ‘centre of slave trade’. Kea 
cited the Danish factor, Kioege as saying in 1774 that the slaves from Crepe were the very 
best on the whole Guinea coast82 When Britain outlawed the slave trade in 1807, the trade 
in fact increased in Ewedome region because most of the slave dealers found Britain’s anti- 
slavery campaign in Accra and its environs inimical to their business. Consequently, the 
slave traders relocated ‘to communities on the Upper Slave Coast’.84 Some of the slaves 
captured in Ewedome were camped at Peki Adzakoe and given a ritual bath before being
74 See Walter Rodney, ‘The Guinea Coast’ in R. Gray (ed.), The Cambridge History o f  Africa 1600-1700,
Vol. IV (Cambridge, 1975), p. 318-319; Rodney, ‘Gold and Slaves’, p. 15.
75 Debrunner, A Church, p. 26-27.
76 Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon, p. 52.
77 Ibid.
78 Kea, ‘Akwamu-Anlo Relations’, p. 56.
79 Greene, Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change, p. 127.
80 Debrunner, A Church, p. 28.
81 Lynne Brydon, ‘Constructing Awatime: Questions o f  Identity in a West African Polity, c. 1690s to the 
Twentieth Century’, Journal o f  African History, 1 (2008), p. 28.
82 Kea, ‘Akwamu-Anlo Relations’, p. 56; Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbours, p. 127; Collier, ‘ A blode’, p. 4.
83 Details about Britih anti-slavery activities in the region o f Accra from 1807 are recorded in Reindorf, 
History, p. 153.
84 Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change, p. 93; Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon, p. 54.
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transported to the coast at Ada or Keta.85 Debrunner quoted Reindorf as stating that in 
1822-3, thousands of Krepes were captured and sold as slaves. A boy of 10 years was sold 
for 25 strings of cowries and an adult for ‘one head and 25 strings’.86 Akwamu also 
embarked on ruthless plundering of Ewedome. Persistent kidnapping and seizure of wares 
from traders ravaged the area. In fact, the trade in slaves from Ewedome in large numbers 
subsided only after Asante had surrendered its influence east of the Volta to the British in 
1874.
In 1829, the states of Ewedome began to take steps to throw off the Akwamu yoke. But 
this first attempt was met with reprisal.87 The suppression of the rebellion was made 
possible partly because of the support which Akwamu received from Peki and other allies 
such as Accra, Akwapim and Akyem.88 Peki earned the displeasure of other Ewes states in
OQ
Ewedome for her role as a tax collector for Akwamu. In 1833, the opportunity came for 
the fragmented states in Ewedome to forge an alliance to confront Akwamu. In that year, 
Akwamu, aided by Accra, attacked the Ewedome state of Nyive for refusing to pay tribute. 
During the course of the attack, the chief of Peki withdrew from the battlefield to attend to 
family matters.90 Akoto, Omanhene of Akwamu, considered this behaviour as a sign of 
disloyalty. Consequently, Akoto sent twelve corns to the chief of Peki and asked the later to 
pay £100 for each grain of the com or risk an attack.91 This outrageous demand forced Peki 
to seek help from other states in Ewedome to attack Akwamu. In the ensuing battle of
85 The site where the slaves were camped at Peki is now a shrine. Interview conducted with the elders and the 
priest at Peki Adzokoe, 8 June 2006.
86 Debrunner, A Church, p. 16.
87 Wilks, Asante in the Neniteenth Century, p. 211.
88 Ibid.
89 By 1874, Peki became the richest state in Ewedome because o f  the wealth it derived from taxes. See Meyer, 
Translating the Devil, p. 2.
90 Welman, Peki, p. 8-13.
91 Asem, Awudome, p. 7.
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Bame in 1833, a coalition of Ewedome states led by Peki defeated Akwamu. The war was 
significant in the sense that it marked the first time that all Ewedome states came together 
in alliance under the leadership of Peki to defeat a common enemy. All the same, the defeat 
of Akwamu in 1833 did not at once bring total peace to Ewedome. A series of internal wars 
followed during which Akwamu tried to restore its superiority over Ewedome.
It was in this period of uncertainty and turmoil that in 1847, the Bremen missionaries 
(Norddentsche Missionsgellescraft) began their first contact with Ewedome.92 One of the 
reasons why they decided to operate in Ewedome was that the region had not yet been 
brought under any European political control and missionary activities in the Gold Coast 
since the 1830s had not been extended into Ewedome. The Basel Mission had opened a 
station in 1864 at Anum, on the western boundary with Ewedome.94 Led by one Lorenze 
Wolf, the Bremen missionaries opened a station at Peki in 1847 but high death rate among 
the missionaries thwarted their initial efforts at evangelization. In 1853, rumours about an 
imminent Asante invasion of Ewedome forced the missionaries to relocate to Keta from 
where they began to reach out to other areas of Ewedome.95 From Peki, other stations were 
opened at Ho in 1859 and Waya in 1855.96 Thus, before 1869, a steady progress had been 
made in the missionary efforts to win converts to the Christian faith.
The defeat of Akwamu, however, was followed by the large-scale Asante invasion of 
Ewedome from 1869 to 1874. The Asante invasion was triggered in part by alarm over the 
exchange of territory on the Gold Coast between the British and the Dutch in 1868. The
92 See Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 5.
93 The Bremen Mission was founded in 1836 and it grew quickly to be come one o f the most important 
Protestant missionary societies in Germany. See Debrunner, A Church, p. 66.
94 Ibid, p. 63. See also Johnson, ‘Ashanti East o f the Volta’, p. 42.
95 Reindorf, History, p. 248; Debrunner, A Church, p. 68.
96 Reindorf, History, p. 249. Debrunner puts the date for the opening o f  Waya station at 1855. See Debrunner, 
A Church, p.78 and 109.
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status of Elmina as a trade outlet to the sea was crucial to Asante interests. British control 
over Elmina coupled with attempts to prevent arms from reaching Asante through the Volta 
provoked the latter into action.97 The Anlo-Ada war of 1865 presented Asante with a 
perfect opportunity to invade Ewedome and to re-impose access to the Volta route. Asante 
took advantage of its alliance with Anlo since the 1790s to enter the war on the side of the 
latter.98 The Ewe of Ewedome were angered by the role played by the Anlo Ewe first in 
promoting Akwamu’s slaving activities in the region and their support for the Asante 
invasion.99 From 1869-1873, Asante waged relentless war in the Ewedome region.100 Many 
Ewes were taken as slaves to Asante during the period of the invasion.101 The Bremen 
Mission was not spared the vandalism of the invading Asante army. The gradual expansion 
of their mission station in the 1850s and 60s had been truncated by the Asante invasion of 
1869, as was the case with Basel Mission stations in the region such as Anum, from where
1 r \ j
Ramseyer and Kuhne were captured and marched to Kumasi. The missionaries had to re­
establish themselves in the late 1870s to 1880s. Asante also suffered some reverses.103 But 
the devastation that the invasion left behind continue to linger on in the minds of the people 
of Ewedome to this day.
97 Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p. 235.
98 For an account on the long history o f collaboration o f  Anlo with Asante and Akwamu, see Ibid, p. 57 and 
224; Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon, p. 45.
99 This was the root cause o f enmity beteen the Ewe o f  Ewedome and the Anlo Ewe, which continued into the 
immediate-post indepence era. J. S. Colman, ‘Togoland’, International Conciliation, 509 (September, 1956), 
p. 35;
100 Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p. 225.
101 For a discussion o f  slavery and the economy o f  Asante during the nineteenth century, see Gareth Austin, 
Labour, Land and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807-1956 (Rochester, 2005), 
p. 116-229.
102 Hans W. Debrunner, A History o f Christianity in Ghana (Accra, 1967), p. 209; Johnson, ‘Ashanti East of 
the Volta’, p. 45; Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p. 225.
103 Asante’s heaviest defeat was at the foot o f  Mountain Gemi in Awatime where rocks were rolled down the 
mountain to crush the Asante army. See Debrunner, A Church, p. 17. The point is also made in Austin, 
Labour, p. 58.
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Relief finally came to the people of Ewedome in 1874 when the British defeat of Asante 
led to the collapse of Asante power along the Volta region and paved the way for the 
expansion of British influence in the Ewedome region.104 The Anglo-Danish agreement of 
1850, that transferred Danish coastal forts to the British, also provided the basis for 
Britain’s growing influence in Ewedome. Oral tradition indicates that during the period of 
Asante dominance Ewedome states paid an annual tribute of two men each to Asante.105 
During the period, Akwamu, Asante and Anlo all acquired slaves from the Ewedome 
region.
Again, the end of Asante hegemony over Ewedome did not bring absolute peace in the 
territory. On the contrary, the invasion simply prepared the ground for one Ewedome state 
to be drawn into conflict with another. Therefore, the history of Ewedome from 1874 to 
1900 was strewn with internal wars that continued to divide the region. A case in point was 
an attack on Ziavi by Taviefe in 1887 for the former’s alleged support of Asante. Taviefe 
was said to have seized seven children from Ziavi and pounded them to death in mortars. 
An Assistant Inspector, Dalrympole, who was sent by the British government to arrest the 
Taviefe chief and his accomplices, was killed in an ambush by the people of Taviefe. It 
took reinforcements from Accra to force Taviefe to sue for peace and to pay a fine of 
£200.106
Akwamu’s suzerainty over Ewedome states for some hundred years followed by Asante 
occupation 1869-1873 had a profound impact on the region. It seems likely that the 
adoption of the Akan chieftaincy system by the Ewes of Ewedome was in consequence of
104 Johnson, ‘Asante’, p. 37.
105 Akwamu was said to have taken responsibility for the collection o f  tribute from states in the territory. This 
is confirmed in Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p. 74.
106 Ibid, p. 396-399. See also PRAAD/A ADM 39/5/73, Ho District Record Book.
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the long period of Akwamu’s occupation of the region. The period marked the transition 
from priest-led political organisation to the institution of Akan-style chieftaincy system. 
Some historians such as Amenumey and Mamattah, however, disagree and argue that if 
there was any borrowing, then it must have come from the experience of the Ewes in Ketu 
and Notsie, and not from the Akans. Though Mamattah agrees that the Ewes initially served 
under tronuawo, he asserts that any claim that the Ewes borrowed the institution from their 
Akan neighbours ‘should be discounted as a fallacy’.107 Evidence from oral traditions, as 
well as some secondary sources, however, suggests a borrowing of the institutions of 
chieftaincy from the Akans. In a letter to the Governor of the Gold Coast in 1931, the 
paramount chief of Anfoega, Togbe Hodo V, and his senior linguist stated that they the 
people of Anfoega ‘learnt the art of chiefship and the science of war from king Akoto of 
Akwamu’.108 He went on to say that the first chief of Anfoega stayed with Akwamuhene 
when he was a minor to learn the art of chiefship. In addition, he indicated in the letter that 
Hodo I was the one who taught the people of Kpando the art of chiefship and enstooled the 
first chief of Kpando in 1860.109
Oral tradition as well as recorded history of Kpando shows that the people of Kpando 
were led to their present home by priests: Asianu, Adedze and Eko. The Danyibakaka 
festival is celebrated by the people of Kpando to recount this history and to honour those 
priests. Oral traditions that I collected from the elders and paramount chiefs of Hohoe, Peki,
107 Charles M. K. Mamattah, The Ewes o f  West Africa Vol. 1 (Accra, 1979), p. 39 and 40; Amenumey, Ewes, 
p .13-14.
08 RAG/H, Hodo V to the Governor o f the Gold Coast, 6 January 1931 (Not filed). K. Baku, ‘Asafo in Two 
Ewe States’, Transactions o f  the Historical Society o f  Ghana, 2 (1998) p. 27-28.
109 Le Lievee, however puts the date for the enstoolment o f Dagadu I at 1850. See PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/42, 
Le Lievee, The Kpando Division, p.3; Baku, ‘The Asafo in Two Ewe States’, 27-28. The people o f  Kpando 
put the date for the enstoolment o f  Dagadu I at 1836. See the funeral brochure for the late Dagadu VII, 30 
April 2008, p. 41. This 1836 dating is interesting in view o f Lawrance’s claim that ‘in the Kpando region 
probably most o f the western portion o f Eweland, Chieftaincy as it exists today was first introduced at the 
highest level, that o f duo, in the 1830s and forties’. Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 30.
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Kpando and Anfoega support the view that stools associated with Akan system of 
chieftaincy were unknown in Ewedome before the Akwamu invasion.110 According to a 
recorded history of Kpando, ‘for a long time during their migration and later settlement, 
many Ewe communities were led by fetish priests and priestesses’.111 The tradition 
attributed the founding of the paramount stool of Kpando to one Bisi Kodzo, also known as 
Kodzo Dra in 1806.112 Dra was said to have stayed at the camp of Asante during the 1869- 
74 invasion of Ewedome where he studied Asante chieftaincy institutions and military 
organisation.113 He then returned to Kpando to replicate what he had learnt.114 In the words 
of Crowther, ‘there is cause for the belief that the office of Fia was originally held by a 
fetish priest’.115 Collier also notes that ‘the period of Akwamu dominance over Krepi from 
the 1740s through to the 1830s may have witnessed a dissemination of Akwamu politico- 
military organization’.116 The tradition of Peki shows that Ofori Tutu who led the people of 
Peki to their present home did not have a stool. It was the successor of Ofori Tutu,
117Asamoah, who founded the paramount stool of Peki. According to Kea, Westerman 
recorded a tradition which stated that Awatime and Ewe people obtained kingship from the 
Akwamu through Odam, an Akwamu and first Awatime chief.118 This assertion was 
contained in the works of anthropologists such as Brydon and Verdon who worked in
110 Interviews with Togbe Deiga, paramount chief o f Peki, 7 August 2000. Togbe Gabusu, paramount chief o f  
Gbi (Hohoe), 6 June 2006; Togbe Hodo VII, 17 June 2006; Togbe Dagadu VII, paramount chief o f  Anfoega, 
16 June 2006. The view is further supported by PRAAD/A ADM 39/5/73 Ho District Record Book, p. 10b.
111 This information is contained in the funeral brochure o f the late paramount chief o f Kpando, Dagadu VII, 
30 April 2008, p. 40.
112 Ibid, p. 40-41.
113 Ibid.
114 See funeral brochure o f  the late Dgadu VII, 30 April 2008, p. 40-41.
115 Crowther, ‘The Ewe Speaking People’, p. 14.
116 Collier, ‘Ablode’, p. 10.
117 Interview conducted with Deigah, the paramount chief o f Peki, 7 August 2000.
118 Odam was said to have been sent to govern Awatime and the neighbouring states by Akwamu sovereign 
just after the mid-eighteenth century. For details o f this story, see Kea, ‘ Akwamu-Anlo relations’ , p. 32; 
Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change, p. 32-35.
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Ewedome in the 1970s and the 1980s respectively. Brydon notes that ‘there is considerable 
evidence from “Ewe-Dome” groups that chiefs were a nineteenth-century innovation, 
effectively the aftermath of the adoption of Asante military formation and its offices’.119 
Verdon, on the other hand, postulated that chieftaincy institution in Ewedome ‘seems to 
have been borrowed in the late 1860s or early 1870s’ and it is only from 1890 that one can
1 70truly talk about what he called a league of sovereign villages. Furthermore, Debrunner 
asserts that after the Akwamu-Asante contacts ‘more and more Togo and Ewe tribes 
adopted from the Akwamu and Asante a proper system of chiefship’.121
It is important to note that there is no record which shows that Ewes of Ewedome 
brought ancestral stools with them from Notsie. As we have seen, the migration story spoke 
of various lineages being led by priests and not chiefs. Rituals and other cultural practices 
as well as offices associated with the institution of chieftaincy in Ewedome were o f Akan 
derivation. For example, the talking drum, an important state instrument, is called atumpani 
and the one who beats the drum is known as Atsrima. These and many other Akan terms 
came to dominate the institution of chieftaincy in Ewedome to this day, which is an ample 
proof of a heavy borrowing from the Akan states. It would appear that many Ewes of 
Ewedome saw the Akan-style statecraft and military organization to be better suited, indeed 
perhaps necessary, to survive in the highly competitive and conflict ridden world in which 
they found themselves. The emerging Ewedome states found themselves wedged between 
the warlike Akan kingdoms of Akwamu and Asante in the immediate hinterland of the 
Gold Coast and the powerful Dahomey on the Slave Coast in the eighteenth and nineteenth
119 Brydon, ‘Constructing Awatime’, p. 29.
120 Michael Verdon, The Abutia Ewe o f  West Africa: A Chiefdom that Never Was (Berlin, 1983), p. 101.
121 The adoption, according to Debrunner, happened first in Peki then spread to Kpando and Ho areas. See 
Debrunner, A Church, p. 56. See also, Collier, ‘Ablode p. 10.
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centuries. Akwamu’s influence on the political, military and, to a lesser degree, on the 
cultural practices of Ewedome was not an isolated case.
From the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth centuries, Akwamu influenced the
122socio-political transformation of many states in the Gold Coast and beyond. Even the 
Anlo-Ewe states on the coast became more centralised after their long interaction with 
Akwamu through trade and administrative contacts during which period institutional 
borrowing from Akwamu might have taken place. Akyeampong notes the presence of 
Akwamu administrators in Anlo as part of Anlo-Akwamu alliance that lasted well into the 
nineteenth century. This view was supported by Lawrance’s claim that the rapid 
development of ‘paramountcy tradition’ among the Anlo was due to the Anlo-Akwamu 
contact from the seventeenth century.124 According to Parker, the process of decoupling 
secular kingship from priest-kings among the Ga was accelerated after Great Accra was 
ravaged by Akwamu from 1677 to 1681.125 Ewedome states also adopted Akan military 
organisation. Lievee observed that, before the Asante invasion, Kpando went to ‘battle in a 
confused body with an advance guard and a rearguard only’.126 With the constant invasions, 
however, it became necessary for Ewe states of Ewedome to adopt the Akan system in 
order to avert heavy casualties being inflicted on their territory. Consequently, all duwo 
within a duko were constituted into a wing of the state military organization, with each 
wing headed by the chief of the oldest village or town. Thus, there was the advance guard
122 Baku, ‘Asafo’ p. 21. For Akwamu’s dominance over the region, see Kea, ‘Akwamu-Anlo Relations’, p. 
32; Law, Slave Coast, p. 229 and 248.
123 Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon, p. 41. See also Debrunner, A Church, p. 61; Kea, 
‘Akwamu-Anlo Relations’, p. 29
124 Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 27.
125 See Parker, Making the Town, p. 9-10.
126 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/42, Le Lievee, Essay on Tribal History o f  the Kpandu Division, p. 4.
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led by the Ngogbe Fia, the main body led by Dome Fia, the left wing led by Miame Fia and 
the right wing led by Dusime Fia and the rear guard headed by Megbe Fia,127
Akwamu influence was not limited to the political and military spheres. In the social 
facets of life, Ewedome culture was highly influenced by Akan culture. In fact, Ewedome 
culture is so flexible that as Meyer succinctly states, ‘it is inappropriate to conceptualise
19o
traditional Ewe culture as a fixed state and closed system’. The adoption of Akan names 
became fashionable and widespread. Names such as Dompreh, Asamoah, Obimpeh, Osie, 
Tutu, Adorn, Aniabre, were but some of the many Akan names common among the Ewes 
of Ewedome. Greene recounts how the exercise of administrative and judicial control over
1 90Anlo by Akwamu from 1702-1730 led to the infusion of Akan culture into that of Anlo. 
Nevertheless, Ewe culture retained an awful lot of continuities from the past, in the 
religious sphere for example. Rituals associated with deities remained essentially Ewe in 
origin and practice. In the words o f Ellis, ‘it is in their religious development that the 
superiority of the Ewe-speaking over the Tshi-speaking people is most apparent’.130
Athough the people of Ewedome adopted the Akan chieftaincy system, the region was 
not characterised by the creation of large centralised states. Every town, no matter how 
small, had a fia  (chief). The fiaga  (paramount/head chief) who resides in the fiadu  (capital 
town) had no control over the day-to-day administration of the other towns. It was
I *3 1
customary, however, for a newly enstooled fia  to be introduced to the fiaga. The court of 
the fiaga  served as the court of appeal within the state. The stools so instituted became
127 For a description o f Akan military organization, see Crowther, ‘Ewe Speaking People’, p. 16.
128 See Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 3.
129 Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change, p. 32-35.
130 Ellis, Ewe-Speaking People, p. 13.
131 The introduction was done amidst elaborate ritual performances during which the new f ia  swore the oath 
o f allegiance to the fiaga  and the latter reciprocated by promising his support.
132 For details, see Manoukian, Ewe-Speaking People, p. 30.
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the embodiments of the beliefs and values of the Ewes as well as the pivot around which all 
activities of the state revolved. Chiefs assumed positions of reverence by virtue of the 
sacrifices that they performed to their predecessors on behalf of the state. The various duwo 
were welded together into a political unit due to their common allegiance to the chief. In 
essence, each state became politically sovereign. The chiefs then became constitutional 
heads who sat in council.
The relevance of Akwamu and Asante invasions and their transformational effects on 
Ewedome to this study lies in the way in which chiefs such as Adzatekpor of Awatime, 
Dagadu of Kpando/Akpini and Howusu of Asogli distinguished themselves in those wars 
and became important leaders in the region. We noted that the Asante army suffered a 
heavy loss at the hands of the people of Awatime on Gemi mountain in 1869. During the 
invasion, many states looked to Awatime to give them protection on the Awatime 
mountains.133 Asogli state, led by Howusu, also mounted strong resistance to Akwamu and 
Asante in Ho.134 Similarly, Dagadu was instrumental in organising the war against 
Akwamu in 1833 and later against the Asante army at Wusuta. The resistance on the part of 
those states to first Akwamu and then Asante militarism led to an accumulation of status 
and authority on the part of those states and their leaders. Thus, the turmoil of the 
nineteenth century reshaped political power in Ewedome and led to the configuration of 
regional politics that confronted the incoming Germans from the 1880s-90s.
Those chiefs did not only use their roles in the Akwamu and Asante wars as a 
bargaining chip in gaining recognition from the German and later, British officials, but they 
also became active collaborators and local agents in the design and implementation of
133 NA C096/746/7, Report to the PMC, Geneva, 24-25 October, 1938.
134 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1285, Petition from Fia Afede o f Ho-Bankoe to the the Governor, 7 July 1931.
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British colonial policy of local government in Ewedome in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. Also of great importance was the effect o f the role of the Anlo Ewe in 
aiding the Asante invasion. This had the effect of drawing a wedge between the northern 
Ewes and the Anlo on the coast and reshaping Ewedome identity. This development would 
become a stumbling block in the quest of the British to integrate the region into the Gold 
Coast in the closing stages of the colonial period.
The Colonial Conquest
Though Britain took over Danish forts along the coast in 1850, the British 
administration had neither the willingness nor the ability to occupy Ewedome, which was a 
distant hinterland across the Volta and therefore beyond the recognised extent of the Gold 
Coast itself.135 After the Gold Coast Colony was established in 1874, the colonial partition 
of the region began to escalate in the 1880s with the arrival of the Germans. Consequently, 
British attitudes began to change in respect of Ewedome. In 1886, Britain invited all states 
in Ewedome to Peki to sing a treaty, which could best be described as an Ewedome version 
of the Fante Bond of 1844. This treaty sought to forestall possible German expansion from 
the coast.136 On 7 December 1886, the British government wrote a letter to Bismarck in 
which it was stated that ‘the territory of Aquamoo and Crepe were among those which 
formerly recognised the authority of the Danish crown and that they were included in the
1 37purchase of rights and possessions of Denmark by Great Britain in 1850’.
135 According to M. Johnson, Britain did not express interest in colonizing the Ewedome region ‘so far as no 
other European power was showing interest in the area’. Johnson, ‘Ashanti East o f the Volta’, p. 56.
136 Arthur J. Knoll, Togo Under Imperial Germany, 1884-1914 (Stanford, 1978), p. 28.
137 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/20, Anglo-German Boundary Agreement, 7 December 1886; Colonial Office List, 
1910, p. 211.
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The presence of Dr Gustav Nachtigal, the German-Consul General, on the coast in 1884 
and the French presence to the west and in the Sudanese zone posed a major threat to 
British interests in the Gold Coast hinterland. German merchant activities along the coast
1 "58created conditions that were invigorating for smuggling activities. German traders were 
interested in the dry Togoland coast because the area was outside the British custom zone
11Qwhere a custom duty of 4 percent on imports was in force from 1874. The Germans 
sought to win over local traders by introducing cheap but inferior products into the 
market.140 Such activities were inimical to British trade east of the Volta.141 Meanwhile, 
long before Nachtigal arrived on the coast, the natives made repeated calls on Britain to 
annex the area and bring it under British protection, but to no avail.142 The intended 
benefits which Britain sought to gain from the 1886 treaty with states in Ewedome failed to 
materialise. Apart from the British flag, which of course, the states were happy to keep, no 
effective measures were taken to ensure that the chief of Peki really had an effective control 
over the other states in the region.143 Far from limiting their activities to the coastal enclave, 
in 1886 Germany began to expand into the interior as far as Agotime, one of the Adangme 
states near Ho.144 This degenerated into a diplomatic row between Germany and Britain. 
The bone of contention here was Kpando’s position as a big market centre in Ewedome
138 Gordon Le Sueur, Germ any’s Vanishing Colonies (New York, 1915), p. 110-111.
139 Knoll, Togo, p. 10; W. O. Henderson, The German Colonial Empire 1884-1919 (London, 1993), p. 49. In 
1904, the Germans went ahead to increase their export duties to 10 percent, far more than the 4 percent 
imposed by the British in the Gold Coast. See Greene, Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change, p. 141.
140 Le Sueur, Germ any’s Vanishing Colonies, p .l 10.
141 It was to check the smuggling along that part o f the coast that in 1886 the boundary between British and 
German territories was for the first time fixed so that the Gold Coast police could enforce the rules along the 
border. See PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/20, Anglo-German Boundary, 1986.
142 Le Sueur, Germ any’s, p. 111.
143 According to the paramount chief o f  Peki, the treaty was simply ineffective. Interview conducted in 
August, 2000. Details o f Kpando-Peki rivalry is recorded in Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 201.
144 Germany’s enthusiasm for the acquisition o f  Ewedome had already being fired towards the acquisition o f  
Ewedome largely by the reports which missionaries wrote about the economic viability o f the interior.
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where the major Salaga trade route converged with other smaller routes.145 The 
revitalization o f the route following the withdrawal of Asante in 1874 changed the geo­
political position of Kpando considerably.146
As the diplomatic wrangling between Britain and Germany continued, the Bremen 
Mission was being firmly established throughout Ewedome. The Mission, which had 
returned to the territory after 1874, re-opened stations at Ho and the mountainous town of 
Amedzofe in 1876 and 1890 respectively.147 In order to win the confidence and support of 
the traditional authorities and appeal to the ordinary people, the missionaries steered away, 
as mush as possible, from local politics. In furtherance of this policy, most villages or 
towns where the Bremen missionaries operated had a section exclusively reserved for new 
converts, a religious segregation known as Kpodzi.u% Converts who lived in those secluded 
places were absolved from the laws regarding the observance of taboos and other 
traditional observances which the missionaries considered ‘fetish’.
One area where the missionaries were successful was the promotion of the Ewe 
language as a unifying force through church and school programmes. On arrival, they 
realised much to their dismay that the existence of various variants of the Ewe language, 
coupled with the many Guan dialects and Togo remnant languages, was a major hindrance 
to their proselytizing and education programmes. To get over this problem, the missionaries 
decided to develop what came to be known as ‘standard Ewe’ in an attempt to harmonise 
the various variants of the Ewe language.149 It became the only vernacular taught in schools
145 Brown, ‘Anglo-Geman Rivalry’, p. 203.
146 Ibid.
147 Reindorf, History, p. 248.
148 Meyer, Translating the D evil, p. 8.
149 According to some experts, ‘standard Ewe’ derives some linguistic features from Ewe dialects o f  Keta,
Peki and Lome. See Edoh Togah, ‘Hands O ff my Ewe’, Cahiers du Cerleshs (Ouagadougou, 2001), p. 20.
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within the region. It was also used in the liturgy and the preaching of sermons.150 Diligent 
missionary research into local ethnology and linguistics led to the publication of many 
books in Ewe. By 1914, the first copy of the Bible translated in Ewe through the co­
ordinating efforts of missionary Jacob Spieth was published and circulated among 
congregations in Eweland.151 In a way, Ewe became a prestige language. This practice of 
standardizing and promoting one variant of a language by missionaries was not peculiar to 
Ewedome. It was very much the tool for the construction of ‘African custom and 
identity’.152
German missionary activities were not confined to proselytization alone. They sought to 
give the converts some degree of economic security by training them in handicrafts and 
laying out experimental farms. At face value, the activities of the German missionaries 
looked innocuous to British interests. The missionaries promoted the teaching and learning 
of English in their schools and they showed no tendency to impose German culture. All this 
was in the interest of Britain. But the German missionaries inadvertently paved the way for 
Germany’s audacious challenge to Britain in Ewedome. In fact, in 1888, the presence of 
the Bremen missionaries in Ewedome facilitated the penetration of the hinterland by 
Hauptmann von Francois, a German government official. Hauptmann von Francois 
traversed Ewedome to Krachi and Salaga and having acquainted himself with the economic 
potential of the area, he made attempts to persuade the inhabitants to accept the German 
flag.153
150 This was in line with the policy o f the missionaries to provide what they called ‘indigenous education’. 
Debrunner, A Church, p. 59.
151 Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 59. It is important to note also that Bernhard Schlegel published the first 
Ewe grammer in 1856 while Diedrich Westermann published an Ewe dictionary in 1856. Knoll, Togo, p. 15.
152 Qoute taken from Berman, ‘Ethnicity’, p. 322.
153 A.W. Cardinall, ‘The Story o f  the German Occupation o f  Togoland’, G old Coast Review, 2 (1927), p. 196.
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In 1890, Britain gave in to Germany’s persistent desire to occupy Ewedome.154 
Following the Heligoland Treaty in that year, Britain ceded the greater part of Ewedome to 
Germany, retaining control over the Peki and Awudome areas only.155 It is important to 
note that the colonization of Togoland by Germany was in response to demands by German 
traders for protection against ‘arbitrary custom duties levied by the native chiefs’.156 
Therefore, Dr Nachtigal’s coming to Lome in 1884 was initially meant to solve the problem 
between the local chief and the German traders.157 This seemingly innocuous move 
eventually resulted in placing the coastal enclave under German protection.
German Rule, 1890-1914
At the time Germany assumed administrative control over Togo, Ewedome had become 
used to dealing with British officials. Some chiefs had learned the English language and the 
spectre of having to learn German haunted them. Besides, the support which the people of 
Ewedome received from the British in subduing Akwamu and Asante endeared Britain to 
the hearts of many in Ewedome. In addition, the people of Ewedome wanted to preserve the 
revitalization of their commercial links with the Gold Coast since the defeat of the Asantes 
in 1874.158 The news about the 1890 Anglo-German partition of Ewedome generated a 
great resentment and shock throughout the territory. Even F. M. Zahn, the missionary 
director from 1862 to 1900, was very unhappy about the partition.159 The Ewes in the
154 See ‘Togo-land, The German Protectorate on the Slave Coast.’ Proceedings o f  the Royal Geography 
Society and Monthly R ecord o f  Geography, 9 (June 1885), p. 377.
155 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/174, Anglo-German Boundary, 1904-1908. The Ewe states that came under the 
British became part o f  the Volta River District under the Eastern Province o f the Gold Coast Colony.
156 ‘Togoland, ‘The German Protectorate on the Slave Coast’, p. 377.
157 Ibid.
158 Accra and Ada had served as major trading centres for goods from Krepiland. See Brown, ‘Anglo-German 
Rivalry’, p.209.
159 Knoll, Togo, p. 34.
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hinterland were aware of Germany’s harsh policies in Southern Togo such as flogging and 
forced unpaid labour. In 1891, chiefs and their elders from Vakpo, Tsrukpe, Have, Tafi 
Nyagbo, Awate, Aveme, Botoku and Wusuta met at Anfoega to elect Hodo III, chief of 
Anfoega, to lead them to the British Colonial Governor in the Gold Coast to plead for 
British intervention in preventing German occupation of their states.160
In 1894, Lieut. Klose led a German police force (polizeitruppe) to Kpando and Anfoega 
and forced the people to receive German flags and to surrender the Union Jack.161 From 
Anfoega, the Germans rushed to Awatime, another area where pro-British sentiments were 
strong. The people of Tafi had averred that they were being attacked by Awatime for 
accepting a German flag. To avert an imminent German reprisal, the people of Awatime 
managed to secure a German flag overnight and hoisted it before the Germans had 
arrived.162 The Germans succeeded in cowing the people into submission partly because of 
the sudden shift of Kpando’s loyalty to Germany. Apparently, Kpando felt that since the 
Anglo-German boundary placed Peki squarely in the Gold Coast, it would end whatever 
claim Peki continued to make over Kpando and other Ewedome states.163
German administration in Ewedome and indeed the whole of German Togo has been 
described as unimpressive.164 The period of German colonial administration in Ewedome 
was relatively short; shorter than it was in the south.165 Even though Germany on paper
160 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/174.
161 Cardinall, ‘German Occupation’, p. 206; Brown,‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 211.
162 Cardinall, ‘German Occupation’, p. 206. Debrunner gave the credit to the Bremen missionaries in 
Amedzofe for their role in preventing bloodshed when Awatime refused to accept German authority. See 
Debrunner, History o f  Christianity, p. 209.
163 Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 208-209.
164 D. E. K. Amenumey, ‘German Administration in Southern Togo’, Journal o f  African History, 4 (1969), p. 
624.
165 According to Fage, the period froml884 to 1914 could best be described as the bare laying o f  the 
foundations o f German rule in Africa, which had hardly been established before it was liquidated. See J. D.
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took over Ewedome in 1890, it was not until 1897 and 1899 that it built its first outposts in 
Kpando and Ho respectively.166 Therefore, tangible German colonization of Ewedome can 
be said to have started from 1899. In the words of Knoll, the German colonies were lost 
just as they ‘began to reach a level of maximal efficiency’.167 For this reason, Knoll 
postulated that ‘we would have had a better perspective of German rule if it had been 
possible to juxtapose the time of mature colonization in the German African empire with a 
similar period in the British and French empire’.168 Nevertheless, Togoland, according to 
Crabtree, was acquired by Germany primarily for the purpose of exploiting the resources of 
the region and not to colonise it, while Henderson was of the view that Germany had 
wanted to use the region as a corridor to penetrate to the Niger.169
From 1898, Ewedome was governed from the German administrative district of 
Misahohe.170 Germany’s colonial rule was dictated by a policy of decentralisation which 
based local administration on village units.171 Views diverge on whether or not the German 
system of direct rule caused the disintegration of larger political units in Ewedome. While 
Knoll stated that the Germans did not purposely fragment traditional polities, Collier argues 
that by basing their rule on village units, ‘the Germans had perhaps been more realistic 
about the acephalous organization of Ewe-speakers and other people of southern
Fage, ‘British and German Colonial Rule: a Synthesis and Summary’ in Proser Gifford and W. M. Roger 
Louis (eds.), Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivary and Colonial Rule (Yale, 1967), p. 701.
166 Amenumey, ‘German Administration’, p. 625.
167 Knoll, Togo, p. 4. It was only by 1910 that agricultural projects were beginning to yield results. See W. A. 
Crabtree, ‘Togoland’, Journal o f  the Royal African Society, 54 (January, 1915), p. 172.
168 Ibid.
169 W. A. Crabtree, ‘The Germans in East and West Africa’, Journal o f  the Royal African Society, 57 (1915), 
p. 361; Henderson, German Colonial Empire, p. 50.
170 The whole o f  German Togo was divided into seven administrative districts: NA CO 724/2, Annual Report 
on British Mandated Togoland, 1920-21.
171 Verdon, Abutia Ewe, p. 77.
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Togoland’.172 Though one could acknowledge the fact that Ewedome had at all times been 
disintegrated and disunited, it is equally true that German colonial policy entrenched the 
fragmentation of the region. The aim was to break down states such as Kpando, Awatime, 
Anfoega and Asogli which were developing into large centralised states. In this way, the 
Germans hoped to prevent any concerted action against their administration. This was no 
different from what pertained in Tanganyika where the colonial policy of Germany was ‘to 
weaken tribal cohesion and to break down tribal government’.173
In furtherance of this policy, even subordinate chiefs were given recognition as 
independent or paramount chiefs (Oberhauptling) instead of chiefs (Hauptling) in their 
divisions. Each village chief who went to Misahohe came back with a German badge and a 
hat.174 As a result, each village became what Verdon referred to as a sovereign political 
group.175 A similar situation occurred in Buem state, made up of Akan and autochthonous 
people, as late as in 1907. In that year, the German governor, Graft Zech, told the head 
chief of Buem that his enstoolment would be recognised only if the political independence 
of Akpafu, Likpe, Santrokofi and Tepa was guaranteed. Consequently, those hitherto 
subordinate divisions broke out of the Buem state.176
Though traditional authorities continued to rule their people, their powers were 
restricted, particularly in judicial matters.177 They had to receive regular instructions from
172 Knoll, Togo, p. 49.
173 Illife, M odem  History o f  Tanganyika, p. 323.
174 The hat was a steel helmet bearing the German crown. For the curtailment o f the judicial powers o f  chiefs, 
see NA C 096/724/2, Annual Report on British Mandated Togoland, 1920-21, p. 21.
175 Verdon, Abutia Ewe, p. 77.
176 NA C096/746/7, Report by C. C. Lilley, Accredited Representative to Geneva, 24 to 25 October 1938; 
Togoland Report 1937, p. 4.
177 The introduction o f tribunals and the way they operated was foreign to traditional judicial procedures. 
Family and clan heads no longer had the responsibility to settle even minor cases. All cases were to be sent to 
the tribunal o f the head chief or that o f the sub-chief. PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, Le Lievre, Kpando Division, 
p. 5-6.
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German officials regarding judicial procedures. As part o f the measures to streamline the
1 78courts, chiefs were ordered to limit their court summon fees to six shillings (6 marks). 
The district was headed by a political officer (Bezirksamtmann) who had unlimited 
jurisdiction excepted that in theory, he had to seek confirmation from the governor in the 
German capital of Lome before carrying out sentences which carried a penalty exceeding 
300 marks or imprisonment over three months.179 In practical terms, the situation was 
different in the hinterland where the district officer ‘could proclaim a martial law, and with 
a minimum of two assessors, hear a capital charge summarily, and have the death penalty
1 RHcarried out without receiving the governor’s sanction’. Chiefs were also used to enforce 
forced labour, particularly in the production of palm kernels.
The Bremen missionaries did not hide their opposition to German colonisation of the 
territory. Some were said to have instigated the natives against the German colonial 
officers. Missionary Franz Michael was said to be an ardent critic of imperialism. He felt 
acquisition of colonies could not be justified on moral grounds.181 Missionaries and 
anthropologists were on record to have raised concerns about German overrule in Africa on 
the floor of the Reichstag.1*2 Accusations of German officials by missionaries led to the 
trial of Carl Peters in 1897 and the withdrawal of Governor Eduard von Liebert from the 
Kilimanjaro district of German East Africa in 1899.183 In Ewedome, the harsh colonial rule, 
especially in 1902-1904, became a clear embarrassment for the missionaries because it 
compromised their political neutrality and hindered the missionary efforts at converting
178 RAG/H Case No. 48/20, Amaglamation o f Divisions in Togoland.
179 NA C096/724/2, Annual Report on British Mandated Sphere o f Togoland, 1920-21, p. 21
180 Ibid.
181 For details on the encounter between the missionaries and the German officials, see Debrunner, A History, 
p. 208; Cyprus C. Adams, ‘The African Colonies o f Germany and the War’ Geographical Review, 1 (January, 
1916), p. 452-453.
182 W. A. Crabtree, ‘German Colonies in Africa’, Journal o f  the Royal African Society, 3 (1914), p. 12.
183 Henderson, German Colonial Empire, p. 84.
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more natives.184 Jacob Spieth, a Bremen missionary, served as a lawyer for the people of 
Ewedome by presenting their grievances to the German government.185
No sooner had the Germans taken over than the relationship between them and Kpando 
became strained because of the imposition and enforcement of border restrictions. The 
border restrictions and the diversion of trade to Lome affected trading activities in Kpando 
and Krepiland as a whole.186 Matters became worse when in 1913 the German colonial 
government decided to inoculate people against an alleged outbreak of sleeping sickness. 
Dagadu Anku (Dagadu III), the head chief of Kpando was suspicious of the exercise and 
opposed the planned inoculation.187 Consequently, Dagadu III was deported to Cameroon 
in 1913.188 According to the dairy of a German officer who was captured in Togo in 1914 
and sent to Kpando, two other charges were framed against Dagadu III. First, he was 
accused of having written to the Kaiser abusing the German colonial government in Togo. 
Second, he was charged with writing to the Governor of the Gold Coast asking to be 
brought under British Rule.189 It came therefore as no surprise that when the First World 
War broke out, Kpando alone contributed 200 men to serve Britain in the Cameroon and
184 Dates taken from Knoll, Togo, p. 55.
185 Ibid, p. 56.
186 This explains why there was a fierce resistance to German occupation o f  Krepiland in Tove. Eventually, 
the town was ravaged by the Germans. These restrictions notwithstanding, British merchants continued to 
have a fair share o f  the trade in Ewedome. It is said that ‘the British had better landing facilities at Ada and 
Keta than the Germans possessed at Lome’. So Keta and Ada still attracted goods down the River Volta. The 
value o f  British trade in Togoland in 1910 was said to have amounted to £100,000. See Henderson, ‘British 
Economic Activity in the German Colonies’, p. 60.
187 The inoculation was not the only concern o f Dagadu. People who were suspected o f  being infected with 
the sleeping sickness were sent to an isolation camp in Kluto in present-day Republic o f  Togo and very few o f  
them came back to Ewedome. See Le Lievee, ‘The Kpando Division’, p. 34. Some o f  the patients also lost 
their sight because o f the use o f the drug atoxyl. See Knoll, Togo, p. 89.
188 A Brochure on Danyiba Kaka Festival, 1974. Chief Dagadu was brought back to Kpando by the British in 
1915. See NA C096/672/5, Togoland Report, 1927.
189 These accusations against Chief Dagadu were indicative o f  the growing resentment against German rule. 
See PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/603, The Return o f Dagadu from Cameroon, 18 January 1915.
62
East Africa campaigns. In addition, Kpando contributed £500 to the fund of the Red Cross 
Society during the war.190
To facilitate the easy enforcement of custom barriers, chiefs were tasked to keep the 
boundary between Germany and the Gold Coast clearly marked, and from 1909 were to be 
paid 5/- per mile for doing so.191 Every chief was issued a ‘Road Notice’which detailed 
those chiefs who were responsible for clearing the boundary. People needed a pass from the 
Germans to cross the border. Those who violated this directive were punished severely by 
the German officials. On 22 May 1910, for instance, the son of the chief of British Kpeve 
went to German Kpeve to tap rubber and he was arrested and fined £10. The chief was 
unable to pay the fine so his son died in prison at Kpando.192 In reality, neither the general 
policy of repression which the German administration adopted towards the people of 
Ewedome nor the flogging by German officials caused anything like the anger that was 
occasioned by the exaction by the German government of direct tax. Apart from the six 
marks payable annually by all males, or work not more than 12 days in a year or products 
corresponding in value to that amount, there were all sorts of other taxes imposed by the 
Germans. This included rubber, animal and emigration taxes193 The inhabitants reacted 
variously to this high-handedness of the Germans.194 Right from 1892, people in German
190 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/25 and ADM 11/1/603.
191 Hitherto, compulsory, unpaid labour was used by the Germans to construct roads. See K.B. Dicksion, ‘The 
Development o f  Road Transport in Southern Ghana and Ashanti since about 1850’, Transactions o f  the 
Historical Society o f  Ghana, 5 (1961), p. 38.
192 PRAAD/A ADM/39/1/20, Petition by Chief Kobla o f  British Kpeve to the District Commissioner, Volta 
River District, Ada 1920. Kpeve town was divided into two by the Anglo-German boundary.
193 Emigration taxes required people who went into foreign country, with exception o f  the Cameroons, for a 
period o f  over three months, to pay ten marks per person. See NA C 096/724/2, Annual Report o f  British 
Mandated Sphere o f  Togoland, 1920-21, p. 53. Some adjustments were made to the annual tax from 1909. For 
details, see Knoll, Togo, p. 74.
194 The brutalities meted out to natives particularly in East Africa by German colonial officers caught the 
attention o f some sympathizers in Germany leading to the formation o f  the German Society for the Protection 
o f Natives. This society used the paper Koloniale Rundschau to sensitise the German populace about German 
overrule in Africa. See Crabtree, ‘German Colonies’, p. 12.
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territory migrated in droves to settle in British territory.195 Most of them settled in and 
around Mampong and Somanya.196
The German colonial government was supportive of missionary efforts to promote 
formal education in the area. This cooperation was important because the early German 
officials needed the services of the missionaries as advisors and interpreters.197 At 
Amedzofe, a seminary for the training of mission teachers and a residential senior school 
for boys and girls were established in 1890.198 The enviable place of Amedzofe in the 
history of education in the region can not be glossed over. Amedzofe became the centre of 
education throughout the colonial period, drawing students from far and near. Indeed, in 
many respects, the fortunes of education in Trans-Volta Togoland were closely tied up to 
the pioneering works of the Germans in Amedzofe. Other schools were opened at Ho for 
infants. In 1914, there were 47 Bremen Mission schools in Ewedome while enrolment in 
schools stood at 1,673.199 In essence, the presence of German colonizers helped to advance 
missionary programmes which had hitherto been disrupted by the Asante invasion of 
1869.200 Similarly, wars among the various states in the region following the Asante 
invasion subsided because of the German presence. This provided the impetus for 
economic activities.201
The German period also saw the development of the exchange economy with the 
introduction of cash crops such as coffee, palm products and an increase in cotton
195 This phenomenon o f  emigration from Togo to the Gold Coast became a regular occurrence from 1900. 
Barbara Ward, ‘Some Notes on Migration from Togoland’, African Affairs, 49 (1950), p. 129. Knoll noted 
that from 1902-1904 some people in Ewedome flee into the bush or Peki and other parts o f the Gold Coast in 
the face o f  German harsh policies: Togo, p. 55-56.
196 See PRAAD/A ADM39/1/20, Anglo-German Boundary.
197 The point in also made in Henderson, German Colonial Empire, p. 75.
198 Togoland Report 1926.
199 NA C096/724/2, Togoland Report 1920-21, p. 29-30.
200 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 120.
201 White, ‘Awatime’, p. 35; Crabtree, ‘The Germans’, p. 365.
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production.202 Of these crops, palm kernel and coffee production were the ones which drew 
most attention from the German government. Cotton production actually went down from 
1902 when the inhabitants realised that palm products were becoming more profitable.203 
The formation of Kolonial Wirtschaftliches Komitee (Colonial Agricultural Board) in 1896 
in Germany facilitated the intensification of agricultural activities in German colonies in 
Africa as a whole.204 British colonial documents noted that ‘great pains were taken by the 
Germans to stimulate native enterprise, especially in demonstrating improved methods of 
cultivation’ of cash crops.205 From 1900, the German government stepped up cotton 
production in the area. This led to increase in export of cotton to an average of about 500- 
550 tons a year.206 The period also coincided with the rubber boom starting from the 
1890s.207
Cocoa cultivation on a large scale did not start in German Togoland until after 1902, 
though the crop had been introduced earlier in Ewedome by inhabitants who went to the 
Gold Coast and came back with cocoa seeds. Initially, the German officials did not allow 
the cultivation of cocoa because they wanted to preserve the forest208 Afforestation was 
one important project on the agenda of the Germans but cocoa cultivation involved the 
clearing of the forest and there was great effort by German officials to induce the 
inhabitants to preserve the forest. Later, German officials distributed cocoa seeds from 
Cameroon in Togoland such that by 1904, Togo began exporting a substantial quantity of
202 Details about the increase in cotton during the German period is found in Maier, ‘Persistence o f  
Precolonial Patterns o f  Production’, p. 71-95.
203 Maier, ‘Persistence o f Precolonial Patterns o f  Production’, p. 89.
204 C.T. Hagberg Write, ‘German Methods o f Development in Africa’, Journal o f  the Royal African Society 
(September, 1964), p. 32.
205 NA C096/724/2, Annual Report o f Togoland, 1920-21, p. 22.
206 German industries also depended exclusively on the importation o f  raw materials. See Le Sueur,
Germ any’s, p.26.
207 Crabtree, ‘Togoland’, p. 178-179; Debrunner, A History, p. 209.
208 Debrunner, A Church, p. 116.
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cocoa.209 According to Crabtree, there was an increase in the export of cocoa in German 
Togo from 1 ton in 1903 to 283 in 1912; while Nugent recorded an export of 335 tons from 
1906-1913.210
To facilitate the transportation of these crops to market centres, the German government 
decided to open up the area by the construction of feeder roads, especially linking up Ho. 
The Germans used forced labour and the threat of severe punishment and fines to force the 
people to construct roads using the crudest of implements.211 In 1914, British officials 
described the system of communication in German Togo as ‘admirably adequate for the 
needs of Togoland as it existed’.212 By 1904, Ewedome and German Togo as a whole, due 
largely to the imposition of direct tax and forced labour, became economically viable to the 
extent that Germany no longer found it necessary to expend grant-in-aid.213
The outbreak of the First Wold War in August 1914 sent waves of jubilation throughout 
the territory. Many of the people of Ewedome identified themselves with the war to get rid 
of the Germans. Consequently, the natives made generous contributions towards the war 
efforts.214 When British soldiers entered Lome in 1914, German soldiers surrendered 
without any resistance because at the time, the latter had a more important responsibility of 
defending Kamina, the big German wireless station.215 The Anglo-French operations
20y Knoll, Togo, p. 152-153.
210 Crabtree, ‘Togoland’, p. 183; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 51.
211 Dickson, ‘The Development o f Road Transport in Southern Ghana’, p. 37.
212 NA CO 724/2, Annual Report on British Mandated Togoland, 1920-1921, 14 November 1922, p. 20
213 Crabtree, ‘German Colonies’, p. 9. It is also said that after 1907, a large proportion o f German Togo’s 
revenue came from Direct Taxation. See Arthur J. Knoll, ‘Taxation in the Gold Coast Colony and in Togo: A 
Study in Early Administration’ in Gifford and Louis (eds.), Britain and  Germany in Africa, p. 449.
214 David Killingray, ‘Repercussions o f  World War 1 in the Gold Coast,’ Journal o f  African H istory, 19
(1978), p. 40. Anfoega, for example, contributed £165. Other states supplied numerous carriers for the 
Cameroon through E.T. Mansfield at Misahohe. PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/216, Anfoega Native Affairs. Togbe 
Hodo V to the DC, 1915.
215 NA CO96/742/20, Capture o f Togoland in 1914; W. A. Crabtree, ‘The conquest o f  Togoland’, Journal o f  
the Royal African Society, 56 (July, 1915), p. 390. The Germans also wanted to prevent the destruction o f  
Lome with its beautiful buildings and mission stations. PRAAD/A A D M 11/1/603, Account o f a German
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against the Germans in Togoland were therefore a success, for it turned out to be ‘the only 
easy conquest that the English and French had made in their assaults upon the German 
colonies.’216 Apart from the burning down of offices by German officials in Ho, Ewedome 
did not suffer much physical damage.217 The few German property left in the British sphere 
of Togoland were sold by auction as ‘enemy properties’.218 Most farmers, however, 
suffered as prices of their produce fell due to the war. Palm kernel producers bore the brunt. 
In 1913, the price was 6/6 per load of 601bs, which fell to 3/- by 1914.219 More excruciating 
was the fact that the partition left the railways in Togo under French control threreby 
leaving Ewedome ‘without any trade outlet to the sea’.220
Despite the German policy of divide and rule in the region, missionary activities coupled 
with German colonialism inadvertently led to the elevation of Awatime, Kpando and Ho 
above other dukowo in Ewedome. We noted that the German missionaries had turned 
Amedzofe, the mountainous town of Awatime, into a citadel of education from 1894 when 
a teacher training college was established there and from where educational programmes 
radiated to other parts of the region and beyond 221 In addition to the seminary for the 
training of teachers, Amedzofe had, before 1914, a senior residential school for boys. 
Similarly, Kpando became an important administrative centre since a sub-district
Prisoner o f War Captured by British Soldiers in 1914. This was the very opposite o f what the Germans did in 
Ho. Immediately on the outbreak o f  the war, the office buildings were burnt down by the Germans before 
they left.
216 Cyrus C. Adams, ‘The African Colonies o f  Germany and the War’, Geographical Review, 1 (January, 
1916), p. 453.
217 For the conduct o f  the war, see G. M. Wrigley, ‘The Military Campaigns against Germany’s African 
Colonies, Geographical Review, 1 (January, 1918), p. 47.
2,8 NA CO 96/724/1, Acting Governor to the Right Honourable, Viscount Milner, 28 July 1920.
219 RAG/H No. 0043, Palm Oil Control 1915.
220 Dickson, ‘The Development o f Road Transport’, p. 39.
221 Debrunner, A Church, p. 125.
222 NA C096/672/5, Togoland Report 1926, x4233. Kpando became the sub-district o f  Misahohe. See NA  
C096/724/2, Togoland Report 1920-21, p. 27.
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headquarters was built there by the Germans in 1894.223 From 1895 to 1901, there were 
collaborations between the German officials and Dagadu of Kpando in quelling opposition 
to German authority in Tove and Anfoega.224 In return for Kpando’s collaboration with the 
Germans during the period, Brown noted that ‘the Germans recognised Kpandu as being 
one of the most important inland Ewe chiefdoms and the Kpandu chief was seen to have 
political influence over much of the northern Krepi area’.225 In much the same way, Ho was 
one of the earliest Bremen Mission stations. It had a senior residential school for boys and 
girls as well as a market centre and the chief acquired a certain amount of importance and 
prestige.226 The German officials also had offices in Ho. Thus, the German period in turn 
reshaped the political landscape by elevating Awatime, Ho and Kpando above other 
dukowo. The reputation of these towns proved very important when the British took over 
from the Germans in 1914 and wanted to introduce the policy of amalgamation in the early 
1930s. On the international level, the transfer to British rule brought Ewedome and all 
former German colonies onto the international stage and led to a change in their status as 
colonies to that of Trust Territories.
Conclusion
Ewedome witnessed migrations from both the east and the west from the fifteenth 
century, which gave the population a heterogeneous character. Following the Akwamu 
occupation from the 1730s to the early 1830s, Ewedome adopted the Akan-style chiefship. 
In effect, each town or village in Ewedome, no matter its size and population, became a
223 Date taken from Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 213.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 NA C096/746/7, Report to the PMC, Geneva, 24-25 October 1938.
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chiefdom of a sort. This further served to deepen segmentation and made the number of 
independent political units stupendous. But the activities of the missionaries from 1874 
promoted the Ewe language as a lingua franca and led to the spread of Ewe migration 
traditions among non-Ewe speaking states in the region.
The processes towards formal colonisation of Ewedome started from 1884 in response 
to the demand by German traders on the coast for official German government protection. 
Germany’s colonial rule in Ewedome was characterised by harsh and inflexible policies and 
flogging as a widespread form of punishment. The period saw the monetisation of the 
economy, the promotion of cash crops for exports, the introduction o f direct taxation, the 
construction of some roads to open up the region and support for education. Though 
missionaries were initially opposed to colonial acquisition of the territory, the coming of 
colonial rule provided a peaceful atmosphere for the advancement of the evangelizing 
mission which had been disrupted by the Asante invasion of 1869-1874.227 Wars among the 
various ethnic groups subsided because of the presence of German soldiers and officials in 
the region. However, the German policy of making the village unit the basis of colonial rule 
entrenched tendency towards small-scale political units. The fragmentation was so 
pervasive that by the time Britain took over the administration of the territory, there were 
numerous small independent chiefdoms. But so far as the in-coming British officials were 
concerned, the unintended elevation of Awatime, Ho and Kpando during the German 
period meant that the crystallization of states around those three dukowo for the purpose of 
local government was feasible in the midst of the numerous chiefdoms scattered all over 
Ewedome.
227 See details in Nugent, Smugglers, p. 120.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MANDATE AND THE CREATION OF NATIVE AUTHORITIES, 1914-1949
In recent scholarly works on the southern section of British Mandated Togoland, the 
issue of amalgamation has featured prominently in the discourse on ethnic identity and 
chieftaincy disputes.1 In this chapter, amalgamation is discussed in relation to the 
development of local government in Ewedome. The chapter evaluates the mandate system 
and its relevance to the political re-organisation of Ewedome from 1914 right up to the 
political watershed of 1948 and the formation of Atando Native Authority in 1949. It then 
examines the 1932 Native Administration Ordinance and its impact on established political 
structures, and explores the principles that guided the creation of large states for the 
purpose of local government. It examines the relevance of local agents in the processes 
leading to the creation of amalgamated states. Finally, it examines the reactions to the 
policy by the local inhabitants and the responses of the administrative officers.
Mandate and Political Reorganization in British Togoland
The defeat of Germany in 1914 and her subsequent expulsion from her African colonies 
engendered a surge by Britain and France to occupy German Togoland in a manner that is 
described by Callahan as ‘a new scramble for Africa’.2 The issue as to who should take 
over which part of Togoland as well as Germany’s other African colonies soon brought the 
fate of the former German empire to the attention of the international community. Britain
1 See Nugent, Smugglers, p. 126-46; Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dom e’, p. 243-267.
2 Michael D. Callahan, Mandate and Empires: The League o f Nations and Africa, 1914-1931 (London, 1999), 
p. 9.
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had to spend a lot of time from 1918 in 1920 in justifying her occupation of Togoland.3 In 
August 1914, the inhabitants were told that British occupation of the territory was 
provisional and that the boundaries could not be determined until the war had been fought 
to a finish.4 The doggedness of American President Woodrow Wilson and other anti­
imperialist elements in Europe in ensuring that colonialism was refined led to the placing of 
all former German colonies under the League of Nations.5 This led to the creation of what 
came to be known as Mandates.
The mandate itself took so long to become operational due largely to the difficulty in 
defining the boundary between British and French spheres. The difficulty arose out of the 
vested interest of Britain and France, for each of them already administered a colony on 
either side of Togoland. Although both powers contributed forces to subdue the Germans, it 
was the British who first occupied the colonial capital of Lome on 26 August 1914, where 
200 Germans and 1,000 Africans surrendered.6 This appeared to have informed the initial 
decision of the Supreme Council of Allied Nations to allow Lome to be part of the British 
mandate in the Anglo-French boundary demarcation of 10 September 1914.7 But Lome had 
grown into a thriving seaport as a result of German rule. It came therefore as no surprise 
that France rejected this initial demarcation, culminating in protracted diplomatic 
manoeuvres.
3 According to the London Times Togolanders had never really settled down after their transfer to the German 
flag, and it has always been their genuine wish to see Britain back again: Times, 22 November 1937.
4 NA CAB 29/1, The German Colonies at the Peace Conference, Correspondence Relating to the Wishes o f  
the Natives o f the German Colonies, Enclosure IV, 12, November 1918.
5 Callahan, Mandate, p.3.
6 NA CO 96/742/20, Capture o f Togoland in 1914.
7 RAG/H, Togoland Report o f 1926, Enclosure ‘A ’, p. 6-7.
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The dispute over Lome was not settled until 30 September 1920 by a convention which 
ceded the city to France.8 A tentative definition of the boundary between Britain and France 
was made possible following the work of the Anglo-French Boundary Commission and the 
issuance of a Boundary Protocol in 1929.9 It is however important to note that final 
demarcation of the boundary was not done until years after the coming into force of the 
mandate system.10 As far as Ewedome was concerned, the southern and western boundaries 
remained unchanged; these having been defined by the Anglo-German Convention of 1 
July 1890 and 16 February 1900.11 Britain thus had to content itself with a narrow portion 
of German Togo of 40 miles wide and about 320 miles long. The area was landlocked, 
beginning about 30 miles from the coast.
Until 1932, the 1924 Administrative Ordinance, the first ordinance enacted by Britain in 
the southern section of British Togoland, allowed German laws to be in force and the direct 
rule system in practice during the German period was not revoked.12 Some local inhabitants 
of Ewedome were affronted by this delay in introducing a purely British system of 
administration. Apparently, there had been optimism that the British occupation would 
reunite them with their kith and kin in the Gold Coast. A petition from the chief of Kpeve 
to the District Commissioner at Ho in 1921 asking that British Kpeve and German Kpeve
n  9
be united was reflective of the people’s anxiety. This demand could not be met at the time
8 RAG/H, Togoland Report o f  1926, Enclosure ‘A ’, p. 6-7.
9 Togoland Report o f 1950, p. 4.
10 RAG/Ho ACC No.221,Togoland Unification Problem, Press Release by Government Agent Office, 6 
January 1955.
11 NA CO 96/790/2, Draft Togoland Report o f 1947, p. 8.
12RAG/H, Native Administration Ordinance o f 1924 (Not Filed). See also Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dom e’, p. 
256.
13 The town o f  Kpeve had been divided into two by the Anglo-German partition o f 1890. PRAAD/A  
ADM 11/1/1217, Kpeve (British) Petition from Chief, 1921. The people o f  the British sphere o f  occupation 
always feared the possibility o f  Britain eventually restoring Togoland to Germany: PRO CAB 291/1, Wishes 
o f the Natives o f the German Colonies, Enclosure IV, Novenber 1910. That the delay in coming into force o f
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on the grounds that the mandate had not yet been decided. Inhabitants of the territory and 
their families in the Gold Coast were, therefore, under different jurisdictions and would 
have to remain so until the future status of the mandated territory was decided.14
One of the arguments put forward by Britain in seeking the mandate to administer a 
portion o f Togoland was the desirability of uniting people of the same ethnic origin.15 The 
mandate, in a way, provided a window of opportunity for the problem created by the 
Anglo-German boundary to be rectified. However, an attempt to form an ethnically 
coherent boundary between British and French spheres of Togoland resulted in unifying 
only the Dagomba kingdom in the northern sector. In Southern Togoland, of which 
Ewedome was a part, no such unification was achieved. In spite of the problems created by 
the boundary demarcation, the League of Nations went ahead in October 1921 to approve 
the boundary arrangements between Britain and France. This paved the way for the terms 
of the mandate system to be defined and confirmed on the 20 July 1922.16
The British sphere was administered under the provisions of the Togoland under British 
Mandate Order-in-Council which was signed on 11 October 1923 by the governor of the 
Gold Coast.17 As mandatory powers, Britain and France had to administer the territories 
within a framework of international supervision and responsibility by a Permanent Mandate 
Commission (PMC). The mandatory powers had to report annually and send accredited 
representatives to the PMC. According to the terms, the inhabitants of the mandated
the Mandate System ‘generated unrest in [the] newly acquired territories over the continuing uncertainty 
concerning their future status’ is noted in Andrew J. Crozier, ‘The Establishment o f  the Mandates System, 
1919-25: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference’, Journal o f  Contemporary History, July
(1979), p. 486.
14 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1217, Anglo-French Partition 1915.
15 NA CO 96/702/4, Governor o f the Gold Coast to Sir Philip Cunliffe, Secretary o f  State for the Colonies, 23 
January 1932.
16 United Nations Trusteeship Council Report, 1947.
17 Ibid.
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territories were not the subjects of the mandatory powers, for the mandatory powers were 
not granted with sovereign authority over the mandated territories. In principle, the 
mandate sought to define the relationship between the colonial government and the 
inhabitants of the mandated territories. They had a different status to the subjects of the 
British and French empires. This position was reflected in the objection raised by the 
Chairman of the PMC to the use of the name “British Togoland” in reference to the 
mandated territory. “Togoland under British Mandate” was therefore chosen as a preferred 
description of the area.19
These provisions of the mandate were, however, rather nebulous. In the words of 
Callahan, ‘the mandate system was a complex and often contradictory blend of theory and 
practice’.20 It is quite difficult to state in what ways the status of the inhabitants of the 
mandated territory and those of the colony differed in practical terms. The only distinction 
noticeable was that Togolanders could not be conscripted into the army or other military 
services.21 Of course, they would also be described specifically as Togolanders in their 
passports but the practical effect of that description on their status remained negligible. It is 
clear that the British and the French did not see the mandates as any different from the 
other possessions that they had. This might have arisen out of the obvious ambiguity in the 
terms of the mandate. Moreover, the United States, which was instrumental in creating the 
mandate system, did not join the League of Nations so it could not do much to enforce the 
terms of the mandate. In reality, Britain and France could implement the mandate according
18 Crozier, ‘The Eastablishment o f  the Mandates. System’, p. 489.
19 NA CO 96/689/1, Downing Street to H.S. Newlands, 22 October 1928. We see also in German East Africa 
that several names were proposed until Tanganyika was finally agreed on. See Iliffe, Modern History o f  
Tanganyika, p. 247.
20 A detailed analysis o f the mandate system is found in Callahan, Mandates and Empire, p. 189.
21 League o f Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, Provincial Minutes, 26 October 1928. But as we shall 
see, many o f the inhabitants were recruited to fight in the Second World War.
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to their whims and imperatives. Nevertheless, the mandate signified the changing nature of
European imperialism, for by the regulations of the Permanent Mandate Commission,
• 22citizens of the mandated territories had the right to send petitions to the commission. Iliffe 
thus sees the mandate as ‘safe-guards against colonial abuse’23
Besides the boundary disputes and the delay in confirming the mandate, there were 
some generic problems that the British colonial government had to contend with. The most 
hydra-headed was the fragmentation of the region into small chiefdoms. This was 
particularly problematic because of long stretches of uninhabited land between the various 
units.24 Hilton’s analysis of the population in Ewedome, comprising Ho and Kpando areas 
in 1931, indicated a density of population of 51 persons per square mile.25 The sparse 
population coupled with the relatively poor infrastructure made socio-economic 
development of the area an onerous task.
Of equal importance was the question of whether to re-draw the German Togoland map
• Of s  •defining the boundaries between each division. During the case between Awatime- 
Dzokpe and Tafi-Atome, it emerged that the German map was not drawn based on proper 
surveys.27 In fact, they were drawn either based primarily on observations made by the 
German political officers during their tours through the country, or fixed as and when land
22 NA CO96/710/6, Gold Coast Confidential Despatch, Downing Street to the Governor o f the Gold Coast, 13 
April 1933; Callahan, Mandates and Empire, p. 103; Crozier, ‘The Establishment o f  the Mandates System’, p. 
485.
23 Iliffe, M odem  History o f  Tanganyika, p. 247.
24 Bourret, Ghana, p. 109.
25 This low figure could be due to the practice among the people o f  avoiding census for fear o f  paying a head 
or hut tax that had been imposed by the Germans. See T. E. Hilton, ‘The Distribution and Density o f  
Population in the Gold Coast and Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship’, PhD Thesis, University o f  
London (1955), p. 58.
26 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/216, Ho-Kpando District Native Affairs, Case number 1455/21, 1922.
27 The people o f  Awatime-Dzokpe and Tafi- Atome were engaged in a violent conflict over land following the 
departure o f the Germans. See PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/258, Dzokpe and Tafi Atome Disturbances, October 
1929. On how boundaries between divisions were fixed arbitrarily by the Germans, see Nugent, Smugglers, p. 
63.
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disputes arose between dukowo and their accuracy left much to be desired.28 The problem 
became worse when Britain took over the territory and agricultural activities were 
rejuvenated and there was a high demand for land to undertake government projects. 
Obviously, the British colonial government had to be circumspect in drawing a new map to 
avert inducement of land litigation.
Furthermore, there was the problem of how to revitalise trade in the territory. The 
Anglo-French boundary deprived the people of the right to free trade with their 
counterparts in the French zone.29 We noted that the railway from Kpalime to the port of 
Lome was the obvious outlet for the exportable produce of a large part of Southern 
Togoland but the Anglo-French partition placed the railway and the port of Lome under 
French control. This necessarily dislocated the system and deprived the inhabitants of the 
British sphere of Togoland from free access to Lome. Many Ewes in Ewedome wanted to 
trade with Lome instead of with Accra.30 Even the British colonial government felt the 
brunt of this boundary demarcation. In 1922, the Governor of the Gold Coast noted that ‘it 
costs £1.38 more per ton to ship produce from Ho to Addah in the Colony than to Lome, 
now in the French zone’.31 An agreement had to be reached with the French government for
• 32a portion of the cocoa grown in British Togoland to be exported through the port in Lome. 
These debilitating factors made for the delay in the smooth take-off of British rule in the 
territory.
28 Nugent described the mnner in which the Germans fixed the boundaries beteen dukowo as ‘extremely 
arbitrary’, p. 63. See also, Togoland Report o f  1926, p. 20.
29 See RAG/H 0192/23, Petition by Adjatekpor V, 13 June 1922.
30 Ibid.
31 NA C096/724/2, Governor to the Duke o f Devonshire, K.G., 14 November 1922.
32 NA CO96/780/4 Sir Alan Bums to G. H. Creasy, 9 December 1944.
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Fortunately, the situation was not entirely hopeless. As we have seen, German officials 
and missionaries had built schools that turned out the first generation of literate indigenes 
that could be worthy partners in the developmental effort. The cash economy was relatively 
developed through the production and export of cotton, palm oil, coffee and later cocoa. In 
1920, the British press noted that ‘Togoland already pays its way and its prosperity seems 
assured’.33 It is trite to read economic meaning into every colonial policy. Lawrance, for 
example intimated that the creation of Akan-like paramount stools gave chiefs the power to 
control stool land and to benefit from cocoa cultivation.34 This might be true in Buem and 
other Akan areas to the north of Ewedome where Lawrance shows how economic and 
social change brought by cocoa cultivation led to disputes that taxed the energies of both 
the French and British governments from the 1920s.35 In those areas, the need to regulate 
cocoa cultivation and control border traffic could be a possible motivating force behind the 
creation of Buem NA.
In Ewedome, cocoa was not a factor in the creation of NAs. It has already been pointed 
out that the Germans did not promote the cultivation of cocoa until the later part of their 
stay in the region. It was after the British took over that cocoa became the main export crop 
from the southern section of British Togoland in the early 1920s.36 Even so, the bulk of the 
cocoa was produced in Buem, Kadjebi, Ahamansu, Papase and Ampeyeo areas to the north 
of Ewedome. Nugent presents a classification of cocoa growing areas in the southern 
section of British Togoland which gives an accurate picture of how insignificant Ewedome
33 The Times, London, 21 January 1920, p. 11.
34 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dome’, p. 246.
35 See details in Benjamin N. Lawrance, ‘“En Proie a la Fievre du Cacao’” : Land and Resource Conflict on an 
Ewe Frontier, 1922-1939’, African Economic History, 31 (2003), p .135-181.
36 NA C096/672/5, Togoland Report 1926; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 51. Unlike the Southern Section o f  British 
Togoland, the first batch o f cocoa was recorded in the Colony in 1885. On the history o f cocoa export from 
the Gold Coast, see Polly Hill, The G old Coast Farmer (London, 1956), p. 103-105; David Kimble, A 
Political H istory o f  Ghana: The Rise o f  Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928 (Oxford, 1963), p. 13.
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was to the cocoa industry.37 Most of the land in Ewedome areas such as Anfoega, Gbefi, 
Ho, Hohoe and Kpando was simply unsuitable for cocoa cultivation. Le Lievee wondered, 
for example, why the people of Kpando decided to settle on an ‘open grassy orchard 
country studded with small hills [for which reason they were] unable to grow commercial 
produce’. The only area in Ewedome where cocoa was grown in some appreciable 
quantity was the mountainous areas of Awatime and Honuta near Kpedze. For this reason, 
many people from Ewedome who were interested in cultivating large cocoa farms had to 
migrate to the Akan and Buem areas to the north of Ewedome while others went to the 
Colony to become part of ‘the backbone of the cocoa labour force’.39
Brown outlined three main reasons for the creation of NAs in the region.40 The first was 
to establish mechanisms for settling ‘land and other disputes between the numerous petty 
chiefdoms’.41 Second, to revive trade which had been dislocated in the region and to 
minimise the migration of the youth from the region. According to Brown, the removal of 
border restrictions which had been imposed by the Germans between the territory and the 
Gold Coast ‘facilitated the migrations of large numbers of youngmen across the River 
Volta’.42 Therefore, the British officials wanted to use the NAs to mobilize the inhabitants 
to improve the economic development of the territory by building market centres and 
constructing roads.43 In this way, the number of youngmen moving into the Gold Coast 
could be reduced. Third, the British government wanted to establish its authority in the 
region by eliciting the loyalty of the inhabitants. According to Brown, British officials were
37 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 55.
38 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, Le Lievee, Tribal History o f Kpando Division, 1924 p. 1.
39 Hill, The G old Coast Cocoa Farmer, p. 24.
40 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 16-18.
41 Ibid, p. 16.
42 Ibid, p. 17.
43 Ibid.
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aware of the desire of some German-educated Togolanders who would like to see the 
Germans return to the territory. This was evident from the activities of the Deutsch Togo 
Bund, a German Togolanders Association.44 Brown concluded that it was the pursuance of 
these three goals which led to the appointment of DCs and the creation of NAs with powers 
to control local affairs.45 The point here is that, by creating NAs, the British officers sought 
to redirect the commitment of the inhabitants from the Bund to the colonial administration 
and its institutions. In addition, as Brown noted, the creation of NAs would reduce the 
influence of the German and other missionaries in the region.46
The fragmentation of the people notwithstanding, the mere existence of chiefs meant the 
existence of recognised leaders in the various political units who could be used as focal 
points for implementing important colonial policies. In addition, the gradual supplanting of 
Guan and Togo remnant languages in the area by ‘standard Ewe’ made it possible to 
envisage a fairly easy task of disseminating information about the colonial government’s 
policies. Equally important was ‘the virility, cheerfulness and adaptability o f the people’; 
qualities that allowed officials to be optimistic about the future of the territory.47
In 1924, the British divided the mandated territory into southern and northern sections. 
The northern section was administered as part of the Northern Territories Protectorate of 
the Gold Coast. The southern section, of which Ewedome was a part, was further divided 
into three administrative areas. The most southerly was administered from Ho, the central 
part from Kpando and the northern area from Krachi.48 An important step taken by the
44 Details o f this association follows in the chapter 4.
45 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 18.
46 Ibid, p. 17.
47 Togoland Report 1933, p. 6.
48 Krachi was initially included in the Northern Section but it was later transferred to the Southern Section in 
December 1950.
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British colonial government was to place the southern section of the mandated territory 
under the aegis of the Commissioner of the Eastern Province (CEP) with its headquarters at 
Koforidua. Thus, the territory remained formally distinct, but an effective ‘merger’ came 
about through the extension of the authority of the CEP. To cement this merger, Nana Ofori 
Atta, Omanhene of Akyem Abuakwa and a leading member of the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council as well as the President of the Provincial Council of Chiefs of the Eastern 
Province, toured the southern section of British Togoland in 1926.49 The supreme court of 
the Gold Coast exercised jurisdiction in the Southern Section where civil courts operated 
under the presidency of political officers seconded from the Gold Coast.50
Even though Colony laws applied to Ewedome, there were special laws that dealt with 
native administration, native courts and the alienation of land.51 In all this, the British 
government had envisioned the development of local government in the area, and the 
officials were well aware that the people of Ewedome had many things in common with 
other Ewes of the adjoining areas of the Gold Coast colony.52 Therefore, the merger was 
seen as much in the interest of the inhabitants as it was a matter of administrative 
convenience. A successful development of local government in the area was contingent on 
having people with some important community of interest. In addition, Ewedome and the 
whole of the southern section of British Togoland would learn from the experiences of the 
Eastern Province in the art of local governance.
49 NA C096/672/5, Report to the Council o f  the League o f Nations, 1927.
50 ‘In the absence o f a local criminal code, that o f the Gold Coast was introduced as a basis o f  procedure’. See 
NA C 096/724/2, Annual Report on British Mandated Sphere o f  Togoland 1920-21.
51 NA CO 96/780/4, File No. 31458/6, Native Administration, 1924.
52 The idea o f introducing local government into the British Togoland was formulated as far back as 1924. See 
Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 27. Also Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study o f  Problems 
Arising in Africa South o f  the Sahara (London, 1938), p. 479; NA CO96/790/2, Draft Togoland Report, 1947, 
p. 9.
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Moreover, the level of development in Ewedome in the mid 1920s was still below 
expectation. This was in contrast with the situation in the Gold Coast Colony where the 
governorship of F. G. Guggisberg from 1919 to 1927 was celebrated as progressive in 
terms of political reforms and infrastructural development. The idea of introducing local 
government into British Togoland became more urgent due to the depression of the 1930s 
which resulted in retrenchment, conservatism and the extension of indirect rule. It was in 
the light of this that the creation of NAs in Ewedome was seen as crucial for the 
administration of the territory, and not necessarily for the control of cocoa economy.
Early Ethnographic Research
The difficulty in creating NAs in Ewedome was how to find agreement as to which chief 
should be the paramount in a newly created state.53 It required some delicate balancing acts. 
First, government had to be careful in determining the actual seats of traditional authority 
within the area that would be designated as new NAs. Second, government had to avoid 
repeating mistakes committed in areas such as south-eastern Nigeria to ensure that whoever 
was to be a paramount chief commanded some degree of acceptability before granting 
those powerful statutory instruments. In appointing Warrant Chiefs in Iboland in the 1890s, 
the officials did not ‘ensure that those chosen for the job were in fact the right men’.54 The 
formulation and implementation of British colonial policy in Ewedome was therefore based 
on various studies carried out in the region.
53 Togoland Report o f 1933 p. 6.
54 Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs, p. 60.
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As early as 1915, R. S. Rattray was commissioned to undertake ethnographic research in 
the territory.55 Rattray’s research had three main objectives. First, ‘to ascertain as far as 
possible what connection racially, linguistically, or by reason of conquest, or suzerainty, 
nominal or real, the tribes in the region (Togoland) have with the inhabitants of the Gold 
Coast Colony.’56 Second, to find out ‘what racial or linguistic connection exists between 
the different elements that go to form this portion of Togoland’.57 Third, to determine the 
basis for Peki’s claim of suzerainty over Ewedome area.58 Rattray was upbeat about how 
valuable such a history or traditions collected directly from the native raconteurs were to 
the local colonial officers:
a collection of traditions such as these help the administrative officer to get 
in close touch with the people whom he lives among, and the knowledge 
that their ancient history is shared by the European who governs them 
serves to give that bond of mutual understanding without which the 
administration of the blackman by the white must be a rule based on 
suspicion, aloofness or fear. An understanding of past-linked-histories 
of these tribal divisions may sometimes help the administrators to know 
where trouble is to be expected.59
The above statement summed up the relevance and the motive behind the task assigned 
to Rattray. He interviewed chiefs and elders of over 234 villages stretching from the district 
of Misahohe in present-day Togo to the district of Kpando and Ho in Ewedome. His
55 For details, see RAG/H RAO 2073, R. S. Rattray, A History o f  the Tribal Divisions o f the District o f  
Misahohe and the Sub-District o f  Ho and Kpando, 19 April 1915.
56 Ibid.
57
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approach was to ‘compile verbatim as much of the history as oral tradition has preserved’.60 
His findings established the point that the inhabitants were one people with strong linkage 
with the inhabitants of the Gold Coast and that their disintegration ino smaller chiefdoms 
was fostered by the Germans. All this, according to Rattray, made ‘a case for British right, 
politically and morally, to take over that part of German Togo’.61 Based on these findings, 
Rattray concluded that it ‘would not be a difficult task to unite under more powerful heads 
units that still remember their past history and traditions’.62 On 14 January 1918, before the 
formal partition of German Togo, J. T. Furley, the Gold Coast Secretary for Native Affairs, 
was commissioned to ‘undertake the task of finding out the wishes of the people of the 
British sphere of occupation in Togoland with regard to the future administration of their 
country’.63 Given the German highhandedness, very little hesitation was evinced by the 
inhabitants in expressing a strong aversion to German rule and an equally strong preference 
for British rule 64
In 1924, P. D. Le Lievee, Assistant DC at Kpando, conducted a research into the tribal 
history of Kpando.65 Lievee’s research focused on Kpando and its surrounding divisions 
and covered aspects such as the history, administration of native law, religion and custom. 
Key to the work of the local colonial officers was Lievee’s findings that Kpando was the 
most important political division in the Ewedome area of the British Mandated Territory.66 
He observed that before 1903, ‘many units were at one time or another either subservient or
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 NA CAB/29/2, Correspondence Relating to the Wishes o f the Natives o f the German Colonies, Enclosure 
lv , November 1918.
64 Ibid.
65 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, An Essay on Tribal History o f  Kpando Division, by P. D. Le Lievee, 1924. Le 
Lievee served in Kpando before C. C. Lilley. See See PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, Case No. 373/186/26,
Kpando Affairs, 2 March 1926; Brown, ‘Politics in Kpandu Area’, p. 103.
66 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/42, An Essay on Tribal History o f Kpando Division, p .l.
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at least under the influence of Kpando’.67 It was in that year that the Germans dealt a blow 
to the power and prestige of Kpando by setting up those units as independent. Therefore, 
a detailed understanding of the history and culture of Kpando, according to Lievee, was 
‘the key to a knowledge of the inhabitants of a comparatively wide stretch of country’.69 
Similar research was conducted by Captain C. C. Lilley in the early 1920s, although on
nc\a smaller scale. Lilley was appointed to the area in 1920 and was given the task of 
superintending the implementation of the policy of amalgamation and the introduction of 
the NA system of local government in the territory. He was bom in 1889 and was educated 
in Cheltenham College, after which he joined the British army. He rose to become a 
Captain in the Worcestershire Regiment and fought in the First World War, during which 
he lost his right arm. On 25 August 1920, he was appointed Assistant District 
Commissioner to Kpando sub-District. In 1930, he was awarded an OBE.71 Lilley initially 
worked under Captain E. T. Mansfield. Appointed DC at Ho in 1921, Lilley brought his 
military discipline to bear on the execution of colonial politicies in the area.72
Lilley’s work was not just a compilation of oral history. He engaged with some analysis 
of ‘the various emigrations which took place, [particularly from the west] and which 
resulted in populating the country known as Togoland’.73 Lilley went on to become a 
member of the Anglo-French Boundary Commission which demarcated the frontier 
between British Togo and French Togo in 1929. He used his knowledge of the ethnography
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Lilley’s account ‘A Short History o f  Nkonya’ published in the Gold Coast Review  in 1925, provided 
detailed ethnographic history o f  not only Nkonya, but also on aspects o f the history o f  Ewedome during the 
Asante invasion.
71 NA Colonial Office Lists, 1921, 1926 and 1938; NA C096/724/2, Despatches No. 358, 12 April 1921.
72 NA C096/724/2, Dispatches No. 358, 12 April 1921.
73 Lilley, ‘Short History’, p. 125.
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of the area, in the words of Nugent, ‘to ensure that the line did not cut across divisions 
where this could be avoided’.74
In 1924, follow-up research was undertaken by Captain Mansfield to ascertain which 
chiefs could be made the head of the amalgamated states. It emerged from his findings that 
Kpando, Awatime and Ho were the most influential states in the Ewedome region. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that these findings were the basis for the merger of the southern 
section of British Togoland with the Eastern Province of the Gold Coast in 1924 and 
important factors in formulating the policy of amalgamation in Ewedome. Rattray, the 
author of the 1915 report, went on to greater fame with his huge body of research on Asante 
and the Northern Territories in the 1920s. His anthropological findings on Asante provided 
crucial information for the design of the scheme of native administration not only in that 
region but in southern Togoland and the Northern Territories.75 Lentz has noted Rattray’s 
admiration for Akan political structures and constitution, which he viewed as ‘the prototype
7  f \for the planned reform of native administration’. As the head of the Anthropology 
Department of the Gold Coast, Rattray’s ideas largely influenced the creation of large states 
with strong chiefs in Ewedome.
Lawrance alluded to some investigations that were conducted into native traditions and 
structures from 1924 upon which the colonial government endorsed the policy of creating 
larger states in the territory.77 He also intimated that Lilley, by virtue of his research and 
long stay in the region, ‘was becoming somewhat of an expert on Ewe custom’.78 Indeed,
74 For details about the work o f the Boundary Commission in shaping the Ghana-Togo border, see Nugent, 
Smugglers, p. 35-38.
75 Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, (Oxford, 1929), p. v.
76 Lentz, Ethnicity and the M aking o f  History, p. 95.
77 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dome’, p. 256-257.
78 Ibid, p. 259.
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the main legislative framework applied to the territory was specifically intended to take into 
account social and political groupings and custom. This was evident, as we shall soon see, 
in the extension of the jurisdiction of the tribunals to cover almost every aspect of 
‘customary law’, and that the interpretation o f those laws were actually devolved to the 
native tribunals.79 Lentz notes how important this research was ‘in the British production of 
ethnographic knowledge’.
It was after similar research into native ‘constitutions’ that we see, by the early 1930s, 
the extension of indirect rule into the Northern Territories and of course the start of the 
move towards the restoration of the Asante Confederation, a process which became 
complete on 31 January 1935. Thus, the policy of amalgamation was not peculiar to the 
southern section of British Togoland; similar projects of formalizing and extending the NA 
system were also underway elsewhere in the Gold Coast. But of more comparative 
relevance to Ewedome was the Northern Territories, where small-scale ‘stateless’ people 
were also being amalgamated into larger and supposedly more administratively ‘rational’ 
units, with treasuries and courts based on the findings o f anthropologists such as Meyer 
Fortes.81
The British colonial government had since the 1930s demonstrated its willingness to use 
research in shaping colonial policy in Africa. We learn from Allman and Parker’s work that 
Fortes’s research on Taleland from 1934-35 was important in the design of indirect rule in 
that territory. In the introduction of direct taxation, specific reference was made to the 
relevance of Fortes’ research on the ‘organisation and delegation of responsibility among
79 NA CO 96/790/2, Draft Togoland Report o f  1947, p. 22. Details on the definition, nature and usage o f  
‘customary law’ follow in the next chapter.
80 Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making o f  History, p. 73.
81 Allman and Parker, Tongnaab, p. 204-205.
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the tribes which comprised the Mamprusi Division’.82 Fortes was accredited for drawing 
the framework for indirect rule among the Talensi people, just as Lilley was instrumental in 
drafting the 1932 Ordinance for the southern section of British Togoland.83 Another 
comparison can be drawn from the Tanganyika case, where the Germans had destroyed 
‘tribal cohesion’ [and] ‘tribal government’. This necessitated the merging of small 
chiefdoms by the British into large ones in attempt to create united ‘tribes’ by 
‘reconstructing the institutions existing before the disaster of German rule’.85 This called 
for ‘a true appreciation of the existing conditions and forms of government immediately 
prior to German occupation’.86
It was observed by colonial officials that the various ‘tribes’ in Africa had genealogical 
connections and that, ‘small tribes were offshoots of big ones and might therefore be
R 7reunited’. Iliffe quotes a British official as saying that ‘native administration was as much 
a historical as a political exercise, its outcome depended heavily on the historical view
OO
current among administrators or plausibly advocated by interested Africans’. It was these 
ideas emanating from the various research that led to the crystallization of the concept of 
amalgamation in British colonies from the 1920s. This policy, which involved the creation 
of states large enough for the purpose of local government necessitated ‘the subordination 
of smaller chiefdoms’.89
82 Ibid, p. 204.
83 Ibid, p. 205.
84 Iliffe, M odem  History o f  Tanganyika, p. 323
85 Ibid, p. 322.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid, p. 324.
88 Ibid, p. 323.
89 Ibid, p. 330
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Formulation of the Amalgamation policy
From 1932, the British government began to take steps to establish effective 
administration in Ewedome. Consequently, a special Native Administration (Southern 
Section of British Togoland) Ordinance of 1932 was passed. This replaced the 1924 
ordinance which had allowed the continued application of the German system of direct rule 
in the territory. Specifically, the ordinance was to provide for the appointment of NAs and 
to prescribe their powers and duties. There were to be constituted divisional and state 
councils as well as native tribunals with well defined powers and jurisdiction.90 These 
councils would then complement efforts by the colonial government in matters such as the 
formulation of laws and administration of justice in the territory. The ordinance sought to 
place the native administration of southern Togoland on a proper statutory basis analogous 
to that which had been provided in other territories such as Tanganyika, the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria.
As pointed out by Hailey, the native administration policy put in place in the Gold Coast 
and later introduced in Ewedome was based on the Nigerian model.91 The principle that the 
right of jurisdiction flowed from the Crown through the Governor and his officials, but was 
not inherent in the chiefs by virtue of their enstoolment, was very much enshrined in the 
ordinance. Therefore, the emphasis here, so far as the 1932 Ordinance was concerned, was 
more on the judicial function of chiefs rather than on their executive authority and 
responsibility.92 It was typical of the British colonial government to vary some details of its 
colonial policy from colony to colony. For example, the degree to which chiefs and NAs
90 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/559, Native Administration Ordinance to Togoland, Case No.2/35/31 (1932).
91 For an overview of the introduction o f  native administration policy into British sphere o f Togoland, see 
Hailey, African Survey, p. 477- 480.
92 Native Administration (Southern Section) Ordinance o f  1932.
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were used in administering any British colony varied according to the peculiarities of each 
colony.
As we have seen, the social and political organization of Ewedome was of far greater 
complexity than in many other regions. There was a conspicuous absence of ‘big chiefs’ as 
compared to much of the Gold Coast.93 What exacerbated the problem was the grant of a 
tribunal to every chief and sub-chief by the Germans.94 The net result was the multiplicity 
of divisions with stupendous number of tribunals: 243 were recorded in 1920.95 Apparently, 
if the Britain colonial government was to be successful in implementing the 1932 ordinance 
in Ewedome in tune with the dictate of indirect rule and local government, then she had to 
go the full hog to undertake some restructuring of the fragmented region. Consequently, the 
government decided to introduce the policy of amalgamation which would culminate in the 
creation of large states with ‘big chiefs’ who could assume status comparable to paramount 
chiefs in the Gold Coast.96
Admittedly, it was simply impossible to give every head chief or Fiaga of every 
division in Ewedome much the same powers as were given to a Paramount Chief in the 
Gold Coast. Consequently, the term ‘state’, which hitherto applied loosely to all divisions, 
could no longer be used. The British government insisted that the term ‘state’ could only be 
applied, in the real sense of the word, to amalgamated areas. Therefore, states that had 
existed prior to amalgamation in Ewedome were designated as divisions and their divisions 
became sub-divisions. Large political units, it was envisaged, might be able to direct a well-
93 RAG/H RAO 134/2, Statement by Governor A. Ransford Slater to the League o f Nations Permanent 
Mandate Commission October 1928. NA CO 746/7, Annual Report to the Permanent Mandate Commission 
24-25 October 1938.
94 Any head o f  family who had left the parent village and founded a new one was allowed by the Germans to 
style himself a sub-chief. See C096/746/7.
95 Ibid.
96 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v Dom e’, p. 251-253.
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defined policy for the mutual benefit of all divisions in the territory. In addition, as Hailey 
pointed out, the purpose of amalgamation of the small chiefdoms was to create states of 
sufficient size and population which would allow for the establishment of local government 
on a proper basis.97 The idea of introducing the policy of amalgamation was conceived by 
the colonial government much earlier but the actual process of achieving this objective was 
set in motion in 1929.98
One of the benefits of amalgamation to the natives was that the Paramount C hiefs 
tribunal was given greater powers to hear cases which hitherto went to the District 
Commissioner. Treasuries were also to be established so that the NAs would be empowered 
to act as agents of development in the provision of such facilities as clinics, schools and 
roads. Since the increased powers would be given to amalgamated divisions it followed 
therefore that those divisions which did not amalgamate would lose whatever powers they 
already had.99 Divisions which agreed to amalgamate were to be given a British flag, not 
only to commemorate their amalgamation but also to serve as a symbol of authority.100 By 
1932, it became obvious that the colonial government had envisaged the creation of three 
amalgamated states in Ewedome. Lilley was said to have gone through the German 
archives and discovered a German document which had pencilled the Awatime, Ho, 
Kpando, Hohoe and Buem chiefs as the seniors in the southern section of British 
Togoland.101 Hohoe was, however, less significant in the pre-colonial history of Ewedome
97 Hailey, African Survey, p. 479.
98 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/545, Memorandum on Amalgamation in Southern Togoland, 1946; PRAAD/A ADM  
11/1/1285, Amalgamation o f Divisions Around Ho, 2 March 1931; PRAAD/A ADME39/1/286,
Amalgamtion o f Divisions (Southern Section) Togoland, Asogli State, 1932-1945; Brown, ‘Politics in 
Kpandu Area’, p. 27.
"PR A A D /A  ADM39/1/25, Amalgamation o f  Divisions, 23 October 1931.
100 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/216, Ho-Kpando District Affairs, Case No. 154/32, Petition by Togbe Delume III,
14 July 1932.
101 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v Dom e’, p. 256-257.
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and did not feature prominently in the early research conducted by colonial officials. It was 
in the 1920s that Hohoe assumed significant importance in Ewedome because of its
1 f l ?position as a cocoa marketing centre, though the cocoa did not come from Hohoe itself. 
Therefore, a clear picture had emerged by the 1920s as to how many NAs should be created 
in Ewedome.
The Amalgamated States
The 1932 ordinance gave legal backing to the creation of amalgamated states in the 
territory. The choice of Awatime, Asogli and Akpini as the seats of the amalgamated states 
was based on the pre-colonial history of the chiefdoms in Ewedome. In the words of 
Debrunner, ‘the kings of Ho, and Kpando had distinguished themselves particularly in the 
resistance against Asante and now exercised a kind of leadership based on the reputation 
they had won’.103 As we shall soon see, even before the proclamation of the policy of 
amalgamation, there were intriguing manoeuvres by Dagadu IV of Kpando, Adjatekpor V 
of Awatime, Kwadzo Dei of Peki and Howusu of Ho to reassert their influence over smaller 
chiefs to whom the Germans had granted independent tribunals.104 Peki’s move was 
untenable because it was outside the mandated territory. Thus, there were local 
collaborators who stood to benefit from the policy and whose support was a crucial factor 
in creating amalgamated states in Ewedome. We shall consider the creation of the three 
amalgamated states in turn.
102 Interviews with C.F.Y. Dekavie, a retired educationalist, Hohoe, May 2007 and Mr Tsetse, Tutor, St. 
Teresa’s Training College, Hohoe, May 2007. The point is also made in Nugent, Smugglers, p. 53.
103 Debrunner, A Church, p. 19. It is important to note that Debrunner’s work was based on oral traditions that 
he collected in the territory from 1959 to 1960.
104 PRO CO 96/706/2, Reports on Provinces, Volta River District, 17 August 1932. The role o f Howusu in 
pushing for amalgamation in Asogli state is recorded in Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v Dom e’, p. 252.
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Akpini (Kpando) State
Lilley referred to Kpando as the most important political division in the British 
mandated territory.105 It was no surprise that, according to Brown, Kpando was ‘the head of 
the first amalgamated state in British southern Togoland’ in 1928.106 Kpando was made up 
of fifteen towns with Kpando-Gabi being the fiadu. Lilley considered as outstanding the 
personality of the head chief, Anku Dagadu III, who ascended the stool on 3 May 1898 and 
died in 1925.107 According to the Togoland Report of 1926, ‘never had a suzeraign a more 
loyal and devoted servant than this government had in Dagadu Anku’.108 Le Lievee’s 
ethnography of Kpando also shows that Sovie and Awate formed the rear guard of 
Kpando’s military organization in pre-colonial times.109 Various colonial documents stated 
that until 1930, there were political units or divisions which were subservient to the stool of 
Kpando and that it was the German government who caused the disintegration of Dagadu’s 
empire ‘by setting up as independent a number of tribes formerly subservient to the stool of 
Kpando’.110 Brown observed that the deportation of Dagadu III to Cameroon by the 
Germans in 1913 inadvertently shored up Kpando’s prestige within Krepiland.111 We also 
recalled how Dagadu III mobilised other Ewe states to oppose the inoculation of people 
against sleeping sickness. Even before the German presence in the area, the British
105 Togoland Report, 1926, p. 4.
106 Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 213.
107 Dates taken from NA C096/672/5, Togoland Report 1927; Funeral brochure for the late Dgadu VII, 2007, 
p. 42.
108 Ibid.
109 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/42, Le Lievee, Kpando Division, p. 4.
110 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/25 No. 48/20, Rattray and Captain Mansfield to the Governor o f  the Gold Coast, 
1921.
111 David Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 213.
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government had acknowledged the seniority of Kpando over the other states, including 
Nkonya.112
Again, Kpando was ‘decidedly the largest and most important commercial town in the 
whole of the Krepi country’.113 As we noted, it was Kpando’s commercial importance that 
attracted the Germans to Ewedome in the 1890s and it had been the desire of ‘the chief of 
Kpando and his elders to see their economic importance translated into a correspondingly 
improved political position’.114 To the Germans, Kpando was ‘more important than its 
neighbours in Krepi’ and the chief was said to have exercised political authority over much 
of the territory.115 It came therefore as no surprise that Kpando became one of the district 
capitals in German Togo. Akpini state was the first to start the process of amalgamation in 
the southern section of Togoland in January 1927, when the first group of 12 previously 
independent chiefs came together at the instance of Dagadu IV to oppose a gun-tax of £1 
introduced by the British government.116
The success in opposing the gun-tax led to the convening of a second meeting on 21 
November 1929, this time by Dagadu IV who ascended the stool in 1926 and ruled until 
1948.117 It was at that second meeting that the name Apkini was adopted by all the chiefs 
and Dagadu IV elected as president.118 This then was ‘the original and indigenous attempt
112 Ibid, p. 205.
113 Ibid, p. 202.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. p. 212. Dagadu was one o f the few chiefs who was paid a salary by the Germans in recognition o f  his 
importance.
116 See RAG/H RAO 1/1932, Report on the Native Administration Ordinance o f  British Sphere o f  Togoland, 
1932. The 12 hitherto independent divisions were Agate, Awate, Gbefi, Fodome, Have, Leklebi, Liate, 
Kpeve, Sovie, Vakpo and Tsyome. See the preamble to Danyigba Kaka  festival brochure, 1 July 1974. 
Interviews with Dagadu VII Kpando, 5 February 2005 and Mr Vanance Kyekye, a retired Kpando Local 
Council worker, Kpando, 3 July 2007.
117 Preamble to Danyigba Kaka festival brochure, 1 July 1974.
118 Therefore, Akpini refers to the amalgamated state under the leadership o f Kpando. See Preamble to 
Danyigba Kaka festival brochure, 1 July 1974.
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of the people for an amalgamation’.119 According to Brown, Lilley had wanted to aboundon 
the plan to form amalgamated states by August 1928 and to create a loose federation 
because of unpopularity of Dagadu IV coupled with strong opposition from Anfoega, Ve 
and Gbi to coming under the presidency of Kpando.120 Dagadu vehemently opposed 
Lilley’s plan to scrap the amalgamation policy and petitioned the Governor.121 When Lilley 
went to the UK on a six-month leave, Dagadu took advantage of the former’s absence to 
form the Akpini amalgamated state and got the CEP’s endorsement before Lilley returned 
to the territory in May 1929.122
Awatime State
Awatime, with its capital at Vane, was also one of the more prosperous states in 
Ewedome. Awatime, in spite of its small size, wielded some political influence in the 
nineteenth century.123 In pre-colonial times, the oath of Adzatekpor, the paramount chief of 
Awatime, was resorted to by Ewe states in settling inter-personal and inter-state disputes. 
Adzatekpor’s court commanded respect and reverence among Ewe states as far as Agu in 
Togo because of an alleged potency of Adzatekpor’s oath, Adzatekpor Wanbi. The oath had 
its origin in one of the wars which Awatime was said to have fought with Logba and Tafi 
on a mountain known as Wanbi in the late nineteenth century.124 Feuding factions in Ewe- 
speaking states swore the oath in order to seek redress in the court of Adzatekpor.
119 Ibid.
120 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 33.
121 Ibid, p. 35.
122 Ibid, p. 36.
123 Brydon, ‘Constructing Awatime’, p. 29.
124 Interviews conducted with Mr Lawson Osena, Asafoatse o f  Awatime Gbadzeme and a retired 
educationalist, 4 December 2007.
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In addition, the popularity of Adzatekpor soared higher among Ewes because of the 
defeat that Asante suffered in the hands of Awatime people in 1869.125 There was also the 
obvious fact that by the end of the German period, Awatime had developed and became the 
most prosperous of all the states which later formed Awatime Native Authority in 1932. 
Adzatekpor IV had a long tradition of working with Europeans since the Bremen Mission 
Station was opened in Amedzofe in 1890. We have already seen how the establishment of 
educational institutions in Amedzofe by the German missionaries gave prominence to 
Awatime. Futhermore, Adjatepkor V, who succeeded the throne in 1917 and ruled until 
1954, was equally a great leader whose ability to speak both English and German made him 
a dependable partner of the colonial officers.126 For his able leadership, Adzatekpor V was 
awarded the KBE in 1949.127
Although Adzatekpor was popular in the area, there were obvious problems in 
attempting to make him the paramount chief over Ewe-speaking states. Awatime people 
were not part of the Ewe-speaking group. If claim by Awatime, as reported by Brydon, that 
they left Ningo in the Ga-Adangbe area in the wake of Akwamu invasion in 1679 is 
anything to go by, then one can conclude that the peopling of Ewedome by Ewes preceded 
the arrival of Awatime people.128 Geographically, Awatime occupied the greater part of the 
mountainous area of Ewedome and it had seven towns or divisions: Amedzofe, Biakpa, 
Dzogbefeme, Dzokpe, Fume, Gbadzeme and Vane. The paramount chief of Awatime, 
Adzatekpor, resided in Vane, the capital town. In the south-east and south-west parts of
125 This view is supported by Brydon, ‘Constructing Awatime’, p. 29. See also NA CO 96/746/7, General 
statement by C.C. Lilley to the 35th session o f  the PMC at Geneva, 24 to 25 October 1938
126 Interview with Adzatekpor VI, Former President o f the National House o f  Chiefs, 8 June 2002.
127 Interview with Mr Lawson Osena, Asafoatse o f  Awatime Gbadzeme, 4 December 2007.
128 Brydon, ‘Constructing Awatime’, p. 28. The assertion that Awatime people were from Ahanta in the south­
western Gold Coast and that they arrived in Ewedome after the Ewes had settled in the region is also found in 
White, ‘Awatime’, p. 35.
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Awatime were Ewe states such as Akome, Dodome, Dzolo, Hoe, Honuta, Klave, Kpedze, 
Kpoeta and Saviofe. By the policy of amalgamation, these Ewe states were expected to join 
Awatime to form an enlarged Awatime state and to recognise Adzatekpor as their 
paramount chief.
Apart from the historical and linguistic differences between the people of Awatime and 
their Ewe neighbours, there were cultural peculiarities that set the two ethnic groups apart. 
For example, circumcision was a taboo among Awatime people, while the Ewes as a whole 
practised circumcision.129 This cultural prohibition inhibited intermarriage between the 
people of Awatime and their Ewe neighbours. In addition, marriage customs and other 
forms of traditional practices of Awatime were based on Akan laws and customs which 
were fundamentally different from the customary laws and traditional practices of the Ewe- 
speaking people.130 These differences had relevance to the determination and promotion of 
the aspirations of Awatime people on the one hand and their Ewe neighbours on the other. 
An awful lot more effort had to be expended by Lilley and other officers to persuade these 
two ethnic groups to cooperate in a common local government administration.
Asogli (Ho) State
The formation of Asogli NA is well covered by Lawrance. It is, however, important to 
recount how Ho came to be chosen as the seat of Asogli State. Ho was also one of the 
earliest Bremen Mission stations and the local chiefs had acquired some degree of 
importance and prestige due to the development of a thriving market in the town.131 It was 
made up of seven towns or divisions with Bankoe being the first settlement. In his
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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examnination of periurban Ewe identity, Benjamin identified Ho and Kpando as some of 
the towns having ‘historical roots as powerful centres’.132 The formation of Asogli state
was the most protracted. The divisional chief of Ho-Dome, Constantin Komla Howusu,
1presented himself to British officials ‘as the only literate chief in the Asogli area. 
Consequently, Howusu became the obvious choice as paramount chief of Asogli State, 
which was to be composed of divisions outside Ho territorial area.134
There is, however, another version to the reason for the choice of Howusu, instead of 
Afede, the head chief of Ho-Bankoe. According to the Agyemang Badu Commission 
Report on the chieftaincy disputes in Ho in 1958, the choice of Howusu of Dome instead of 
Afede o f Bankoe was due to the latter’s refusal to shake hands with Lilley.135 Lilley had 
lost his right arm in the First World War and on meeting Afede, he offered his left hand but 
Afede refused on the ground that it was a taboo to shake hands with the left hand. This 
annoyed Lilley and he decided not to have anything to do with Afede any more. While the 
outside divisions resented the loss of their independence, disagreement over the choice of 
Howusu rendered Ho division itself incapable of leading the amalgamated state. The other 
divisions of Ho objected to the choice of Howusu Komla because Afede of Ho-Dome was 
considered the head chief of Ho. Meanwhile, in a petition to the governor in 1931, Afede of 
Ho-Bankoe recalled the gallantry displayed by Ho-Dome in the Akwamu invasion.136 There 
is no doubt that the historical relationship that the three dominant local leaders -
132 Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 26.
133 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v Dom e’, p. 250
134 The ceremony o f installation o f Howusu ia recorded in PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1285, The Unification o f  
Native States o f Togoland, Notes by Captain Mothersill o f a Meeting o f Chiefs held at Ho, 24 February 1931.
135 RAG/ H, RA0144. Agyman Badu Commission o f Enquiry into the Chieftaincy Disputes in Ho, 31 January 
to 16 May 1958. The controversy between Afede Asor I and Lilley is contained in PRAAD/A ADM39/1/456, 
Qaurterly Reports, Ho District, 1932. See also Babara Callaway, ‘Local Politics in Ho and Aba’, Canadian 
Journal o f  African Studies, 4 (1970), p. 134-145.
136 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1285, Unification o f Native States Togoland, Ho-Asogli, Petition o f Fia Afede o f  
Ho Bankoe to Sir Alexander Rensford Slater, 7 July 1931.
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Adzatekpor, Dagadu and Howusu - had first with the Germans and then the British had an 
impact on shaping the amalgamated states. Their emergence as new paramount chiefs 
represented, to some extent, a return to the regional status quo of the late nineteenth century 
where the three chiefs became dominant local leaders after the Akwamu and Asante 
invasions by creating a culture o f ‘progressive chieftainship’.137
The implementation of policies of this nature, Spear argues, could not have been 
possible without some local historical precedents.138 This assertion corroborated the point 
made in Iliffe’s work on Tanganyika that NAs, ‘must obviously be a normal evolution of 
whatever form of tribal government [had] existed’.139 He noted further that the 
establishment of NAs ‘was as much a historical as a political exercise, its outcome 
depended heavily on the historical views current among administrators or plausibly 
advocated by interested Africans’.140 It must also be bome in mind that the whole idea of 
NAs was not just about using chiefs to mobilise labour, impose taxes and raise revenue, but 
also to introduce a system of government at the local level using traditional leaders. The 
amalgamated states as well as the paramount chiefs needed some degree of local legitimacy 
to be effective partners in the scheme of indirect rule, which of course limited the ability of 
colonial officers to simply invent and imposed such a policy on the indigenes.141 What was 
happening in Ewedome with regard to this policy exemplified the dynamics at play during
137 According to Iliffe, ‘progressive chiefs’ such as Mgeni, Abdiel Shangali and Gabriel Ruhumbika were 
‘key figures in indirect rule’ in Tanganyika in the 1920s. Iliffe, Modern History o f  Tanganyika, p. 327.
138 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 4.
139 Iliffe, M odem  History o f  Tanganyika, p. 322.
140 Ibid, p. 323.
141A detailed and broader picture o f these dynamics and their influence on the reconstruction o f  new identities 
in colonial Africa is presented in Spear’s critique o f  the concepts o f ‘invented tradition’, ‘making o f  
customary law’ and the ‘creation o f tribalism’. See Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 3-27. Lentz also argues 
that ‘it was not only European views that fed into this discourse about tribal characteristics, history and 
ethnicity; Affiacn knowledge and ideas, introduced by chiefs, also played their part’. See Lentz, Ethnicity and  
the Making o f  History, p. 86.
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the colonial era in Africa, where colonial officials created larger units, with the assistance 
of indigenous actors in areas where chiefdoms were seen as too small and fragmented to be 
of practical use. The fact was that various chiefdoms in Ewedome, just as in other parts of 
Africa, started experiencing tremendous economic, social and political transformations 
since the contact with the missionaries. Local parochial interests, according to the officials, 
had to give way to the interest of a larger community in order to meet the demands of 
modernity. Spear is right in stating that the colonial state itself had to change in order to 
adapt to local conditions and meet its own set objectives.142 Thus, the colonial policy of 
centralisation in Ewedome created a platform for the three ‘more determined Ewe chiefs to 
attain regional hegemony’.143
Reactions to the Political Reorganisation
Criticism of the 1932 ordinance was severe in the Gold Coast press.144 A government 
report quoted the press as having regarded the ordinance as a sinister move to impose direct 
taxation using chiefs.145 Section 3 of the ordinance, which gave the Governor power to 
constitute any administrative area or appoint any chief to be a NA, received the severest 
attack. The contention was that the ordinance gave the colonial government unfettered 
powers to effectively control the NAs. Specific reference was made to the provision 
allowing the governor to regulate orders issued or issuable by the NAs which in the view of 
the press would reduce chiefs to the status of government appointees.146 Even among the
142 NA CO 96/705/8, Report on an Ordinance o f  the British Sphere o f  Togoland (Southern Section) 
Amendment Ordinance 1932, 29 June 1932.
143 Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 34.
144 Ibid.
145 Section 36 o f the ordinance proposed the introduction o f a Native Revenue Administration Ordinance.
146PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/653, Acting Attorney General’s Report, 1932.
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administrative officers themselves, there was some scepticism. De Hart, the acting Attorney 
General, questioned the feasibility of introducing such a highly complex and technical 
legislative instrument in a territory composed largely of an illiterate population.147 
Arguably, it was one thing being successful, as a chief, in exercising jurisdiction and 
administering justice under native custom, but it was quite another making written bye-laws 
in accordance with the tenets of an ordinance whose language and technicality a chief could 
not comprehend.
In Ewedome itself, protest against the policy was spontaneous, particularly from 
divisions that were to amalgamate with the so called ‘Paramount Chiefs.’ Interestingly, the 
protests were not against the policy per se. The main contention of the smaller divisions 
was that the definitions of terms such as ‘sub-Divisional Chief, ‘Paramount Chief, and 
‘State’, as well as the interpretations of those terms in the text of the ordinance which 
implied and postulated subordination of one independent stool or division to another stool 
or division. For example, there seemed to be some confusion with regard to the definition 
of the term ‘Paramount Chief and Fiaga.us Fiaga which is the Ewe equivalent of an Akan 
‘Paramount Chief or Omanhene had existed long before amalgamation. The only 
difference was that the territorial area of jurisdiction of the Fiaga was relatively small. 
Again, ‘a state’ in the traditional sense referred to a duko in Ewedome. However, as we 
observed earlier, so far as the ordinance was recognised, ‘a state’ was a number o f dukowo 
coming together and owing allegiance to one central paramount authority. This obvious 
problem of terminology persisted throughout the period of NAs and constituted a major 
source of disagreement well into the post-independence period.
147 Ibid.
148 Report o f  Agyman-Badu Committee o f Enquiry into Chieftaincy Affairs in the Volta Region, 5 December, 
1973.
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Opponents of the policy further argued that the subordination o f a stool’s territorial 
independence was not needed to achieve the political and administrative reconstruction of 
the territory.149 It was contended by the divisional chiefs, sometimes referred to as ‘smaller 
chiefs’, that the position of the paramount chief of a state should be that of primus inter 
pares.150 In other words, they wanted a formula under which all chiefs could co-operate in 
forming a political or administrative state without the constituent divisions necessarily 
having to sacrifice their sovereign independence and territorial or stool integrity. Mass 
meetings were held throughout the smaller divisions to elicit the views of the people 
regarding the ordinance, after which 23 Fiagawo and Fiawo met to petition the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies.151 The government noted that the purpose of this particular provision 
was to define the executive functions of the NAs. Another ground of protest was the fact 
that the tribunals established under the ordinance would be subject to the supervision of 
administrative officers as well as liable to closure if they were found to have abused their 
powers or to be incapable of administering justice impartially.152 The fact that the NAs 
were new and were required to administer a complex legal regime made the need for 
supervision necessary. The lack of such supervision in the Gold Coast Colony accounted 
for the growing unpopularity of the 1927 Native Administration Ordinance among the 
common people.153
149A similar situation occurred amongst the Ga people o f Accra when the Native Authority Ordinance o f 1927 
was introduced. See Parker, Making the Town, p. 227.
150 The main argument against the policy o f amalgamation was that the position o f paramount chief was not 
made rotational. See Collier, ‘Ablode ’, p. 24; Nugent, Smugglers, p .126-146.
151 NA CO 96/705/8, Petition from Fiawo, 25 September 1932.
152 Ibid.
153 NA CO 96/705/8, Petition, 25 September 1932.
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The real difficulty was that the authority of some chiefs was seen as being enhanced, 
while others feared that their status was being reduced.154 A close examination of the 
ordinance, however, shows clearly that the chiefs generally had greater freedom and power 
in exercising their judicial functions under the 1932 ordinance than they had under the 
Germans. In the German period, no authority was conferred on chiefs to enforce 
judgements, such enforcements were permissible only with the approval of a political 
officer who had absolute discretion in the matter.155 The 1932 ordinance, on the other hand, 
enhanced the status of the chiefs by substituting the right of effective jurisdiction for the 
arbitration powers which they had possessed under the Germans.156 This was however not 
enough to placate the divisional chiefs who were determined to hold their own against the 
policy.
Another source of protest was in relation to section 32(2) of the 1932 ordinance, part of 
which read:
any native proved to be in possession of stool property who, after being 
ordered by the state council to deliver up the stool property, fails to do 
so shall be guilty of an offence, and shall, on conviction by a State Council, 
on which the necessary jurisdiction is hereby conferred, be liable to a 
fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprisonment with or without 
hard labour for any term not exceeding six months.. .and the one would be 
ordered to deliver the said property within one month from the date of such 
order and on failure to comply with such order his private property may be
154 Togoland Native Administration Ordinance, 1932. Sections 19 and 41.
155 NA C 096/724/2, Annual Report on British Togoland 1920-21, p. 21.
156 Ibid. Part IV.
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attached and sold to recover such value.157
On the face of it, this clause looked innocuous, but an understanding of the events which 
informed its insertion explains why it generated so much indignation. From the beginning 
of British control over the area, the institution of chieftaincy began to witness a gradual 
change towards greater authority and powder. This was in sharp contrast to the German 
period when the institution was not altogether an enviable one so people did not see the 
need to contest the stools. The coming of the British appeared to trigger an increase in 
chieftaincy disputes.158 In some cases, people decided to hide stool property in order to 
prevent the enstoolment of a chief whose selection they had opposed.
A typical example was in Ho-Dome where a dispute arose as to the right of succession 
to the stool in 1930. The stoolfather (Zikpuitor), being dissatisfied with the decision of the 
elders, hid the stool.159 When all efforts to locate the stool proved futile, a new stool had to 
be consecrated for the newly elected chief.160 A similar incident occurred at Kpedze in 
1932 where the original stool was removed by those who had custody of it because they 
objected to the chief elected.161 This trend provided the basis for the necessity of inserting 
section 32(2) into the ordinance. It was the intention of the British government not to 
interfere in any way with the choice of a chief, if the choice was unanimous. At the same 
time, when there was a considerable dissension among the divisions as to who to elect as a
157 The Native Administration (Southern Section) Ordinance o f 1932, p. 13.
158 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/285, Amalgamation o f  Divisions, Case no. 2184/32, Chieftaincy Dispute in 
Alavanyo, 1944.
159 The Stoolfather or Zipkuitor is the head o f the family which produces the chief and he is the custodian o f  
the stool. The proximity o f the stoolfather to the stool made him a very powerful person in the chieftaincy set­
up. See Verdom, Abutia Ewe, p. 92.
160 See detail o f this incident in PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/281, The Asogli State, Case no. 194/1932.
161 PRO CO 96/705/8, Togoland Native Administration Ordinance, 1932,
Official Government Despatch, No. 867, 8 December, 1932.
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chief, the government was bound to intervene to some extend in the interest of law and 
order.
Apart from protests emanating from the provisions of the ordinance, the ‘smaller chiefs’ 
took strong exception to the principles that were to govern the formation of large states. 
One such provision was that government would not give legal recognition to the 
amalgamation of a division with a state unless the said division was unanimously in favour 
of amalgamation.162 If a head chief of a division wished to amalgamate with another 
division, he first of all had to obtain the consent of all the chiefs, elders, and people within 
his division. He then had to be accompanied by his subordinate chiefs and elders or their 
representatives to the paramount chief whose state he wanted to amalgamate with for the
1 /TO
swearing of oath of allegiance.
To achieve unanimity on the issue of amalgamation in Ewedome proved to be very 
difficult because many of the divisions were disturbed by internal strife emanating from the 
policy. Factions emerged within divisions as a result of struggles for political power. There 
were also disagreements over which particular state divisions should amalgamate with.164 
In 1931, for instance, the chief of Goviefe, Sasraku VII, petitioned Captain Lilley against 
the decision of the chief of Woadze to amalgamate with Dagadu of Kpando. Apparently, 
Sasraku, who claimed to be the paramount chief over Have and Woadze divisions, wanted 
all divisions under him to amalgamate with the Ve division.165 Therefore the decision of the
162 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/338, Amalgamation o f  Chiefs, 13 July 1946.
163 RAG/H RAO 0014, Confidential Correspondence, Appendix B, Unamalgamated Divisions 8 September 
1932. Details about the commonalities in the amalgamation ceremonies are found in Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. 
Dom e’, p. 261-263.
164 RAG/H No. 48/21, Address by Captain Lilley to the Chiefs o f  Ho Division, 28 October, 1931.
165 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/338 Amalgamation o f Chiefs, 13 July 1932.
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chief of Woadze to go contrary to the wish of the chief of Goviefe generated tension 
between the two divisions.
Similarly, in 1932, the chiefs, elders and people of the various divisions of Wli state sent 
a petition to Lilley at Kpando in which they expressed their objection to the decision of 
their paramount chief to amalgamate with Gbi (Hohoe). The people of Wli claimed that 
traditionally, they had had a long relationship with Dagadu of Kpando and that it was their 
wish to amalgamate with Akpini state under the paramountcy of Dagadu. They went further 
to destool their paramount chief and enstooled another person. This generated chieftaincy 
disputes in Wli traditional area.166 In the same vein, the paramount chief of Ve was 
dsstooled in 1932 for amalgamating with Dagadu because some divisions in Ve objected to 
amalgamation with Kpando.167 Again, the decision of the paramount chief of Adaklu to 
amalgamate with Ho instead of Peki created tension between the paramount chief of 
Adaklu and his subjects. In Aveme area, while some of the citizens cited proximity as one 
of the reasons why they preferred to join Kpando (Akpini) others objected to it vehemently. 
Those who opposed the idea made reference to a land dispute between Kpando and Aveme 
which led to conflict between the two states in 1926.168
In addition, some divisions had chieftaincy disputes which made unanimity 
unachievable. A typical example was Asogli state. As stated earlier, chieftaincy disputes in 
Ho division had its origin in 1930 when Lilley made the sub-divisional chief of Ho Dome, 
Howusu, the paramount chief of Asogli state. Consequently, Togbe Afede of Ho-Bankoe
167 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/338, Amalgamation o f Chiefs, 13 July 1946.
168 PRAAD/A ADM, Amalgamation o f  Divisions, Aveme Native Affairs, 1937.
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lost his position as the head chief of Ho division from 1930 to 195 8.169 The Ho incident 
became one of the contentious issues which made amalgamation of other divisions with 
Asogli very difficult to achieve. As we noted, Howusu himself was having serious 
problems as when he was enstooled in May 1930 the stoolfather refused to give him the 
stool because he (the stoolfather) did not recognise his right to be a chief. Consequently, a 
new stool had to be made for Howusu.170 It therefore came as no surprise when in October 
1930, thirteen head chiefs agreed at a meeting in Tanyigbe to elect Togbe Afede as their 
paramount chief of Asogli state, in defiance of Lilley’s directive.171
Initially, divisions were allowed to amalgamate as they pleased, provided the state was 
of sufficient size to warrant recognition as a state.172 As things turned out, this principle 
also became a recipe for chaos as divisions began to amalgamate haphazardly. It was no 
surprise that kinship ties between the various divisions became the basis for amalgamation. 
An example was the decision by the people of Adaklu to amalgamate with Peki instead of 
Ho. Adaklu alluded to a long standing pre-colonial bond of friendship between them and 
Peki; forgetting that the ordinance was not in any way applicable to the Gold Coast Colony, 
of which Peki was a part.173 It was based on the same principle that the people of Akome, 
Aveme, Dedome, Dzolo, Kpeve, Honuta and Kpale decided in 1931 to amalgamate under 
Ve, even though these divisions were not geographically coterminous thus making a 
mockery of the objective of the policy of amalgamation.174 This was followed by the chief
169 In 1958, following the findings o f  a Commission o f  inquiry into the dispute, the paramountcy was given 
back to Ho-Bankoe and Afede has since been the head o f  Asogli State. See Inquiry into the Chieftaincy 
Dispute in Ho in 1958. For details on the origion o f the despute, see PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/456, Quarterly 
Reports, Ho District. This incident was also recounted in Callaway, ‘Local Politics in Ho and Aba’, p. 135.
170 Ibid
171 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/025, Report on the Ordinance o f  1932, 17 May 1932.
172 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/216, Ho-Kpando District Native Affairs, Case No. 1455/21, 1931.
173 Togoland Report o f  1947, p.9.
174 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/25, Report on Amalgamation o f  Divisions in Togoland, 1931.
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of Taviefe who in 1932 opted to join Togbe Sri of Anlo far away on the coast in the Gold
i nc
Coast Colony because he did not want to serve under any division in Ewedome.
One principle which generated great controversy and protest was that ‘amalgamation 
was recognised only if native custom of a particularly binding nature had been performed 
by the divisions concerned.’176 Before the advent of colonialism, no customary observance 
of a binding nature had ever existed among the various independent divisions (dukowo). It 
was not a common practice for any chief within a duko to contemplate performing a custom 
that would bind him and his du or the whole duko to a chief of another division. However, 
considering the importance which the inhabitants attached to oath the colonial officials 
found it expedient to use it as an important instrument for forming and cementing large 
states for the purpose of local government.
Oaths and the Creation of Native Authorities
Generally, there were two types of oaths among the Ewes, the chiefs oath and the so- 
called fetish oath.177 In the context of the creation of NAs, the focus will be on a chiefs 
oath, the discussion of which will illuminate our understanding o f why the use of oath to 
enforce amalgamation became highly contentious. A chiefs oath can be described as an act 
of making reference to some disaster or tragedy that befell a particular ethnic group, a state, 
a town or even a chief. The disaster could take the form of a defeat of a state in war, the 
tragic death of a chief either through a strange illness or through assassination. In most 
cases, the day on which the disaster occurred became a taboo. A chiefs oath could also
175 RAG/H RAO 133, Meeting o f Captain C.C. Lilley and the Chiefs o f  Taviefe, 26 May, 1932.
176 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/545, Memorandum on Amalgamation in British Togoland, 1946.
177 The word ‘fetish’ is a complex word, incorporated into the local usage from the Portuguese word feitico  
and commonly used to refer to anything to do with the African spiritual realm, but still retaining problematic 
and sometimes derogatory overtones.
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originate from the ritual performances involved in instituting a stool. A stool could 
therefore have one or more oaths.178 Any reference made to those disasters was tantamount 
to swearing an oath which had very serious implications for the one who swore the oath, 
the state, and the chief whose oath was swom. In the traditional Ewe worldview, veneration 
of ancestral spirits was an essential feature. Swearing of a chiefs oath was therefore a very 
serious matter because it had the potential of evoking the wrath of the spirits of the 
ancestor(s) involved in the said disaster.
Under very strenuous circumstances, however, people could resort to the oath in order to 
save their lives, institute an action or prove their innocence. For example, if someone had 
been wronged or someone accused someone else of an offence, then swearing an oath 
underlined the seriousness of the accusation, forcing the accused to respond (often by 
swearing an oath) or to concede their guilt or culpability. Therefore, if anybody who was 
accused of a crime said, ‘meka Hoawo fe  f i e \  literally meaning ‘I swear by the evening of 
Ho’, or ‘me ka Dagadu fe  Kwasida’, ‘I swear by Dagadu’s Sunday’, ‘he/she was making a 
very solemn declaration of his/her innocence’.179 The chief was then obliged to investigate 
the allegation. In the same vein, if two people were involved in a quarrel and one of them
i Jinfelt his or her life was in danger, he or she could swear the oath of any stool. Once the 
oath was swom, the quarrel had to stop immediately because the swearing of oath 
introduced a new dimension into the dispute. The matter at stake ceased to be a mere 
quarrel between the two individuals, instead it assumed significant importance at the state
178 Welman, Native States, p. 49.
179 Ibid. The evening o f  Ho refers to the eve o f  Asante invasion o f Ho and Dagadu’s Sunday is in reference to 
the day Dagadu III lost his two sons in a blazing fire.
180 People could swear the oath o f a stool outside their town if  they felt that they would not get a fair hearing 
in their own town or if  they had any reason to believe that the oath in their town was not potent enough.
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level. Both parties had to present themselves to the chief whose oath was swom for the 
matter to be investigated.
A chief could also swear oath for two main reasons. First, he could use the oath of his 
stool as instrument of enforcing his orders which under normal circumstances could be 
disobeyed by his subjects. Second, a chief could swear an oath pledging his allegiance to 
his superior chief. This happened particularly within a traditional area where sub-chiefs in­
charge of villages swore an oath of allegiance to the chief of their parent settlement (fiadu). 
In such a case, the swearing of oath was preceded with elaborate ritual performances. 
Normally, the subordinate chief would swear the oath of the superior chief to pledge his 
loyalty to the senior chief. The senior chief would reciprocate the gesture by swearing his 
own oath to affirm his commitment to protecting the subordinate chief. Chiefs could not 
swear oath without holding and stretching out the ‘oath-sword’ (atamkayi), the most visible 
symbols of authority of a chief.181
The swearing of an oath of allegiance by Delume, the paramount chief of Ve, to Dagadu 
IV, the paramount chief of Kpando, to mark the entry of Ve into the amalgamated Akpini 
state, vividly illustrates the seriousness attached to a chiefs oath and its relevance in 
cementing the formation of large states in Ewedome. On 24 July 1946, after Delume had
1 o9
failed to form his own amalgamated state, he finally decided to join Akpini state. Before 
Delume swore Dagadu’s oath to pledge his allegiance, a sheep was slaughtered and Delume 
dipped his left foot and his linguist stick into the blood of the sheep. This ritual signified 
the admission of Delume into Akpini state. Both chiefs then drank palm wine from the
181 The stool itself was not to be seen in public. In fact, in some localities, even chiefs were not allowed to see 
the stool.
182 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/338, Amalgamation o f  Chiefs, 13 July 1946.
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same calabash as a sign of unity. Dagadu then dipped his finger into the blood of the sheep 
and touched the tongue of Delume with the blood.
The significance of the ritual was that it reminded Delume of the need to remain truthful 
to whatever he would say. It was also meant to serve as a seal of the whole transaction. 
Delume then held the oath sword in his hand, stretched it towards Dagadu and proceeded to 
swear the oath of allegiance thus: ‘If Dagadu called me either by day or night and I failed to 
respond to his duties or I disobeyed him, then I shall be guilty of Dagadu’s Sunday 
{Dagadu fe  Kwasida)\m  Dagadu also got up, took the oath-sword and assured Delume of 
his resolve to protect Ve traditional area at all times.184 Again, the chiefs who met at Vane 
to seal the amalgamation of Awatime state in 1931 swore Adzatekpor’s oath, Adjatekpor 
Wanbi, to the effect that if they broke away from the amalgamated state, the oath should 
kill them.185
It is important to observe that by swearing the oath of Dagadu, Delume was in fact 
subordinating himself, all stools in Ve area as well as the people of Ve to Dagadu and his 
stool. While there was nothing in the Native Administration 1932 ordinance by which the 
territorial rights of a particular stool were conveyed to another stool, the swearing of oaths 
of allegiance and the rituals associated with it tended to subordinate one stool to the other. 
The swearing of oath, together with the definition of “State” as contained in the ordinance, 
sought to confer on the so called big chiefs greater powers of principe principium over 
‘smaller chiefs’. In the traditional sense, such greater powers could only be exercised by the 
‘big chiefs’ if they had acquired the territories of the smaller divisions either by right of 
conquest or through cessation. Therefore, the explanations given by Lilley and other
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 See Togoland Report o f 1931, p .12.
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administrative officers that the oath of allegiance conferred no right on the paramount 
chiefs of amalgamated states over the lands of the stools subordinated to them was difficult 
for the smaller chiefs to fathom.186
By 1932, it became apparent that amalgamation was not going to be achieved easily, and 
that the government could not rely on the good will of the people to achieve total 
amalgamation. For instance, 15,000 and 13,000 were the total population of Asogli and 
Awatime states respectively, while the population of Akpini was 28,000. Akpini had 
nineteen divisions, Awatime ten and Asogli thirteen.187 Yet, there were still fourteen 
divisions in Ewedome which refused to join any of those states. The total population of 
unamalgamated states at the time was 32,534.188 Meanwhile, the delay in the full 
implementation of the policy slowed down the development of the territory. In 1937, for 
example, the colonial government was accused of doing little to improve amenities in the 
Togoland mandated area.189 It was reported that in 1937, it took almost as long to get a 
reply from Ho to a letter posted at Accra as it did to one despatched to London.190 Kpando 
had no telegraphic or telephonic communications with the outside world. Mails were sent 
from Accra to Ho and Kpando through Adidome by runners on foot.191 There was no 
hospital in the area.192 The plan was that, when established, the NAs could be empowered 
to begin the process of addressing the developmental needs of the territory.
186 Ibid.
187 It is important to note here that the process o f  amalgamation started long before amalgamation was given 
legislative form in the NAO o f 1932. See RAG/H, RAO 1/1932, Report on the Native Administration 
Ordinance o f British Sphere o f Togoland, 1932.
188 Figure computed from the 1931 census.
189 The West African Review, No. 120 September, 1937, p. 39.
190 Ibid.
191 NA CO 724/2, Annual Report on British Togoland 1920-21, p. 33.
192 The West African Review, No. 120 September 1937, p. 39
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Government’s Reaction to Protests
Initially, the government decided to go ahead with the implementation of the policy 
despite the protests with the view that its implementation would alleviate the disquiet 
among the chiefs and those who had already agreed to amalgamate. Meanwhile, the policy 
received support from the members of the Permanent Mandate Commission.193 As protests 
against the policy grew, government was forced to re-examine the ordinance and the 
principles under which amalgamation was to proceed. This led to the postponement of the 
formal application of the ordinance from July to October 1932.194 There seems to be a clear 
case of misunderstanding of some terms in the ordinance itself due largely to language 
limitations. Linguistic difficulties had always been a problem for colonial officials in the 
region. Often, one comes across many shades and gradations of the English language which 
had no exact counterpart in the local language. We already noted the people’s conception of 
‘state’ as against its interpretation in the ordinance. This created some confusion in the 
minds of the inhabitants.195
It was also realised that mere persuasion was not enough to achieve total amalgamation 
in Ewedome.196 This was not due to any weakness in the persuasive power of the 
administrative officers. Rather, it was partly as a result of the extraordinarily fierce local 
patriotism. It was clear that the dukowo were resolutely protective of their age-old loyalties 
and were not in any mood to brook any interference in their domestic affairs. In Britain, the 
concept of local government and its workings emanated from centuries of political,
193 See NA CO 96/705/8, Notes on the Petition from Natural Rulers Society. 25 September 1932.
194 NA CO 96/705/8, From the Acting Governor o f  the Gold Coast to Secretary o f State o f the Colonies, 8 
November, 1932.
195 RAG/H RAO 755/155/124, Dispatch from the DC, Kpando to the Commissioner o f the Eastern Province, 
Koforidua, 1932.
196 Ibid.
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constitutional and legal developments. Yet, the nature of the political change expected from 
the people was so dramatic, considering the huge contrast between the levels of 
advancement of the territory to that of Britain at the time. It was therefore erroneous to 
proceed from the assumption that the inhabitants could be persuaded to accept the policy 
simply because the officers considered the policy to be good for them.
Some degree of force or coercion was necessary if the policy was to be effective. As a 
first step, an amendment to the ordinance was effected in 1936. One of the key issues in the 
amendment was the enforcement of amalgamation.197 It was aimed at forcing ‘stubborn’ 
divisions to amalgamate. It gave a further boost to the power of the chiefs by making it 
possible for anybody who refused a directive to appear before a NA, Provincial 
Commissioner or Administration Officer to be arrested.198 In addition, unanimity would no 
longer be required before giving legal recognition to amalgamated states. Once there was a 
definite majority in support of amalgamation in a division, the process could be allowed to 
go on. This particular amendment proved quite successful as it lessened the tension on 
divisions in which the people were divided on the issue of which particular state they 
should join. We observed that some divisions were unable to amalgamate because a 
minority was apparently opposed to the policy.199 Consequently, Aveme was allowed to 
join Akpini state in 1941 even though only two-thirds of the population were clearly in 
favour.200 Also because of this new directive, only ten divisions remained unamalgamated 
by 1941. A further step was taken to abandon the principle of voluntary amalgamation. In
197 NA CO 96/728/9, Togoland Native Administration Legislation, Amendment to 1932 Ordinance, 22 
August 1936; RAG/H, Supplement to the Gold Coast Government Gazette, 10 July 1936. (Not Filed).
198 NA CO 96/728/9, Togoland Native Administration Legislation. Amendment to 1932 Ordinanace, 22 
August 1936.
199 RAG/H RAO 221/3, Amalgamation o f  Chiefs-British Togoland, 1936.
200 RAG/H RAO 33/45, Akpini State Affairs,1933.
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1936, divisions which refused to amalgamate were debarred from exercising jurisdiction
over their own subjects by means of a tribunal until those divisions became members of a
• •  201state. Cases that arose in those divisions had to go directly to the District Commissioner. 
Indeed, Taviefe finally succumbed to amalgamating with Asogli state in 1941 as a result of 
this directive.202 Similarly, Adaklu, which refused to amalgamate with Ho, was forced to 
join Asorgli state in 1945 for want of a tribunal.203
Apart from the grant of tribunals, colonial officers also resorted to the use of resource 
allocation as an instrument to coerce ‘recalcitrant’ divisions to amalgamate. For instance, 
divisions such as Anfoega, Gbi, Have, Kpedze, Tsrukpe and Ve which refused to 
amalgamate were denied the supply o f gun-powder and social amenities such as water, 
clinics and grants for education 204 Another case in point was the decision taken by Lilley in 
1936 to stop the construction of a bridge between Have and Vakpo.205 This was in reaction 
to Have’s refusal to amalgamate with Kpando. The bridge was to be built across River 
Dayi. But when the people of Have insisted that they would not join Kpando to form 
Akpini state because of a long standing dispute between the two states, Lilley called for 
works on the bridge to stop. All materials were removed from the site, forcing the people to
906amalgamate with Kpando.
201 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/76, Eastern Province Political Conference, Appendix C, June 1936.
202 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/280, No. 475/2185/32, Agotime Native Affairs, Amalgamation o f Taviefe with 
Asogli State at Agotime Kpetoe, 8 March 1943..
203 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/74, Report on Amalgamation o f  Divisions, 1945.
204 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/662, Joint Welcome Address by the Independent States to the Governor o f  the Gold 
Coast, 15 October 1949.
205 Ibid. PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/74, Report on Amalgamation o f  Divisions, 1945
206 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/74 Report on Amalgamation o f  Divisions, 1945.
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Formation of Atando State
In 1938, Abutia, Adaklu, Anfoega, Gbi, Goviefe, Tsrukpe and Ve together with non- 
Ewe states such as Likpe, Nkonya and Santrokofi formed what they called the Natural 
Rulers’ Society (NRS). This group had its origin in 1932 when 25 divisions met to protest 
against the ordinance. Since then, the number dwindled in size to only ten, following the 
amendment of the ordinance in 1936. The NRS intensified their protest from 1936 in 
apparent reaction to the decision by the colonial officers to close down tribunals of 
divisions which had not amalgamated. Another of their objectives was to protest against 
Lilley’s return to the district in 1938.207
The group was of the view that the use of the names such as ‘Akpini’, Asogli’ and 
‘Awatime’ for the states created the impression, erroneously though, in the minds of the 
new paramount chiefs that their territorial boundaries had been extended to cover the 
divisions which amalgamated with them. The ‘smaller chiefs’ feared that the so-called 
paramount chiefs would use their elevation to dominate the other divisions in their 
respective amalgamated states. A case in point was the attitude of Dagadu IV to arrogate to 
himself the powers of ‘paramount chief proper’.208 The administration was therefore 
compelled to remind him of his true position as primus inter pares 209 Dagadu IV had a 
style of rule which was a far cry from that of his predecessors. In a recent publication, he 
was remembered as ‘quite autocratic and unapproachable’.210 In Awatime State, the Ewe 
divisions had never been happy with the name ‘Awatime’. It was no surprise therefore that
207 Captain Lilley had gone to England for treatment and was due to return to the district in 1938. RAG/H 
RAO 048/ 20, Native Affairs, Ho District, 25 September 1938.
208 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/463 Akpini State Native Affairs, 1938.
209 Ibid.
210 Funeral Brochure for Dagadu VII, April 2007, p. 48.
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in 1951 they fought to have the name changed.211 To the NRS, there seemed to be much 
that was obscure in the procedure being adopted by the administrative officers.
Consequently, in 1940, the NRS decided to petition the Acting CEP by stating that more 
progress could have been made if they had been allowed to form federations instead of 
amalgamated states.212 It was felt that federation, where the presidency would be rotational, 
would uphold the sacred right of self-government which would leave every division 
perfectly free to regulate its internal affairs, but subject to the constitution of the federation. 
Coincidentally, the petition was sent at the time when there was serious opposition to the 
workings of Buem NA to the north of Ewedome. Buem was a conglomeration of different 
ethnic groups. The original inhabitants called Lefanas formed one-third of the population 
and they provided the paramount chief and divisional chiefs. Within this geographical area 
were some Akan migrants, who were not represented on the state councils because they had 
no divisional chiefs. These Akan groups were demanding their own separate division
9 1 Twithin the Buem state.
In 1941, the Commissioner, fearing that the disturbances in Buem could spill over into 
Ewedome in view of the petition sent by the NRS, called for a review of the policy of 
amalgamation. He advocated the breaking up of amalgamated states altogether in the whole 
of the southern section of British Togoland. To the other officials, particularly those 
working in the territory, it was not in the interest of the colonial government to show any 
sign of weakness in administering the mandated territory. Moreover, contrary to the 
situation in Buem, all divisions in Ewedome which agreed to amalgamate were duly
211 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/549, Petition to the Governor o f the Gold Coast, 21 February 1953.
212 Ibid..
213 RAG/H, Memorandum on the Administration o f the Southern Section o f  Togoland. 1946; PRAAD/AADM  
39/1/416, Development by Native Authorities, Buem Disturbances, 1944.
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represented in their respective NAs. The officers therefore insisted the grant of the proposal 
of NRS would negate the government’s intention of fostering state consciousness among 
the Ewe states. Worst yet, the proposal by the NRS for a confederacy instead of a 
centralised state would mean that those divisions which would form the confederacy would 
have a constitution fundamentally different from other states in the whole of the Southern 
Section of British Togoland.
Two problems confronted the officers. First, there was the problem of how to protect the 
newly formed states from breaking up and secondly, how to deal with the unamalgamated 
divisions. There were two options that the officers could explore. First, they could wait 
with the hope that the unamalgamated divisions would change their mind and join one of 
the states. In this way, the officers would not be forced into making any changes to the 
policy towards any particular group of divisions within the same territory. Besides, if the 
three existing states proved to be viable NAs which delivered material benefits to the 
people, they might have an impact on the attitude of the diehards. The obvious 
disadvantage of this option was the likelihood that the officers could wait in vain.
Second, the officers could allow the unamalgamated divisions to form a state of their 
own, in default of a better solution. This second option was in itself a difficult one in view 
of the differences that existed among the members of the NRS. The group was 
heterogeneous, with different laws, customs and languages which made any attempt at 
affecting a sympathetic union between them a difficult proposition. It did not look likely 
that the non-Ewe states in the NRS such as Nkonya, Santrokofi and Likpe would want to 
cooperate with Ve, Gbi, and Anfoega. Even among the Ewe states, Ve wanted to be seat of 
such a state, something Gbi and Anfoega opposed. Anfoega was situated very close to
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Kpando but it refused to join Akpini state because Dagadu II had orchestrated the German 
attack on Anfoega in 1901.214 Anfoega also felt that by virtue of its contribution to the 
British war effort in 1914, its head chief should be considered as a paramount chief.
Nkonya, a Guan state, had no affinity with the Ewes. They believed they had occupied 
their present homes long before most of the Ewe inhabitants of the mandated area arrived. 
According to Lilley, the Nkonyas were part of the Effutu ethnic group originally from 
Oguaa in the present-day Central Region of Ghana. Lilley refers to them as ‘the proper 
aboriginal tribe of the Gold Coast’ 215 Based on this, Nkonya always considered itself as 
superior to the Ewe states and never showed any inclination towards forming a NA with 
any Ewe state 216 Similarly, Santrokofi used to serve the paramount chief of Buem until the
7 1 7Germans came and put a stop to Buem’s control over Santrokofi. Therefore, the general
1 Q
feeling among the people of Santrokofi was to join Buem. In a memorandum drawn up 
in Likpe in 1951, it was claimed that the people of Likpe were originally Akans.219 They, 
like the people of Awatime, abhorred circumcision and they had a language peculiar to 
themselves. They therefore resisted any attempt to force them to join any Ewe state because 
of the obvious linguistic and cultural differences.220 Eventually, the officers decided 
initially to go by the first option and concentrate their energies on improving the workings 
of the already established NAs. The independent divisions were left on their own. Their 
chiefs had certain duties as NAs but they did not have legal means of exerting their
214 For details on the German attach on Anfoega, see Brown, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry’, p. 212.
215 Lilley, ‘Short History o f the Nkonya Division’, p. 108.
216RAG/H, Memorandum on the Administration o f  the Southern Section o f  Togoland, 1946.
217 Ibid, Appendix B.
2,8 Ibid.
219 RAG/H, Memorandum by the Likpe Grand Council to the President, Southern Togoland Council, 27 
March 1951.
220 RAG/H, RAO O il, Petitions-General, Petition by the Grand Council o f  Likpe. Likpe Native Affairs. 1 
August 1951.
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authority because their tribunals were closed down. The situation remained unchanged until 
1949, when the government agreed to allow Ve, Gbi, Likpe and Santrokofi to form Atando 
Native Authority. The hope was that Anfoega would also change its mind and join the new 
state.221
Atando NA was a confederacy in its structure and operations. The members rejected the 
term ‘paramount chief.’ No division was made to swear allegiance to any other division. 
Instead, they elected a president among themselves to preside over the state. The president 
had no suzerain power but that of primus inter pares?21 In this case, there was no 
subordination of one division to another. The president would hold office for three years, 
after which he would be eligible for re-election. Federal meetings were to be held quarterly, 
but the president could call an emergency meeting at any place within the federal divisions. 
The formation of Atando in 1949 finally brought the process of amalgamation in Ewedome 
to a close.223 It must, however, be noted that total amalgamation was still not achieved 
because Anfoega division refused to join any of the states right up to when the NAs were 
abolished in 1951 224
Four main factors accounted for the colonial government’s decision to recognise Atando 
state. First, Sir Alan Bums, who took over as governor of the Gold Coast in 1941 was 
dissatisfied with the policy of amalgamation. In his words ‘the policy as regard Native
221 Buem Native Authority in the north o f Ewedome was also created under the NAO o f 1932, making four 
NAs in the southern section o f British Togoland.
222 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/545, Petition from Independent Divisions to the Governor o f  the Gold Coast, 19 
October, 1945.
223PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/93, Federation o f Divisions in Togoland under UN Trusteeship. Formation o f  
Atando Native Authority, 1947.
224 For the intransigence o f Anfoega, she was denied government grants throughout the period o f  the existence 
o f the NAs. See Nugent, Smugglers, p. 131.
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Authorities had gone astray.’225 He noted similarity between institutions among the Ewe 
and those of Iboland in Nigeria and came to the conclusion that the administrative officers 
were making the same mistake in Togoland that they had made in Iboland by trying to 
impose upon the territory a native administration which was not native to the area. Bums 
therefore became sympathetic towards the NRS. Second, from 1945, the government 
decided formally to integrate the whole of southern section of Togoland into the Gold 
Coast. This meant that some paramount chiefs would be elected to sit on the Joint 
Provincial Council with other paramount chiefs of the Gold Coast. This was not going to be 
possible if some states continued to remain in splendid isolation. Third, it was observed that 
the combined population of Gbi, Likpe, Santrokofi, Ve at the 1931 census was 17,521. This 
figure was considerably more than the number considered sufficient for Awatime state to 
be recognised. There was therefore no need to prevent the above states from forming a NA. 
Fourth, the idea of setting up a committee following the 1948 disturbances in the Gold 
Coast to investigate into constitutional matters and to make recommendations for 
implementation made the pursuit of amalgamation in Ewedome a less important issue in the 
political scheme of things.
The British officials were sincere in their bid to follow pre-colonial political 
organization and affiliations in creating NA areas in Ewedome. Their research into the 
history and ethnography of the region did lead to a reasonable understanding of local 
realities. Nevertheless, as things turned out, it became obvious that it was one thing for the 
chiefdoms to develop loyalties of their own and quite another to force them to form states 
with binding legislations they did not have a hand in formulating. Lentz notes that though
225 PRO CO 96/780/4, Native Administration, Allan Bums to G.H. Creasy, 9 December 1944. See also 
Nugent, Smugglers, p. 128.
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the officials were sincere in their attempt to formulate their policies on their knowledge of 
the societies, ‘a gap existed between ethnographic knowledge and colonial practice’.226 
From the protests against the policy, one is inclined to state that if the seat of the paramount 
chief had been rotational, the policy would have met less resistance. The point was that 
tribunals were eagerly sought after by every chief because they enhanced the status and 
power of chiefs and their elders, not to mention the financial inducement that the tribunals 
offered. As the narrative has shown, colonial rule and amalgamation was responsible for 
the shifting notion of Ewe identity in the 1920s and the 1930s. Amalgamation policy 
caused many communities to start probing into their local histories and figuring out how 
they could evaluate previous relationships/alliances against this new pressure to join in 
larger amalgamated units.227 This goes to support Iliffe’s analysis of how colonialism made 
ethnic identities and loyalties in Africa not only important but also more complex 228
Conclusion
The multitude of small independent units in Ewedome generated tension and protests 
when the amalgamation policy of the British colonial government came into operation in 
1932. It is clear that the first step to be taken was ‘to shift the political trajectory towards 
strong, centralised chieftaincies’. In the process, British administrative officers became 
deeply involved in local politics, more so in chieftaincy issues. Such involvement pitched 
the British officials and some chiefs on a collision course right from the 1920s.
226 Lentz, Ethnicity and the M aking o f  H istory, p. 74.
227 A typical example o f  how the people o f  Likpe used their cultural and historical peculiarities to fight against 
their inclusion in Atando is demonstrated in Paul Nugent, ‘A Few Lesser People’: the Central Togo Minorities 
and their Ewe Neighbours’, in Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent (eds.), Ethnicity in Ghana-. The Limits o f  
Invention  (London, 2000), p. 169-173.
228 Iliffe, M odern History o f  Tanganyika, p. 318.
229 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dome’, p. 244.
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The policy encountered difficulties because the concept of ‘indirect rule was premised on 
the existence of culturally homogeneous’ ethnic group with a central authority.230 The 
cultural heterogeneity of Ewedome, even among the Ewes, accounted for the conflicting 
interest and tensions that characterised the policy. The curtailment of the political 
sovereignty of divisions then became a feature of amalgamation in Ewedome. The process 
in many cases divided divisions along anti-amalgamation and pro-amalgamation lines. 
Evidently, conflicts at the chief-subject level undermined the otherwise good chief-subject 
relations in many divisions leading to high incidence of destoolments. The process 
undermined the position and authority o f many divisional and sub-divisional chiefs.
Be that as it may, the policy cannot be dismissed as a failure. Such outright 
condemnation of amalgamation/indirect rule policy only serves to evoke the writings of the 
first-generation African historians whose nationalist agenda was to condemn every British 
colonial policy in their bid to project the African personality. In recent times, we see a 
return to this kind of approach to colonial historiography on Africa as demonstrated by 
Mamdani’s theory of ‘decentralised despotism’.231 To this day in Ewedome, as in the whole 
of the Volta Region, amalgamation endures as a viable policy option. Several divisions 
amalgamate to operate one divisional council. Despite the problems evinced by the 
implementation of the policy, the relative success laid the structure for socio-economic 
development that were to follow in the territory, and signified the nature of British colonial 
government’s contribution to the development of the area. The delay in completing the
230 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 16.
231 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject.
1 2 2
process was inevitable, for the British administrative officials ‘had to lead and the people to 
follow, often reluctantly’.
232 RAG/H, Memorandum on the Administration o f the Southern Section o f British Togoland, 1946 (Not 
Filed).
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CHAPTER THREE
NATIVE AUTHORITY IN PRACTICE, 1939-1950
Having achieved some level of success in creating Native Authority structures in 
Ewedome, the British administrative officers had to turn the new states into working 
political entities. This was a formidable task, considering the complexities of the traditional 
political set-up and the depth of divisional feelings and local patriotism among the people 
of Ewedome. Quite clearly, the task of the officers since the creation of the NAs was how 
to persuade the local inhabitants to transfer some of their traditional loyalty to the new 
states and institutions. The task was made more complex for the reason that the NAs in 
Ewedome were just about taking shape when the very foundation of colonialism was being 
shaken. The star of rule through chiefs was on the wane throughout colonial Africa 
following the Second World War.
The focus of this chapter is to examine the working of the NA system, as its success or 
otherwise can best be assessed by the way it operated in practice and what it actually 
achieved. The chapter begins by examining the structure and power relations within the NA 
system as it operated in the territory and explores its role in spearheading the execution of 
self-help projects. It then goes on to evaluate the effects of the Second World War on the 
work of the NAs. The chapter concludes by appraising the changes that the trusteeship 
system and post-war developments introduced into the NA system in Ewedome.
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The Structure of Native Authorities
The three newly created Native Authorities of Asogli, Akpini and Awatime comprised 
state and divisional councils as well as tribunals. The highest authority in each state was the 
paramount chief. Paramount chiefs of the newly created states were technically appointed 
by the governor, but in actual practice the composition of NA institutions was determined 
by the people themselves. The paramount chief presided over the state council which was 
made up of all divisional chiefs within the state. The divisional chief also presided over a 
council which was made up of all sub-chiefs within the division. A quorum in the 
divisional and state councils was obtained by more than half the number of members. By 
1939, the whole NA structure had taken shape, with the exception of the independent states 
which would later form the irregular Atando State.
All political disputes inside the division went first of all to the divisional council. The 
state council was given the powers of an appeal court from divisional councils and it had 
the powers to enquire into all constitutional disputes which could not be settled within the 
division.1 In addition, it also acted as an appeal tribunal from divisional tribunals and as a 
court of first instance in political matters and land disputes between two divisions. In other 
words, the state council could act either in the first instance when the divisional council 
could not function or on appeal from divisional council.3 A serious snag that arose, 
however, was how to educate the local inhabitants and members of NAs to come to grips 
with the blend of customary executive and judicial powers of chiefs, on the one hand, and 
the new powers of the NAs as enshrined in the 1932 ordinance, on the other.
1 Togoland Report o f 1931, p. 14-15.
2 Ibid.
3 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/277, Notes on the Ordinance by Captain Lilley, 1932.
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Native Authority Structure and Functions in Ewedome
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The foundation of the whole NA structure was the state council, that is to say all the 
divisional chiefs sitting together, but efforts were made to preserve the separate entities of
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each division. This certainly explains why for creating and establishing divisional councils 
and tribunals which empowered divisional chiefs to deal with all matters of a political and 
civil nature arising within their divisions. In addition, divisional tribunals were created to 
take cognisance of the social fabric of the communities at every level of the judicial system. 
The jurisdiction of the tribunals thus covered almost every facet of customary law, 
especially those concerned with social custom.4 Customary law is difficult to define, for it 
varies in nature and interpretation from society to society. From the British Official point of 
view, customary law meant:
a rule or a body of rules regulating rights and imposing correlative duties, 
being a rule or body of rules which obtains and is fortified by established 
local usage and which is appropriate and applicable to any particular cause, 
action, suit, matter, dispute, issue or question, and includes also customary 
law recorded or modified by a traditional authority under and in accordance 
with the provisions of any ordinance for the time being in force relating to 
such traditional authority.5 
Even though the officials were clear as to what constituted customary law, its interpretation 
was devolved to the tribunals.6
In Ewedome, the composition of the tribunal reflected the traditional notion of a court, 
for although the governor had discretion in deciding on the composition o f the tribunals, the 
members were always recommended by local leaders.7 The tribunals were normally
4 NA CO 96/790/2, Togoland Report o f 1947, p. 25.
5 NA CO 96/822/2, Comments by Colonial Office on Coussey Report, 1949; NA CO 96/824/4, Constitutional 
Matters Affecting Chiefs, 1951.
6 Ibid.
7 RAG/H RAO C. 144/2, DC to Governor, June 1941.
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composed of the chief, the linguist and four or five elders or councillors.8 In other words, 
membership of the tribunals was dependent upon constitutional position within the state. Of 
the councillors, some were elected by virtue of their occupancy of a certain office or 
position in the state.9 In addition to those who usually formed the majority, the people 
could choose any member of the community who was specifically distinguished by his 
wisdom, his influential position or his services to the duko, to be a councillor.10
Traditionally, the tsami (linguist from the Akan Okyeame) of any duko was selected by 
the king-makers, much the same way that a chief was selected. Linguists expressed the 
views of the chiefs; therefore they were expected to be tactful and eloquent.11 The list of 
those chosen were sent to the Assistant Commissioner. He in turn made his 
recommendations to the Governor, who formally constituted the tribunals.12 The rationale 
behind this arrangement was to ensure that the composition of the court was not left
entirely to the discretion of the chiefs. Otherwise, there was the possibility of the chiefs
packing the courts with people they considered to be of the same mind set as they the 
chiefs. Normally, the number of panel members of the tribunals was ten.13
Native Authorities as Agents of Development
One important area where NAs functioned prominently as agents of development was in 
the realm of the administration of justice. Administration of justice was inextricably linked 
to development because the numerous disputes between the chiefdoms in the 1920s were
8 British Togoland Report o f  1927.
9 Interview with Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI, paramount chief o f Peki, 3 July 2007.
10 Ibid.
11 Interview with Togde Kwadzo Dei XI, 3 July 2007.
12 NA CO 96/746/7, Report to the PMC, Thirty-Fifth Session, Geneva, 24-25 October 1938.
13 NA CO 96/790/2, Togoland Report o f 1947, p. 27.
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detrimental to development. Therefore, the philosophy behind the creation of native 
tribunals was to establish ‘institutionalised and authoritative procedures for settling 
disputes’.14 Without native tribunals, the district courts presided over by the DCs would 
have been overwhelmed by the numerous litigations emanating from various parts of the 
territory. In 1936, there were 1,978 cases tried in the native tribunals in Southern 
Togoland.15 It was found that recourse to colonial district courts for the settlement of every 
petty case and the solvent action of western ideas on native institutions generally could 
weaken the vigour of the traditional system and lower the authority of the chiefs.16 It was in 
this regard that native tribunals became very important to British officials and the right to 
hold tribunals was jealously guarded by the chiefs. The first batch of revenue that came into 
the various treasuries in Ewedome was from fines and fees from the tribunals. From 1946 
to 1957, native tribunals in the southern section of British Togoland heard 983 civil cases 
and 1,213 criminal cases giving a total o f 2,196 cases. The NAs derived revenue to the tune 
of £3,183 and expenditure amounted to £1,971.17
In 1946, there were a total of 58 tribunals and 12 registrars in Ewedome.18 Most of these 
registrars were young Standard Seven graduates from the Ewe territory of the Gold Coast 
Colony. The Technical Department of the Gold Coast assisted the NAs in training their 
prospective candidates for their administration. Normally, the basic qualification for
14 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 16.
15 Figure compiled from Togoland Report o f 1936, p. 34-35.
16 It was in recognition o f the traditional judicial system that the Gold Coast Native Jurisdiction Ordinance o f  
1883 was enacted and it subsequently became a model for the development o f native courts in Asante, 
Ewedome and so on. See PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f Commission on Native Courts in the Gold 
Coast, 1951.
17 Expenditure was in respect o f salaries o f registrars and allowances to tribunal members as well as other 
administrative costs.
18 The table does not include independent states, some o f which later formed Atando state. Figures compiled 
from RAG/H RAO C 214, DC, Ho, to the CEP, Koforidua, 2 May 1946. For the population figures, see 
Togoland Report o f 1936, p. 5.
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training was the Primary School Leaving Certificate, but a further period of training was 
given in the case of entrants to the teaching, medical, health, agricultural, veterinary, and 
forestry branches of the NAs.19
Tribunals in Ewedome in 1946
State Population No. of Tribunals No. of Registrars
Akpini 28,238 22 5
Asogli 20,666 26 4
Awatime 13,285 10 3
Total 62,187 58 12
Undoubtedly, the number of tribunals appears excessive as far as the mere 
administration of justice and the population served were concerned. In the Gold Coast 
Colony, when it was realised that some states were too small to operate a tribunal, a number 
of them were combined with their neighbours to form federal native courts. Similar 
arrangements were made in the so called ‘stateless’ areas in the Northern Territories, while 
in Asante there were ‘area courts’.21 Therefore, the general principles that guided the 
establishment of courts in other areas under British control were that an area should have a 
minimum population of 10,000 and a minimum of 200 cases heard annually to warrant the 
establishment of a tribunal.22 In Ewedome, historical and political factors did not make for 
the application of those principles. It will be recalled that when the policy of amalgamation
19 Togoland Report, 1950, p. 30.
20 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f  Commission on Native Courts in the Gold Coast, 1951, p. 9.
21 Ibid.
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was instituted each divisional chief who agreed to amalgamate with others into one state 
was promised a tribunal, irrespective of the size or population of his division. In reality, 
many of the separately constituted tribunals were little more than local panels. Yet, any 
attempt to constitute fewer courts could be construed as a theoretical breach of the promise 
at the time of creating the NAs.
Nevertheless, while the administrative officers went as far as possible to retain the 
theoretical judicial independence o f the divisions, they also tried to reduce costs. Although 
each division had a tribunal, it did not mean that each tribunal maintained a full separate 
staff of a registrar, bailiff and so on. A registrar travelled on a circuit devised so that he 
reached each tribunal roughly once a week.23 Parties wishing to institute proceedings would 
await the registrar’s arrival or would apply to the president of the tribunal who in turn 
notified the registrar.24 Under the treasury system in vogue in the territory, cash receipts
were kept at the tribunal headquarters and were taken at the end of each month with the
0 ^cash book to the central state treasury by an ‘elder’ of the tribunal. The state registrars 
were paid from state funds, for the state retained one-third of revenues received from the 
divisions 26 It was the responsibility of the NAs to provide buildings to house the tribunals 
and pay members’ allowances.
The district magistrate, who was stationed across the Volta at Akuse in the Gold Coast 
Colony, visited Ho and Kpando each fortnight and heard all criminal cases and inquests as
onwell as all appeals from tribunals. In practice then, the circuit system in Ewedome meant
23 RAG/H RAO C.214, DC, Ho to CEP, Koforidua, 2 May 1946.
24 Ibid. Some o f  the registrars were stationed at the district headquarters while a few lived within the Native 
Authority area.
25 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1544, Native Administration Policy, Native Tribunal Committee o f Enquiry, 12 
February 1943.
26 RAG/H RAO C. 214, DC to CEP, 2 May 1946.
27 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/594, Togoland Mandated Area-A Report to the League o f Nations, 1945.
132.
that the operation of tribunals was not dissimilar to the system in vogue in Asante, the 
Colony, and the Northern Territories, where court panels included names of people from a 
number of towns in the state enabling the tribunal to sit in various towns. Since there were 
no NA prisons in Togoland at the time, all persons convicted were sent to the government 
prisons at Ho and Kpando.
The decision to maintain the divisional tribunabls and to operate them under a circuit 
system was based on the complex political landscape of Ewedome. One should not lose 
sight of the non-Ewe speaking divisions: Awatime, Logba, Nyangbo and Tafi, located 
within the territory. In dealing with the question of native tribunals, one of the first 
considerations should be the relation between the theory and practice of administration. The 
two essential elements could not be divorced. Both elements had to be weighed by anyone 
who was considering the problems of multiplicity of tribunals and the heterogeneity of the 
area under review.
The theory of administration of law through the native tribunals had to relate to the 
conditions in which that theory was made to work. The heterogeneous nature of Ewedome 
meant that divisions differed according to custom and tradition. Therefore, allowance had 
to be made for the varying social conditions of the different communities. Indeed, the 
legislative framework applied to the territory in 1932 was specifically intended to take into 
account social groupings and customs. The bewilderment which ‘local people were said to 
have had when they appeared before British courts’ would be the same when people from 
non-Ewe divisions had to appear in a court in an Ewe division where the procedure was 
dictated by a strange custom.28 Therefore, allowing each division to have a tribunal 
afforded the non-Ewe divisions the opportunity to dispense justice based on their peculiar
28 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, p. 29.
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customs and traditions. Some chiefs who were local actors in the whole policy of 
amalgamation supported these arrangements but there were those who opposed them. In 
1942, 97 sub-divisional chiefs sent a petition to the governor in which they asked that their 
tribunals should be reopened.30 They premised their demand on what they termed 
4 insufficient tribunals in Ewedome’ .31
One could understand the frustration of the sub-divisional chiefs. Nevertheless, as 
expected, the Commissioner for the Eastern Province (CEP) observed that some of the sub- 
divisional chiefs were at the time captains of quarters where the population of their subjects 
did not go beyond 300 people. To grant the request would mean that divisions such as 
Dedome with a population of 1,200 would have five tribunals; Hoe with a population less 
than 400 people would have two tribunals; Akoviofe with a population of 120 people 
would also have its own tribunal. Certainly, that number of tribunals would have been 
unnecessary and it would have been impossible to obtain competent registrars for them. 
The petitioners continued to grumble until 1946 when most of them, with pressure from 
their own subjects, grudgingly joined the divisional tribunals.32
A second snag that arose was that in Ewedome customary law made no distinction 
between civil and criminal cases. The basis of punishment prior to the inception of colonial 
rule was the maintenance of the balance of power between family and family as well as 
clan and clan. Moreover, what could be considered a criminal offence under English law 
might not be criminal under customary law. To find a common ground between English
29 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1544, Native Tribunal Committee o f Enquiry, 12 February 1943.
30 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1048, District Quarterly Reports, Eastern Province, CEP to the Governor, 1 
December 1942.
31 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1048, Petition by Sub-Divisional Chiefs to the Governor o f  the Gold Coast, 17 
October 1942.
32 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/456, Handing over Report, 1949.
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law and customary law, the officials came out with 22 petty offences whose contravention 
was to be tried by the tribunals.33 Out of this number, eight were offences which would not 
be criminal by English law but were criminal by custom. This included ‘putting persons 
into fetish’, ignoring the oath, frivolously swearing the oath, sexual relations with a 
pregnant woman and having sex with a woman in an open place.34
One interesting case in which the incongruity of native customary law and English law 
was exposed was the manner of the destoolment of Adzatekpor V, the paramount chief of 
Awatime Native Authority in 1937. When the youngmen and some aggrieved elders of 
Awatime division in conjunction with the stool father decided to destool the paramount 
chief on the charge that he was trying to introduce a Poll Tax in disguise, they did so in
'X ^accordance with custom. In Awatime division, the destoolment of a chief involved the 
removal of his sandals and the rubbing of those very sandals on his head. Once this ritual 
was performed, the chief was deemed to have been destooled. And this was exactly what 
the stoolfather did. However, the government refused to recognise the destoolment.
Consequently, a Gold Coast police force was sent to Awatime and arrested the 
stoolfather, his elders and some of the youth and arraigned them before the magistrate’s 
court at Kpando. At the court, they were found guilty of assault.37 The submission of the 
stoolfather that the rubbing of the chiefs head with his sandals was a ritual of purely 
customary nature was rejected by the magistrate. The magistrate indicated that ‘even 
pointing one’s finger at another man meant an assault in the police law’, and that he would 
not accept the rubbing of the paramount chiefs head with his sandals as a performance of a
33 NA CO 96/790/2, Togoland Report o f 1947, p.27.
34 Ibid.
35 RAG/H DA/D 142/32, Protest against Direct Tax by Awatime State, 13 August 1937.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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custom. In the end, all the youth were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The 
stoolfather and his elders were asked to pacify the paramount chief with ‘fifty-five pounds 
and a live sheep’.39 The stoolfather and his collaborators were never happy with the charge 
of assault of which they were convicted. In their view, the conviction was an affront to their 
custom.
Indeed, the procedure of the native tribunals was more familiar to the people than the 
British court system operated by colonial officials at the district headquarters. The fact that 
the DC and his officials did not interfere directly in the procedure of the native tribunals 
made the local people feel that they were actually in control of their own affairs.40 The only 
officials who were directly involved in the tribunal system were the registrars whose duty it 
was to explain the procedure and the provisions of the ordinances to the illiterate members 
of the tribunals 41 By and large, NAs altered the relations among the chiefs of the various 
divisions and the people in general. The chiefs met frequently without formality; they often 
dined together when they attended state council meetings.42 This provided an opportunity 
for informal discussions between divisional chiefs.
In the area of education, the NAs worked in tandem with the Ewe Presbyterian Church 
and the Roman Catholic Mission in promoting education in Ewedome.43 In 1950, for 
instance, NAs were responsible for the payment of 10 percent of teachers’ salaries in infant 
schools.44 This was later reduced to 5 percent. They also provided an equipment grant of
38 The records are silent on the length of the sentence.
39 RAG/H DA/D 142/32, Protest against Direct Tax by Awatime State, 13 August 1937; PRAAD/A ADM  
39/1/47, Awatime Criminal Records,1937-1940.
40 The control exercised by officials was through the various ordinances that were enacted since 1924.
41 Togoland Report o f  1936, p. 34.
42 NA CO 96/746/7, General Statement by the Accredited Representative to the P.M.C., 24-25 October 1938.
43 The processes by which an indigenous Ewe Presbyterian Church emerged in the 1920s to take the place of 
the Bremen Mission is discussed in the next chapter.
44 RAG/H DA/D, Publicity Campaign, Your Council and Your Schools in TVT, 1952.
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£10 per teacher from standard IV to VII teachers and £6 for an infant school teacher in 
addition to a maintenance grant of £5 to every teacher.45 Some of the schools which later 
became mission schools were once managed by NAs. For example, in 1935, Saviofe 
division in Awatime state took over the management of the famous Saviofe National 
School from the First Century Gospel Mission until it was placed under the auspices of the 
Ewe Presbyterian Church in 193646 Liati, Fodome and Wli divisions of Akpini state 
presented another success story of NAs’ contribution to the promotion of education in 
Ewedome. The divisions were responsible for running of a total of eight infant and junior 
schools from 1937 to 1951.47 There was a compulsory levy of 6/- a male and 4/- a female a
AO
year in the three divisions from which teachers of the schools were paid 30/- a month.
The establishment of District Education Committees in 1942 gave a further boost to the 
work of the NAs in the promotion of basic education in Ewedome. The committee’s work 
was mainly to ‘advise on the local application of educational policy and on the choice of 
schools for grant-in-aid from funds administered by the NAs.’49 Various colonial records 
show that even mission schools received some financial support from NAs.50 All the NAs 
spent a greater portion of their revenue on education. In 1949-50, for example, Akpini state 
spent £1,315 on education, Asogli state spent £2,284, Atando spent £509 and Awatime 
spent £1,953.51 The period also witnessed an increase in enrolment with a corresponding 
increase in the number of schools. Enrolment in schools rose from 3,529 in 1930 to 29,509
45 Infant schools and standard IV to VII schools became Primary and Middle schools respectively from 1951. 
See RAG/H ACC/497, Education in trans-Volta Togoland, 1954, p. 3.
46 Togoland Report o f 1936, p.52.
47 RAG/H ACC 226, Petition o f the People o f Liati, Fodome and Wli to the Governor o f the Gold Coast, 25 
September, 1945.
48 Ibid.
49 Togoland Report o f  1948,
50 Ibid.
51 NA CO 96, Summary o f Togoland Report o f  190, p. 18.
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in 1950 while the total number of schools increased from 68 in 1930 to 312 in 1950 in 
southern British Togoland as a whole.52 Even though most of the schools were owned by 
the missions, the contribution of the NAs to the increase was not in doubt.
Native Authorities had enthusiastically constructed and maintained feeder roads ‘at very 
little cost to the government’.53 Iliffe describes transportation as a major innovation of the 
colonial era.54 Until 1936, all roads in Ewedome were constructed and maintained by the 
NAs with logistical support from the government. It was from 1936 that the Public Works 
Department eventually took over the maintenance of most of the major roads.55 By 1936, 
Lilley had led the NAs to construct the Golokwati-Hohoe-Jasikan road, Have-Kpando- 
Kwamikrom road and from Dzolokpuita to Vane road.56 One of the most difficult roads 
was constructed by Awatime NA with assistance from government in 1943. This was the 
three-mile stretch of road between Awatime-Vane and the hill station of Awatime- 
Amedzofe, a height of 2500 feet above sea level.57 That road was needed to convey 
warping and winding machinery required by the Awatime weaving industry at Amedzofe.58 
In 1944, the road through Vane to Fume, a very difficult hilly area, was completed by 
Awatime state.59 One of the major roads constructed by Asogli state was from Ho through 
Taviefe and Matse to Kpedze.60 Awatime State assisted by completing the section from 
Dzolopkuita to Dzologbogame.61 These roads were able to open up the remote areas
52 Ibid, p. 27.
53 NA CO 96/700/14, Sir Ransford Slater on Native Revenue Proposal, 1931
54 John Iliffe, Africans: The History o f  a Continent (Cambridge, 2007), p. 219.
55 RAG/H ACC/No.282, Feeder Roads in TVT, p .l.
56 Ibid.
57 RAG/H, Memorandum on the Administration o f the Section o f  Togoland, 1943.
58 Ibid.
59 NA CO 96/772/9, Togoland Report o f 1941, p. 6.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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bringing them closer to Ho. Transportation of foodstaffs to the market centres was greatly 
enhanced.
Similar roads were constructed by other NAs to the extent that by the time the NAs
handed over to local councils in 1952, works on feeder roads linking every village in
Ewedome to the major trunk roads had reached various stages of completion. In 1943, for
62example, Asogli state devoted its entire revenue to schools, roads and water supplies. The 
local people provided communal labour while the officials provided equipment for the 
construction of the culverts. Each division worked on the roads on rotational basis so that 
the local people would not spend all their time constructing roads at the expense of their 
farms or other needs. From 1949, other agencies worked in tandem with the NAs in the 
construction and maintenance of roads. These agencies were Local Development 
Committee, Central Government, The National Food Board and The Cocoa Marketing 
Board.63 The table below shows the amount of work done on feeder roads by NAs in 
Ewedome in 1951.64
In 1949 alone, Asogli and Awatime states were able to construct water supply, latrines, 
drains, market sheds, dispensary, slaughter houses, and lorry parks for a number of 
communities.65 Another impressive project was the construction of the bridge on the road to 
Honuta in 1937.66 The quality of the roads in Ewedome drew the attention of the 
administration officers. Captain Lilley received commendation for his supervisory role. It 
was recorded that all the bridges supervised by Lilley in Ewedome were made of permanent
62 RAG/H, Memorandun on the Administration o f  the Southern Section o f  British Togoland, 1943.
63 RAG/H ACC/No.282 Feeder Roads in Trans-Volta Togoland, 1951, p. 2-4.
64 Togoland Report o f  1950.
65 PRAAD/A ADM 38/1/416, Development by Native Authorities, Asogli and Awatime states,1949.
66 Togoland Report o f  1937, p.6.
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steel and concrete.67 In 1943, when the first class road between Accra and Ada became 
unfit for traffic, military convoys used the Bame-Honuta-Kpalime road that passed through 
Ewedome.68
NATIVE AUTHORITY PROJECTS IN EWEDOME IN 1951
PROJECT FUNDS ALLOCATED
PERCENTAGE
COM PLETED
Three span at Shia £500 30
Lume-Ave-Shia road £50 50
Ziavi-Anfoeta road £150 20
Goviefe-Kpeve road £25 90
Agotime-Kpetoe-Adidome road £20 60
Waya-Aboadi road £820 75
Amedzofe-Kpedze Road £20 25
Ashanti Kpoeta-Honuta Road £250 25
Shia-Klave-Hoe Road £150 10
Dzolo Gbogame-Kpedze Road £45 10
The NAs could have even done more in terms of development but for the problem of 
land acquisition and the delay in introducing direct taxation. In Ewedome, before the 
introduction of cash crops, land was communally owned by families and clans. Sale of land 
was rare and was only resorted to in times of dire distress or when the whole family was 
indebted and could not raise money through other means. In that case, the sale must be 
effected with the consent of all members of the family. The family would be considered as
67 RAG/H, Memorandum on Southern Section o f  Togoland, 1943.
68 Ibid.
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possessing a right of redemption when favourable opportunity arose. In effect, there was no 
need for private ownership of land. All this changed with the introduction of cash crops into 
the region coupled with increase in population. Cash crop farming such as coffee, cocoa 
and palm trees, banana and plantain involved long-term investment, which meant that 
individuals had to hold on to a plot of land for a considerable number of years. This 
encouraged the sale of land, which in turn introduced land litigation.69 We also noted that 
land acquisition for public works often generated a lot of controversy.
Even more remarkable was their performance in the absence of treasuries. From 1936, 
NAs were prohibited from using forced communal labour in undertaking development 
projects. Labour on such projects was to be voluntary, or paid for.70 The NAs had to find 
ways of increasing their revenue, in the absence of direct taxation, in order to meet the cost 
of development projects. As of 1936, it was only in Akpini state that direct taxation was 
introduced by the NA, not by the central government.71 Native Authorities, as of 1941, 
continued to raise revenue through tribunals and ad hoc contributions to particular 
projects.72 In spite of the obvious constraints, individual divisions, through the medium of 
the NAs, inspired local enthusiasm for self-help projects. They were able to lay down the 
basic infrastructure that served the agricultural economy. British officials acknowledged the 
works of the NAs when they reported to the Mandate Commission in 1936 that: ‘thanks to 
the efforts of the NAs more money is being spent on medical and sanitary services and the 
improvement of water supplies and village layouts’.73
69 It is noted that the sale o f land as a result o f the growth o f  the cocoa industry was ‘inconsistent with native 
custom’. See also Debrunner, A Church, p. 214-215. For the general situation in the Gold Coast and the 
quotation, see Hill, Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer, p. 9.
70 RAG/H, Memorandum on Southern Section o f  Togoland, 1943.
71 Ibid, p.21.
72 Togoland Report o f 1941, p 3.
73 Togoland Report o f 1936, p. 41.
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The Outbreak of the Second World War
Analysis of the effects of the Second World War on Africa has so far focussed on 
regions rather than on specific societies. In this section, we will examine the effects of the 
war on the NAs in Ewedome. The rather steady progress in the development of Ewedome 
was rudely interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The war did not 
only delay development backwards, but it also provided a real test of the loyalty and 
support of the inhabitants to the British cause. Since the German occupation of 
Czechoslovakia and the subsequent signing of the Munich agreement in the early part of
1939, rumours had been rife in Kpando and Hohoe about the imminence of war between 
Britain and Germany.74 This fear was heightened by the fall of France in June 1940 with 
speculation that Germany would reposess her former African colonies as part of a 
negotiation for a truce with France.75 Patently, there was tension throughout Ewedome 
when news about the war was received via wireless at Kpando. Many started moving into 
the Gold Coast for fear of a possible German attack on Togoland.76 It took the dexterity of 
the paramount chiefs to avert mass migration from the territory. State council meetings 
were organised by the paramount chiefs where resolutions were passed declaring loyalty 
and support to the British Crown.
The contribution of the NAs in Ewedome to the war effort was considerable. One week 
each May during the war years was declared ‘Mosquito Bombers War Week’ and 
everybody was required by government to contribute to the prosecution of the war as the
74 Togoland Report o f  1937, p. 21.
75 Nancy Ellen Lawler, Soldiers, Spies, and Whisperers: The G old Coast in World War II (Athens, OH, 2002), 
p. 3.
76 Interview conducted with G. N. K. Yayo, elder o f Akome Agate, July 2006. See also Togoland Report o f
1940, p. 20; Mr Adolf Adorsu, a retired civil servant, Logba Vuita, 2 January, 2000.
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amount to be realised was to be used in the purchase of Mosquito Bombers planes to bomb 
Berlin. In 1944 over £1000 was collected.77 The people were also informed that ‘the British 
government needed palm kernel and food stuffs to fight the war,’78 Recruitment into the
79army was carried out throughout Ewedome with over 1,600 allotments drawn every year. 
The most successful recruiting campaign was held in Janauary and February 1942 where 
over 800 volunteers presented themselves.80 Out of this number, 420 were declared fit for 
military service. Further recruitments were made throughout 1942. Financial contributions 
from the people of Ewedome towards the prosecuting of the war were further 
demonstration of the loyalty of the local inhabitants to the British crown. It was recorded 
that during a week’s contributions in aid of the Gold Coast Spitfires Fund in May 1942, the 
inhabitants raised £1,400 with Gbi division alone contributing £252.81 This was rated as the 
single most outstanding contribution in proportion to the numbers and wealth of any state 
or division in the whole Gold Coast and the mandated territories combined.82 At the same 
time, the overall development and efficient functioning of the NAs suffered a severe jolt as 
a result o f the war.
In October 1939, the headquarters o f the southern section of British Togoland was 
shifted from Kpando to Ho, with Kpando becoming a sub-district office. Due to staff
83shortages during the war, both Ho and Kpando were run by one administrative officer.
77 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/99, Memorandum on the Southern Section o f Togoland, 1944.
78 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/286, Amalgamation on Divisions Togoland-Asogli State, Case No. 2185/1932.
79 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/99, Memorandun, 1944.
80 The recruitments were in complete contravention o f the mandate which barred the mandatory powers from 
recruiting the inhabitants into military service. It appears the PMC itself became moribund as a result o f the 
war.
81 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/99, Memorandun, 1944.
82 Ibid.
83 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/594, Togoland Mandated Area- Report to the League o f  Nations, 1945.
143
The exigencies of the war imposed additional responsibility on the officers who had not had 
the time or the staff to devote themselves to the ordinary task of native administration.84 It
or #
retarded progress somewhat with delays in getting responses to petitions and letters. Since 
Lilley left the region at the end of his duty in 1938, the administration lacked continuity. 
Three assistant district commissioners served in turn in the whole southern section of 
British Togoland between 1938 and 1942, and none of them served for more than five 
months, hardly enough to acquire any personal knowledge of the problems of the
o /
territory. This was in contrast to Lilley’s pedigree as an expert in the history and custom 
of Ewedome, a quality that enabled him to see the NAO of 1932 through its gestation 
period from the 1920s to the 1930s.
Welch and Nugent show how general economic conditions in the territory were affected 
by the war.87 From the fall of France in June 1940 until 1942, the French mandate across 
the border was enemy territory under Vichy rule, which scared many British Togolanders 
and limited movement of people across the border. The problem was exacerbated by the 
French official policy to close the border with British Togoland.88 Shops closed down many 
selling points, particularly in 1941. Consequently, the Commonwealth Youth Trust closed 
down all their stores in the whole of Southern British Togoland in 1942 and the Syrian 
traders who had offered opportunity for a profitable trade in textiles had withdrawn from 
the territory since the outbreak of the war.89 The director of supplies of cement had placed
84 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/545, Memorandum on Amalgamation o f  Divisions, 1942.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Claude Welch Emerson, Dream o f  Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West A frica  (Ithaca, 
1966); Nugent, Smugglers, p. 93. For a broader picture on the dislocation o f  Africa’s economy caused by the 
war, see Cooper, Africa since 1940, p. 31-35.
88 Detailed analysis o f  how the closure o f the border caused indignation among the Ewe people and led to the 
development o f  Ewe nationalism is found in Welch, Dream o f  Unity, p. 65-74.
89 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/76, Political Conference, Southern Section o f British Togoland, 1943.
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restrictions on issues of cement in 1943.90 In effect, goods such as cement, iron sheets and 
kerosene became very scarce while sugar, gunpowder and cigarettes became the most 
fruitful commodities of speculation in the black market.91 The problem of transportation 
also became very serious during the war. The rationing of petrol led to a reduction in the 
volume of motor traffic.92 Therefore, the war and the resultant changes in the economy 
substantially retarded the material development of the territory. Nonetheless, the people 
were said to have tried to adjust themselves to the war-time economic conditions by 
recourse to the use of traditional products.93 The production of traditional soap, for 
example, was rejuvenated to meet the shortage of imported soap.94
No doubt, the Second World War had debilitating effects but there were some positives 
as well. In Britain, the concept of a welfare state, which was bom out of the Second World 
War, placed emphasis on the need for the state to lend support to less privileged 
communities. This idea had a profound influence on the formulation of colonial policies 
after the war. There emerged a paradigm shift in development policy. Hitherto, the 
philosophy was that the role of the state was to ‘keep the ring’ and to promote private 
enterprise.95 All this changed and people began to advocate direct state involvement in the 
provision of social services and improvement in the general standard of living in deprived 
regions.96 Reid shows how Britain pursued a number of interventionist policies to mitigate
0 7the economic impact of the Second World War on West African peasants. Consequently,
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 NA CO 96/772/9, Togoland Report o f 1941, p. 7.
93 Ibid, p. 34.
94 Ibid.
95 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Report on Native Administration and Political Development in British Africa, 
1940-42.
96 Cooper, Africa since 1940, p.31.
97 Richard Reid, A History o f  M odem  Africa, 1800 to the Present (Oxford, 2009), p. 252-253.
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the economic and social wellbeing of British colonies became essential components of 
colonial policy. In Ewedome, these new ideas could only find expression in indirect rule if 
the NAs were well positioned and empowered to deliver good services and provide the 
basis for the development of local government. It was in the light of this that new policies 
were introduced after the Second World War with the aim of strengthening the capacity of 
NAs in Ewedome.
The Introduction of Direct Taxation
Until 1942, Native Authorities had considerable difficulty in executing development 
projects because of delay in introducing direct taxation in Ewedome in particular and 
southern Togoland in general. Yet, direct taxation was crucial, without which the whole 
policy o f indirect rule was doomed to fail. It was for this reason that provision was made 
for the establishment of stool treasuries in section six of Ordinance 23 of 1931 in the Gold
QO #
Coast. One of the reasons advanced for establishing NAs was that the local inhabitants 
would be more willing to submit to a more or less direct taxation at the bidding of their 
chiefs rather than colonial officials. Therefore, British policy was clear from the onset that 
direct taxation would not be imposed by the central government but by the NAs acting in 
accordance with powers delegated to them by the governor, and with the government’s 
approval. A caveat to this provision, however, was that the governor could impose a tax and 
arrange for its assessment and collection in the event of a NA in a particular state refusing 
to exercise the power conferred on it."  Despite this policy objective, the British officials
98 NA CO 96/700/14, Colonial Despatch, 1931.
99 NA CO 96/700/14, Proposed Native Revenue Ordinance.
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decided to shelve the introduction of direct taxation in the territory. Several reasons can be 
adduced to explain why.
An important feature of the colonial economy of Ewedome was that the entire revenue 
of the territory before the creation of NAs was derived from indirect taxation such as 
import duty, the export tax on cocoa, tax on cover cloths, drinks, gun licences, among 
others.100 The option of raising revenue through the introduction of either an income tax or 
a capitation tax was not considered feasible in an area deemed to be so poor.101 The desire 
of the officials was to continue raising revenue through indirect taxation until such a time 
that the economic condition of the territory was strong enough for direct taxation.
It was also observed that direct taxation had never been immediately acceptable in 
British West Africa, except in Northern Nigeria where the inhabitants had had a long 
tradition of paying taxes authorised by the Koran. In other British colonies of West Africa, 
introduction of direct taxation had not been smooth sailing. The poll tax of 1852 in the 
Gold Coast had to be abandoned nine years later, due to strong opposition to its 
introduction. Eight years later, it was argued in the Gold Coast press that the proposed 
direct taxation was an attempt to re-introduce a Poll Tax in disguise.102 This was followed 
by the rejection of income tax in the Gold Coast in 1931.103 The hut tax in Sierra Leone in 
the 1890s provoked a serious uprising.104 The history of the Aba disturbances in the Igbo 
region of southeastern Nigeria in 1929 was well known. Moreover, British officials also 
noted that in 1914 the people of Ewedome spontaneously surrendered the large number of 
muskets with which the German government had armed them, because they were happy
100 NA CO 96/746/7, General Statement by the Accredited Representative to the P.M.C., 24-25 October 1938.
101 League o f  Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, Provincial Minutes, 26 October 1928.
102 NA CO 96/700/14, Governor o f the Gold Coast to the Colonial Office, London, 16 August 1931.
103 NA CO96/704/6, Income Tax Bill, Gazette No. 71/1931.
104 NA CO 96/700/14, Colonial Dispatch, 1931.
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about getting rid of the Germans who had imposed a head tax on them.105 As soon as the 
British took over from the Germans, they abolished the head tax and introduced indirect 
taxation which sat well with the inhabitants.106 Therefore, some precautions had to be taken
1 0 7before government openly threw its support behind state treasuries.
A far more important reason why British officials adopted a cautious approach was the 
difficulties which the French government was experiencing in collecting direct taxes in 
French mandated Togoland. There had always been on the Anglo-French boundary a 
fluctuating population which drifted backwards and forwards. However, the drift from the 
French controlled area to the British sphere became alarming from 1929 as a result of the 
introduction of direct taxation by the French.108 To prevent people from moving into the 
British sphere of Togoland, the French government had sought the assistance of the British 
government to rigidly control movement across the border.109 The British government 
rejected the French proposal because it observed that there was only a negligible migration 
from the Gold Coast and the British sphere of Togoland, while the migration into British 
territory was significant.110 It therefore became obvious to the British officials that the 
French made the proposal because of the difficulties they were experiencing in collecting 
direct taxes.111
A further attempt by the French to increase taxes and to prevent movement into British 
territory led to serious disturbances in Lome in 1933 where there were rioting and looting
105 Ibid.
106 Bourret, Gold Coast, p. 107.
107 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Report on Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical 
Africa, 1940-42, p.6.
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109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. NA CO 96/691/10, Governor o f  the Gold Coast to Lord Passfield, 26 October 1929.
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of shops by a mob of local inhabitants.112 Although nobody was reported killed, 
considerable damage was done to property and even the lives of the staff of the British 
Consulate in Lome were threatened by the rioters.113 Clearly, the British officials could not 
be oblivious to the likelihood of such protests having resonance in Ewedome and British 
Togoland as a whole. In view of this, it was important to give the people of Ewedome time 
to adjust themselves within the framework of the new administration.
Nonetheless, direct taxation was seen to have numerous advantages. First, it could 
relieve the local inhabitants from communal work on such projects as schools, dispensaries, 
wells and road construction. Such development projects could be executed with the portion 
of the tax which would be retained locally. The Native Revenue Bill introduced in the Gold 
Coast in place of the income tax in 1931 was to enhance the capacity of the Native States 
established to build and maintain ‘schools, hospitals, post offices, roads, drains, latrines and 
water supply’.114 Second, direct taxation would provide chiefs with proper remuneration for 
their work. It was observed that it was highly desirable that chiefs should receive a regular 
salary instead of being dependent on court fees and other pickings, a system which, in the 
Gold Coast Colony, was said to have led to some perversion o f justice and to gross abuse of 
power by certain chiefs.115
Third, direct taxation could stimulate in the NAs a sense of their responsibilities to the 
communities entrusted to their charge. Government grants alone without taxation tended to 
encourage the belief that it was the duty of government to provide the necessary funds for 
local development projects and thus discouraged local endeavours. NAs could only exercise
112 NA CO 96/710/6, British vice Consulate in Lome to British Consul-General, Dakar, 28 January 1933.
113 Ibid; CO 96 710/6, Petition, Leaders o f Deutsch Togoland to the Governor o f  the Gold Coast, 16 February 
1933.
114 NA CO96/704/6, Income Tax Bill, Gazette No. 71/1931.
115 NA CO 96/700/14, Colonial Despatch, Proposed Native Revenue Ordinance, 1935.
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their financial responsibilities fully if the duty of raising revenue locally through direct 
taxation as well as of disbursing it was entrusted to them. Fourth, it would enable the NAs 
to carry out the functions of local government in a manner most appropriate to local needs 
and custom.116 There was no doubt that the absence of direct taxation was holding back 
development.117 The underlying factor in all this was the depression of the 1930s, which 
put severe strain on colonial governments’ resources and made direct taxation a necessary 
policy.118
The existing sources of revenue were clearly spelt out in the 1932 ordinance. Such 
sources included profits derived from the cultivation of farms controlled by NAs or the 
stool of a paramount chief, all fees and fines payable in respect of proceedings in native 
tribunals, market rents, dues, slaughter-house, and hunters’ fees, palm-wine tapers’ fees, 
and fishing fees, among others.119 This idea of a treasury and direct taxation was readily 
embraced by the paramount chiefs. In 1935, when the NA areas began to take shape, 
Akpini and Asogli states took advantage of section 35 of the Administration Ordinance to 
pass state treasury bye-laws even before the coming into force of any laws establishing and 
regulating treasuries by the government.120
Enthused by these developments, Lilley wrote to the CEP requesting that a form of 
financial assistance should be granted by government to those divisions in which state 
treasuries had been established.121 Yet, Akpini and Asogli treasuries could not be 
considered to have been established on a sound enough basis to warrant official
116 NA CO 96/700/14, Memorandum on the Introduction o f  Direct Taxation in the Gold Coast Colony and 
British Togoland, 1940.
117 RAG/H, Togoland Report o f 1940, Appendix A.
118 Reid, History o f  Modern Africa, p. 254.
119 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/559, Native Administration Ordinance to Togoland, Sources o f Revenue for Native 
Authorities, 1932.
120 Togoland Report o f  1940, p .13.
121 RAG/H C 229/36, State (Stool) Treasury Subsidies, C.E. P., to Governor, Accra, 26 September 1936.
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recognition. Presumably, Lilley wanted to be in a position to offer certain specific 
advantages to Asogli and Awatime states, which had taken the initiative in order to 
encourage the establishment of treasuries by other divisions. But the proposal was rejected 
by the governor on the grounds that the grant of such concessions to native treasuries in 
Togoland would lay government open to a demand for similar concessions to such
199 •treasuries in the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories. Moreover, if government 
was to provide grants to NAs, it would be necessary to establish very definite measures of 
governmental control over such treasuries. The CEP was even more emphatic when he 
stated that:
no form of Government subsidy should be given to any Native Treasury 
until such time as the Treasury is well established and has been working 
satisfactorily for a period of years, in other words when it has been shown 
that the native authority can be trusted to administer its funds for the good of 
State, or Division, as a whole, and the principle is understood, appreciated 
and supported by the local population.123 
By 1938, the prospects of the NAs starting a treasury looked feasible, for they made 
deposits with the district treasury.124 Akpini state for instance made a deposit of £32/6, 
while Awatime state deposited £22/6.125 These deposits consisted of money that accrued 
from tribunal fees and fines. The most intriguing development was the establishment of a 
treasury in Kpando by a group known as the ‘Kpando Asafo Union’ in December 1938. 
This particular group, made up of educated elites and the sub-chiefs of Kpando, collected
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid. CEP, to the DC, Kpando, October, 1936.
124 NA CO 96/746/7, Statement by Accredited Representative to the 35th Session o f  the PMC in Geneva, 25 
October 1938.
125 Togoland Report o f  1940, p .15.
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market and lorry park fees and deposited them with the district treasury.126 Within ten 
months, the group collected a total of £259.15.127 But the Fiaga of Kpando stopped the 
activities of the Asafo Union and took over the collection of the market fees.128 A similar 
situation occurred in Ashanti. The control of the finances of NAs was first mooted in 
Ashanti in 1923 when it was realised how mistrust, destoolments and so forth were caused 
by the misapplication and maladministration of stool revenue.129 Therefore, this 
acquisitiveness on the part of the chiefs in Ewedome put government under considerable 
pressure to start propaganda about direct taxation and to educate the people in the 
understanding of the value of a properly organised fiscal system.
Coincidentally, wartime conditions in Britain made it imperative for British officials to 
consider seriously the issue of direct taxation. Britain’s economy was in a shambles as a 
result of its high indebtedness to the US and the horrible destruction visited on her 
industries by Germany.130 Consequently, for the NAs to continue to render essential 
services and promote local government there was the need for the chiefs to realise their 
responsibility for managing the financial affairs of their states honestly and in the best 
interest of their people. In addition, the responsibility of all the citizens to contribute 
financially to the material progress of their divisions had to be institutionalised, a 
responsibility which could best be discharged through the payment of direct taxation. Many 
of the treasuries in the Gold Coast got a big chunk of their revenue from rents and royalties
127 Ibid, p. 17.
128 Ibid, p. 18.
129 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/73, Control ofN ative Administration Finance, 1940.
130 Cooper, Africa since 1940, p.36.
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drawn from mines and stool lands.131 The absence of any such sources of revenue in
Ewedome made a form of direct taxation even more imperative.
Some officials learning from the failure of the 1852 Poll Tax experiment in the Gold
Coast averred that an increase in import duties was an alternative to direct taxation.132 But
such a traditional course of increasing revenue could be an anathema to producers and
importers and might not yield the expected revenue. For one thing, the low purchasing
power of the people of Ewedome might make recourse to increasing import duties a flop.
Already, in 1921, the imposition of full Gold Coast Custom Import Duties in British
Togoland led to a decline in trade in the territory.133 The European firms which operated in
the territory at the start of the mandate had been forced to close down on account of high
import and export taxes which they had to pay in addition to charges at Lome port. Goods
at Ho were reported to be expensive as a result.134 It is also on record that an increase in the
import duty on spirits in the Gold Coast in the late 1920s led to a complete cessation of the
purchase of gin and other spirits.135
An analysis of the Poll Tax experiment shows that the failure was ascribable, at least
partly, to mistakes in the manner of imposing and collecting the tax. Chiefs were not
« 1directly involved in its collection, which was one shilling per man, woman and child. 
Instead, the collection was entrusted to agents employed and paid by government.137 
Moreover, no benefit was derived from the impost; the tax produced very little revenue and
131 Togoland Report o f  1937, p.7.
132 NA CO 96/700/14, Governor o f  the Gold Coast to Sir R. Slater, 31 October 1931.
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had to be abolished in 1861.138 The Poll Tax was expected to yield £20,000 per annum but
1 1 0for the nine years it was in force, only £30,286 was collected. Even that was realised at a 
cost of an expedition into the Krobo areas and the naval bombardment of Christiansborg 
and Labadi.
Finally, when the officials decided to introduce direct taxation they were confronted 
with a more formidable obstacle of a technical nature. The administrative officers were 
divided on the issue of whether the system of controlled finances should be applied within 
the framework of the 1932 ordinance or whether the provisions of the Native 
Administration Ordinance of 1939, which was operating in the colony should be extended 
to the southern section of British Togoland.140 After some debate, the 1932 ordinance was 
amended to ensure that treasuries were established in the territory on a sound basis. The 
amendment became part of the ordinance and referred to as ‘Part 5-Native Administration 
Finances.’141 Eventually, a nominal roll of all eligible tax payers was compiled by the end 
of 1944, paving the way for direct tax to be formally levied in 1945.142 The ordinance was 
one of crucial importance and it may well be said to mark the modest beginning of ‘local 
government’ in the modem sense, thus completing the edifice of NAs in Ewedome.
The taxes were to be graduated, where and as far as circumstances would allow, 
according to the gross annual income of the individual. The collection of the tax by chiefs 
was supervised by the DC, who should examine the native treasury books, to which he
138 Ibid.
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must be given access at all times, and at as frequent intervals as possible.143 All revenue 
was divided into three parts: one for the state and two to the divisions in which it was 
collected. From the state share all staff such as clerks, registrars, tax collectors, and the 
police was paid as well as mail carriers, where the agency or the postal agent’s mail carriers 
served more than one division.144 The decentralisation of financial administration was 
found to be appropriate based on experiences gained from the Gold Coast. Rigorous 
centralised control in many states in the Gold Coast had often resulted in an unduly high 
proportion of the revenue being devoted to the payment of salaries of chiefs, clerks and the 
like.145
Each divisional council stated what exactly it wanted to spend its two-thirds on for 
approval.146 By this method, administration costs were kept low and tax payers were 
assured that the bulk of their tax was spent within their area and not in the capital towns. It 
is important to note that part 5 of the 1932 ordinance made it clear that no taxation in any 
shape or form could be introduced except under a bye-law passed by the state council, and 
approved by the governor before it could have effect.147 In addition, there had to be in every 
NA a finance committee to manage revenue and expenditure. The committee consisted of a 
chairman, treasurer and three other members appointed by the NA, provided that the 
appointment of the treasurer was approved by the DC. Three members of the committee 
were considered competent to transact business at any time. Many NAs had difficulties in 
handling the finances of their state in an appropriate manner. They had difficulties in
143 NA CO 96/746/7, Statement by Accredited Representative to the 35th Session o f  the PMC in Geneva, 25 
October 1938.
144 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/594, Togoland Mandated Area-Report to the League o f  Nations, 1945. See also 
Native Authority Ordinance Southern Section o f  British Togoland 1932, Part V-Native Administration 
Finance.
145 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f the Commission on Native Courts, Gold Coast, 1951, p.8.
146 PRAAD/A ADM 39//594, Report to the League o f  Nations, 1945.
147 Native Administration Ordinance, southern section o f Togoland 1932, Part V.
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maintaining accounts and preparing estimates. It was this apparent inability of most chiefs 
to comprehend the very rudiments of financial administration that led to the creation of a 
central treasury held by the DC on behalf of the chiefs in 1932.
Protest Against Direct Taxation
Protests against direct taxation started in Ewedome even before the coming into force of 
the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance. It was difficult to convince the people that 
development of their divisions was dependent on direct taxation because the history of
148economic advancement in the Gold Coast showed that it was not necessarily the case. As 
we have already seen, as early as June 1937, youngmen attempted to destool paramount 
chief Adzatekpor V of Awatime for the decision by the state council to introduce an annual 
levy of 2/- for development projects in the state.149 The youth went round all the divisions 
to incite people against the tax. They contended that the annual tax was a subtle means by 
government to reintroduce the Poll Tax imposed by the Germans.150 As a result, the DC 
ordered the suspension of the taxes in that state. In 1944, when direct tax was given legal 
backing, Awatime State Council re-introduced it. On 19 April 1944, a resolution was 
passed by the council for an annual state levy known as dudzadrado gadzodzo (town 
development levy) to be imposed during the financial year of 1944-45 in all towns and 
villages throughout the entire Awatime state.151 The amount was to be spent on all divisions 
of the state on such projects as roads, education, sanitation, maintenance of public 
buildings, salary of the clerical staff in the tribunals as well as emolument of the paramount
148 NA CO 96/746/7, Statement to the PMC, 1938.
149 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/280, The Awatime State, Destoolment o f  Head Chief, Case No. 142/32, June, 1937.
150 RAG/H DA/D 142/32, Awatime Divisional Council to C.C. Lilley, 13 August 1937.
151 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/334, Native Administration Treasury-Awatime State, Protests against Annual levy,
1944-1945.
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chief. The taxes were graduated in such a way that the paramount chief was to pay 10/-; 
divisional chiefs were to pay 5/-; all other chiefs were to pay 2/6; all male adults within the 
ages of 17-60 were to pay should pay 2/- and all female adults within the ages of 17-60
1 C J
were to pay 1/-. This resolution generated another wave of protest throughout the state.
Women were vociferous this time against direct taxation. In most of the states, women 
invariably bore the brunt of taxation. They paid tolls on their farm produce at the market. In 
fact, until the introduction of direct taxation, NAs derived a substantial amount of their 
revenue from market tolls.153 Therefore, the women felt they were being over- taxed by 
compelling them to pay annual tax as well. Leaders of women traders also known as 
‘Market Queens’, were at the forefront of the campaign. In 1951, the market queen of 
Saviofe was arrested and fined £15 for inciting the women-folk against the payment of the 
annual tax.154 Further attempts at prosecuting other queens weakened the united front of the 
women. Nevertheless, the campaign by the women accounted for the fall in the revenue of 
Awatime state in 1950-51 by £744 in 1951.155
Similar protests occurred in the Liati division of Akpini state. The Asafo Company in 
Liati protested against the annual tax collection because they claimed their head chief did 
not seek their consent before assenting to the scheme establishing the collection of the taxes 
for the state treasury.156 Meanwhile, a divisional treasury had been in operation in Liati 
since 1938.157 The only division which welcomed direct taxation and showed its
152 Ibid.
153 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/446, Quarterly Report, Ho Sub-District, 31 March 1951.
154 As we will see in the last chapter, some o f these market queens later became ‘Queen Mothers’. The office 
o f the ‘queen mother’ and its evolution in Ewedome is discussed in chapter six.
155 Ibid.
156 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/302, Native Administration Treasury-Ho/Kpando District, Protest against Direct 
Taxation., 1945. The emergence o f asafo companies in Ewedome is discussed in the next chapter.
157 RAG/H ACC 226, Petition, People o f  Liati, Fodome and Ewli to the Governor o f the Gold Coast, 25 
September 1945.
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preparedness to even pay more was Agate in the Akpini state. When the DC visited the 
division in 1943 . to sell the idea of taxation to the inhabitants, the chief told him that 
taxation was not new to them. The division had, since the 1930s, ensured that all children 
had free primary education. The cost was borne through the payment of an annual tax 
which was generally approved by everybody in the division. Much to the surprise of the 
DC, the youth even indicated their readiness to pay 8/- annually instead of 6/- which the 
DC had proposed.158 Agate was a tight-knit community. They derived their income mostly 
from the production of food crops to feed the major markets in the region.
Protests against direct taxation did not come from the indigenes of Ewedome alone. 
Strangers residing within the region were more ruthless in their opposition to the tax. One 
of the consequences of the development of the cash crop economy under colonial rule was 
the creation of a comparatively mobile labour force. There was the problem of how to 
handle the presence of such large numbers of ‘strangers’ from the French territory.159 
Awatime and Asogli states witnessed the emigration of large number of Kabres from the 
north of French Togo. Many of them moved there in order to earn the money to pay the 
taxes being demanded by the French.160 They also wanted a better standard of living.161 
Naturally, one would expect that they could be allowed to naturalise and stay in the 
divisions in which they worked. But this was not always feasible, for they moved from one 
division to the other at will.
In 1945, Kpedze, the centre of commercial activities in the Awatime state, bore the brunt 
of the protests from strangers. There arose a disturbance in the division by the stranger
158 RAG/H, Memorandum on the Administration o f the Southern Section o f  Togoland, 1943.
159 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1046, Migration o f  People from the French Territory to the British Territory, 15 
October 1945.
160 NA CO 96/691/10, Governor o f the Gold Coast to Lord Passfield, Despatch No. 021, 26 October 1929.
161 Ibid.
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community because of the annual levy.162 In fact, the resolution adopted by the council in
1944 stated that any alien who had lived within the state for more than six months was
1obliged to pay the annual levy. Subsequently, the strangers decided to move out of 
Kpedze division to Honuta-Aflakpe whose divisional chief was vehemently opposed to the 
levy. The divisional chief of Honuta-Aflakpe promised the strangers safe haven and 
freedom from taxation. This led to serious clashes between the people of Kpedze and the 
strangers.164 What aggravated the already volatile situation was the de-roofing of houses by 
the strangers.165 While the people of Kpedze were not against the strangers moving to 
Honuta, it was a taboo for anybody to de-roof a house on the basis that he or she was 
leaving the division.166 Apparently, the strangers felt they were not under any obligation to 
pay taxes. Before the proclamation of the 1932 ordinance, an old German law debarred
1 zrf
chiefs from dealing with cases relating to strangers in their towns.
The idea of families raising a levy was not new among the people of Ewedome. There 
were instances where a family in a village occasionally raised a levy, not for any immediate 
specific purpose, but to supplement the funds which the head of the family held to be spent 
on what the family deemed necessary. They objected to the direct tax because they felt that 
whereas in the case of an occasional levy the purpose of the levy was known before it was 
imposed, in the case of the annual tax the spending of it might be wholly out of their 
control. Apparently, there was a wide gap that existed between the principle of acceptance 
of the system of a levy for a specific purpose, sanctioned by custom, and the acceptance of
162 Ibid, Disturbances in Kpedze, 5 April 1945.
163 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/334, Native Administration Treasury-Awatime State, Protests against Annual Levy, 
1944-1945.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Interview with the paramount chief o f Kpedze, Togbe Atsridom, 25 September 2007.
167 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/288, Amalgamation o f  Division, Awatime State, 1932.
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a levy imposed and controlled by the state. The people of Liati, for example, cited an 
instance where an amount of £25 lodged in the state treasury was allegedly unaccounted for 
by the paramount chief of Akpini state.168 When the DC, visited Liati in 1945 to impress 
upon them to pay 6/- per male into the state treasury they replied,
we have no confidence in the money methods of the Akpini state 
council, nor the paramount chief Dagadu, and firmly believe that 
the money raised from the 6/- taxes as suggested will be used to foster 
the aggrandisement of the paramount stool and the headquarters division 
to the injury of the petitioners and their divisions.169 
The impression, whether perceived or real, was that taxes were going to be to the advantage 
of the divisions that housed the treasury. Therefore, other divisions feared they might not 
get from the treasuries as much as they put in. This called for an appropriate administrative 
disposition to assuage the fears of the constituent divisions.
The introduction of direct taxation meant a lot of work for the NAs. Government grants
• 170became partly dependent upon the amount that the NAs collected in direct taxation. In 
this regard, a grant of 17/6 was paid to each NA for every £1 collected in direct taxation 
during the years 1948-1949.171 The onus therefore was on NAs to improve their efficiency 
of tax collection in order that they could attract more government grant. Other 
considerations that guided the disbursement of the grant were the expenditure of the NAs 
on personal emoluments, including allowances paid to customary office holders, honoraria
RAG/H ACC 226, Petition, Liati, Fodome and Wli to the Governor, 25 September 1945.
169 Ibid.
170 Togoland Report, Corrections to paragraph 217, 1950.
171 Ibid.
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to court members and allowances to postal agents.172 In addition, there was a grant based on 
the population of the state. For example, in 1949 a grant of £1/10 per hundred head of 
population was paid to each NA.173 To ameliorate the burden on NAs with low population 
figures, special assistance was given to such states at the discretion of the Chief 
Commissioner of the Colony on the recommendation of the Senior DC. In 1950, for 
instance, Asogli received a special amount of £100 to enable it to carry out repair works on 
its water tanks.174
In Ewedome, as in other parts of the colony, NAs had the freedom to graduate the 
annual tax according to occupation or some other criterion that would take into account 
ability to pay.175 From the government’s point of view, the introduction of some elasticity 
in the tax regime was one way of minimising protest.176 In the Gold Coast Colony, where 
the tax was varied to bear definite relation to the material conditions of the various 
localities and to take into account the difficulties evinced by periodic price fluctuations, 
protest was minimal.177 In Ewedome, the NAs overlooked this dispensation. Although 
chiefs paid a higher rate, a flat rate was applied throughout the states.178 This certainly did 
not go down well with many divisions which felt that they were poor therefore they should 
be made to pay a lower rate than their neighbours in the more endowed divisions.
From the later part of 1950, things began to stabilise due to increasing interest in the 
work of the NAs and a better understanding of their functions, which resulted in protests 
against direct taxation beginng to wane.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Togoland Report o f  1950, Corrections to paragraph 225.
176 PRAAD/A ADM 39/5/42, Report on Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical 
Africa, 1940-42, p.6.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
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REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN 1949/50
.NATIVE AUTHORITY REVENUE EXPENDITURE
Akpini State £6,183 £4,740
Asogli State £9,353 £9,492
Atando state £5,574 £4,189
Awatime State £5,221 £4, 997
Total £26,331 £23,418
Indeed, most NAs increased their annual taxes considerably in 1950 and 1951 without 
much protestation. For example in 1951, Awatime increased its rate for men from 6/- to
1 7 012/-. Some of the youth groups (Sohewo) in Awatime and Asorgli who most violently
1 RDopposed the operations of the treasury became most anxious to see it working well. In the 
1950-51 financial year, 39 percent of revenue for the NAs was made up of direct taxation 
with court revenue 16 percent, fees and tolls constituted 14 percent and government grant
1 Ol
28 percent. The young CPP-supporting nationalists were reconciled to the idea of having 
well ordered finances but maintained that they would rather see the CPP-led government
1 R7assume complete control instead of the chiefs. Once again, it appears that the increases in 
the rates for 1950-51 were made possible by increase in the producer price of cocoa. For
179 Togoland Report o f  1950, Corrections to paragraph 225. Increase in the rate for women in Awatime for 
1951 was put on hold due to protests by women. See PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/446, Quarterly Report, Ho Sub- 
District, 31 March 1951.
180 Memorandum on the Administration o f  the Southern Section o f  Togoland for the 1949. Sohewo is an Ewe 
term for Asafo companies.
181 UN Trusteeship Council Visiting Missing Report, December 1950, p. 39. Figures for the table were taken 
from NA CO 96/816/3, Summary o f the Togoland Report o f 1950, p. 16.
182 Ibid. We whall return to the emergence o f  CPP activism in Ewedome in the next chapter.
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the 1950-51 crop season, the price of coca was 70/- a load, an equivalent of £131 per ton, as
against 45/- a load (£85.30 per ton) the previous year. It is also reasonable to suggest that
the reforms carried out in 1949 might have contributed to greater willingness of the
1 8^inhabitants to pay rates than in previous years.
The Trusteeship System and the 1949 Ordinance.
Soon after the end of the war, Governor Sir Shelton Thomas visited Vane in Awatime 
and informed Adzatekpor V that Japan was defeated and that it would not be long before
1 aA
the young men of Awatime would return from India and Burma. A far more significant 
development following the war was the replacement of the mandate system with the 
trusteeship system. When on 17 January 1946 the British Foreign Secretary said to the 
United Nations General Assembly that they welcome the trusteeship council which was to 
replace the mandate system, it marked yet another political change in the history of
1 Of
Ewedome and British Togoland as a whole. The British government then declared its 
intention to enter into negotiation for placing Tanganyika, Cameroons and Togoland under 
the Trusteeship system.186 These territories had been under the mandate system conferred 
by the erstwhile League of Nations for 25 years.187
A most striking difference between the mandate and the trusteeship systems was that in 
the case of the later, there was a UN Visiting Mission, which was empowered to visit the 
territory to see things at first hand and to listen to the concerns of the inhabitants.188
183 Togoland Report o f  1950, p. vi.
184 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/288, Visit o f Sir Shelton Thomas to Vane, 13 September 1945.
185 Trusteeship Report o f  1946, p. 1.
186 Ibid, p. 4.
187 Article 75 o f  the UN Charter which made for the establishment o f  a trusteeship system was signed at San 
Francisco on 26 June 1945.
188 For further discussion o f  the differences between the two systems, see Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 3
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Measures were taken to ensure that the international supervision of the administrative 
authorities was more effective than it had been under the mandate system. Other non- 
European countries such as the US and USSR had the authority to question the 
administrative authorities. The annual reports to be submitted by the administrative 
authorities to the UN General Assembly were based on a ‘questionnaire drawn up by the 
Trusteeship Council in accordance with Article 88 of the UN Charter.’189 But from the 
perspective of the colonial powers, the administrative authorities still had permission to 
make proper use of the resources of the trust territories for defence and economic 
purposes.190 The implication of all this was the pressure it brought to bear on NAs and 
administrative officers to meet the expectations of the UN visiting missions.
As early as the 1920s, Sir Gordon Guggisberg was quoted as saying that ‘the British 
were not to keep the African people over whom they were ruling in a state of permanent 
subjugation which in days gone by was represented by slavery and in days yet not so 
altogether past, by the economically false policy of exploitation of the country regardless of 
the interests of the people’.191 He went on to say that they had to adopt the policy of 
trusteeship for the well-being and development of the country for the benefit o f the 
inhabitants and for the general welfare of mankind.192 The point being emphasised here is 
that the policy of trusteeship was not new to British policy makers. It was a familiar policy 
that had been agitating the minds of British colonial officers long before the principles of 
trusteeship were written into the charter of the United Nations in 1945 and before Britain 
formally exercised the policy of trusteeship from 1946 to 1956 in British Togoland. It was
189 Terms o f the UN Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland, Article 16, October 1946.
190 Report on the Trusteeship Territories in Africa Under United Kingdom Mandate, British Secretary o f  State 
to British Parliament, 23 January 1946.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
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no surprise therefore that the cardinal objectives of the trusteeship system and the functions 
of the trusteeship council largely reflected British ideals of ‘development trust’.
The ultimate objective of the trusteeship system was self-government or 
independence.193 One specific provision of the agreement was that the administering 
authorities had to constitute their respective territories into customs, fiscal or administrative 
union or federation with adjacent territories and to promote the political advancement of the 
inhabitants.194 The coming into force of the trusteeship system by and large shaped the 
political, constitutional, and economic development of Ewedome from 1946. Thenceforth, 
various policies and ordinances that were passed in relation to the territory as well as 
innovations in the NA system were largely informed by the provisions of the trusteeship 
agreement and post-war developments in the Gold Coast.
From 1946, steps were taken to reappraise the working of the NAs. In practice, the 
tribunals still presented certain weaknesses of a technical nature such as the excessive cost 
of litigation, the partiality of tribunal members, and the power of the registrar, whose 
knowledge of the law was generally greater than that of any of the tribunal members.195 As 
stated earlier, the executive and judicial functions of the chiefs were closely bound 
together. That was why varying measures of control over native tribunals were embodied in 
the 1932 ordinance. It was up to the officers and the registrars on the ground to enforce 
those controls. There is no gainsaying the fact that the effectiveness of the entire NA 
system was contingent largely on the degree of supervision or stimulus they received from
193 Fourth Report o f  the Ad Hoc Committee on Petitions, 13 July 1950.
194Article 5 o f the UN Terms o f Trusteeship for Togoland, October, 1946.
195 RAG/H ACC No. 337, Native Courts, Petition from Chiefs, 1946.
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the officials on the ground.196 This happened to be some of the weaknesses of the British 
policy of indirect rule. In Ewedome, it appears that the close co-operation between the DC
* 197and other officers with the chiefs tended to weaken the enforcement of regulations. So 
extensive were the political quarrels, personal distrusts and partiality among the chiefs that 
some reforms were necessary to maintain the successful functioning and integrity of the 
tribunals.198 The strength of the NAs depended largely on the prestige of the tribunals. 
Whenever the integrity of the tribunals was compromised, the position and authority of the 
whole NA system was seriously impaired.199
A more serious problem had to do with the enforcement of the orders of the chiefs. 
Since the establishment of the tribunals, chiefs in most cases had to resort to the use of the 
oath to enforce their orders. This traditional method of enforcing court orders was not 
always effective. In 1936, for instance, 58 applications for enforcement of tribunal 
judgement were sent to the DC out of which 57 were enforced.200 This arrangement was not 
the best, for it led to the delay of justice. The question then was whether the DC should 
continue to enforce tribunal judgements or the tribunal should be empowered to enforce 
their own judgements through conventional means. Certainly, clearer arrangement had to 
be made for the support of the authority of the native tribunals in any action which they 
legally or rightly undertook. The absence of such a policy was making the administration of 
justice illusory and the power of the NAs weak.
196 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, 
1940-42, p. 22.
197 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1544. DC to CEP, June 1946; PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/559, Acting CEP to the 
Governor o f  the Gold Coast, 29 January 1946.
198 Ibid.
199 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, p. 24.
200 Section 38 o f  the 1932 ordinance empowered the DC to enforce tribunal judgements.
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The inability to enforce NA laws, coupled with the wishes of the rising groups of 
educated youngmen for a wider representation on the state council and the desire to make 
the ‘stranger communities’ feel part of the system, led to the passing of the Native 
Authority (Southern Section o f Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship) Ordinance in 
September 1949.201 The ordinance made it possible for approximately one-third o f the 
members of each NA to be individuals who did not hold office by tradition and for 
members of ‘stranger communities’ to be represented.202 These non-chiefs were initially 
nominated 203 Though the inclusion of educated non-chiefly elements in NA administration 
was part of the general reshaping of indirect rule following the Second World War, the 
1949 ordinance has to be understood within the context of post-war labour militancy, riots 
and a surge in anti-colonial sentiment in the Gold Coast in 1948.204
Causes of the disturbances in the Gold Coast were multi-faceted. The frustration of the 
educated elite who were anxious to take part in politics, the failure of government to 
appreciate that rule through chiefs was becoming obsolete, public resentments at the 
increasing concentration of certain trades in the hands of foreigners, and the disappointment
20 5of ex-servicemen and others with post-war conditions, were some of the causes. 
Although the 1948 riots did not spread to Ewedome, their impact on the youth in the region 
was profound. Native authorities were proving incapable of containing the rise o f anti­
colonial ‘nationalism’ and increasing dissatisfaction with the rule of chiefs. Therefore, the 
1949 ordinance was seen as a belated attempt to democratise the NA system. Cooper sees
201 From the administrative point o f  view, the 1949 ordinance was largely influenced by the coming into force 
o f the trusteeship agreement.
202 RAG/H ACC No. 64, Gazette Extraordinary, Togoland under British Mandate, 4 August 1949.
203 Fourth Report o f the UN Trusteeship Council Ad Hoc Committee on Petitions, 13 July 1950, p.23.
204 An examination o f post-war rethinking o f  indirect rule by the British government is found in Reid, History 
o f  M odem Africa, p. 254.
205 NA CO 96/796/5, Strikes and Disturbances in Accra, Report o f  Commission o f Enquiry, 1948, p .l. Causes 
o f the 1948 riots are found in Apter, Ghana, p. 169-172; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 70-77.
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such reforms as an attempt by the officials to re-legitimise colonial rule in view of rising 
post-war aspirations and agitations in Africa.206 In the Gold Coast, the Watson Commission 
set up to investigate the 1948 disturbances had already recommended major constitutional 
reforms.207
Native Authority Police Force
In 1949, it came to light that a key to the problem of how to enforce the orders of the 
NAs was the introduction of NA police forces to assist in law enforcement at the local 
level.208 A critical aspect of the 1949 ordinance was section 46 which stated that, ‘there 
should be established in and for the area of authority of a NA a body of police’.209 This was 
welcomed by the chiefs. All the same, there was the contrary view that investigating and 
prosecuting of offences against NA bye-laws should be undertaken by the Gold Coast 
police.210 The fact is that bye-laws were of local application and required local interest and 
knowledge for their enforcement. The Gold Coast police were liable to constant transfer 
from one area to another which made it difficult for them to acquire the necessary local 
knowledge. Even though there was the view that chiefs could be overly empowered by 
providing them with a police force, it was important that an effort be made to enforce local 
bye-laws.
• 211Native authority police established in 1949 performed a wide range of functions. 
These included the maintenance of peace and order in the state, investigating offences
206 Cooper, Africa since 1940, p. 62-65.
207 For a discussion o f  Watson’s Report, see Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 20.
208 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/450, Chief Police Commissioner to DC , Ho, 11 August 1949; PRAAD/A ADM  
39/1/450, Conference o f Senior Police Officers, June 1946.
209 Native Authority Ordinance 1949, Section 46.
210 R AG/H RAO 7/9, Native Authority Police, Petitions, 1949.
211 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/450, Native Authority Police, Responsibilities and Functions o f  Native Authority 
Police, 20 October 1952.
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reported to them or detected by them and handing over to the Gold Coast police cases 
beyond the jurisdiction of the native courts. Furthermore, they conveyed convicted persons 
to the nearest prison. In addition, they undertook day and night patrols within their areas, 
enforced local bye-laws and price controls by acting as price inspectors as well as 
accompanying revenue collectors. In some cases, they actually collected fees, tolls and 
rates for the NAs. The NA police had the powers to search premises and arrest with or 
without warrant.212 Other non-statutory duties included maintaining order at NA meetings
• *71 ^and court sessions and acting as orderlies, runners, messengers and attendants to chiefs.
Native authority police were not armed. Therefore, it was necessary for the Gold Coast 
police to afford them assistance from time to time. When it became evident that the NA 
police was being seriously obstructed in the performance of their duties, a chief police 
officer at the request of a DC would detail as many Gold Coast police as the situation might 
demand to be present in the state while the NA police performed their duties.214 Normally,
21 5the native police force comprised a sergeant, two corporals and eight constables.
One major policy evinced by the 1949 ordinance was that it conferred powers on the 
NAs to legislate by means of orders and rules.216 Orders could be made when it was 
intended that legislation should only be temporary. Rules could be made for the same 
purpose as orders, and for any other purpose providing for peace, order, good government 
and welfare of the persons.217 The difference between orders and rules was that whereas 
only the approval of the DC was necessary in the case of orders, rules necessarily required
212 Togoland Report o f  1950, p, 47.
213 Ibid.
2,4 RAG/H ACC No. 53/19/50, Assistance to Native Authority Police Forces, 15 February 1952.
215 RAG/H ACC No. 51/19/50, Native Authority Police, Asogli State, 22 June 1950.
216 See detail provisions in the 1949 Native Authority (Southern Section o f  Togoland under UK Trusteeship) 
Ordinance o f 1949.
217 Ibid; Togoland Report o f 1950, p. 34.
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approval of the governor.218 Examples of rules applied by the states concerned markets, 
deaths, marriages and divorce, activities of herbalists and palm wine sellers, slaughter 
houses, lorry parks, and the registration of births.219 Orders were used by all NAs to control 
the practice of bush burning and to establish native police forces.220 That the zeal o f the NA 
was emboldened from 1949 by the presence of the NA police was not in doubt. It must also 
be emphasised that the coming into force of NA police in 1949 and their role in supervising 
and collecting taxes greatly improved the tax collection. On the flip side, however, the 
creation of NA police had the unintended effect of widening the disjuncture between the 
chiefs and their subjects. Some of the police officers were accused of arbitray arrest and it 
was this which gave the NAs a ‘despotic’ outlook.
Judicial Reforms: Native Courts
Consequent to the 1949 ordinance, a Native Court 1949 Ordinance for Togoland was 
introduced to amalgamate existing divisional tribunals.221 The courts so constituted were 
grade ‘B’ courts and there was only one grade ‘A’ court for a state. In all, 24 courts were 
established in the whole of southern Togoland in place of the divisional tribunals 222 This 
idea of native courts replacing divisional tribunals was part of a general reform of courts in 
the Gold Coast since Governor Sir Alan Bums assumed office in 1941 223 At the time, it 
was observed that most of the tribunals were too unwieldy to be considered as ‘a model of
*)0Ajudicial decorum’. Consequently, a committee was appointed by Bums in 1942 to
218 Most often the Governor delegated this power to the Chief Commissioner o f the colony.
219 Togoland Report o f 1950, p. 34.
220 Ibid.
221 RAG/H ACC No. 64, Gazette Extraordinary, 4 August 1949.
222 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f Commission on Native Courts, 1951, p.8.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
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consider the working of the tribunals. The report of the committee led to the passing of the 
1944 Native Court (Colony) Ordinance, which in turn shaped the native court arrangement 
in Ewedome in 1949.
NATIVE COURTS IN AWATIME NA IN 1949
COURT NO. 1 COURT NO. 2
Awatime Tribunal Honuta Tribunal
Akome Tribunal Hoe Tribunal
Dodome Tribunal Klave Tribunal
Dzolo Tribunal Kpeze Tribunal
Saviofe Tribunal Kpoeta Tribunal
The arrangement in Awatime vividly illustrates the amalgamation of tribunals in 
Ewedome in 1949. In Awatime Native Authority, the tribunals in Awatime, Akome, 
Dodome, Dzolo and Saviofe were grouped together to form one grade ‘B’ court. The court 
thus constituted had jurisdiction over only the five divisions grouped under it. The court
9 9  Showever did not sit permanently in one division. For example, if there were many cases 
in Awatime at one time, the court would arrange to sit at Awatime. At the same time, if 
there was say one case from Saviofe, the court could try that case while it was sitting at 
Awatime. In effect, there were two grade B courts in Awatime state with three magistrates. 
In other words, the court rotated among the divisions whose tribunals constituted the court. 
In preparing the schedule, opportunity was given to effect any desirable reorganization
225 RAG/H DA/D 71, Awatime Native Authority, Awatime state to the DC Ho, 27 April 1949.
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having regard to both tradition and efficiency.226 This enabled the state to reduce the 
number of tribunals to only two grade ‘B ’ courts.227
The new courts continued largely in the firmly rooted traditions of the existing NAs. 
The only modification was the inclusion of a greater number of non-chiefs on the NAs. It 
was expected that the new NAs and courts would enjoy identical powers to those held in 
the Colony.228 The new composition of the state councils drew protest from some of the 
educated youth in Ewedome. Their concern was that the appointment of non-chiefs to the 
state councils was dictatorial and undemocratic.229 They contended that non-chiefs should 
have been elected by universal suffrage.
The Southern Togoland Council
The 1949 ordinance also established a Southern Togoland Council as part of the 
reorganization of NAs in the region. The council was made up of 15 members, with three 
elected by each of the erstwhile NAs.230 It was .to meet from time to time to deliberate upon 
matters affecting the welfare and interest of the southern section of Togoland. In addition, it 
would elect one member to the Gold Coast Legislative Council and appoint a member each 
to the Cocoa Marketing Board, the Agricultural Development Corporation, the Agricultural 
Produce Marketing Board and the Library Board.231 Each NA in the whole of southern 
British Togoland elected three members to the council, which meant that Anfoega was not
226 Schedule to the 1949 Native Authority Ordinance for Southern Section o f  British Togoland.
227 Ibid. In addition to the two grade ‘B ’ courts, there was one Native appellate Court for the state served by 
one Registrar.
228 Coussey Committee had been set up in 1948 to make recommendation for constitutional reforms in the 
Gold Coast. Therefore, the 1949 ordinance was enacted pending the receipt and consideration o f the Coussey 
report.
229 RAG/H ACC No. 5128/8.067, TUNA Youth Section to Senior DC Ho, 4 December 1949.
230 The council had its first meeting in Ho on 16 February 1950.
231 NA CO 96 827/2, Minutes o f Meetings o f  Southern Togoland Council, 23 February 1950.
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represented because of the latter’s refusal to join any of the amalgamated states.232 This 
council was not of much significance since it was merely an advisory body with no 
legislative powers.233 It was not a body of chiefs composed along the lines of the Provincial 
and Joint Provincial Council of the Colony or the Asanteman Council, except that it was
')'1A
the apex of the NA system in the southern British Togoland region.
Apart from the one seat allocated to the council on the Legislative Council of the Gold 
Coast, it did not meet the expectation of the chiefs and the youth.235 The disbursement of 
government funds for local development was taken over by a non-statutory Southern
O'XfiTogoland Rural Development Committee. Its functions were to submit to the 
government schemes for economic development, and to supervise, within the limits of its 
competence, approved schemes.237 All the same, the coming into being of the council 
marked the first time in the history of the territory that a body was established that could 
debate and express a common opinion on matters of interest to the territory as a whole.238 It 
is however important to note that the re-structuring of NAs in Ewedome at this time was 
considered as being only an interim measure because further reform of local government
232 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 131-132.
233 Togoland Report o f  1950, p. 13; NA CO 96/827/5, Togoland Administration, The Standing Consultation 
Commission, 1 November 1950; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 82.
234 NA CO 96/827/5, Togoland Administration, The Standing Consultation Commission, 1 November 1950; 
NA CO 96/824/7, Constitution: Regional Government, 1951. The number o f seats for the Southern Togoland 
Council was increased to three in 1950. See D. E. K. Amenumey, The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political 
History (Accra, 1989), p. 114.
235 Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 83. Detailed discussion o f the unification problem follows in the next 
chapters. For representation o f Southern Togoalnd Council on the Legislative Council, se Austin, Politics in 
Ghana, p. 147.
236 UN Visiting Mission Report, 1950, p. 15.
237 Ibid.
238 RAG/H Press Release No. 160/50, Public Relations Department, Accra, 16 February 1950; Interview with 
Mawusinu Dogoe, daughter o f Lawyer Dogoe, 8 December 2007.
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was imminent in view of the process towards a major constitutional reform in the Gold 
Coast.239
Conclusion
Native Authorities were able to hold their own for two decades in Ewedome due largely 
to the relative acquiescence which British colonial rule enjoyed in the region from the end 
of the 1920s to the later part of the 1940s. To the British officials, the NA system was 
successful in the way it provided a layer o f local ‘legitimate authority’ between themselves 
and the mass of people, whose immediate concerns were somewhat dealt with by local 
chiefs. An obvious disadvantage was that the traditional authorities no longer derived their 
power from their subjects. Instead, colonial officials became the source of the chiefs 
political authority. This eroded the chiefs accountability to the people. By and large, the 
NA system was a superimposition of a bureaucratic administrative structure on the pre­
colonial system of authority in Ewedome. This often sat awkwardly with the traditional 
African process of decision-making where the elements of consultation and consensus were 
highly valued. The cost of running such a bureaucratic administrative system, the need for 
fostering a sense of corporate responsibility within the NAs, in addition to providing for 
economic and social development, all in the midst of the depression in the 1930s, made the 
introduction of direct taxation inevitable.
As the territory began to witness social and political transformation, changes were 
introduced into the NA system to accommodate the balance of forces that were developing. 
In many respects, the coming into force of the trusteeship system and economic, social and 
political unrest in the Gold Coast following the Second World War changed the chemistry
239 RAG/H ACC No. 64, Gazette Extraordinary, 4 August 1949.
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of native administration and set in motion a series of reforms in 1949. These reforms were a 
last-gasp attempt to keep increasingly out-of-date system afloat.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE TRANSITION FROM NATIVE AUTHORITIES TO LOCAL COUNCILS,
1949-1951
Native Authorities served the purpose of the colonial state and its intermediaries in 
Ewedome for some eighteen years from 1932 to 1949. Indeed, the interwar period was the 
heyday of the NA system of administration in British colonial Africa. The colonial political 
structure provided a platform for many chiefs to gamer considerable power and authority. 
From 1948, however, the rise of popular anti-colonial nationalism in the Gold Coast served 
to articulate and to organise simmering discontent and frustrations of non-chiefly elements 
for change. In Ewedome, the demand by the UN for political advancement of the Trust 
Territories and the crystallization of ‘Ewe national consciousness’ into political movements 
such as the All Ewe Conference (AEC) and the Togoland Union (TU)/Togoland 
Congress(TC) in the 1940s ‘speeded up the agenda for decolonisation [and] provided the 
focus for the development of active local politics’.1 All this affected British colonial policy, 
culminating in the promulgation of a new constitution in 1950 and the formation of a 
diarchy in the Gold Coast in 1951. The stage was thus set for the first phase o f the process 
of decolonization, which involved the dismantling of the NA system of local government.
This chapter first examines the grievances that the people of Ewedome had against NAs. 
It then focuses on how the shift to elected local government in Ewedome was carried out by 
a new reformist colonial regime in league with the Gold Coast nationalists. It demonstrates
1 Ken Kwaku, ‘Tradition, Colonialism and Politics in Rural Ghana: Local Politics in Have, Volta Region’, 
Canadian Journal o f  African Studies, 1 (1976), p. 79.
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how this attempted democratization of localised forms of government represented a key 
part of the broader pattern of political change. Finally, the chapter examines some of the 
acrimonies and protestations that characterized the transition and then discusses the 
structure of the new local government system.
The Decline of Native Authorities: Native Courts
One of the main grievances with the NA system in Ewedome was the reservations that 
many people harboured about the native courts. The native courts as constituted by the 
chiefs and their elders had become unsatisfactory in dealing with litigations which were fast 
passing from ‘customary’ cases to ones which required a higher standard of knowledge of 
law and legal procedure. The courts also were far too cumbersome in their composition. 
Generally, the ordinances which established the courts only stated that the courts should be 
composed of chiefs and their councillors in accordance with native custom without 
specifying the mode of selection of these councillors and the number that should be 
selected. This left the composition of the courts to the discretion of the chiefs thereby 
increasing their numbers and compromising efficiency and effectiveness.2 Attacks on the 
native courts were part of the broader anti-colonial movement of the post-war era when 
lawyers began to demand the codification of customary law and the professionalisation of
a
the native courts.
2 See PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, 
1940-42, p. 24.
3 For a broader analysis o f  post-war reforms o f  customary law in Africa, see Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 
128-137. With specific examples in the Gold Coast, see Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 13-15.
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There had been constant attacks in many parts of the Gold Coast on the continuous 
recognition of the oath by the NAs as a means of bringing a case before the native courts.4 
As we have seen, the oath was one essential customary form of judicial procedure that was 
preserved by the statutory rules. The main ground for objection to the oath was its use by 
the native courts to extort heavy fees and fines from litigants.5 In Ewedome, the use of the 
oath as a means of instituting a civil action unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation. 
For example, a person who swore the oath had to report the fact and terms of the oath to the 
Registrar of the nearest native court and pay a fee of £1 for the case to be heard.6 The 
argument by most educated citizens and law officers was that the oath was archaic, 
unnecessary and undesirable.
We noted that these problems with the native courts were already emerging by the early 
1940s, prompting the enquiry set up in 1942 by governor of the Gold Coast Sir Allan 
Bums.7 Rathbone described the report as ‘utterly devastating’.8 The 1943 report noted inter 
alia that the cost of litigation was inflated and that the courts were regarded by members ‘as 
a source of revenue instead of a fount of justice’.9 But the 1949 ordinance which replaced 
native tribunals with native courts in southern section of British Togoland did not go far 
enough to address these pent-up concerns. It will be recalled that one way by which chiefs 
enforced executive orders was to swear the oath on their subjects. Such orders could be for 
the execution of development projects such as the construction and maintenance of roads 
and classroom blocks. A classic example was the use of the oath to bring about the cocoa
4 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f  Commission on Native Courts, 1951.
5 Ibid, p. 20.
6 Ibid.
7 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1544, Native Tribunals Committee o f Enquiry (Blackall Report), 12 February 1943, 
p. 4-55.
8 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 18.
9 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1544, Native Tribunals Committee o f Enquiry (Blackall Report), 12 February 1943, 
p. 18; PRAAD/A ADM3/3/80, Report o f Commission on Native Courts, 1951, p. 8.
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hold-up of 1929-30 in the Gold Coast.10 The attack on the oath had the effect of eroding the 
authority of the chief and, by extension, that of the NAs.
In Ewedome, the NAs had been unwilling to spend money on the staff and infrastructure 
of the courts to bring them to an appreciable standard. A disturbing trend was the huge 
disparity in the quality of court buildings.11 The salary of most of the Registrars and court 
staff was woefully inadequate.12 This, coupled with an inadequate training programme for 
court staff, led to poor service delivery. The native police established in 1949 were poorly 
paid and trained with no prospects of advancement. Constables attached to the NAs were
1 3paid as little as £1/10 a month, far below the government approved minimum wage of £5.
Furthermore, the combination of executive and judicial functions by the NAs meant that 
there was too close a connection between the courts and the chiefs. Even though the NA 
Ordinance of 1932 made a clear distinction between the functions of NAs and those of the 
state councils, the distinction was largely theoretical. In reality, the same people served on 
both councils and that blurred the supposedly distinct functions of the two. Mamdani was 
thus right when he remarked that the NA system effectively ‘fused in a single person all 
moments of power; judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative’, a point also made 
by Spear.14 This gave rise to corruption, the use of the courts as a political weapon and 
delays in dispensing justice. To avert such delays in the Colony and Ashanti, the 1944 
ordinance set a minimum of 200 cases to be dealt with annually by the federal courts to 
ensure that they carried out a reasonable amount of business.15 In the southern section of
10 RAG/H RAO/C 214, Assistant Chief Commissioner to the Senior District Officer, Ho, 1945.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f Commission on Native Courts, 1951, p. 21-22.
14 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 23; Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 14.
15 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f Commission on Native Courts, 1951, p. 9.
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British Togoland, the report noted the inability of this guiding principle to have much effect 
because of the territory’s particular history.16 As noted earlier, the 69 native tribunals 
introduced under the 1932 Ordinance were reduced to 24 amalgamated native courts under 
the Native Courts Ordinance of 1949.17 But the reduction in the number of courts did not, 
in fact, represent a fundamental change, for the panels of the new courts were greatly
1 ftincreased to include members drawn from all component divisions. From 1949, there 
were as many as 30 persons on the panels of a native court in Ewedome and other parts of 
southern Togoland.19 Besides, the underlying problem of combination of magisterial and 
executive functions by the NAs was not resolved. It is interesting to note that the 
administrative officers themselves combined magisterial and executive functions in the 
colonies. This perhaps accounted for their lack of enthusiasm in separating the two 
functions20
A further sore point was the name ‘native court’ which was considered to be no longer 
appropriate in view of the complexity of cases brought before them. The name ‘native 
court’, as originally conceived, was solely concerned with the administration of ‘native 
law’. Admittedly, the courts had grown beyond the mere administration o f ‘customary law’ 
or ‘native law’. Native courts, after 1949, began to exercise jurisdiction in matters falling 
quite outside the ambit of native law, and in particular, they were empowered to adjudicate 
in respect of criminal offences under the penal code.21 As we shall see, customary law has
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/80, Report o f Commission on Native Courts, 1951, p. 9.
19 Togoland Report, 1950, p. 76.
20 See PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, p. 26. RAG/H RAO/C 214, Assistant Chief Commissioner to the Senior 
District Officer, Ho, 1945
21 Native Courts (Southern Section) Togoland Ordinance o f 1949.
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been undergoing synthesization since the start o f colonial rule.22 In fact, the criminal law 
which operated in Ewedome combined both the Gold Coast law, as set out in the criminal
9 3code, and native customary law.
From 1949, the likelihood that the native courts could extend their jurisdiction over all 
persons, irrespective of race, was probable. This would inevitably have serious 
ramifications for the substantive law administered, and also for the composition of the 
courts, the training and qualifications of court officials as well as court procedures.24
Throughout colonial Africa, the use of native custom for the administration of justice in 
societies which were becoming more complex as a result of social change posed a major 
problem in the administration of justice. Customary law became important in the 
formulation of British colonial policy in the inter-war period when colonial officials wanted 
to synthesize the native legal system and use it ‘to regulate their dealings with local
9  Speople’. Meanwhile, most appeal cases from the native courts went to the district courts 
which were essentially English courts. Native custom varied greatly and was too little 
known in many areas outside the locality for it to form the basis of law enforceable, 
ultimately, in English courts. The practice of sending disputes to the English courts at 
district headquarters had, in many regions in Africa, already ‘undermined the authority of 
the local rulers and profoundly affected indigenous law’ 26 It created a scenario whereby ‘a
22 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’ p. 13.
23 PRAAD/A ADM 11/1/1544, Native Tribunals Committee o f Enquiry, 12 February 1943.
24 RAG/H ACC N. 26/50, Conference o f African Courts Advisers, Agenda, 1953.
25 A detailed analysis o f  the process by which customary law was created in Africa and its key role in the 
functioning o f indirect rule under the NA system is found in K. Mann and R. Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial 
Africa (Portsmouth, 1991), 3-47; Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 13-16.
26 Mann and Roberts, Law in Colonial Africa ’, p. 13.
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dual system of law was administered by two forms of judiciary, the English and the native 
courts’.27
In his analysis of the evolution of customary law, Spear remarks that by removing what 
was deemed repugnant to natural justice from indigenous legal systems and combining 
‘colonial and common law, administrative regulations and Christian injunctions’, 
customary law ceased to be wholly indigenous law 28 Mann and Roberts see the fusion of 
European laws and indigenous African legal system as an ‘elaboration of customary law, 
[which limited the] power and authority of local rulers’.29 The case of Awatime as 
illustrated in Chapter 3 was a classic example of how colonialism subordinated African 
indigenous systems of law ‘to metropolitan legal traditions’. As these elaborations 
continued and the society was becoming more complex, chiefs were finding it difficult to 
reconcile native custom with the defined law of the ordinance.31 Worse yet, the absence of 
such codification rendered native customary law largely contradictory in terms.
Admittedly, codification was a formidable task which could take a very long time to 
accomplish.32 As Spear has shown, in every colonial territory there were many variants of 
customary law that made attempts at codification illusive.33 Moreover, as Mamdani notes,
27 PRAAD/A ADM  5/3/42, p. 34; Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 11.
28 Spears, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 13-14. The point that these changes in customary law were in some cases 
brought about by the role o f administrative officers in the exercise o f their appellate powers was noted in 
PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, p. 30.
29 For the dual effects o f  colonial law on the authority o f  chiefs, see Mann and Roberts (eds.), Law, p. 33.
30 Ibid, p. 8; Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 13.
31 Togoland Report o f  1941, p. 3.
32 According to Brett Shadle and Spear, the colonial authorities were less keen on codifying customary law in 
order to allow for flexibility in its application to the different segments o f  the African societies. See Brett L. 
Shadle, ‘“Changing Traditions to Meet Current Altering Conditions”, Customary Law, African Courts and the 
Rejection o f Codification in Kenya, 1930-60’, Journal o f  African History, 40 (1999), p. 411-28; Spear, ‘Neo- 
Traditionalism’, p. 16.
33 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p. 13.
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codification had the potential of limiting ‘the scope for local initiative’.34 It had always 
been the policy of the British officials not to interfere with customary law unless it was 
found to be ‘repugnant to natural justice’. Customary law touched on the values and belief 
systems: birth, puberty, marriage, death, inheritance and the veneration of ancestors that 
held African societies together. Therefore, any unbridled modifications could affect the 
very existence of the societies. Moreover, according to Rathbone, it could antagonise the 
chiefs, important allies of the colonial state.35 Nonetheless, colonial officials recognised the 
importance of ‘the spread of Western legal arrangements to the growth of trade and 
civilization’.36
Socio-Economic Change
The rise of ‘youngmen’ has been recognised as absolutely central to the entire process of 
the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism and decolonization in Ghana. The youngmen, 
according to Callaway, constituted ‘the historical dissenters of changing Ghanaian 
society’.38 Austin attributes this phenomenon to the opposition by the new breed of school 
leavers to the established order.39 Western education turned out scholars from institutions 
such as Achimota College in the early 1940s whose goals and aspirations were to develop 
Gold Coast nationalism independent of traditional authorities 40 The Gold Coast Youth
34 Mamdani cited Bechuanaland Protectorate as an exceptional colony where customary laws were codified in 
the late 1930s. Thereafter, it became part o f the main stream British administrative reforms in the 1950s. 
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 129.
35 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 15; Berman, ‘Ethnicity’, p. 316.
36 Mann and Roberts, Law in Colonial Africa, p. 11.
37 The term ‘youngmen’ is a Ghanaian neologism which refers to the youth or commoners. They are known in 
Ewe language as soheawo. See details in Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. xiv.
38 Callaway, ‘Local Politics’, p. 123.
39 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 49.
40 For detailed analysis o f the hostility o f  the youth against chiefs and the colonial officials in the Gold Coast, 
see Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 146-174. Skinner also observed how the rapid expansion in primary
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Conference held in 1943 showed how far the youth in the Colony had come in making their 
voices heard.41 However, the established NA system dominated by the elderly chiefs 
largely blocked any concomitant political advance for youngmen. This, according to 
Skinner, deprived the youngmen ‘of mechanisms by which their interest could be 
represented to chiefs and elders’.42 Iliffe, who referred to education as ‘the chief dynamic of 
colonial change’, cited Ewe as one of the ethnic groups which embraced missionary 
education in the 1900s.43 In the words of Welch, ‘most analysts of Ewe society have 
commented upon the relative ease with which social change accrued among the Ewe’.44 As 
an increasing numbers of youngmen in Ewedome received western education, there 
emerged changes in human relations at the level of the individual and at the level of the 
state. The youngmen began to see things from a wider perspective than the narrow 
divisional and chiefly enclaves.
Collier’s analysis of the impact of adult education on the territory from 1947-1966 
shows how those inhabitants who benefited from such programme offered by the 
University College of the Gold Coast came back home with ideas of nationalism.45 Though 
the People’s Education Association (EPA) formed under the adult education programme 
always emphasised its non-partisan nature, its curriculum dealt with topics such as 
economic, political, social and cultural changes taking place in the Gold Coast46 It also
education in the post-war Africa led to the creation o f ‘a cohort o f  discontented young men’. See Skinner, 
‘Agency and Analogy’, p. 291.
41 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 160.
42 Skinner, ‘Agency and Analogy’, p. 291.
43 Iliffe, Africans, p. 229.
44 Welch, Dream o f  Unity, p. 43.
45 Collier, ‘Ablode p. 123-155.
46 For the courses offered by the Adult Education programme, see Rhodes House Library, Oxford [hereafter, 
RHL], NSS. Afr. S. 1877, Papers o f Lalage Bown, Fourth Annual Conference o f EPA at Hohoe, 3 May 1953.
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aimed ‘to provide leaders for the nation and for political parties’.47 Collier examined in 
particular, the contact between Togoland participants in the Adult Education programme 
with leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention and concluded that the formation of an 
alliance of political leaders in the southern section of British Togoland was attributable in
AQ
part to the Adult Education programme. As Collier put it, ‘adult education was one of the 
ways by which Togolanders came to feel confidence in their own ability to lead...the result 
was a clear determination to prevent Togoland’s fledging elite from being submerged 
within that of the Gold Coast’.49 The overall effect of this was a shift in the social structure 
by 1949 as traditional institutions and their functions were caught up by these 
transformations. This rising aspiration of the youth was reflected in the creeping disrespect 
for NA directives.
Another factor responsible for the climate of change in Ewedome was religious change 
brought about by conversion to Christianity. In her study of Ewe appropriations of 
Christianity, Meyer observed that missionary pietism was interpreted to mean 
disengagement with traditional society.50 The converts saw themselves as more civilised 
than the non-Christians and so they began to long for social and political mobility.51 In 
effect, Meyer argues, conversion provided the avenue by which individuals sought to 
disengage themselves from the traditional society or family.52 Christianity thus produced a 
class of converts who were beginning to despise indigenous values and structures in favour
47 RHL, NSS, Afr. S. 1877, Papers o f Lalage Bown, Speech by Mr G. Adali-Morttty, to the Fifth Regional 
Conference at Aburi, 29August 1954. See also Collier, ‘Ablode ’, p. 127.
48 Ibid, p. 125-126
49 Collier, ‘Ablode ’, p. 155.
50 Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 213.
5' Ibid, p. 214.
52 Ibid, p. 213.
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of western values.53 All of this played into the growing argitation against NAs. Debrunner 
quoted Westerman as having said in 1936 that by attacking traditional religion of the 
Natives of Togoland, Christianity ‘removed valuable forces holding the social organization 
together’.54
In addition, the church was an important factor in reshaping Ewe identity. From 1911, 
the Bremen Mission mooted the idea of training the natives to become independent of 
Europeans.55 The process was aided by the translation of the Bible into Ewe in 1915 and a 
gradual increase in the number of natives trained as pastors and deacons.56 These 
developments were responsible in creating Ewe identity that tended to bind Ewes and non- 
Ewes together. In fact, the Ewe Bible, in the words of Lawrance, provided the ‘Ewe 
subgroups a mutual intelligibility on which they could build cultural, political, and social 
objectives’.57 Following the expulsion of the Germans from the region, an independent Ewe 
Church had developed by the early 1920s and began taking over most responsibilities of the 
German Mission. In 1922, an agreement between the board of the Mission in Bremen and 
the native pastors led to the birth of the ‘Evangelical Church’.58 At its the first all-African 
synod held in May 1922 at Kpalime in the present-day Republic of Togo, the synod 
emphasized its identity as an Ewe Church. Consequently, the name ‘Ewe Evangelical 
Church’ was adopted.59 It later became the Evangelical Presbyterian Church.60 Some of the 
native pastors, who had their training in Germany, were exposed to ideas of nationalism
53 Analysis o f  how religion opposed to indigenous cultures divided family and communities in recorded in 
Berman, ‘Ethnicity’, p. 340-341; Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 213-214.
54 Debrunner, A Church, p. 123.
55 Ibid, p. 132.
56 Ibid, p. 132-136.
57 Lawrance, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 123.
58 Ibid, p. 163.
59 It is important to note that there were native pastors from the non-Ewe areas o f  Amedzofe and Akpafu 
districts on the Synod. See Ibid, p. 163. Meyer, Translating the Devil, p. 19.
60 Skinner, ‘Reading, Writing and Rallies’, p. 141.
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and on their return, they became active advocates of Togoland politics. An example was 
pastor Paku who at one time served as the secretary of the Togoland Union. In 
demonstrating the processes by which an indigenous political leadership emerged in 
Ewedome region, Skinnner notes how the Bremen Mission produced teachers who later 
became founders of the Togoland unification movement in the late 1940s.61 She notes in 
particular, S. G. Antor, E. O. Kofi Dumoga, G. O. Awuma, F. R. Ametowobla and K. A. 
Ayeke who had served at various times as pastors, catechists or teachers.62
Added to the religious transformation was the centripetal pull of the mines and cocoa 
farms in the Gold Coast which saw a sizaeble proportion of youngmen drifting to and from 
the Gold Coast in search of job opportunities. This fuelled a gradual weaking of family ties, 
widespread erosion of established religious and social values and less loyalty to traditional 
institutions. The mutation of the social structure led eventually to political change as the 
youth began to question the validity of the NA system and the privileged position of chiefs. 
Chieftaincy institution began to lose significance in the sight of the youth who had acquired 
elements of new western lifestyles. By the 1940s, asafo became very active in all facets of 
life in Ewedome.
It is important to explain the meaning of asafo and to bring out its significance in the 
politics of Ewedome. Asafo is an Akan name for youth organizations that emerged in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries among the Akan communities in the what became Gold 
Coast Colony. They were especially prominent among the Fantes of the Central Province 
of the Colony. Asafo had duality of purpose. As a social organization, it was composed of
61 Kate Skinner, ‘Reading, Writing and Rallies’, p. 141.Welch recounts the conscious effort made by the 
church to create Ewe unity. See Welch, Dream o f  Unity, p. 43-48.
62 Ibid.
63 For the origins o f asafo among Akan, see The Gold Coast Chiefs List, 1928-29, p.3; Ray A. Kea, 
Settlements, Trade, and Polities in the Seventeenth Century G old Coast (Baltimore, 1982), p. 132.
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both men and women and it facilitated the integration of newcomers into the 
communities.64 As a military organisation, it was made up of only men for offensive and 
defensive purposes.65 Since the various ethnic groups relied on the asafo for the prosecution 
of their wars, the latter became an influential group in the political decision-making process 
of the communities.66 According to Rathbone, asafo groups were responsible for many 
destoolment cases in the Colony in the colonial period.67 In most cases, they were seen as 
an ‘unruly lot’.68 Asafo was part of the institutions that were borrowed by the people of 
Ewedome from their Akan neighbours in in the pre-colonial era. In the 1920s, asafo 
companies became the vehicle for the aspirations of rising groups of western-educated 
literate ‘youngmen’ who were increasingly frustrated by the political authority o f the 
indirect-rule chiefs.
Political Change: Ewe/Togoland Nationalism.
We have noted that some of the forces pushing for change in Ewedome in the 1940s 
were, broadly speaking, similar to those elsewhere in the Gold Coast where social change 
generated by the cocoa economy, labour migration, education and Christianity led to the 
demands for political change. But as we shall see, the emergence of Ewe national 
consciousness, the trusteeship status of the territory and the agitations for unification set the 
whole process of change and decolonisation in Ewedome apart. Put differently, the process 
of decolonization was subsumed by the fight for and against Ewe unification. The Ewe 
regions of the Gold Coast Colony were also convulsed by the integration/unification
64 Kea, Settlements, Trade, and Polities, p. 132.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 24.
68 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p. 132.
188
debate. Thus, the dynamics of decolonization in Ewedome became more complex, 
assuming more of an international dimention than was witnessed in the southern Gold 
Coast, Ashanti and the Northern Territories. The promotion of the Ewe language, the 
emergence of political movements and the special status of the territory were some of ‘the 
historical processes that created a Togoland national identity’.69
In Ewedome, the demand by the educated youth for wider participation in the working 
of the NAs did not come until 1949. In fact, by 1948, few people in Ewedome were 
literate.70 The NAs sometimes recognised their own deficiencies when it came to handling 
issues which fell outside the domain of tradition or custom. They often drafted educated 
people into their fold to assist in carrying out specific duties. Many African officials who 
worked in the NAs as registrars, bailiffs, secretaries and so on were western educated 
people. We see similar a situation in Tanganyika where, according to Iliffe, the NAs 
‘welcomed educated guidance’.71 It is in this regard that the intervention of the youth of 
Ewedome in Togoland politics and their challenge to chiefly authority from the later part of 
the 1940s has to be understood within the broader context of political developments in the 
Gold Coast.
We saw that in 1947, J. B. Danquah cashed in on generational disaffections and 
expectation of the youth in the Colony to form the first political party, the UGCC. The 
aftermath of the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast saw the division in the leadership of the 
UGCC, with the breaking away of Kwame Nkrumah and the formation of his own 
Convention People’s Party in 1949. This marked a turning point in the rise of the youth 
against established chiefly authority. Within the climate of change, the CPP provided an
69 Skinner, ‘Reading, Writing and Rallies’, p. 128.
70 NA C 096 796/5, Report o f  Commission o f Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948, p. 5.
71 Iliffe, Modern History o f  Tanganyika, p. 329.
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outlet for the youth to see their political ambitions fulfilled. The party’s activism spread 
into Ewedome and fed into the growing agitation of school leavers whose numbers had 
been increasing since the 1940s. By the late 1940s, the asafo in Ewedome started to 
develop into a significant political force and began to draw inspiration from CPP activism 
in the Colony to oppose chiefs in Ewedome on a number of important political issues. All 
this fits into the analysis of how social movements provided fertile ground for the
79‘collective mobilization’ of aggrieved segments of the society for political power.
In addition, Ewe national consciousness, which began with the promotion of the Ewe 
language by the missionaries in the nineteenth century, provided an avenue for the 
formation of voluntary organisations and the crystallization of quasi-political parties which 
transcended territorial divisions by the mid 1940s. According to Nugent, the emergence of 
various groups all professing Ewe nationalism had their origin in the proliferation of 
voluntary associations in the Gold Coast long before 1947. His list of some of those 
associations included the Anyako Union, Glidzi Union and Togoville Union.73 A lot has 
been written on these Ewe political groupings in all the standard works on Ewe unification. 
The most important ones were the All-Ewe Conference formed in 1946, the Togoland 
Union in 1947 and the Togoland Congress in 1950.
During the German period, there was an association of Togolanders known as the Bund 
der Deutschen Togolander, a League of German Togolanders, originally founded by the 
Germans when they occupied the territory. This group was re-organised in Accra in 1922 
by people referred to by Amenumey as ex-clerks who could not find new jobs because of
72 Qoute taken from Cooper, Africa since 1940, p. 39.
73 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 158.
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their inability to speak English.74 Some of the objectives of the Bund were to establish 
close contact with Germany and to undertake to represent Togoland at the League of 
Nations.75 Later, in 1951, the Joint Togoland Congress (JTC) adopted the Swastika for a 
flag. The use of the Nazi symbol was seen by the government as a misguided attempted by 
the JTC to stress the unity of the area once under German rule. For fear that the Swastika
7 7could provoke disturbances in the territory, the government prohibited its use.
The gradually emerging consciousness on the part of the Ewes of their shared history 
and traditions found concrete expressions in the activities of the first ever Ewe group, the 
Ewe Union, founded in Accra in 1943, which became the All-Ewe Conference (AEC) in 
1946. It was fairly representative of educated people from all parts of Eweland including 
Peki, Anlo and Ewes from the French mandate. Those from the French mandated territory 
were represented by the Comite de VUnite Togolaise (CUT), formed in 1938 and led by
7 8Augusto De Souza, Sylvanus Olympio and Jonathan Savi de Tove. Some of the leaders 
from the British side included D.A. Chapman, Philip Gbeho from Anlo to the south and 
G.O. Awuma, Kofi Dumoga, V. O. Anku, E. Amu and S. G. Antor from Eedome. Its 
dissatiafaction had its origin in the economic inconveniences imposed on the people by the 
different fiscal policies of the manadatory powers and by the rigid regulations of trade 
across the frontiers owing to the world war.79 Nugent describes the founders of the AEC as 
a lobby group in Accra which sought to win the Gold Coast nationalist over in the fight for
74 Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 27.
75 NA C096/719/3, League o f German Togolanders (Bund der Deutsch-Togolanders), Circular, Accra, 19 
December 1923; NA C 096/715/8, Petition to the League o f  Nation, 1925 by the Bund. Details about the 
Bund are found in Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 27-28; Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 34; Lawrance, Locality, 
Mobility, and “Nation”, p. 120-147.
76 RAG/H S.092/3, Senior DC to the Chief Commisioner o f  the Colony, 6 September 1951.
77 Ibid.
78 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 164. The date taken from Welch, Dream o f  Unity, p. 68.
79 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/339, Unification o f  Ewe-Speaking People, Memorandum on the Administration o f  
the Southern Section o f  Togoland, 1946.
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Ewe unification.80 The objective the AEC was the creation of an independent Ewe state, 
composed of the Ewe-speaking parts of the Gold Coast and the Ewe-dominated southern 
parts of Togoland under one single administration.
As the Gold Coast began to move towards independence, the need to decide on whether 
to join Ghana or Togoland pushed the people of Ewedome to reflect upon their identity. 
Though identity can change dramatically over a couple of generations, there was still an 
awareness in the 1940s and 1950s of the role of Anlo in Akwamu and Ashanti slave raiding 
and slave trading in the nineteenth centuries. In 1947, E. O. Kofi Dumoga, V. O. Anku, 
G.O. Awuma and S. G. Antor revived and exploited this rift between the northern Ewe and 
the Anlo to canvass for secession of Togolanders from the AEC and to form the Togoland 
Union. The Togoland Union’s aim was Togoland unification (not Ewe unification) and it
O 1
campaigned on the platform of ‘Togoland for Togolanders’.
The TU was supportered by some people from the non-Ewe Buem area who feared that 
any form of unification based on the Ewes as a whole would be dominated by the Gold 
Coast Ewes.82 In Ewedome itself, the minority ethnic groups tended to support the 
Togoland Congress. In fact, the secretary of the Togoland Union, Mr S. G. Antor, was from 
Logba, a non-Ewe division within Ewedome. The point was that, though the minority 
ethnic groups insisted on their cultural identity, they were often drawn into the larger 
Ewedome/Ewe identity for national level politics.83 Nugent attributed this partly to the 
limited scale of their languages which made it impossible for them to use those languages
80 For details on the activities o f the AEC, see Ibid, p. 43-52; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 164-74.
81 While the AEC from 1952 wanted Ewe unification, the TC was working against Ewe unification so as to 
avoid been dominated by Anlo and Peki Ewes o f the Gold Coast. See PRO CO 96/827/3, Togoland: Minutes 
o f Southern Togoland Council, Ho, 29-30 September 1950; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 189. See also 
Amenumey Ewe Unification, p. 119.
82 United Nations Visiting Missing Report, 1950, p. 10.
83 See Nugent, ‘Few Lesser People’, p. 163.
192
as means of ethnic mobilization.84 Later in 1950, the Togoland Congress emerged. It was a 
merger of different political groupings in the Trust Territory after a conference held in 
Borada.85 It included the vast majority o f the traditional rulers, the Togoland Union, the 
Togoland National Farmers’ Union, the Togoland Youth Association as well as some 
members of the All-Ewe Conference.86 It was the members of the TU which constituted the 
leadership of the Togoland Congress.87 With the emergence of the Togoland Congress, the 
All-Ewe Conference lost its original political significance.88
Mr S. G. Antor was the Togoland Congress leader who spearheaded the campaign for 
unification of the two Togolands as an independent state.89 The Togoland Congress resisted 
any moves that would bring the Ewes of the trust territory together with those in the Gold 
Coast.90 The emergence of the Togoland Congress increased the tempo of the fight for and 
against Togoland unification. Another factor in the rise of Ewe nationalism was a launch in 
May 1945 of a monthly journal known as the Ewe Newsletter edited by D. Chapman, one 
time leading member of the AEC. The journal started as a monthpiece of the All-Ewe 
Conference and from 1946 also appeared in an Ewe-language version. This enabled it to 
reach out to numerous Ewe readers in both British and French Togoland. The journal was 
most critical of the administrating authorities in its bid to forge Ewe consciousness and
84 Ibid, p. 164.
85 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 190; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 139; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 180-181.
86 Ibid; Collier, ‘A blode’, p. 175.
87 This might be the reason why Collier suggestes that ‘prior to 1953, the name Togoland Union was used for 
the Togoland Congress’; Collier, ‘Ablode ’, p. 191. For futher clarification, see Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 35.
88 D. Chapman and Gbeho both Anlo Ewes and founding members o f the AEC moved to join the CPP.
89 Mr S. G. Antor was bom on 27 December 1913 in the non-Ewe division o f Logba Alakpeti. He obtained 
teachers’s Certificate ‘A ’ (4-Year) from Akropong Presbyterian Teacher Training College in 1938. His first 
teaching job was at Hohoe Evangelical Presbyterian Middle School in 1938-40. It was at Koforidua where he 
was teaching in the late 1940s that he got involved in Togoland politics. From 1957-58, he was imprisoned by 
the CPP government for his role in Togoland politics and his alleged involvement in the disturbances that 
followed the 1956 plebiscite in Ewedome. He was a member o f the Constituent Assembly in 1967-68 and 
went on to become Ghana’s Ambassador to Togo under the Busia regime from 1968-72. He died in exile in 
Togo on 2 June 1986. Interview with Mr Antor’s son, Bob Antor, a retired educationalist, 17 December 2007.
90 See Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 139-147; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 182; Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 35.
193
nationalism.91 As Skinner has shown, literacy in the Ewe language was key in mobilizing 
support for the unificationists.92
It is also important to establish the role of the UN Visiting Mission as a catalyst in the 
surge in Ewe nationalism and the decline of the NAs in the territory. Until 1946, the 
acrimonous political conflicts between the youth and chiefs in the Gold Coast were not 
prevalent in Ewedome. Even when the process of decolonization began in the Colony, 
Ewedome was largely a recipient of the product and not an active participant. Ewedome’s 
involvement in the process towards independence started with its participation in the 1951 
election. The point is that the situation in Ewedome was very different from other areas in 
the Gold Coast. The issue of whether to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast or 
to unify British and French Togolands seemed to have engaged the attention of the people 
of Ewedome more than decolonization itself. It was the presence of the Visiting Mission, 
which added a spark to the surge in Ewe national consciousness and an appetite for 
decolonization in Ewedome.
The presence of the Mission was important in the process o f ‘political activation and 
mobilization in which groups and strata of the population [were] progressively drawn into 
the vortex of active political involvement’.93 In fact, the 1949 and 1952 Missions’ report 
which recommended measures favouring Togoland unification testify to this assertion.94 
The Missions were responsible for the evolution of rival political groupings and the fierce 
struggle for recognition and power that became a feature of the years preceding 
independence in 1957. Most of the delegates on the Mission were from countries that were
91 The Ewe Newsletter, September, 1947, p. 1.
92 Skinner, ‘Reading, Writing and Rallies’, p. 141-143.
93 Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 51.
94 Ibid, p. 47.
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essentially anti-colonial such as the USSR, China and India. They visited the territory in 
1949, 1952 and 1955. The 1949 Visiting Missing, for example, found the NA system to be 
‘inconsistent with the progressive political development of the indigenous inhabitants of the 
Trust Territory towards self-government and independence’.95 In addition, the Mission saw 
the outlook of the NAs as limited to the chiefly class as restrictive to the development of a 
sense of unity and a common identity among the inhabitants. This image of the NAs was 
contrary to the principles of the UN with its avowed objective of opening the political space 
for advancement towards self-government or independence. Indeed, the UN was at pains to 
ensure the democratization of the NAs as a pre-requisite for the ultimate adavance to self- 
rule. It was in this regard that Coleman stressed the role of the Visiting Missions in ‘the 
political awkening of the people o f Togoland’.96
Thus, the desire by the Missions to democratise local government and, at the same time, 
promote the separate identity of Togoland provided fertile ground for Ewe national 
consciousness. It was this awareness created by the UN Visiting Missing that partly 
emboldened the zeal of the youth to fight for participation in local government. The youth 
conducted this fight, as in other parts of the Gold Coast, mostly through boycott of 
communal labour and the payment of taxes. The task of the Mission in ascertaining the 
sentiment of the inhabitants provided a platform for the western-educated literates such as 
Antor who began to feel that the future direction of their region was in their hands. The 
Missions whipped up anti-imperialist sentiments in the territory through ‘the publicity 
given the principle of self-determination [leading to] fundamental changes in foreign
95 NA CO 96/790/4, Consideration o f  1947 Report by Trusteeship Council, 1949.
96 Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 51.
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rule.’97 Colonialism thus became the most criticised force as the inhabitants became aware 
o f their rights to self-government and independence as well as their special position as a 
Trust Teritory. We shall now see how the social and political change served to weaken the 
individual NAs in Ewedome.
The Atando NA in particular was an albatross around the neck of administrative 
officers. Nugent writes that the problems of Atando were never resolved until the era of the 
NAs ended in 1951.98 This NA, constituted in 1949, was seen as a complete failure. Its 
failure had been due largely to internal dissension in Likpe and Ve divisions and to the fact 
that Atando had been used as ‘a sounding-board in the play of Togoland politics rather than 
as an administrative body’.99 A further problem in Atando was that rich divisions like Gbi 
had been unwilling to help the poorer ones in the confederacy, while the taxpayers in the 
poorer divisions objected to paying a levy into the common pool and receiving nothing for 
their money. The Ve division was divided by a constitutional dispute concerning the head 
chief, the stoolfather and the sub-chief of Ve Kolenu.100
Lipke, one of the non-Ewe divisions to the north of Ewedome, had always been 
resentful of their inclusion in an Ewe dominated NA. For his decision to join Atando NA, 
the Grand Council of Likpe, led by Nana Mensah, resolved to destool their head chief, 
Togbe Akoto, on 24 April 1950.101 The people of Bakpele, a sub-division of Likpe, refused
97 Welch, Dream o f  Unity, p. 74.
98 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 145.
99 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/142, Local Government Enquiries, CO, Cape Coast to the Governor, Gold Coast, 9 
March 1952; For opposition in Likpe against Atando NA, see Nugent, Smugglers, p. 40.
100 PRAA/A ADM 39/1/505, Gbi Hohoe Local Council Enquiry, 20 November 1951.
101 RAG/H No. 226.2, Likpe Native Affairs, Grand Council o f Likpe to the President o f  Southern Togoland 
Council, 27 August 1951; PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/256, Petition-General, Likpe Grand Council to the Minister 
o f Local Government, 12 August 1951. See also Nugent, Smugglers, p. 144; Nugent, ‘Few Lesser People’, p. 
170-173.
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to pay taxes to the Atando treasury at the instigation of Nana Mensah.102 Indeed, the 
attitude of this faction frequently necessitated intervention by the Gold Coast police 
force.103 By 1950, the Atando NA had almost broken down after having existed for only 
one year. The finance board refused to cooperate with the secretary.104 The youth of Ve 
division wished to have the Secretary, believed to be anti-Nkrumahist, dismissed but the 
chiefs of the Gbi division demurred.105 Thus, Atando became a battle ground for Togoland 
politics.
The final blow to Atando was the alleged arrest of the sub-chief of Likpe Kukurantumi 
by Hohoe division in 1951. The sub-chief went to Hohoe, the main trading centre in the 
area, on 12 February 1951 and he was said to have been arrested, beaten and detained by 
the youth of Hohoe for six days for his role in opposing the inclusion of Likpe in Atando 
NA.106 In the report sent to the DC of Kpando on 25 February 1951, the people of Likpe 
narrated how they had been suffering harassment when they visited Hohoe to attend 
hospital or to transact business.107 Atando was therefore a major blot on the success of NA 
administration in Ewedome.
Internal disputes were not peculiar to Atando. Asogli was another hot spot of chieftaincy 
disputes. The history of chieftaincy in the Ho division of the state was a complicated one 
that spanned several generations from the end of the Asante wars in the 1870s to 1958. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, the Bankoe stool family had resented the transfer of their paramount
1 ORstatus to Dome since the early days of amalgamation in the late 1920s. This resentment
102 Nugent, ‘Few Lesser People’, p. 170.
103 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/256, Petition-General, 27 August 1951; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 144.
104 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/505, Report by the DC, Kpando, 20 November 1951.
105 Ibid. Gabusu, the head chief o f Gbi, was a staunch member o f the Togoland Congress.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Lawrance, ‘Bankoe v. Dom e’, p. 250-253
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grew in proportion when Howusu, the divisional chief of Dome, became the paramount 
chief of the NA.109 This prevented the two divisions from working together. Moreover, the 
Asogli amalgamation had never been a happy one. Many of the divisions were extremely 
small and when they were placed alongside their more influential and richer neighbours, the 
latter became unwilling to sacrifice their resources for mere cooperation.
Added to the chieftaincy disputes was the retardative effect of Togoland politics, which 
divided the state between the AEC and the TU to the extent that there were five Togoland 
Union and twenty-three All-Ewe Conference divisions in the state in the late 1940s.110 
While the youth of Asogli supported the TU, the chiefs were for the AEC. Meanwhile, the 
Asogli Youth League (AYL), a group regarded by the chiefs as subversive of traditional 
authority, had been active in gaining supporters from among the asafo in the outlying 
divisons and as a result many of the youngmen in all of the divisions became actively 
opposed to the political opinions of their chiefs and elders.111 Collier recounts how the 
AYL put pressure on Mote Kofi, the paramount chief of Asogli state to withdraw his 
support for the AEC and to throw his weight behind the TU in November 1949.112
In April 1949, when it became evident that Howusu, the paramount chief of Asogli state, 
had come under the influence of the TU, the other chiefs passed a resolution to elect their 
own president of the NA.113 The issue became complicated when Agotime initially 
supported Howusu.114 Agotime, a non-Ewe division, was the richest in the state. It was 
regarded at the time with a certain awe by the other divisions because of the qualities that
109 Ibid.
110 Detailed discussion o f these political parties follows in the next chapter.
111 The opposition o f Asogli Youth League to chiefs and the AEC is well covered in Amenumey, Ewe 
Unification, p. 119; Nugent, Amugglers, p. 172.
112 Collier, ‘A blode’, p. 57.
113 This point was also made in Collier, 1 A blode’, p. 57.
114 RAG/H 2/110, Asogli Native Affair, Senior District Commissioner, Ho, to Chief Commissioner, Cape 
Coast, 14 March 1950.
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its people displayed in the Asante war. It was the support from Agotime that enabled 
Howusu to call the bluff of his rivals in the Asogli NA. Later on, the secretary to the NA, 
F.Y. Medie, was able to prevail upon Agotime to withdraw its support for Howusu on 
condition that the chief of Agotime would be elected the paramount chief of Asogli state 
when the amendment order No. 62 of 1949 ordinance was made.115
True to the plan, the chief of Agotime was elected paramount chief of Asogli NA in 
1949.116 This apparent change of the constitution of Asogli NA to a confederacy system 
with an elected president was a severe blow to the amalgamated policy in Ewedome.117 As 
expected, the secretary’s position became a source of discontent. The youngmen of Ho had 
worked to incite public opinion against the secretary. Consequently, he was persuaded to 
tender his resignation.118 During the period that these disputes lasted, the Asogli NA record 
books were lodged at the divisional court in Accra.119 Added to this was the fact that Asogli 
had grown too large for effective administration. The 1948 census put the population of the 
area at 45,164 and there was frequent complaints of neglect from the component divisions, 
most distant from Ho.120
In 1949, Awatime state decided to pool the resources of all its divisions to implement a 
three-year development plan so that by the end of the third year, each division would have
191had some major work carried out in its area. The plan was to use the revenue from
115 Ibid. For brief background information on Mr F. Y. Medie and his contribution to Asogli, see Nugent, 
Smugglers, p. 170.
116 RAG/H 2/110, Asogli Native Affair, Senior District Commissioner, Ho, to Chief Commissioner, Cape 
Coast, 14 March 1950.
117 This point is also made in Collier, ‘Ablode p. 25.
118 RAG/H RAG/H 2/110, Asogli Native Affair, Senior District Commissioner, Ho, to Chief Commissioner, 
Cape Coast, 14 March 1950.
1,9 Ibid.
120 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/511, Memorandum on the Composition o f  Local Councils in Ho, 25 April 1950.
121 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/518, SDC, Ho, to the CC o f the Colony, Cape Coast., 28 September 1951.
199
Kpedze market to supplement revenue from taxes.122 The divisional chief of Kpedze had 
always resisted any interference by the NA in his division. He was keen on developing his 
division independent of the state. Besides, the head chief was a staunch supporter of the TC 
while Adzatekpor was in league with the CPP. The attitude of the head chief of Kpedze was 
a source of considerable trouble. When an attempt was made by the state to collect the 
entire revenue from the market on 12 August 1950, the divisional chief tried to obstruct the 
rate collectors. But the youth rose against the chief and condemned his behaviour. The 
intervention of the youth notwithstanding, the divisional chief succeeded in inciting the 
stallholders to object to the payment of the rents imposed by the NA.
In Akpini, there was the gradual erosion of the authority of Dagadu Bulla from the 
1930s. According to Brown, Bulla’s involvement in cocoa business took him to stay in
• • • 123Accra and his long absence from the state stoked discontent among component divisions. 
Moreover, Toghe Bulla owed many cocoa farmers whose cocoa he had collected and 
shipped to Holland in 1938.124 The Kpando Asafo Union took advantage of Togbe Bulla’s 
misconduct and took control of the state finances. Brown again noted that before 1948,
• 1 9  Sthere was little involvement of educated youngmen of Kpandu in Togoland politics. But 
this changed from 1949 with the rise of the CPP. In addition, Akpini state was a 
geographically unwieldy unit, stretching diagonally as it did from Wli in the north-east to 
Tsoho in the south-west across the main communication line running from north to south. 
Yet its machinery of local government was not able to initiate development projects over
122 Hitherto, only two-thirds o f  the revenue from market went to the state treasury.
123 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 52.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid, p. 247.
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more than a very limited area.126 This was the result of the inability of the NA treasurer to 
supervise works in outlying towns other than the headquarters.127
One of the main purposes of the local government reorganisation in 1949 was to cure the 
lack of executive control in the NA syatem. As it turned out, this problem could not be 
solved if the present size of Akpini NA was not trimmed down. The efficiency of revenue 
collection, the functioning of the courts, the control of markets and of all other local 
administration services in Ewedome varied inversely according to distance from the local 
government headquarters. Obviously, the presence of the UN Visiting Mission coupled 
with the precocious rise of the CPP in the Gold Coast from 1949 set the stage for the 
contest between integration and unification in British Togoland as a whole.
Thus, with the specific context of Ewedome, as Atando, Asogli, Awatime and Akpini 
have demonstrated and as we shall see in the next chapters, chief-subject antagonism went 
beyond mere agitation for chieftaincy to be delinked from local government. It complicated 
and takes forward the standard interpretation of rising generational conflict. The privileged 
position of the chiefs was therefore threatened when the British officials, being mindful of 
social and political transformations taking place in Ewedome coupled with political unrest 
in the Gold Coast, began to make significant but belated changes to the NAs. That reform, 
however, could not go far enough, as it was overtaken by rapid political and constitutional 
developments in the Gold Coast.
126 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/518, SDC, Ho, to the CC o f the Colony, Cape Coast, 28 September 1951.
127 Ibid.
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The Coussey Committee and Local Government Reforms
The British colonial government had never been oblivious to the deficiencies inherent 
in the NAs, which was why it had since 1944 set up the machinery for the reform of native 
administration in the Colony.128 In Ewedome, the 1949 reform which increased the 
participation of progressive non-traditional elements in the administration of the NAs and 
changed the native tribunals into native courts clearly testified to government’s desire to 
see local government reformed. That attempt at reform, as stated earlier, was seen as 
belated only because of the 1948 unrest in the Gold Coast and the series of reforms that 
were to follow. The chiefs were simply incapable of meeting the socio-economic demands 
of a rapidly changing society in addition to containing the growing nationalist agitation. 
Not even a reformed NA system could provide a solution.
As far back as August 1947, a summer school was organised for officers from Africa at 
Cambridge aimed at stimulating thought and discussion on the problems of local 
government in African territories.129 As a sequel to the summer school, a governors’ 
conference was convened in London in November 1947 to examine the details of the 
recommendations of the Cambridge school. The recommendations were based on the 
collective experience of a large number of officers from the different African territories and 
could therefore be regarded as representing an agreed general statement of policy on local 
government in African territories. It represented a logical evolution of a ‘modem’ form of 
local government in African territories.
Essentially, the recommendations pointed to the need for a better organisation of local 
government and the value of applying UK experience to the problems of local government
128 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 18.
129 NA CO 96/810/6, Secretary o f  State to the Officer Administering the Gold Coast, 13 January 1947.
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in Africa.130 It was further emphasised that the aim of government policy must be to ‘build 
up an effective and representative local council system within the framework of the NAs 
themselves with a chain of responsibility through district councils’.131 By a representative 
local council, it was understood that members of the councils would, at least in part, be 
elected. Before the 1947 recommendations could be given serious consideration, however, 
the 1948 disturbances in the Gold Coast accelerated the process that would lead to the 
complete abolition of NAs. The causes of these disturbances have been examined in all the 
standard narrative of political change in the Gold Coast. But it is important to state here, as 
we noted in the last chapter, that a major cause of the disturbances was the frustration on 
the part of the educated elite anxious to take active part in politics coupled with the 
disappointment of ex-servicemen at post-war conditions.132
Arguably, the 1948 unrest ought not to have been of any consequence in Ewedome, 
considering its status as a Trust Territory whose future relation with the Gold Coast had not 
yet been determined. However, apart from the general post-war economic difficulties in all 
British colonies, the people of Ewedome had specific economic grievances with the 
government. The Cocoa Marketing Board was set up by statute as a semi-public 
corporation began operation in 1947 with an initial capital of £14,000,000 made available 
by the West African Produce Control.133 Its remit was to cushion the effects of price 
fluctuations.134 No inhabitant of Togoland was a member of the Board. This constituted a 
major source of discontent and agitations directed at the NAs and the colonial government.
130 NA CO 96/810/6, Conference o f  African Governors, November 1947.
131 Ibid.
132 NA CO 96 796/5, Report o f Commission o f Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948, p. 1. The 
youth felt the government was delaying ‘Africanization’. For details, see Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs; 
Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 50-74.
133 NA CO 96/790/4, Consideration o f 1947 Report by Trusteeship Council, March to April 1949.
134 The Board was expected to fix prices at a level that would ‘give the cocoa farmer a stable income’ See 
Coleman, ‘Togoland’ p. 21.
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The Togoland Congress accused the colonial government of ‘using the Cocoa Marketing 
Board to swindle Togoland cocoa farmers of their fare share from cocoa proceeds’.135 It is 
important to note, however, that in 1946/47 the area that came to be known as the Volta 
Region (including the British Trust Territory) produced 16.2 thousand tons of cocoa.136 
This constituted only 8.4 percent of the overall cocoa produced in Ghana in that period.
The report of the Watson Commission of Enquiry into the disturbances recommended an 
amendment of the Gold Coast constitution to give every citizen of ability an opportunity to 
gain political experience. These recommendations had wider implications for the Trust 
Territory too. It was this recommendation that led to the appointment of the Coussey 
Committee in 1948.137 The new governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, and his group of 
younger Colonial Service officials who came to replace the older colonial staff showed 
willingness to dialogue and negotiate with the leadership of the political groupings.138
It is worthy of note that the Coussey recommendations on local government took into 
account some of the policies worked out in Cambridge and London in 1947. Part two of the 
report, which focused entirely on local government, recommended far-reaching reforms 
that would change completely the structure of local administration.139 While the report 
acknowledged the contribution of the NAs to local administration as ‘definite progress and 
solid achievement’, it identified three weaknesses inherent in the system.140 To begin with,
135 “M ost Secret” Politics in Togoland: The British Government’s Attempt to Annex Togoland to the Gold  
Coast, by the Movement fo r  a Democracy o f  Content (New York, 1953), p. 6. This document was produced 
by the Togoland Congress.
136 For the data on the quantity o f  cocoa produced in the region and other parts o f Ghana from 1933 to 1970, 
see Merrill J. Bateman, ‘An Econometric Analysis o f  Ghanaian Cocoa Supply’, in R. A. Kotey, C. Okali and 
B. E. Rourke(eds.), The Economic o f  Cocoa Production and Marketing (Legon, 1973), p. 315.
137 The committee was made up o f some chiefs and people drawn from the UGCC. Apter, Ghana in 
Transition, p. 170; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 78
138 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 29-30; Austin, Politics, p. 85.
139 Coussey Committee Report, 1949.
140 Ibid, p. 17-18.
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the report felt that the 1949 ordinance which made provision for the nomination of 
‘commoners’ onto the NAs and the state councils did not go far enough in democratising 
the NAs. Those nominated were few and their inclusion was said to have strengthened 
rather than weaken the privileged position of the chiefs and their elders, much to the 
discomfiture o f people with the requisite capabilities and willingness to contribute to the 
progress of society.141
It was also noted that the high rate of illiteracy among the members of the NAs was a 
major deficiency in the proper functioning of the system.142 Finally, the report attributed the 
cumbersome nature of the procedures of the NAs to the inability of the latter to attract 
qualified support staff.143 The report therefore suggested that members of the local councils 
should pass a literacy test.144 At the heart of the issue was the substantial reduction in the 
influence of the traditional authorities in local affairs. Added to this was the fear on the part 
of the chiefs of being left entirely out of the business of local government.145 To mitigate 
this loss of power, paragraph 435 of the Coussey report made a vague reference to the 
possibility of establishing a ‘privy council’.146 But this proposal was rejected by the 
Secretary of State.147
Although the newly formed CPP had reservations about the report, it saw aspects of the 
report relating to local government as a necessary step in ‘reducing the power o f traditional
14 Sbodies in the country side’. The British government generally agreed with the Coussey 
Report that only the educated elements could provide the energy and progressive spirit
141 Ibid, p. 17.
142 Ibid, p. 18.
143 Ibid.
144 NA CO 96/822/2, Gold Coast Constitution, Local Government, 1951.
145 NA CO 96/824/4, Constitutional Matters Affecting Chiefs, 1949.
146 PRAAD/A ADM 3/6/69, Coussey Committee Report, 1949.
147 West African Affairs, 10, 7 April 1951, p. 4.
148 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 30; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 87.
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needed to manage rising post-war expectations.149 But the colonial government also felt 
that there was a looming danger that the councils could be, in turn, dominated by the 
educated elite. It was essential, according to British officials, to pay greater attention to 
giving means o f expression to the inert and politically unconscious part of the population 
for purely local interest, as against the educated and progressive parts.150 Chiefs had stood 
by the government in times of difficulty and the feeling among some government officials 
was that they owed it to the chiefs that their future should not be handed over for 
determination by an anti-chieftaincy majority in the local councils.151 
Indeed, Hailey had warned as far back as 1942 that:
intervention in the interest of the educated or similar elements may 
of course have its dangers. An educated or trading section which can 
obtain a controlling position in a native council may in time constitute 
an oligarchy which will not be less harmful to the interest of the general 
community than the dominance of a chiefly family or conservative 
elders.152
Change, according to the officials, must be gradual enough to allow the majority of the 
people to be sufficiently literate and politically experienced to protect themselves against 
exploitation. So far as Ewedome was concerned, there was the need for a corresponding 
degree of cultural, political and economic development to accommodate the changes 
envisaged. The government averred that it was necessary to develop local councils from the
149 NA CO 96/822/2, Colonial Office on Coussey Committee Report, 1949. This view  o f the Colonial 
government that the Coussey Report would enhance ‘administrative efficiency and accountability’ is also 
made in Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 30. For the impact o f  the Coussey recommendations on 
traditional authority, see Cooper, African since 1940, p. 52.
150 NA CO 96 822/2, Colonial Office on Coussey Committee Report, 1949
151 Ibid; NA CO 96 824/4, Constitutional Matters affecting Chiefs, 1949.
152 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Native Administration p. 16.
153 Ibid; NA CO 96 822/2, Colonial Office on Coussey Committee Report, 1949.
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existing system by orderly means and in a manner acceptable to the chiefs and the general 
population.154 Moreover, the issue of ‘democracy’ ought not to be overemphasied. In the 
words of Hailey, chiefs had always been, in many respects, ‘dependent on the assent of 
their councillors’.155 He cited the Gold Coast, where constitutional devices existed for 
dispensing with chiefs who attempted to act unilaterally.156 This might not be democratic 
by conventional standards, but as Hailey points out, ‘it was equally not autocracy’. What
1 SRwas important was to harness the loyalty and enthusiasm of all segments of society. This 
could only be achieved if the new system of local government was based on the already 
familiar institutions in the communities. Even more worrying to officials was the possibility 
of friction developing between state councils composed entirely of chiefs and the new local 
councils. State councils were to have power to make laws on matters affecting the social 
and cultural life of the people. The local councils, on the other hand, would deal with all 
local government matters. Yet, social and cultural life of the people had implications for 
local government matters too.
In December 1949, a select committee was appointed by the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council to settle the precise manner in which the recommendations could be applied to the 
various territories. The committee recommended that since the new form of local 
authorities that were to be established were so divorced from the old NAs, the new bill 
should be called a ‘Local Government Ordinance’.159 The Coussey Committee had 
proposed three classes of councils which were designated ‘A ’, ‘B’ and ‘C’, and were to be
154 Ibid.
155 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/42, Native Administration, p. 17.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid, p. 18.
158 Ibid.
159 RAG/H RAO/C. 458/48, Chief Commissioner to all District Commissioners on Select Committee on Local 
Government, 25 April 1950.
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known as ‘Local Authorities’.160 The select committee found the Coussey proposal too 
elaborate and rather suggested two classes of councils composed of district and local 
councils and the Legislative Council accepted that.161 According to the structure, all local 
councils irrespective of whether they were in the urban or rural areas were subordinate to 
district councils. They were, however, autonomous in the performance of functions 
delegated to them and they had direct access to the regional administration in respect of 
those functions under the established instrument.162
The district and local councils would be composed of a majority of elected non- 
traditional members drawn from within the area concerned and by representation of the 
traditional authorities (from existing state councils) up to not less than one-third of the total 
membership. In effect, a mixture of direct appointment and elections were to be made to 
local councils, while members of district councils were to be drawn from the local councils. 
The new local councils were to be accorded a wide range of powers and functions relating 
to taxation, education, forestry, land conservation, agriculture, public health, control of 
markets, and maintenance of roads, among others. The functions of the paramount and 
divisional chiefs and their councils were to be embodied in a completely separate 
ordinance.
Local government reform was seen as the essential bottom tier of a new, increasingly 
democratized system of rule, eventually leading to full self-government. Thus Coussey’s 
local government proposals were part of a bigger package of constitutional reform at the 
centre of which was a Legislative Assembly, two-thirds of which was to be elected on a
160 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/47, Report o f  the Select Committee on Local Government, 1950, p. 2; PRAAD/A 
ADM 5/3/69,Coussey Committee Report, 1949, p. 20.
161 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/142, Memorandum on Local Government Reform in the Gold Coast, 1951.
162 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/47, Report o f the Select Committee on Local Government, 1950, p. 2.
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popular franchise and one-third elected by the existing chief-dominated Territorial 
Councils. In December 1950, a new constitution giving greater representation and say in 
government to Africans came into effect.163 In the general election that followed in 1951, 
the CPP won the majority of seats in the new National Assembly. Nkrumah himself won 
the Accra municipal seat even though he was in prison at the time the election was 
conducted.164 The Southern Togoland Council elected F. Y. Asare as a territorial member to 
the Assembly, though the Togo Union tried to prevent Togolanders from taking part in the 
elections.165
Nkrumah thus came out of prison in February 1951 to be the ‘Leader of Government 
Business’.166 In 1952, his title was changed to the Prime Minister.167 At the same time, the 
British officials had to repackage Nkrumah and present him to the people ‘as a responsible 
leader’.168 Under the constitution, the appointment of the Executive Council was still the 
preserve of the governor, not the leading party in the Legislative Assembly.169 A number of 
important departments such as finance, defence, external affairs and justice were still under 
the control of the Colonial Office. Nkrumah now began to collaborate with the British 
under what he termed ‘tactical action’ but was described by Apter as a ‘combination of 
ideological purity and pure political opportunism’.170
For Nkrumah, the democratization of local government offered the chance for the CPP 
to replace what he regarded as outdated, anti-democratic and anti-CPP chiefs with
163 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 179.
164 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 103.
165 Ibid, p. 8 and 147.
166 Ibid, p. 154.
167 Ibid, p. 156.
168 See Cooper, Africa since 1940, p. 64.
169 The LA was a unicameral house set up under the 1950 constitution. See Apter, Ghana, p. 180.
170 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 214.
209
• 171‘modem’, democratic and, hopefully, CPP-supporting local government bodies. In 
August 1951, the local government ordinance was passed into law. Even before the 1951 
election, there was much evidence that the CPP was hostile to chieftaincy.172 Its paper, the 
Accra Evening News, founded in 1948, carried a famous editorial on 5 January 1950 in 
which it warned chiefs opposed to the CPP that they would one day ‘run away fast and 
leave their sandals behind them’.173
The institution of chieftaincy, however, would continue to operate in the existing state 
councils. Thus, the functions of the state councils were to be limited to matters of 
constitutional nature affecting traditional authorities. These included the selection and 
enstoolment of chiefs, maintenance of stool property and general responsibility for 
customary law. However, any modification to customary law in a state had to be submitted 
to the governor in council for approval.174 Another important change effected in the rural 
areas since the coming into office of the diarchy was that the British District 
Commissioners became Government Agents.175 The change of title was to placate the local 
people by creating the impression that the district officers were no longer agents of 
colonialism but representatives of the new diarchy regime.
The Delimitation of Local Council Areas
The Coussey Committee suggested three guiding principles for local government 
reforms. First, the factor to be considered for setting up councils was ‘community of
171 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 22; Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 242.
172The hostility o f  Nkrumah towards chieftaincy in the Colony and Ashanti is well covered in Rathbone, 
Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 32.
173 Accra Evening News, George Padmore Library, 5 January 1950. The point is also made in Rathbone, 
Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 22.
174 RAG/H, State Council (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance, 1952 (Not Filed).
175 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 159
210
interest of the people in the area’.176 This implied that existing states and divisional 
organisations should, wherever feasible, be the basis for the formation of a local authority. 
Second, the population of the area had to be taken into account and third, the resources of 
the area. A strong caveat to the above principles was that:
although the existing states would form the basis of the formation 
of local authorities, yet it was important that efficiency and convenience 
of administration should not be sacrificed to this principle. Consequently, 
wherever there was a conflict between geographical factors and traditional 
allegiance, the former should prevail if that would lead to more efficient
1 77administration.
Certainly, Coussey’s principal criterion was fraught with many difficulties if it was to be 
used in defining local government areas, particularly in politically fragmented regions such 
as Ewedome. In the first place, there was the inability of the inhabitants to understand the 
difference between the new local government system and the old NAs. Second, 
complications were likely to arise over the election of traditional members of a council 
should it be decided that, for administrative purposes, part of a state should be included in 
the area of a council whose area of administration was based on that of a different state. 
Finally, there was the possibility of land disputes engulfing the councils in cases where a 
local council area might cut across existing boundaries. Experience from the NAs from 
1932 to 1949 in Ewedome shows that the overriding factor in the establishment of a 
workable local government system was the influence of traditional ties.178 In the view of
176PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/69, Coussey Committee Report on Local Government, 1949, p. 20.
177 Ibid.
178 PRAAD/A ADM 5/3/47, Report by the Select Committee on Local Government, 1950, p. 2; RAG/H 
RAO/C 234/49, Memorandum for the members o f the Standing Committee o f the JPC, 25 April 1950.
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government officials, the co-operation of the people was the sine qua non of any local 
government system and the people should be encouraged to accept the new system even at 
the expense of a theoretical loss in administrative efficiency.179
To obviate the above problems, an attempt was made to strike a compromise to ensure 
that the benefits of the new system would not be lost through too sudden and complete a 
break with the NA system. It was seen as desirable by the select committee to adopt 
existing NA areas as the basis for local councils. The select committee conceded that the 
new conception of district councils might prove acceptable only if the local councils 
conformed, as far as possible, to NA areas and were at the same time ‘amenable to the 
principle of community of interest’.180 Furthermore, it was recommended that special 
consideration should be given to individual cases and the inhabitants should be consulted in 
those areas where a complete departure from the existing NA system was contemplated.181
In effect, each local council was to be established by seperate instrument to allow the 
‘supersession’ of a NA area by a new local council to be looked at thoroughly on a case-by- 
case basis.182 The bill enabled enquiries to be held in connection with the preparation of 
those instruments.183 In addition, by establishing each council by a separate statutory 
instrument, the ordinance provided considerable latitude in relations to the powers and 
functions vested in each local council. For example, the power to impose rates could be 
vested in a local council or in the district council. The enquiries were to be carried out in 
two phases. Phase one consisted of the ‘democratisation’ of the existing NAs, which would
179 Ibid.
180 PRAAD/A ADM  5/3/47, Report by the Select Committee on Local Government, 1950, p. 2.
181 Ibid, p. 6.
182 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/142, Memorandum on Local Government Reform in the Gold Coast, 1951.
183 The new councils were to be known as Local Authorities. RAG/H, Press Release No. 1352/51, 29 October
1951. See also Coussey Report, p. 20.
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be reconstituted in the form of local authorities, which would themselves carry out, in the
1
first instance, much the same functions as the old NAs and over similar areas. The 
second phase was to organise the re-distribution of functions or any regrouping of areas 
which might be desirable.185
Petitions and Protests
In Ewedome, the delimitation of new local council areas brought to the fore, once more, 
the controversial policy of amalgamation. The process was greeted by similar protests and 
representations that bedevilled that policy in the 1930s. The new local government system 
required that some of the existing states be broken up. Yet, strong feelings of independence 
still existed. Many states were seeped in petty political squabbles and objected to joining a 
local council which bore the name of a neighbour. These divisive tendencies might well 
lead to a general disintegration of local councils into a multiplicity of small local groups all 
refusing to co-operate with one another. It became an urgent necessity for agreed policy to 
be formulated on the structure of local government in Ewedome with particular reference to
1 RAthe numerous applications received from small groups for separate local councils. The 
enquiry team included the GA, his assistants and some of his administrative staff, most of
1 on
whom were indigenous representatives.
The first petition for a separate local council came from Alavanyo division in the Akpini 
state in 1952. Alavanyo had a population of 2,659 according to the 1948 census.188 Kpando 
itself was agitating for a local council of its own. It had a population of 7,661 and the
186 RAG/H D.A/D260, Regional Officer, Ho, to the Minister o f Local Goverment, Accra, 28 November 1952.
187 Ibid.
188 RAG/H D.A/D6281, Government Agent, Ho, to the Regional Officer, Ho, 7 December 1952
213
remaining divisions, including Alavanyo, had a total population of 5,944.’89 The desire of 
Kpando was always to wash its hands of the other divisions, which were regarded as 
retarding its progress.190 In Asogli, the chief and the people of Ho Bankoe even before the 
inception of the Asogli Local Council had repeatedly asked for a separate local or urban 
council for the town.191 The people o f Bankoe and their chief had not as yet reconciled 
themselves with the decision of the enquiry team to place the whole of Ho in one council: 
Asogli Local Council. They had withdrawn their representative members from the council 
and had even started collecting their own levy for which a post office savings bank account 
was opened in 1952.192 It became apparent that the old Bankoe-Dome conflict of the 1930s 
was going to be a stumbling block in the successful operation of the proposed Asogli Local 
Council.
As usual, Atando posed the greatest challenge when the enquiry team met all the 
divisions at Ve on 1 December 1951.193 Despite the fact that Atando had been a failure, no 
one division was prepared to say, in the presence of the other two divisions, that it wished 
to break away from the confederacy. When the Assistant District Commissioner visited the 
three divisions separately and had private conversation with the chiefs and their elders, he 
found a general satisfaction in all three divisions that their confederacy was to be brought to 
an end.194 In a protest letter to the government against their inclusion in Atando NA and 
the proposal to convert Atando into a local council, the people of Likpe stated that 
a power backed by a law placed in the hands of a backward
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 PRAAD/D ADM 39/1/505, Gbi Local Council Enquiry, 20 November 1951.
194 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/505, ADC to Officer in Charge, Gbi Hohoe LC Enquiry, 5 December 1951.
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people to applied against people against whom they have a 
hereditary grudge and deep seated time immemorial bitterest 
enmity and hatred persecutions unprovoked prosecutions must 
be the logical out-come among such semi-backward people.195 
The tone of the protest letter epitomised the degree of animosity among the three 
component divisions. It would therefore be imprudent, according to the enquiry team, to 
convert Atando NA into a local council. The Gbi division, with a population of 7,822 
people, including Hohoe, a major commercial centre for the whole of southern Togoland, 
was thought to be rich and capable enough of supporting its own local council. In southern 
Togoland, only in Gbi and in Anfoega was it proposed by the CPP government that a 
separate local council, not based on an existing NA, should be formed.196 Apart from the 
sole exception of Sefwi Bekwai, no local council had been recommended for an area whose
1 0 7population was lower than 10,000 in the Gold Coast proper.
This recommendation for a separate local council for Gbi division was made in order to 
meet the special needs of Hohoe town.198 It was felt that if Hohoe continued to expand, it 
might be capable of developing at some future date into an urban council. Moreover, 
looking at the finances o f Atando, Gbi by itself would not fare any worse than the NA did 
as a whole and there were good grounds to expect it to do considerably better.199 The name 
Gbi-Hohoe Local Council was chosen instead of Gbi Local Council because it was thought 
that by bringing in the name of Hohoe town, stress would be laid on the essentially urban
195 Ibid.
196 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/505, Schedule to the Draft Instrument on the Report on Gbi Local Council, 20 
November 1951.
197 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/142, Chief Commissioner to the Officer in Charge, Enquiry Team, Hohoe, 23 
October 1951.
198 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/505, Schedule to the Draft Instrument on the Report on Gbi Local Council, 20 
November 1951.
199 Ibid.
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nature of that local council.200 This had the added advantage of forestalling any objections 
from other rural divisions which might argue that if the Gbi division could have its own 
local council, there was no reason why their division should not receive the same treatment.
The next issue for the enquiry team in Atando was where to place Ve and Likpe 
divisions. It was proposed that Lipke should join the Buem Lefanas local council to the 
north of Ewedome. Separating Lipke and putting it elsewhere did not mean any greater 
likelihood of its cooperation, but it was probably better to keep a non-cooperative unit 
outside Gbi Hohoe, which had an urban responsibility.201 Although Ve initially made a 
representation for a separate local council, they later gave in to the decision to include them 
in the proposed East Dain local council.202 Initially, the proposal generated yet another 
protest from Logba, Nyagbo, Have, Agate, Tafi and Woadze divisions 203 The protest was 
in respect of the headquarters of the local council. The group maintained that the 
headquarters should be sited at Logba Alakpeti instead of Ve, the headquarters of the 
defunct Atando NA. If the headquarters was moved to Logba it was likely that Ve division 
with a population of 5,236 might try to secede.204 Ve might carry with it the divisions of 
Wli, Fodome, Liati and Leklebi whose combined population totalled 5,13 1 205 This would 
leave the protesting divisions with a population of 5,820 without a local council.206
The refusal of Anfoega to join Akpini Local Council or any other local council was a
0 ( Y 7threat to the entire programme of local government reorganization in the region. It will
200 Ibid.
201 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/142, Local Government Enquiry, 9 March 1952
202 Ibid.
203 RAG/H ACC No.67/54, Resolution by Six Divisional Chiefs to the Government Agent, Ho, 23 September
1952.
204 Ibid,
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 RAG/H RAO/C 511/50, Memorandum from Anfoega to the Trusteeship Council, 15 August 1951.
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be recalled that Anfoega had had no experience of local government since it had never 
formed part of a NA. They set out three conditions under which they would join any local 
council. First, due regard should be given to Anfoega as a separate entity independent of 
the other divisions in any such council.208 Second, due consideration should be given in 
assignment of seats to Anfoega as an independent division on the council.209 Third, there 
should be an independent divisional treasury for Anfoega. In the absence of the fulfilment 
o f these conditions, Anfoega would demand a separate council.210 In the end, not only was 
the request for a local council granted, but also a seperate native court and a police force 
were established for Anfoega.211 This decision to treat Anfoega differently sparked a wave 
of protests throughout Ewedome. Later events showed that Anfoega was a stronghold of the 
CPP. Anfoega was one division that welcomed the CPP into Ewedome because of that 
division’s long standing antagonism with the British colonial government over amalgation. 
Anfoega’s support for the CPP enabled it to be granted the special dispensation for its own 
council. As Nugent has shown, Togbe Tepre Hodo III, the paramount chief of Anfoega, was 
one of the traditional rulers that the CPP won into its fold in Ewedome.212
The Awatime NA was the only state which posed little problem for the enquiry team. It 
was relatively stable and had a much respected paramount chief in the person of 
Adzatekpor of Awatime.213 It was accordingly recommended that the Awatime NA be 
replaced with a local council covering the same area. It was also suggested that to
208 RAG/H RAO/C 458/48, Memorandum from Anfoega to the Select Committee on Local Government, 1 
July 1950.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 PAG/H RAO/C. 1079, Anfoega Local Council, Native Court and Police Force, 4 September 1952.
212 Nugent, Smugglers, p. 213. See also PAG/H RAO/C. 1079, Government Agent, Kpando to Judicial 
Adviser, Cape Coast, 30 August 1952. Hodo III was one o f  the chiefs who protested against German 
occupation o f Ewedome. It took a German expedition to subdue him in 1901. See Brown, ‘Anglo-German 
Rivalry’, p. 212.
213 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/511, The Composition o f the Local Councils in Ho District, 28 September 1951.
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emphasise the difference between the new local council and the state, the local council 
should have a different name. It is worth remembering that when the amalgamation of 
divisions was effected in 1932, the name Awatime was adopted for the NA because 
Awatime was the largest division in the state and the paramount chief came from Awatime. 
Under the amalgamation, however, the Ewe language was adopted as the official language 
for the transaction of business by the state. Even the official language of the state courts 
was Ewe. Since the coming into force of the new local government ordinance of December 
1951, the Ewe-speaking divisions had looked forward to pushing their cultural ‘dominance’ 
over the Awatime-speaking people a step further into a political dominance.
The Ewe-speaking states used their majority position on the state council to change the 
name of the state from Awatime to Hokpe State Council and the local authority to Yingor 
Local Council in 1952.214 These were Ewe names. In addition, they voted to move the 
headquarters of the state and the local council from Vane in Awatime division to 
Dzolokpuita, an Ewe-speaking division. In effect, Hokpe state superseded the Awatime 
State Council and Yingor Local Council superseded the Awatime NA. The adoption of the 
name Hokpe was suggestive of what took place on that day in 1932 when Captain Lilley 
brought the Ewe and Awatime people together to form the amalgamated Awatime state. Ho
1 c
is an Ewe word meaning town and kpe means to meet. Hopke therefore means the 
coming together of different towns. Yingor, on the other hand, means to ‘move forward’ 
and it signified their desire to advance the development of their divisions.
This change of name did not go down well with Awatime people. They saw the change 
of names and the transfer of the headquarters of the local council to Dzolokpuita as an
214 PRAAAD/A ADM 39/1/183, Yingor Local Council to Awatime Traditional Authority, 6 February 1953.
215 Ibid.
2,6 Ibid.
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orchestrated move by the Ewe-speaking divisions to dominate Awatime. In a strongly 
worded petition to the government in February 1953, the people of Awatime demanded a 
separate local council.217 They indicated their resolve not to pay taxes to Yingor local 
council and also not to take part in the activities of the Hokpe state. While no official 
reasons were adduced for rejecting the request by Awatime, it is reasonable to suggest that 
if that request was granted, Adzatekpor would cease to be the paramount chief over the 
Ewe divisions.
In the case of Asogli NA, a decision was taken to split it into two forming Anyigbe and 
Dzigbe local councils.218 There was an alternative proposal to set up one council, but this 
proposal was rejected by other divisions which would not like to join a local council whose 
ceremonial president would be Howusu of Dome.219 Meanwhile, Asogli State Council was 
not able to meet for a long time and whether in fact it could be said to exist at all was 
doubtful 220 In fact, as we have seen, Ho-Bankoe and Ho-Dome were implacable rivals of 
long standing. It was certain that anything like a representative meeting of the state council 
could not be held at the time because of the feud between the two divisions 221 Thus, the 
only alternative way of electing traditional members to the local councils in Asogli was to 
have them elected by the divisional chiefs sitting in council. Any mention of the Asogli 
State Council in the instrument setting up the local council comprising all the divisions of 
the old Asogli NA might lead to complete boycott of the local council.222
217 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/703, Awatime Traditional Authorities to the Governor, Accra, 21 February 1953.
218 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/305, Quarterly Report-Ho sub-District, 31 December 1951.
219 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/518, Petition -A koefe Chiefs to SDC Ho, 6 May 1952.
220 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/147, ADC, Ho, to the CCC, Cape Coast, December 1951.
221 Ibid.
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The New Councils
By May 1952, delimitation of the first group of local councils had been completed.223 In 
place of the four old NAs (including Atando), ten local council were created initially in 
Ewedome.
LOCAL COUNCILS IN EWEDOME IN 1952224
DISTRICT FORMER NATIVE AUTHORITY LOCAL COUNCILS
Ho Awatime Yingor
Asogli Adaklu
Asogli
Anyigbe
Dzigbe
Kpando Akpini Ablode
Anfoega
Akpini
East Dain225
Gbi Hohoe
As regards the election of traditional members, the Senior DC noted that the 
recommendations, in so far as Kpando and Ho districts were concerned, departed in some 
respects from the proposals contained in the report of the Colony Select Committee on local 
government.226 He recommended, for instance, that except where a local council area was 
coterminous with the area of a state, as in the case with Awatime, they should be elected by 
a council of chiefs composed of the paramount chief (if any) and divisional chiefs in the
223 RAG/H ACC/No. 493, Local Enterprise, 1952-1954, p.16.
224 Awudome and Peki Local Councils were missing in the above table because they did not form part o f the 
NAs in Ewedome. It was later in 1953, following the creation o f  the TVT Region, that Awudome was 
included in the Ho District Council and Peki was made to join Kpando District.
225 As we noted, some o f the members o f  Atando joined the East Dain Local Council.
226 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/518, SDC to the Governor, Accra, 28 September 1951.
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area of the local council.227 The presidency of the local council was to be elected by a 
council of chiefs or by the state council where a local council area was coterminous with 
the area o f a state to serve, for a one year term. The president had no casting vote and he 
presided only on ceremonial occasions.228 The table below shows the councils which 
replaced the NAs.
The proposal to divide the territories of the NAs into local councils in 1951 revealed a 
technical problem in relation to the native courts, police and prisons. It was proposed that
• 99Qthe area of jurisdiction of native courts should be left unaltered as far as possible. But 
this was not feasible because it would necessitate a native court exercising jurisdiction 
outside the area of authority of a local council which would finance it. In this regard, there 
was an urgent need to make slight alterations in the areas of jurisdiction of the existing 
courts to adjust them to coincide with the proposed local councils areas. For the NA 
prisons, they were to be administered by the local council in whose area they were 
situated.230 Native Authority police force was absorbed into the local council structure but 
was to be known as Local Authority Police. They were to perform much the same functions 
except that they were no longer expected to serve as guards to the chiefs or run errand for 
them.231
The new local government structure could not be deemed complete without some 
organization of local councils into districts councils. Under the old NA system, British 
officials with indigenous supporting staff headed the district headquarters. The transition to
Ib id .227
228 Ibid.
229 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/142, Draft Instrument on Local Councils in Southern Togoland, 1951.
230 PRAAD/A ADM39/1/142, Draft Instrument on Local Councils in Southern Togoland, 1951.
231 Interviews with Mr Edem Gbadegbe, retired registrar o f  Dzolopkuita Local Council, 20 May 2000. See 
also RAG/H ACC. 277/52 Native Authority Police-Proposal, 1952.
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the new form of local government gave opportunities to non-traditional indigenous 
inhabitants to have an increasing degree of participation in the administration of their 
affairs at the district level. Some Government Agents had reservations about the setting up 
of district councils.232 District councils in other parts of the Gold Coast had not been 
successful. In the Colony, there were doubts whether the local councils could afford to 
support district councils financially. As of 1952 only two district councils had been formed 
in the Colony, both for the centralised states of Akim Abuakwa and Kwahu, and it was 
proposed to proceed cautiously with the establishment of others.233 In Asante, nearly all the 
district councils had been established but many were failing to secure good attendance at 
meetings.234 The crux of the matter, however, was that the new local government system 
with its elaborate structures was more expensive to run than the old NAs.
In 1951, changes were made in the administrative boundaries of the Ho/Kpando 
districts. A new district headquarters was opened at Jasikan in 1951 to administer the non- 
Ewe-speaking areas in the northern part of the region. Krachi, which was formerly part 
of the Northern Territories, was included in the southern section in 1950 and now became 
part of the Jasikan district in 195 1 236 The composition of the district councils was such that 
not less than one-third of the traditional members from each local council sat on the district 
council. These traditional members were either elected from among the members of the 
component local councils or otherwise as agreed by the state council(s). All the non- 
traditional members of a district council were elected from the component local councils
232 RAG/H RAO/C451/15, Conference o f Government Agents, Ho, 25 June 1953.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 RAG/H RAO/C 458/48 Chief Commissioner, Cape Coast to Select Committee on Local Government, 25 
April 1950.
236 RAG/H C 458/48, Akpini NA to the Select Committee on Local Government, 6 June 1951.
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according to the population of the individual local councils. For example, a local council 
with a population of 6,000 might be entitled to one member. Where applicable, a few seats 
were reserved for members representing ‘special interests’, though the records were silent 
on what constituted ‘special interest’.
KPANDO DISTRICT COUNCIL
Local Councils Traditional Members Representative Members Total
Anfoega 1 1 2
Ablode 1 3 4
Akpini 2 3 5
East Dain 2 4 6
Gbi-Hohoe 1 2 3
Peki-Guan 2 4 6
Total 9 17 26
HO DISTRICT COUNCIL
Local Council Traditional Members Representative Members Total .................. .. .
Adakiu 2 1 3
Anyigbe 3 1 4
Asogli 3 1 4
Awudome 2 1 3
Dzigbe 3 2 5
Yingor 3 2 5
Total 16 8 24
In deciding on the boundaries of the district councils, much consultation was done with 
the various local councils to determine the district under which each council would like to
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work. Meanwhile, the policy was to ensure that all the district councils were as equal as 
possible in size and that the lands of the various councils within a district were contiguous. 
To achieve this balance, it was decided to include the Peki-Guan and Awudome local 
councils in Kpando district. Consequently, the creation of the Trans-Volta Togoland 
Region in line with the recommendations of Coussey and Phillipson reports became very 
urgent. The area of the Trans-Volta Togoland Region was demarcated in section two of the 
State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance, 1952. It included southern 
Togoland and contiguous areas of the Gold Coast such as the states of Anlo and Peki and
7 3 7the divisions that formerly constituted the Tongu NA. This covered a total area of about 
9,000 square miles and a total population of about half a million persons.238 Its 
implementation, however, was delayed by protests from the Southern Togoland Council 
and the Togoland Congress.239 These notwithstanding, the government created the TVT 
Region in June 1952. This paved the way for Peki and Awudome, which were not part of 
the trust territory, to become part of the local government re-organization in Ewedome.240 
The proposal to include Peki and Awudome in Kpando district, however, presented a 
problem of its own, which delayed the restructuring process until 1953.
There had been a long-standing dispute between Peki and Awudome since 1886 in 
which the latter had fought doggedly to secede from the former. Following the introduction 
of the Coussey Report, Awudome was granted a separate local council. This singular act by 
government gave Awudome the impression that their separation from Peki state was 
recognised de facto if not de jure. Consequently, Awudome decided to join Ho district, not
237 State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance, 1952.
238 Ibid.
239 Daily Graphic, 17 November 1952, p. 1; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 84.
240 A further discussion o f the regional reorganization and the protests that it generated follows in the next 
chapter.
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because they had a greater affinity with the people of Ho but because they wanted to 
emphasise their independence from Peki. The reaction from Peki was very swift. They felt 
strongly that Awudome should not be allowed to join Ho district because that would be 
tantamount to official recognition of the separation of Awudome from the Peki state.241 
Peki had made a demand to be allowed to stand on its own as a district, but to emphasise its 
resolve not to let Awudome go, Peki agreed to join Kpando district on condition that 
Awudome would as well be included in the Kpando District Council.
After a protracted negotiation, it was decided that traditional allegiance should not be 
the basis of establishing district councils; otherwise, the councils could be distracted by the 
overbearing influence of traditional authorities. More importantly, the inclusion of 
Awudome and Peki in the same district could be counter-productive in the sense that the 
feud between the two states could engulf the whole district. Peki obviously had many 
advantages in joining Kpando district. It was likely to get more attention from the 
Government Agent at Kpando than it would get if it was added to the larger Ho district. In 
addition, it would be in the same district with their kith and kin - the Gbi of Hohoe -thereby 
forging closer co-operation between them. Even though some parts covered by the Kpando 
district might seem somewhat remote, many Peki people had been farming extensively in 
the area to the north of Hohoe and therefore had interests in common with the people of 
that area.243
In order to keep the expenses of district councils to a minimum, it was proposed that 
they should use the offices of local councils established at Ho and Kpando and use the staff 
of the same local councils. Those councils could then be reimbursed for the additional work
241 Awudome had been under the suzerainty o f  Peki since the colonial period.
242 RAG/H LG S.033, District Councils-Grouping o f Peki-Guan, 5 December 1952.
243 Ibid.
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through honoraria contributed by the constituent local councils and that each local council 
should pay attendance and travelling expenses of its own representatives on the district 
council.244 In order to prevent the overlap of functions, and preserve some autonomy at the 
level of the local councils, the district councils were given well defined roles.245 The 
powers vested in district councils were to be permissive rather than mandatory and district 
councils should assume responsibility for certain functions such as the construction of 
roads with the support of local councils.246 By the end of 1953, the structures of local 
government were established in Ewedome.
Local Council Elections
The final stage of the transition to the new form of local government was reached with 
elections to the various local councils held from 1952-54. Elaborate regulations spelling out 
the conduct of the elections were contained in the subsidiary legislation made under the 
Ordinance of the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, the Northen Territories and Togoland under 
the UK Trusteeship in 1952.247 All local council areas were divided into smaller units 
called ‘wards’, and each ward elected one councillor for a three-year term. The wards were 
so demarcated that each division and sub-division had a representation. Candidates vying 
for election as councillors were norminated by three qualified voters of the ward for which 
he or she was a candidate.248 Voters who wished to norminate a candidate had to fill a 
‘Form A ’ indicating their name, address, a description of themselves, date of birth and
244 RAG/H RAO/C0233/32, Instrument Establishing the Ho District Council, 21 March 1953.
245 RAG/H RAO/C451/15, Conference o f Government Agents, Ho, 25 June 1953.
246 RAG/H RAO/C0233/32, Instrument Establishing the Ho District Council, 21 March 1953.
247 RAG/H Local Government Ordinance 1951, Section 24, The Elections (Local Government) Regulations,
19 January 1952. See Revised Edition, V. VIII.
248 For details on the election result, see Ibid.
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signature. Eight days before the date fixed for the elections, the full list of the candidates, 
the wards for which they were nominated, and the persons by whom they were nominated 
were published within the local council area. Elections to the various local councils were 
not conducted on the same date. For example, Akpini, Asogli, Adaklu, Gbi (Hohoe) and 
Yingor Local Council elections were held in 1952, Ablode in 1953, and that of Anfoega 
took place in 1954. To qualify as a voter, one had to attain the age of 21, own immovable 
property within the area of a local council or have resided within the area at least six 
months preceeding the date of one’s application to register and paid the basic rate unless 
such a person was specifically exempted from paying rates.249
With the exception of Asogli and Yingor where almost all the candidates were elected 
unopposed, the elections in other local council areas such as Ablode, Adaklu, Akpini and 
Gbi were hotly contested.250 This was partly responsible for the acrimony that characterised 
this maiden local government election in the territory.251 The CPP mounted a spirited 
campaign in its bid to win majority seat in local councils in the territory.252 The Togoland 
Congress, fearing defeat, initially called for a boycott of the registration exercise and the 
elections.253 This accounted largely for the low registration in Togoland.254 All the same, 
the election went ahead as scheduled, amidst intimidation and harassment of Togoland
249 Local Government Ordinance, Section 12 (A, B&C), 1951.
250 The stronghold o f the TC was Kpando district with its expanding towns o f Hohoe, Vakpo and Anfoega. 
See the ‘M ost Secret’ Document, p. 10. The point that the CPP became dominant in all rural areas in Ashanti 
and Togoland after the 1951 election is made in Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 33-49.
251 The campaign strategies o f the TC and the CPP are analysed in Nugent, Smugglers, p. 185- 188.
252 Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 39.
253 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 113. Collier argues that CPP rallies were well attended because the diarchy 
government made state resources available to the party. ''Ablode’, p. 225.
254Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 113.
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Congress supporters. The tables below on Asogli Local Council illustrate how the ward 
system worked.255
DEMARCATION OF WARDS
(Asogli Local Council, 1952)
Ward Population Area Number o f  Persons 
Registered
A. Totokoe 733 Tokokoe Mate 
Tokokoe Aburi
188
B. Tanyigbe 1,280 Tanigbe Anyigbe 
Tanyigbe Atidze 
Tanyigbe Etoe
390
C. Akoefe 1,280 Akoefe 
Akoefe Dzafe
394
D. Hodzo 625 Hodzo 394
E. Ho 1,016 Ho-Kpenoe
Ho-Takla
Ho-Tokor
Ho-Wayanu
208
F. Ho-Dome 600 Ho-Dome North 157
G. Ho-Dome 740 Ho-Dome South 105
H. Ho-Bankoe 1,000 Ho-Bankoe North 331
I. Ho-Bankoe 1,500 Ho-Bankoe South 305
J. Ahoe 900 Ahoe 170
K. Ahliha 500 Ahliha 37
L. Heve 600 Heve 102
255 Data for the above table was obtained from RAG/H RAO/C 147 No. LC 19’3 Asogli Local Council 
Elections, 2 April 1952.
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ELECTION RESULTS, 1952
(Asogli Local Council)
Local Council Ward Candidate(s) Votes
Asogli A J. K. Adzali (TC) Elected Unopposed
B D.Danso (TC) Elected Unopposed
C S. K. Dusu (TC) Elected Unopposed
D D. K. Yeboa (CPP) Elected Unopposed
E G. Y. Klu (TC) Elected Unopposed
F A. W. K. Dey (CPP) Elected Unopposed
G C. B.K. Attah (TC) Elected Unopposed
H J. K. Nutsunyo (TC) Elected Unopposed
I P. K. Keh (CPP)
S. G. Dzaba (TC)
S. W. Akondor (TC)
175
15
0
J F. R. Ametowobla
K S. O. Awuma (TC) Elected Unopposed
L S. Nkansah-Annaney 
(CPP)
Elected Unopposed
Well after the elections the struggle between the CPP and the TC continued to rock the 
councils creating the situation where some councillors were forced to resign for their 
support of one party or the other. For example, in 1953, three chiefs from Sovie wrote a 
letter to the chairman o f the Akpini Local Council seeking the resignation of Godfred
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Sapati, councillor for Sovie ward ‘H’, from the council. Their charge was that Sapati never 
consulted them before going to council meetings; neither had he ever briefed them on any 
proceedings from the meetings.256 It turned out that Sapati was a strong CPP supporter 
while the chiefs calling for his resignation were TC supporters 257 Such cases abounded 
throughout the Territory and they were never resolved.
For representatives of traditional authorites on local councils, elections were held by 
each traditional area to occupy one-third of the seats. In this respect, taking the case of 
Asogli as an example, the local council had 12 elected members therefore the state council 
elected six representatives to the Asogli Local Council. Elections of representatives of 
traditional members to the councils were generally smooth except in Asogli where Togbe 
Afede refused to accept his seat on the council unless the constitutional dispute between 
him and Howusu was settled.258 Despite these obstacles, the elections gave the inhabitants, 
for the first time, the right o f suffrage and an increasing degree of participation in local 
government. The old NAs were effectively replaced by new institutions by a ‘modernizing’ 
nationalist government in league with the out-going reformist colonial regime.
Conclusion
The transition to elected local government was a key part of the larger process of 
decolonization in the Gold Coast. Indeed, the transition was the main avenue through which 
decolonization became perceptible in rural areas such as Ewedome. In the wake of the 
rising demand from younger, educated group for reform, the very existence of the NA
256 RAG/H RAO/C 179 No. LC 24, Akpini Local Council Elctions, Petition from Sovie Konda, 23 June 1953.
257 RAG/H RAO/C 179 No. 0344/67, Report by Acting Government Agent, C. N. Weatherbum, Kpando, 7 
July 1953.
258 RAG/H Correspondence No. 0405/SF.3/14, Regional Officer, A.Cowley, Ho, to the Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry o f  Local Government and Housing, Accra, 28 October 1953.
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system was threatened. Thus, the only prop supporting the NAs was the colonial officers.259 
The 1951 ordinance therefore represented a major change with emphasis more on a 
representative system of local government. The new system was modelled largely on the 
UK structure of local government but with considerable variations tailored to suit local 
needs and peculiarities.
Ultimately, the objective of establishing local councils was to replace what was 
perceived as an anachronistic and undemocratic system with a democratic one that gave 
participation to ‘commoners’. Obviously, such a process was not likely to achieve the 
desired results without a ‘modem’ system of local government. Admittedly, the NA was 
essentially a colonial superstructure, the continuous existence of which was incongruous 
with the new wave of political, economic and social transformation in the 1940s and 1950s. 
By the abolition of the NA system, Nkrumah and the CPP leadership reckoned that local 
government structures would be controlled by the party-therefore actually bolstering central 
control by the new nationalist government. Nevertheless, the question as to whether the 
new system could deliver more efficient and democratic local government without 
exhibiting the same weaknesses identified with the old NAs is worth asking. The answer to 
this question forms the main theme of the next chapter of this study.
259 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 150.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE RUN-UP TO INDEPENDENCE,
1953-1956
The completion of the new local government structure in Ewedome in 1953 coincided 
with the gradual devolution of power to the CPP-dominated Cabinet and Legislative 
Assembly in the Gold Coast. This development had a direct bearing on the trusteeship 
status of the territory. Politics, which in British Togoland had been localised and focused 
on native states, emerged at regional level by the 1940s. From 1954, it assumed greater 
intensity with the rise of a bitter contest between the CPP government and the Togoland 
Congress over the future status of the Trust Territory. The CPP, supported by the British 
colonial officials, was determined to integrate the Trust Territory into the Gold Coast. The 
Togoland Congress, encouraged by the formation of two other regional opposition parties, 
the National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the Northern Peoples’ Party (NPP) in 1953- 
54, vehemently opposed such a move and rather sought the unification of the two 
Togolands as an independent entity.
What is of significance to this study is the effect of the struggle between integrationist 
and unificationist advocates on the overall development of local government in the 
Ewedome region. The chapter begins by analysing the initial problems that confronted the 
new local councils in the turbulent years in the run-up to independence. It focuses on the 
politicization of local government as the issue of the status of the Trust Territory emerged 
at the local, national and international levels. In doing so, the chapter re-examines the 
existing narrative of the Ewe unification question, as it unfolded in Ewedome, in order to
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illuminate our understanding of the impact of the struggle for and against integration on the 
local councils.
Initial Problems with the Establishment of Local Councils
By 1953, all the local councils in Ewedome had been established. It was soon realised, 
however, that the setting up of the councils by law was one thing and getting them to 
function efficiently was another. In several cases, there was dissension regarding the 
boundaries of the councils, which was often rooted in old land disputes. It was 
contemplated by the enquiry team that the new councils would have a higher percentage of 
‘enlightened’ members who would come more readily to agreement with their neighbours 
concerning boundary demarcations than the members of the old NAs. It was hoped that 
interim boundary arrangements would be accepted by the members of the councils as a 
workable basis for the councils to start operating. The final demarcation could then be the 
first duty of the councils when they formally began work.1
Most people still had a confused conception of the functions of the new councils. This 
confusion was due to the fact that many members of the defunct NAs had at the same time 
been members of the state councils and the two bodies came to be regarded as synonymous. 
It will be recalled that even though the NAs were abolished, their State Councils continued 
to exist as residual bodies. People found it hard to visualise a local council that would be 
entirely distinct from the State Councils. The possibilities of friction between State 
Councils and local councils appeared to be considerable at the inception of the latter. This 
was not only in the field o f everyday business, but also in the legislative and financial 
spheres. The onus was on government officials to bring more focus on the continued
1 RAG/H RAO/C 313, Supersession o f Native Authorities, Progress Report, Ho, May 1952- June 1953.
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existence of State Councils and to ensure that they and not the local councils would still 
deal with certain customary matters. The financial implications of the division of functions 
between local councils and state councils obviously needed the closest examination to 
prevent this resulting in a considerable increase in administrative cost.
According to the transitional provisions, there was to be no interregnum between the 
exit of the NAs and the establishment of local councils.2 The transitional arrangement was 
such that all assets, liabilities and rights of action belonging to NAs passed over to the local 
councils automatically, with little time to appoint the required personnel to head the 
councils. Thus, there were delays in the new councils holding their first meetings and 
actually discharging their duties. Until the first meetings were held, the councils could do 
nothing. They could not even appoint agents to do their work and during that period the 
task of the NA staff, who were absorbed into the councils, was made difficult because they 
could not receive any directives from their new employers. In addition, there was the 
problem of what to do with the assets where the NAs (with the exception of Awatime NA) 
were succeeded by more than one council.
In effect, certain powers that the NAs had been exercising were in abeyance until the 
local councils, at or after their first meetings, could direct their exercise anew. This had 
adverse effects on the financial administration of the councils at the initial stages. For 
example, the financial committees of the NAs ceased to exist on the very day the local 
councils were established. The new councils, according to the ordinance, must by 
resolution appoint a finance committee at its first meeting and declare the persons who 
were authorised to sign and countersign payment vouchers and cheques.3 The banks
2 See Local Government Ordinance Section 10, 1951.
3 Ibid, Section 42, 1951.
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required to be furnished with a copy of any such resolution with the seal of the councils or 
the signatures of all the local council members.4 As a result, no money could be paid out 
and no cheques could be drawn and the salaries of the staff inherited from the NAs could 
not be paid.5 The situation was similar to that which pertained in Asante, where the newly 
elected councillors had no idea how funds for projects could be accessed.6 Nonetheless, 
projects such as the construction of ‘feeder roads and school buildings required local 
council expenditure’.7 The situation was made worse by lack of adequate accommodation 
arrangements for the new councils. Government made £2,000 available for the new 
councils to construct or purchase new buildings, but this would take time. It appeared that 
not enough thought was given to the transition process and that the establishment of the
o
councils in Ewedome and the Gold Coast as a whole was done in haste.
The councillors were new to their work, yet many of them were over-zealous in trying to 
make a clean break with the past system of NAs by introducing radical changes into the 
working of the councils. In particular, charges were made that staff inherited from the NAs 
were being dismissed or victimised and traditional authorities being denied allowances 
while councillors were granting over-generous allowances to themselves.9 Some localities 
were split into two factions, one supported the local council and the other the traditional 
authorities. The result was a regrettable state of affairs with the working of local councils
4 RAG/H C.264/LCF26, Anfoega Local Council Treasury, September 1952.
5 Ibid.
6 Kate Skinner, ‘“It Brought some Kind o f Neatness to Mankind”: Mass Literacy, Community Development 
and Democracy in 1950s Asante’, Africa, 79 (2009), p. 493.
7 Ibid.
8 For examples on how this affected local councils in the Gold Coast, see J. K. Nsarkoh, ‘Development o f  
Local Government in Ghana-1951/71’, Journal o f  Management Studies, 1 (1977), p. 77. See also Ronald 
Wraith, Local Government in West Africa (London, 1964), p. 18-19.
9 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/502, Local Councils, Trans-Volta Togoland Region, Survey o f  Local Government, 17 
January 1953/54.
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prejudiced at the very onset.10 Despite these difficulties, the local councils inherited a 
strong tradition of self-help that had been built up in the villages and divisions by the old 
NAs. The task was to ensure that this well-grounded tradition of self-help was, so far as 
possible, grafted into the work of local government. For this purpose, councils were tasked 
to encourage villages, groups of villages and small divisions to propose special rates for 
works to be carried out in their areas.11 These special rates attracted additional grants from 
central government. In this way, the local councils provided scope for those groups which 
wished to increase the pace of their development to do so. This yielded dividends with an 
increase in the rates collected during the 1952-3 fiscal year of 100 percent over the previous 
year.12
The Trans-Volta Togoland Council
The creation of the TVT Region in 1952 needed to be given more meaning by bringing 
Togolanders and the Gold Coasters together in a regional administrative body. The plan 
was first mooted in 1948, when Sir Thorleif Mangin, Chief Commissioner of the Colony, 
toured the southern section of Togoland and discussed with the chiefs and their subjects the 
need for a representative of Togoland on the Joint Provincial Council as the first step
13towards Togolanders having a representative on the Legislative Council. It was 
subsequent to this that the 1949 Native Authority Ordinance for the southern section of 
British Togoland was passed to harmonise the NAs in the territory in line with that of the
10 Ibid.
11 RAG/H D A/D 6281, Meeting by Local Council Officers in Kpandu District, 17-19 March 1953.
12 Ibid.
13 RAG/H D/D 388, Chief Commissioner’s Office to the District Councils in Togoland, 20 January 1949. The 
JPC was for over 30 years been the body o f chiefs in southern Ghana with its headquarters at Dodowa, the 
capital o f the Eastern Province o f the Colony. It was dissolved in 1958 by the CPP government to give way 
for Houses o f  Chiefs in the regions it had previously covered. See West Africa, 29 November 1958, p. 1129.
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Gold Coast Colony to facilitate the admission of southern Togolanders into the JPC.14 This 
proposal, as already noted, was responsible for the increased agitation for Togoland 
unification. It will be recalled that, historically, political organisation and social identities in 
Ewedome tended to be highly fragmented and focused on immediate localities. This 
outlook could not, of course, change overnight, for it was natural that divisional affairs 
should have a prominent place in the people’s thought. Nonetheless, Mangin, a staunch 
supporter of the old indirect rule order at this time of rapid move towards reform, thought 
otherwise. He felt that, for further progress to be made in the development of local 
government, this interest in divisional affairs must give way to interest in those of larger 
political units such as the Joint Provincial Council or a regional body.15
The Ewe chiefs of Ewedome were not sure how their membership of the Joint Provincial 
Council could affect their status as a Trust Territory and a possible unification with Ewes in 
French Togo.16 Moreover, the failure of the Southern Togoland Council established in 1949 
was due in part to the feeling of uneasiness by a large concentration of Akan strangers to 
the north of Ewedome that they would not be easy bedfellows with the more numerous 
Ewes on a regional body. After careful consideration, the Gold Coast government decided 
to shelve the idea of Togolanders taking seats on the JPC in the belief that it would only be 
a matter of time before they were naturally drawn into closer contact with the JPC.17 This 
decision stemmed from concern that the Togoland Union could capitalise on the issue and 
cause a split in the territory, especially as the union was composed largely of members of
14 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/495, Address by the Chief Commissioner, T. R. O. Mangin, Ho, October 1948; 
RAG/H D/D 388, Chief Commissioner’s Office to the District Councils in Togoland, 20 January 1949; 
Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 11; Nugent, Smugglers, p. 173.
15 RAG/H D/D 388, Chief Commissioner’s Office, 20 January 1949.
16 RAG/H D/DA 1060, Memorandum on Togoland (Southern Section) under British Trusteeship, 27 October 
1948.
17 RAG/H, Excerpt from the Handing Over Notes from Mr Dennis to Mr Hindle, 19 October 1948 (No File 
Number).
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the more educated class.18 Besides, a lot of work had to be done on the various legislative 
amendments required to carry this decision into effect. Consequently, the matter became 
the subject of correspondence between the DC of Ho, and the office of the Chief 
Commissioner of the Gold Coast until 1950, when major constitutional developments were 
set in motion in the Gold Coast.19
In 1953, the regional reorganization was completed with the creation of the TVT 
Council. Its members were drawn from local and district councils including Anlo and Peki 
and it was to support and supervise the new local councils in their bid to increase the pace 
o f economic and social development.20 It was also meant to give the inhabitants better 
opportunities of working together in common institutions, solving common problems and
•  91helping to plan and coordinate the development programmes of the local councils. The 
council could deliberate on matters affecting local government which were of common 
concern to the people of the region as a whole and could make representations on such 
matters to the central government. As a deliberative and advisory body, it had no executive 
or legislative functions.22 Government consulted it in formulating policies regarding 
important issues such as constitutional matters, development programmes and the like. A 
regional officer was to be appointed to coordinate all government activities in the region
18 RAG /H D/D 388, Chief Commissioner’s Office to the District Councils in Togoland, 20 January 1949.
19 The Southern Togoland Council opposed the creation o f the TVT Region on the grounds that it was not in 
the interest o f the special status o f the trust territory. RAG/H D/D A 8/0167/99, Southern Section o f  Togoland 
under British Mandate Ordinance, 2 May 1949.
20 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/691, Minutes of the Southern Togoland Council, 5 to 18 February 1950; Sir Sydney 
Phillipson Commission Report on Regional Administration, 1951, p. 16; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 84.
21 Speech by the Regional Officer to the First Meeting o f the Trans-Volta Togoland Council, 11 July 1953.
22 Togoland Report, 1952.
238
and to be responsible directly to the central government in Accra.23 There were six other 
officers including an Assistant Regional Officer and a Secretary.24 
Many Ewes of the Trust Territory continued to show resentment against the establishment 
of Trans-Volta Togoland Region and its Council, which they claimed could be dominated 
by Ewes from the Gold Coast.25 Since the British took over Togoland from the Germans, 
the area had witnessed the influx of Gold Coast Ewes, mainly from Peki and from Anlo, the 
coastal region to the south. G. O. Awuma, one of the leaders of Togoland Union, observed 
that it was difficult to see how Togolanders could be given education in self-determination 
when all the key positions in the local councils, the schools, commerce and even the 
churches were filled with ‘adventurers’ from the Gold Coast Eweland.26 It seemed 
therefore to the Togolanders that the government, the missionary societies and the merchant 
houses seemed to have conspired to support Gold Coast Ewes to dominate Togolanders. 
Consequently, the feeling among the inhabitants was that the new regional council was 
going to operate at the pleasure of Gold Coast Ewes who were more educated than the 
Ewes in the Trust Territory.
There was no doubt that Ewedome, and for that matter the entire trust territory, was in a 
backward state of economic development. It is also a fact that although the region was 
administered as an integral part of the Gold Coast, ‘its trust status conveyed special 
assistance from the British government and the responsibility towards the UN rested on the 
shoulders of the British government’.27 This position was supported by the Treasury in
23 Togoland Report, 1952.
24 Ibid.
25 Petition from Southern Togoland Council to the Governor. See NA CO 96/827/2 Minutes o f Meetings o f  
Southern Togoland Council, 23 February 1950.
26 RAG/H D A/D140 A, Gerald O. Awuma to the Colonial Secretary, Gold Coast, 7 June 1952; The 
dominance o f Anlo and Peki Ewes in the Trust Territory is also noted in Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 35.
27 NA C096/826/9, Colonial Office to the Governor, Accra, 22 November 1950.
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London which felt that there was ‘a pre-eminently strong case on strict economic grounds 
for a measure of further [financial] assistance to Togoland and the Cameroon’. The 
effective administration o f such a fund in the territory made a strong case for a regional 
body that could oversee its implementation. The Togoland Congress opposed the creation 
of the regional council on the ground that it was not represented on the Coussey Committee
9Qthat made the proposal for the creation of regions as part of local government reforms.
The action of uniting the Ewes in the Colony and those in Ewedome was designed to 
further the long-held objective of the colonial administration, and later that o f the CPP, of 
more fully integrating Togoland into the Gold Coast. This would make it easier to resist 
pressure in future for the unification of the British and French Trust Territories.30 Indeed, 
the UN Trusteeship Council observed that the plan to create the Trans-Volta Togoland
Region, conceived in 1949, ‘appeared to have the effect o f strengthening the integration of
11
the southern section of the Trust Territory with the adjoining part of the Gold Coast’. 
Although the governor retained reserve powers over Togoland, there was a gradual 
devolution of powers, both executive and legislative, to the CPP from 1951.32 According to 
Coleman, ‘it was impossible to determine whether any particular measure affecting 
Togoland since 1951 has been the act of the British government (which was the 
administering authority) or the act of the CPP in the cabinet’.33
28 NA C096/826/9, Correspondence from the Treasury, London, 29 December 1953.
29 NA C 096827/2, Petition: Togoland Council, 23 February 1950.
30 NA C096/824/7, Note by the Colonial Office on the Coussey Report, 1950.
31 Report o f  the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly, New York, 23 July 1949 to July 1950, p.44.
32 The fact that the governor never used his reserved powers as regards Togoland is stated in Coleman, 
‘Togoland’, p. 20.
33 Ibid.
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Development Issues
At the first meeting of the TVT Council on 11 July 1953, Togbe Tepre Hodo III, chief of 
Anfoega, who represented the Anfoega Local Council, was elected president.34 The first 
task of the council was to consider how the £1,000,000 development grant announced by 
Nkrumah for the region in the Legislative Assembly on 7 July 1953 should be spent.35 The 
council submitted a proposal for a number of development projects which received 
approval from government in Accra. These projects included the construction of feeder 
roads, a trade school at Kpando, a hospital at Worawora in the Jasikan District and one in 
the south, a number of dressing stations, telecommunications and the Anfoega community 
centre. By 1954, a lot of progress had been made in various facets of development under 
the new local government system. Almost all the councils had completed work on their new
3 f\offices and court houses. Drilling started in Ho and Adaklu areas after two geologists had 
been posted to the trust territory to carry out a water supply survey in order that necessary 
information could be obtained for executing the water project proposed by the TVT 
Council.37 Good progress was also made with the building of the Mawuli secondary school, 
a regional education and regional administration blocks in Ho while a non-boarding 
secondary school was opened in a temporary building at Kpando. The period also saw the 
completion of work on the first phase of the building programme for Hohoe district police 
headquarters.39
34 Togoland Report, Appendix A 1953.
35 Ibid.
36 RAG/H, Progress in TVT 1951-1954, Report by the Regional Officer to the Trans-Volta Togoland Council. 
28 April 1954.
37 Ibid.
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Another development of considerable significance was the establishment of the National 
Food Board by the government with a grant of £100,000 in order to plan and stimulate 
ways and means of increasing food production. In the first instance, the board decided to 
concentrate on the construction and the reconstruction of feeder roads in order to speed up 
and facilitate the flow of food stuffs from farms and villages to the main centres.40 This 
plan benefited Ewedome in particular as roads linking Adaklu to Kpedzegle, Waya- 
Kpedzegli, Aboudi to Waya and Abutia to Juapong were constructed. The trunk road 
linking Hohoe to Kpeve was completed in 1954 and all major towns were linked with 
telephone lines.41 In addition, a bridge was to be built over the Volta as a way of opening 
up the region to other parts of the Gold Coast42 This commitment was designed to dispel 
the propaganda by the Togoland Congress that the government was neglecting the Trust 
Territory.43 The Togoland Congress had used the low level of development of the territory 
as a tool to campaign against integration.44 Coleman attributed the delayed political 
integration of the territory into the political life of the Gold Coast partly to the inability to 
bridge the Volta River.45 Further boost was given to the development of the area following 
the opening of branches of British Bank of West Africa and Barclay’s Bank in Hohoe in 
1952.46
The bridge across the Volta River was constructed at a cost of £560,000 and a trunk road 
from the bridge through Kpeve in Ewedome was also completed. Drifts were built across
40 RAG/H ACC/No. 282, Feeder Roads in Trans-Volta Togoland, 1955, p, 3.
41 RAG/H, Progress in TVT 1951-1954, Report by the Regional Officer to the Trans-Volta Togoland Council. 
28 April 1954
42 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1 456, Handing over Note, Kpandu 22 August 1953.
43 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 234.
44 The broader political argument o f the TC in league with other opposition parties are well laid out in Ibid, p. 
233-234.
45 Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 20.
46 RAG/H, Progress in TVT 1951-1954, Report by the Regional Officer to the Trans-Volta Togoland Council. 
28 April 1954.
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the Oti and Asukawkaw rivers to link up the road between Kpando and Kete-Krachi to the 
north. The construction of these two drifts, available to motor traffic for all but four months 
of the year, speeded up the transportation of foodstuff from the Krachi area and greatly 
stimulated the movement of market women from Ewedome to yam producing areas of 
Kete-Krachi. These road networks facilitated not only the distribution but also the increased 
production of foodstuffs. In addition, the feeder roads facilitated the provision of portable 
water supply by making it possible for the heavy machinery of the Department of Rural 
Water Development to reach hitherto inaccessible areas to provide boreholes for rural 
communities.47
Until 1954, district councils were unable to undertake more than consultative and 
advisory functions due to improper planning resulting in the lack of linkage between the 
regional institutions and the local and district councils. The purpose of the district councils 
was to provide services within their areas which they could administer better than any of 
their member local councils. From 1954, however, plans were made for them to carry out 
their proper roles in the field of local government. Their main activities were the 
construction and maintenance of roads which formed part of the TVT Council’s road 
programme. The road projects were funded from two sources: the central government, in 
which case the district councils acted as local agents, and from the local councils. While 
funds from the central government was used to construct the roads, the cost of their 
maintenance was to be funded by the local councils.
Other functions of the district councils included responsibility for controlling the Cocoa 
Marketing Board grants made available to cocoa growing areas in the trust territory. These 
functions were performed in addition to those which the 1951 Local Government
47 RAG/H ACC/ No. 282, Feeder Roads in Trans-Volta Togoland, 1955, p. 7.
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Ordinance enjoined them to perform. For example, district councils took over the 
maintenance and management of maternity homes and local clinics and local courts.48 
Under a new education ordinance, district councils became the authorities responsible for 
ensuring that government’s policy in the fields of primary and middle education was 
carried o u t49 In line with the practice under the erstwhile NAs, the councils were 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of school buildings. This task of planning 
and supervising primary and middle education was arguably the most formidable 
undertaken by district councils. Part of the grant from the Cocoa Marketing Board was to 
be used in assisting scholars from the territory and other parts of the region who were 
attending the University College of the Gold Coast, the Kumasi College of Technology or 
Sixth Form schools in the Gold Coast. In performing these functions, district councils took 
over responsibilities that had hitherto been borne by District Development Committees.50 
District Development Committees were set up as far back as 1949 and from 1952, each of 
them was allocated £2,000 to spend on the development of their districts.51
In the past, owing to the slow development of primary and middle education and the 
absence of secondary schools in the trust territory, fewer students from Ewedome than from 
Anlo and Peki and other parts of the Gold Coast had obtained education beyond middle 
school level.52 Formal education started very late in Ewedome even though there had been
48 Yingor Local Council clinic stood out as the most successfully managed local council project in Ewedome. 
In 1956, there was an average o f 60 patients visiting the clinic daily, rising to between 70 and 100 patients 
daily by 1958. These figures were contained in a letter written by the Senior Medical Officer in Charge o f  
Maternity and Child Health Service in the Volta Region addressed to the Regional Medical Officer at Ho 
expressing the need for a hospital at Dzolokpuita, the seat o f Yingor Local Council, 9 October 1972. Copy o f  
the letter obtained from the elders o f Dzolokpuita, on 5 July 2007.
49 RAG/A A/DA 39/253, Organization o f Local Authorities in TVT as District Education Authorities.
50 RAG/H AD/D253, Organization o f Local Education Authorities in Trans-Volta/Togoland.
51 RAG/H A CC/N0.282, Feeder Roads in Trans-Votal Togoland, 1955, p. 2
52 RAG/H ACC/497, Education in Trans-Volta Togoland, Memorandum by the Minister o f Education and 
Social Welfare, 30 November 1953.
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schools in the Gold Coast areas inhabited by Ewes for more than hundred years.53 It was 
only at the beginning of 1952 that free primary education was made available to all 
children.54 Consequently, very few people from Ewedome occupied positions of 
importance in the government service, teaching and commerce. This situation had been 
commented upon by the Visiting Mission in 1950.55 It was one of the most bitter causes of 
division between the people of Ewedome and Ewes in the Gold Coast. It was to hasten the 
removal of this grievance that the TVT Council had made its proposal for a special 
scholarship scheme for the region.56 The grant was to cover a seven-year period at an 
estimated cost of £40,000 and it formed part of the £1,000,000 pledged by Nkrumah for the
cn
development of the region.
Most inhabitants of Ewedome were disappointed about the lumping together of the trust 
territory and the Gold Coast areas for the disbursement of the scholarship scheme.58 They 
had expected the scheme to be devoted specifically to bridging the yawning gap in the 
education differential between the trust territory and the Gold Coast areas occupied by 
other Ewes.59 The UK government’s report on education, which was corroborated by the 
UN report on scholarships, showed that the majority of the most educated people in 
Togoland were teachers; however, out of twenty scholarships made available to the 
southern section of Togoland in 1948, only one was awarded to an indigenous teacher.60 
Indeed, it had been observed by the Trusteeship Council in 1950 that some Gold Coast Ewe
53 United Nations Visiting Mission Report, 1949, p. 45.
54 Togoland Report, 1952.
55 RAG/H United Nations Visiting Mission Draft Report, 1949, p. 45; RAG/H, UN Trusteeship Council- 
Examination o f Petitions, (Fourth Report o f  Ad Hoc Committee on Petitions), 13 July 1950.
56 RAG/H, Trans-Volta Togoland Council, Supplementary Scheme for Scholarships and Bursaries, 1953/54.
57 RAG/H, Address by the Prime Minister to the Trans-Volta Togoland Council, Ho, 1953.
58 ADM 39/1/532, Trans-Volta Togoland Council Development Plan, Standing Financial Committee Report, 
1953/54, p. 1.
59 Ibid.
60 Togoland Report, 1948, p. 145.
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teachers were transferred to Ewedome and were given Togoland addresses so that they 
could benefit from the scholarship scheme.61 ‘This created the impression of official 
connivance with Gold Coast Ewes to deprive indigenous Togolanders of scholarship 
specifically allocated to the latter.’62
The TVT Council appreciated the fact that extension of the scope of its scholarship 
scheme beyond the Trust Territory would not address the imbalance that the people of 
Ewedome had been yearning to correct since the late 1940s.63 But the hands of the council 
appeared to be tied by the joining of the territory to the Ewe-dominated parts of the Gold 
Coast. It was therefore inadvisable to discriminate in the disbursement of the scholarship 
grants by excluding the Gold Coast areas, particularly as the Tongu area between Ewedome 
and the Anlo region, with one-fifth of the total population, was also ‘very backward in 
terms of development’.64 The onus was therefore on the district and local councils in 
Ewedome to fill whatever gap the scholarship scheme would leave in the promotion of 
vigorous education programmes. For example, Yingor Local Council was compelled in 
1954 to impose a special education rate to enable it pay the hugely increased rate of 
expendable equipment grant to schools.65
In Ewedome, the task of district and local councils in supplementing the cost of 
education and, at the same time, undertaking other development programmes was herculean 
due to the relatively meagre annual grant allocated to the region from 1953. During the 
financial year 1953-54, the sum of £946,210 voted for the whole country under the
61 UN Trusteeship Council, Fourth Report o f the Ad Hoc Committee on Petitions, N ew  York, 13 July 1950.
62 Ibid.
63 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/532, Trans-Volta Togoland Council Development Plan, Standing Financial 
Committee Report, 1953/54, p. 1.
64 RAG/H, Memorandum by the Minister o f Education and Social Welfare, 30 November 1953 (Not Filed).
65 PRAAD/A ADM, 39/1/183, Yingor Local Council, Estimate for 1954/55, 3 July 1954.
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‘ordinary estimates’ was distributed as follows: the Colony received £326,000, Asante 
£330,000, the Northern Territories £221,000 and Trans-Volta Togoland got only £49,000.66 
Some of the criteria used in distributing the grant included the amount raised by the local 
councils in direct taxation the two previous years and a reimbursement of cost of living 
allowances paid by authorities to their employees. In large part, this formula was 
anomalous and very much to the detriment of Ewedome in particular and the Trans-Volta 
Togoland Region as a whole.
The 1951 local government finance report, for example, showed that the grant-in-aid per
/ • o
head of population was 3/- more in Ashanti than the other regions. The main reason for 
the advantageous position of Ashanti was the operation of the formula which matched 
every £1 raised in direct taxation with 16/- in government grant.69 In 1950/51, Asante NAs 
with a population of 817,000 raised a total of £248,330 from rates, whereas the Colony 
NAs including the TVT Region with a population of 2,122,000 raised only £144,110.7° 
Ashanti had huge natural endowment with large mineral deposits and timber concessions 
appreciably greater than the rest of the country.71
Presumably, the grant based upon the amount raised by direct taxation was to encourage 
local councils to raise more money from the levying of rates but its effectiveness as an 
incentive was largely limited. It was difficult to imagine local councils in poorer regions 
such as Ewedome having to raise taxes in anticipation of a corresponding increase of 
government grant two years after. Under the NAs in Ewedome, a tradition had been set by
66 RAG/H, Distribution o f Grants to Local Authorities other than Municipalities, 1953/54; PRAAD/A ADM  
5/7/170, Local Government Financial Statistics, 1953/54.
67 Ibid.
68 RAG/H, Local Government Finance Report, 1951.
69 RAG/H, Distribution o f Grants to Local Authorities other than Municipalities, 1953/54.
70 RAG/H, Local Government Finance Report, 1951.
71RAG/H, Distribution o f Grants to Local Authorities other than Municipalities, 1953/54.
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the British officers in fixing rates whereby the emphasis was rather on what the people 
themselves were willing to pay. The formula adopted for disbursement of the government 
grants differed markedly from that tradition and favoured the more prosperous areas to the 
detriment of the poorer.
In addition, socially ‘backward area’ grants were distributed at the discretion of officers
7 9in charge of the regions. The designation was relative; it differed from region to region 
and there were considerable variations in the method of allocating grants based on 
‘backwardness’. Regional circumstances might well have a bearing on the decision as to 
which local councils were in most need of assistance. The most appropriate formula was 
one which took into account the population and the number of local councils in the region. 
Population was an easily understood factor and taking into account the number of councils 
in a region was also relevant because the greater the number of local councils in a region, 
the greater the proportion of administrative and overhead expenditure. Moreover, in 
Ewedome, there was little to choose between the potential resources of individual local 
council areas, which made the distribution of grants according to population more relevant.
In 1954, the purpose of paying local tax was still seldom fully understood, despite 
attempt in the previous year to launch a local government publicity campaign. The film 
‘Progress in Kojokrom’ was shown in almost every village of any size and a pamphlet, 
‘Your Council and Your Progress’ was widely distributed in nine local languages.73 A 
follow-up campaign with the theme: ‘Pay Your Local Council Rates’ was also started with 
the support of the department of Social Welfare and Community Development and the
72 Ibid.
73 RAG/H, Pamphlet on T.V.T. Local Enterprise, 1952-1954.
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Extra-Mural Department of the University College of the Gold Coast.74 The publicity was 
part of a nation-wide mass literacy and social welfare programme initiated by government 
with the inception of the new local councils. In the words of Skinner, the essence of those 
mass programmes was to educate the rural folk and make them ‘receptive to a range of 
expensive governmental interventions’.75 For British officials, the training of students in 
local government was seen as necessary since there was ‘a good deal of prejudice among 
African students against the emphasis placed by colonial policy on local government 
reforms which they tended to regard as a device to avoid the grant of responsible 
government’.76 The basic training of such officers involved attachment for one year to a 
suitable local government institution in the UK and attendance at Oxford or Cambridge in 
order to obtain the requisite cultural background and a degree in a wide variety of 
subjects.77 Many of these students returned only to be stationed in Accra.
Local Councils and the Question of Integration
In this section, we return to the contested terrain of Togoland unification. We have seen 
how the youth of Ewedome began to get involved in Togoland politics and the effects it had 
on the NAs and chieftaincy. We noted also that the post-Second World War era marked the 
beginning of Ewe cultural consciousness and nationalism, which built up gradually until it 
reached a crescendo in the early 1950s.78 Hitherto, as noted in the previous chapters, the 
Ewes of Ewedome had been a disunited people who tended to resist any attempt to bring
74 Ibid.
75 Skinner, ‘“It Brought some Kind o f  Neatness”’, p. 471.
76 NA C096/827/8, Gold Coast Africanization Committee, Colonial Office to R. P. Armitage, Secretary,
Accra, 2 June 1950.
77 Ibid.
78 The point that Togoland unification was driven by Ewe ‘cultural and political renaissance’ is made in West 
Africa, 1 December 1956, p. 969.
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them together. The gradual emergence of a movement towards Ewe unification, however, 
changed all that.
From 1953, the Togoland Congress intensified its fight against integrating British 
Togoland with the Gold Coast in reaction to political developments in the Gold Coast 
involving the rise of the Northern People’s Party and the National Liberation Movement in 
1953-56. There were allegations that Government Agents in the Gold Coast were 
conducting campaigns to the effect that the UN was not capable of helping Togolanders to 
realise their aspirations. The allegations had their roots in a booklet published in 1953 by 
the Togoland Congress, which it called a ‘Most Secret’ document on the future of 
Togoland.79 The document, allegedly written by the British government, was said to have 
contained plans to incorporate Togoland into the Gold Coast. According to the document, 
the problem facing the British Colonial Office was ‘how to ensure that the territory emerges 
from its trust status not later than the Gold Coast attains full self-government and that it 
becomes an integral part of a self-governing Gold Coast’.80
Meanwhile, the Van Lare Commission had completed the redemarcation of electoral 
districts for the second general elections to be held in 1954.81 Three constituencies were 
created in Ewedome: Kpando North, Ho East and Ho West. The Togoland Congress had 
made a demand to the Commission to ensure that the electoral districts did not overlap the 
Trust Territory and the Gold Coast.82 In addition, the Togoland Congress wanted a separate 
legislature to be created for Togoland to show its special status as a Trust Territory. The
79 “M ostS ecre t” Politics in Togoland. See also Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 193; Amenumey, Ewe 
Unification.
80 Ibid, p. 9.
81 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 176 and 203; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 146.
82 Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 146.
83 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 233; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 88.
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relevance of the 1954 elections was in its objective of establishing a sovereign government 
that would place the administration of the Gold Coast and the British Togoland in the hands 
of Africans, including Togolanders.84
In the elections, S. G. Antor won Kpando North, which included Hohoe, Rev. 
Ametowobla, a Togoland Congress supporter from Awatime who stood as an independent 
candidate, won Ho West and G. O. Awumah took the Ho East seat.85 In all, the CPP had 72 
out of the 104 seats in the Assembly, eight of which were from the TVT Region. Togoland 
Congress participated in all these elections because, according to Amenumey, it feared CPP 
supporters could be elected to speak on behalf of the territory.86 After 1954, the insistence 
of Togoland Congress on unification of the two Togolands was of questionable relevance. 
The victory of the CPP in the 1954 general elections moved the political development of 
the Gold Coast and Togoland rapidly towards independence. It introduced significant 
political advances both at the local and the national levels to the extent that the number of 
Togolanders on the national legislative body had increased from one in 1951 to six in 
1954.87 As it happened, the United Kingdom Trusteeship Order-in-Council 1954, for all 
intent and purposes, effectively put paid to any hope of unificationists realising their 
objectives.88 What fuelled the consternation of the Togoland Congress most was the 
‘progressive devolution of real executive power to the CPP component of the Executive
O Q
and the Legislative Assembly’. The only portfolios reserved for the governor were those 
of defence, security, external affairs and the responsibility for the administration of British
84 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 200; Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 86.
85 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 241. In all, Togoland Congress won six seats. See Amenumey, Ewe 
Unification, p. 114.
86 Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 87-88.
87 See RAG/H ACC 343, Mr Scott to the Fourth Committee o f  the Trusteeship Council, 8 December 1954.
88 The UK Order in Council 5 May 1954 was the last o f  a series o f  successive constitutional reforms which 
progressively brought Togoland closer to the Gold Coast short o f a plebiscite.
89 See Coleman, ‘Togoland’, p. 20.
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Togoland as stipulated by the Trusteeship Agreement.90 The reforms also introduced an all- 
African cabinet, which included two Togolanders: G. O. Awuma from Ho and F. Y. Asare 
from Buem.91
For practical purposes of local government administration, revenue accruing in the 
southern section of British Togoland was included in the budgets of the Gold Coast as a 
whole and expenditures were allocated to the former based on the needs of the parts of the 
Gold Coast with which it was administratively integrated.92 Moreover, the use of the central 
government services of the Gold Coast in running the administration of the trust territory 
had resulted in an appreciable reduction in overhead administrative costs for the local 
government institutions since 1951.93 The argument in favour of this administrative 
arrangement was that if it were not for the close association of the territory with the Gold 
Coast, the resources of the territory would be quite insufficient to support the standard of 
local government organization and development already achieved in British Togoland.94
For the quarter of a century that British Togoland had been administered as part and 
parcel of the Gold Coast, the local government and educational systems had been 
developed on the British model. All the modem ideas, philosophical and political thoughts, 
institutions, trade practices, monetary policies, and indeed the overall way of life of the 
people of British Togoland had developed along British lines. Anything to the contrary, 
according to integrationists, could be a retrograde step in the political and economic 
development of the Trust Territory. All this fed into the CPP’s agenda that focused on the
90 RAG/H ACC 343, Mr Scott to the Fourth Committee o f the Trusteeship Council, 8 December 1954..
91 The two Togolanders defected from the Togoland Congress to join the CPP. See Skinner, ‘Reading,
Writing and Rallies’, p. 143.
92 UN Visiting Mission Report, 1950, p. 6.
93 UN Trusteeship Council Records, the Ewe Problem, 9th Session, N ew York, 24 July 1951.
94 C 096/827/826/9, Colonial Development and Welfare Assistance to Togoland, 1950.
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creation of a strong, centralised and unitary independent state, which would include the 
trust territory. Federation or outright separation, to the view of the CPP, was associated 
with the outdated power of chiefs, especially with regard to the NLM in Asante.95 This 
notwithstanding, the Togoland Congress still felt it had a strong case, for the UK 
government had no mandate from the UN to transfer its responsibility over the Trust 
Territory to the new Gold Coast government.
What is of concern to this study is the effect of the struggle between integrationist and 
unificationist advocates on the overall development of local government in the territory. 
While the new local government system sought to reduce, according to the nationalist 
modernizers, the overbearing influence of chiefs, there was the real danger of separatist 
parties gaining control over local councils. As it turned out, local government affairs 
became caught up and confused with national politics, as the councils became the platform 
for canvassing support for or against integration. In Kpando District Council, for example, 
a ban was placed on the discussion of Togoland politics at its meetings because the district 
was not exclusive to the trust territory but extended into the Gold Coast.96 We noted that 
Peki, which had been outside the Trust Territory, was incorporated into the Kpando District 
in 1953. However, this could not insulate the council from the politicisation of its 
proceedings. Kpando became one of the hottest spots for the showdown between the CPP 
and the Togoland Congress.
The leadership of Togoland Congress toured Ewedome and specifically called on the 
inhabitants not to cooperate with councils.97 Local Councils were labelled as CPP-invented
95 RAG/H, CPP Regional Secretariat, Ho, Pamphlet on Togoland and G old Coast: Forward Together to 
Freedom  (Accra, 1953), p. 7.
96 RAG/H LC 23/SF.4, Kpando Local Council Meetings and Minutes, 1954.
97 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/511 No. S.0180/SF.30, Asogli Local Council, 1954.
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structure that should not be allowed to work. There were demands by the Togoland 
Congress to move the Trans-Volta Togoland Council headquarters from Ho to Hohoe with 
the excuse that the future political position of Ho was uncertain.98 But the real reason 
behind this demand was that Ho was more of a CPP stronghold than Hohoe. It will be 
recalled that the Togoland Congress newspaper, the Vanguard, which appeared at irregular 
intervals, was published by the Togoland News Syndicate at Hohoe until it was suspended 
in 1954." Hohoe was the de facto headquarters of the Togoland Congress. Ho, in contrast, 
was host to the second national annual conference of the CPP in 1951, where the future 
strategy of the party was approved.100
Interestingly, all the councils including those in Ewedome resolved to be integrated into . 
the Gold Coast.101 But as we shall see, it became clear from the results of the plebiscite 
conducted later in 1956 that the local councils in Ewedome were hijacked by CPP activists 
who whipped councillors to create the impression that the inhabitants of Ewedome were in 
support of integration. One interesting development common throughout Ewedome was the 
tendency for elected councellors to switch camp to the side of the CPP once they got onto 
the local councils, while the wards which elected them remained predominantly pro- 
Togoland Congress. One cogent reason given by Brown for this trend was that 
‘participation in council implied support for the TVT administration, positions which were 
opposed by the Togoland Congress’.102 Besides, there were material benefits for councillors 
to gain from supporting the CPP. All key positions went to CPP supporters. Some
98 RAG/H, Memorandum by Ho District Branch o f the CPP on the transfer o f  TVT Council from Ho, 8 
September 1955.
99 RAG/H, Suspension o f the Togoland News Syndicate, May 193 (Note filed). See also Amenumey, Ewe 
Unification, p. 139.
100 Austin, Politics, p. 162.
101 Reference to UN Trusteeship Council Petitions on Togoland from 1950 to 1954.
102 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 272.
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Togoland Congress supporters who resisted the use of coercive apparatus to force them to 
decamp boycotted initial council meetings in protest. Brown cited the case where Togoland 
Congress councillors from Alavanyo boycotted the first sittings of the Akpini Local 
Council.103 In this way, the CPP came to have absolute control over the local councils right 
from 1951 to 1966.
The CPP itself had advantages to gain in seeking the integration of Togoland into the 
Gold Coast. Its stance emanated partly from the proposed Volta River project, an elaborate 
hydro-electric power scheme which involved the damming of the river. The economic 
implications of the project on the livelihood of the fishing communities along the river were 
enormous. An aerial survey conducted in 1957 showed that the artificial dam to be created 
would displace many of the Togolanders living along the river banks. Togolanders, 
particularly from Ewedome, had therefore sent a petition to the UN demanding that the 
Volta River scheme should be looked at as an international project on which Togoland 
should be ‘represented as a nation’.104 It would have been unthinkable for the Gold Coast 
government to build such a gigantic dam so close to Togoland and allow the latter to 
become an independent nation. That would have had serious security implications for the 
Gold Coast. It was imperative, therefore, that Togoland remain part o f the Gold Coast 
without which the project might have well been abandoned.105
Meanwhile, the people in Buem-Krachi District to the north of Ewedome were 
linguistically and historically linked to the Gold Coast. The Krachis and Nkonyas were said 
to have migrated from the Gold Coast. The same could be said of Adeles and Nchumurus
103 Ibid, p. 272-273.
104 RAG/H ACC No.344 Petition from Togoland Youth Association, Ho District, to the UN Trusteeship 
Council, 28 September 1953. S. T. Fleku, a Togolander, was subsequently appointed to the planning 
committee o f the Volta River Project in 1953. See Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 145.
105 Ibid.
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(in the Nkwanta district of the present-day Volta Region) who traced their origin to the 
west. In pre-colonial times, the chief of Krachi was said to have served the Asantehene.106 
Similarly, the inhabitants in the northern section of British Togoland had their kith and kin 
in the Gold Coast with whom they shared common customs and traditions. Not even the 
division of Dagomba into two by the Anglo-German partition of 1890 could prevent the Ya 
Na in German Yendi from continuously exercising authority over the selection of chiefs 
among the Dagombas in the Gold Coast.107
Consequently, they described the whole idea of unification as ‘a political madness that
1 08sought to exchange the frontier to their east for a new frontier to their west’. In a 
resolution sent to the UN Trusteeship Council, the Buem-Krachi District Council reiterated 
the point that they were ‘tired of being handed over from one power to another and 
considered that the progress of their area had been greatly retarded by the frequent changes 
in the foreign powers who had administered them’.109 The only area where a dissenting 
view was recorded was Biakoye Local Council to the north of Ewedome, made up 
predominantly of a number of small ethnic groups which were neither Akan nor Ewe. 
Certain chiefs in this area declared their preference for unification of the two Togolands on 
the ground that the ‘Gold Coast had been their enemies since time immemorial’.110
In December 1954, the UN General Assembly observed that the imminent independence 
of the Gold Coast rendered the continued administration of British Togoland by the UK 
government under the Trusteeship Agreement impossible.111 A change in the Trusteeship
106 UN Trusteeship Council, Mandate o f the Buem-Krachi District Council to its Delegates to the Trusteeship 
Council, 29 January 1954.
107 UN Visiting Mission Report, 1952, p. 35.
108 Ibid.
109 UN Trusteeship Council Petitions, Petition from the Buem-Krachi District Council, 13 October 1953.
110 RAG/H ACC.0012, UN Visiting Mission to Biakoye Local Council, 24 August 1955.
111 RAG/H, Press Release No. 1565/54, Office o f  the Secretary to the Governor, Accra, 23 December 1954.
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Agreement was also not feasible, for any such change could ‘necessarily affect the interests 
of the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration.’112 Meanwhile, the prospects 
of unification with French Togoland looked very bleak, making the stance of the Togoland 
Congress untenable. As late as 1954, the French authorities made it crystal clear to the UN 
that they had not contemplated any programme towards rapid independence of that 
territory.113 Moreover, no one could guess the exact conditions under which French 
Togoland would eventually be granted independence, or whether or not those conditions 
would be compatible with the aspirations of all Ewes.114 Among the imponderables was the 
likelihood of the French government backing an idea of ‘balkanization as against the 
creation of a new African state’.115 What made the situation more intricate was the 
statement by the British government to the UN that when the Gold Coast became 
independent it was not prepared to remain in Togoland.116
The Togoland problem was first brought to the attention of the Trusteeship Council as 
far back as 1947, when seven petitions were received from the AEC and from Mr 
Augustino de Souza, President of the Comite de VUnite Togolaise in French Togoland 
demanding the unification of Ewe people.117 Yet, the problem was allowed to simmer for 
that long. As the Gold Coast drew nearer to independence, the issue became more complex. 
The UN Visiting Mission stated in 1953 that
it seems clear that a constitution granting full autonomy to the 
Gold Coast cannot be made to apply also to Togoland so long
112 Ibid.
113 UN Special Report on Ewe Unification Problem, New York, 1955, p. 43.
114 Ibid.
115 R. W. Howe, Black Star Rising: A Journey through West Africa in Transition (London, 1957), p. 179.
116 Ibid. See also RAG/H Trans-Volta Togoland Council Addresses, Arden-Clarke to Trans-Volta Togoland 
Council, 17 December 1954.
117 UN Visiting Mission Report on the Trust Territory o f  Togoland under French Administration, Letter o f  
Transmittal from S.K. Benerji, Chairman, to Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General, 18 October 1955.
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as the Trusteeship Agreement retains its present form, since the 
United Kingdom Government would no longer exercise any 
control over the Gold Coast Government it would not be possible 
for Togoland to be administered any longer as an integral part of 
the Gold Coast and still retain the United Kingdom Government 
as its Administering Authority’.118
Based on these facts, the UN General Assembly adopted the draft resolution terminating 
the Trusteeship Agreement.119 The Trusteeship Council was then tasked to determine how 
the wishes of the inhabitants could be ascertained. In pursuance of this task, a special 
visiting mission was despatched to the territory in 1955.120 The importance of this 
resolution lay in the fact that while the Trusteeship Agreement was emphatic about the need 
for earliest possible attainment of self-government or independence for the trust territory, it 
was silent on the factors to be considered in deciding on the termination of the trust 
status.121
Local Councils and the 1956 Plebiscite
After the 1954 election, the CPP endeavoured to speed up the integration process by 
embarking on a vigorous political campaign to open branches in the trust territory with the 
view to integrating it with the Gold Coast ‘by the time of Ghana’s independence’.122 
Interestingly, the slogan of the CPP was ‘freedom’ while that of the Togoland Congress
118 UN Visiting Mission Report (Document No. T/1040), 1953, paragraph 84.
119 RAG/H, Press Release No. 1565/54, Office o f the Secretary to the Governor, Accra, 23 December 1954.
120 UN Visiting Mission Special Report, 24 October 1955, p. 42.
121 RAG/H ACC, 343 Mr Scott to the Trusteeship Council 8 December 1954.
122 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 222.
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was the Ewe translation of freedom which is ‘ablode ’,123 Arrangements were made for the 
leadership of the CPP to meet members of the local and district councils. Nkrumah toured 
Ho district with Komla Gbedemah and held meetings in such towns as Ho, Hohoe, Kpando, 
Kpetoe, Kpedze, Vane and Saviefe.124 Gbedemah, an Ewe from Anlo, was a leading 
member of the CPP and a key lieutenant of Nkrumah who became the first Finance 
Minister of independent Ghana. His presence in Nkrumah’ entourage was to appeal to 
ethnic sentiments of the Ewes of Ewedome and to calm fears that integration with the Gold 
Coast implied the subjugation of Ewe of Togoland, but his Anlo identity did not help 
matters.
The local councils became the main field on which the political battle between the CPP 
and the Togoland Congress was fought. Many council meetings frequently broke up in 
disorder and confusion and there were instances where councillors refused to attend 
meetings. As the councils were divided into factions, the initial enthusiasm of both 
councillors and the general populace began to wear off. In some cases, the campaign 
brought in its trail outright conflict. At Hohoe in August 1954, some people opposed to 
integration vandalised a CPP van, destroyed its loud speakers and assaulted its occupants. 
One person was arrested, charged, convicted and sentenced to two months’ 
imprisonment.126 In Awatime, for example, towns and villages which supported the CPP 
became targets of abuse.127 In East Dain Local Council, the political differences reached 
such a crescendo that the council became divided into two with one half threatening to
123 For details about the use o f Ewe-language chants and songs in the campaigns see Skinner, ‘Reading, 
Writing and Rallies’, p. 132.
124 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/305, Quarterly Report, Ho Sub-District, 31 December 1955.
125 RAG/H LG/SF.5, Yingor Local Council Meetings, Agenda and Minutes, 20 August 1955; PRAAD/A  
39/1/456, Handing over Note, Kpandu District, 22 August 1953.
126 RAG/H ACC.0012, UN Visiting Mission to Biakoye Local Council, 24 August 1954.
127 RAG/H RAO/C.728, TVT,SF/10, Report to the Trans-Volta Regional House o f Chiefs, 23 June 1958.
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secede to form a separate council to avoid the political machinations of Antor and the 
Togoland Congress.128 In Asogli Local Council, the disruptive effects of the struggle 
between unificationists and integrationists led to the resignation of some councillors and a 
threat by their respective wards to withdraw from the council in 1955.129
The situation in Akpini Local Council was most deplorable as the relocation of a new 
market from Togoland Congress-dominated Aloyi to a pro-CPP Tsakpe led to serious 
dispute between the CPP group, most of whom were the youth, and the separatists.130 Some 
councillors walked out in protest at the attempts by the chairperson of Akpini Local
n i
Council to get the full support of the council for integration. The opposition to the 
council intensified when, according to Brown, the Treasurer of the Akpini Local Council 
embezzled £700.132 The immediate response of taxpayers was to form the Ratepayers 
Association in 1954, forcing the government to interdict the Treasurer. Brown noted 
further that the antagonism between integrationists and unificationists made it virtually 
‘impossible for local council to attempt any revenue collection in pro-Ablode areas’.134
Rate collection suffered also because many elderly people became reluctant to pay their 
rate in protest against the move by government to integrate the territory into the Gold 
Coast.135 In the words of Brown, ‘cocoa farmers supported Togoland Congress while local 
council and government department employees [who were more educated, younger with
128 RAG/H LG.2/SF.7, East Dain Local council, 31 December 1953.
129 RAG/H LG 6336, G.O Awuma to Asogli Local Council, 7 December 1955.
130 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/456, Handing over Note, Kpandu District, 22 August 1953. This point is also noted 
in Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 297.
131 Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 146.
132 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 305-306.
133 Ibid, p. 305-306.
134 Ibid, p. 306.
135 Ibid.
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less social status or wealth] tended to support the CPP’.136 This further explains how the 
generational divide noted in the previous chapters continued to have retardative effect on 
the new councils. In Akpini Local Council areas, ‘CPP supporters were omitted from the 
nominal roll, upon which rate liability was based, and several cases where Togoland 
Congress supporters were harassed for payment, and where organized raids were made on 
pro-Ablode villages’.137 It is worth noting that the resolution of the issue of integration was 
pivotal for the development of local government in the territory.
On 9 May 1956, the people of Togoland under the UK Trusteeship went to the polls to 
decide whether their territory should be united with an independent Gold Coast or whether 
it should be separated from the Gold Coast and allowed to continue under trusteeship, 
pending the ultimate determination of its political future.138 The results of the plebiscite 
showed 92,775 for union with the Gold Coast and 67,529 for separation. Allegations of 
rigging were made by the Togoland Congress, though it failed to provide concrete evidence 
in support of its allegation.139 An interesting picture that emerged showed that while 
Ewedome voted overwhelmingly for separation, the other ethnic groups to the north voted 
for union with the Gold Coast.140 Even within Ewedome, the picture was more complicated 
than the general figures show.
Skinner makes the point that political affiliation with either the Togoland Congress or 
the CPP and voting in the plebiscite operated on ‘communal lines’.141 She notes further that 
‘local issues, rather than adherence to a broader party manifesto, were determining voting
136 Ibid, p. 254.
137 Ibid, p. 303.
138 The decision to hold a plebiscite was based on the recommendations o f the UN Visiting Mission Report o f  
1955.
139 Daily Graphic, 12 May 1956, p. 1.
140 Figures taken from Ibid.
141 Skinner, ‘Reading, Writing and Rallies’, p. 126-7.
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behaviour’.142 Indeed, the fight for and against integration provided fertile ground for local 
rivalries and conflicts to be articulated through CPP/Togoland Congress politics.143 In other 
words, internal feud or stool rivalries between dukowo often determined the support for or 
against integration. Amenumey notes that because of an old dispute between Vakpo and 
Anfoega, Vakpo decided to support unification while Anfoega was a stronghold of the 
CPP.144 In East Dain Local Council, the old conflict between Taf5 and Logba was revived 
and articulated with national politics. The political differences reached such a height that 
the council became divided into two with one half, most from Tafi, threatening to secede to 
form a separate council to avoid the political machinations of Antor, a citizen of Lobga.145
Results of the 1956 Plebiscite
Section Union/Integration Separation
Northern Section 49,119 12,707
Southern Section 93,095 67,493
TOTAL 142,214 80,200
Results of the 1956 Plebiscite in Ewedome
District Union/Integration Separation
Ho 7,217 18,981
Kpando 8,581 17,020
TOTAL 15,798 36,001
142 Ibid.
143 For examples o f the interaction o f  local and national issues and its effects on local communities can also be 
found in Ahafo. See John Dunn and A. F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in 
Ahafo (Cambridge, 1973), p. 315-321.
144 Amenumey, Ewe Unification, p. 144.
145 RAG/H RAO/C.728, TVT.SF/9, Report to the Trans-Volta Togoland Council, 23 June 55.
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Two months after the plebiscite, the third general elections were held in the Gold Coast 
and the trust territory on 17 July 1956 to sort out two very important issues. The first was 
whether the UK government should relinquish power to the CPP in 1956.146 The second 
issue was whether at independence the country should be a unitary or federal state.147 The 
Togoland Congress once again won in its three traditional districts in Ewedome -  Ho East, 
Ho West and Kpando North -  but the CPP, which stood for unitary state, was the overall 
winner by claiming 71 out of 104 seats throughout the country.148 The results of the 
plebiscite and the 1956 elections effectively killed off federalist and separatist tendencies of 
opposition elements and put paid to the campaign of the Togoland Congress for the 
unification of the two Togolands. Nevertheless, it did not end the spate of violent incidents 
in Ewedome; on the contrary, violence escalated in Kpandu and Hohoe areas in 1956-7. 
The leadership of the Togoland Congress wanted to salvage something out of the loss they 
..suffered in the plebiscite by fighting for the recognition and maintenance of southern 
Togoland identity within the enlarged Gold Coast. This it hoped to achieve by the creation 
of a separate region for Southern Togoland.149 Although the Togoland Congress got the 
support of a large number of chiefs, it was frustrated by the Togoland branch of the CPP.150 
The Togoland Congress and the majority of chiefs then decided to boycott the
Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 323.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid, p. 347.
149 RAG/H, Report by Parliamentary Opposition Fact-Finding Delegation to Southern Togoland, 1957, p. 3.
150 Ibid.
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independence celebrations scheduled for 6 March 1957 until their demand for a separate 
region was met.151
On the 27 February 1957, the Togoland Congress organised a rally in Kpando to 
galvanise support for the boycott of the events on March 6. After the rally, unsubstantiated 
rumours spread alleging that ‘the Togoland Congress had hatched plans to vandalise the 
police station; dynamite houses and shoot supporters of the CPP; that Togoland Congress 
had sent 150 youngmen to Kumasi to train as Action Troopers; that assassination plot was 
formed at Kpandu Aloi; that the people were being trained in the bush for subversive 
activities’.152 It was also alleged that CPP supporters had a secret meeting at Kpandu 
Agudzi where guns and gunpowder were distributed to members. The government’s 
position on the issue was that while no one was under any obligation to take part in the 
celebration of the independence, it would not countenance any attempt to prevent those 
who wished to do so.154
The discovery of alleged Togoland Congress camps in the Alavanyo area in the Kpando 
district and Hodzokofe in the Ho district led to the deployment of 485 police and 400 
troops into Ewedome. To legitimize the presence of the troops, the Governor signed a 
Peace Preservation Order on 26 February 1957. Searches were conducted to retrieve 
firearms, cutlasses and other weapons.155 On 4 March, some supporters of the Togoland 
Congress in Kpando went to the forecourt of the district and local councils and dismantled 
decorations and buntings mounted in preparation for the independence celebration and 
broke the windows of the council buildings. They then moved on to vandalise the Post
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
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Office and a petrol station which had also been decorated. On 6 March, there was an 
exchange of fire between another group of Togoland Congress supporters and the police 
which left two people dead and several wounded, despite a ban on the use of arms and 
ammunitions.156
Indiscriminate arrests were made by the police, resulting in many innocent people being 
beaten and arrested. Elderly people, travellers and even members of the CPP who did not 
oppose the celebrations were mistakenly arrested and severely beaten.157 The whole district 
was mired in utter confusion and chaos, with 141 arrests made. The disproportionate 
reprisal by the government forces in the run-up to independence created widespread fear, 
indignation and disquiet throughout Ewedome, which adversely affected the work of local 
government institutions. Ironically, Kpando tended to benefit most from the CPP 
government during these turbulent periods in the run-up to the 1956 plebiscite. According 
to Brown, ‘between 1952 and 1957, Kpandu received more benefits in the form of
1 SRdevelopment than at any other time before or since’. Kpando was a stronghold of the 
CPP in Ewedome and the strategy of the party was to use resource allocation to promote the 
development of constituencies which were most supportive of the party and its leader. 
Kpando borbobor - a cultural dance performed by the youth of Kpando - became an organ 
of the CPP. The group attended all CPP rallies and attracted many of the youth. More 
specific to Kpando’s case was the dominant role played by its CPP activists in the TVT 
Council, a body responsible for the distribution of government grants and projects in the 
region from 1952 to 1958.
156 RAG/H LC.23/SF.4, Kpandu Local Council Meetings and Minutes, 1955. This date (1955) refers to the 
date that the file was started.
157 Report o f Parliamentary Opposition Fact-Finding Delegation to Southern Togoland, 1 April 1957.
158 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 293.
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Examples of projects undertaken in Kpando included district council offices, community 
centre, health centre, secondary school, library, pipe-borne water, new market, post office, 
tarring of the strests of the town, construction of drainage system and the trade school, 
which later became Kpando Technical Institute. All these projects were executed within a 
period of four years.159 The most disturbed picture was that even within Kpando itself, 
CPP- dominated areas benefited more than Togoland Congress areas such as Kpando-Aloyi 
in the allocation of development projects.160 This explains the decision of Ablode 
supporters to boycott payment of rates to the councils in Ewedome. Brown quoted the 
Government Agent at Kpando, David Heaton, as saying in 1955 that, ‘party politics plays 
an unfortunately large part in the council’s affairs and colours almost all its discussions’.161 
This problem identified by Heaton became a disturbing feature of local government 
throughout Ewedome right from the inception of the new councils and well into the post­
independent era.
Conclusion
Local government institutions in Ewedome began to make progress from 1953 after the 
initial setbacks brought about by poor transitional arrangements. The modest progress made 
in the area of education, health, road construction, agriculture and the provision of potable 
water to district headquarters was due largely to the one million pound grant made available 
to the region by the CPP government. As the Gold Coast moved towards independence, the 
trusteeship status of British Togoland brought the issue of integration onto the international
159 Ibid, p. 294-296.
160 Ibid.
161 Ib id , p. 273.
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stage. The dynamics of Togoland identity coupled with the CPP- dominated government’s 
determination to integrate the Trust Territory into the Gold Coast complicated matters.
The political atmosphere of the territory was greatly disturbed. The overall effect was 
that modem party politics began to impact negatively on local councils. The division of 
local councils into separatist and integrationist factions made the new institutions of local 
government vehicles for the broader party political struggle. Local government 
programmes were brought to a virtual standstill. The results of the plebiscite and the 
subsequent integration of Togoland into the Gold Coast was no different from what 
happened in some parts of Africa where the partition of the continent forced smaller 
African political entities to dissolve in larger ones.162 In the case of the Ewes of Ewedome, 
the real danger was that any ethnographic state within the southern section of British 
Togoland would be an anachronism and that the resolution of the problem came as a 
breather to the CPP and the UK government. As for the development of local government 
in the territory, it remained to be seen whether the local councils fared any better following 
the final settlement of the question of integration.
162 One exception to this general observation is the case where Gambia avoided incorporation into a united 
Senegambia.
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CHAPTER SIX
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-INDEPENDENCE
PERIOD, 1957-1974
On Ghana’s attainment of full independence in March 1957, the CPP government had to 
come to terms with the need to establish firm control over the country as well as to forge a 
strong sense of shared nationality among its citizens. At independence, the country was 
patently polarized. Disturbances in Ewedome in 1957 were the most violent and serious 
facing the CPP government. These developments strengthened Kwame Nkrumah’s resolve 
to introduce tough policies to crack down on the opposition, which made the CPP 
increasingly authoritarian. The period thus saw attempts at consolidating the CPP at the 
grassroots level as the country moved towards a one-party state. For the party to be present 
throughout the country meant firm control over local government structures. Over a period 
of nine years, the regime restructured local government three times.1 Such frequent reforms 
brought the government’s seriousness of promoting sustainable development into question 
because the ‘unstable structure of local government was a constraining factor’.2
The impact of CPP policies and those of successive governments: the National 
Liberation Council of 1966-9, the civilian Busia regime of 1969-72 and the National 
Redemption Council which came to power in 1972, on local government in Ewedome is the 
focus of this chapter. The chapter begins by examining the CPP’s handling of the 
opposition in Ewedome after independence and evaluating the impact of government’s 
policies in relation to local government. It then examines local government in the post-
1 For the categorization o f local government reforms under the CPP, see Ben Amonoo, Ghana 1957-1966:
The Politics o f Institutional Dualism (London, 1981), p. 157.
2 Ibid, p. 159.
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Nkrumah era up to 1974, the year local councils were abolished throughout the country, 
and concludes by giving a brief overview of local government to the present. This extends 
the scope of the chapter a little beyond the 1974 cut-off date for this study.
The CPP and Opposition Elements in Ewedome
No sooner had the CPP assumed full office than disturbances erupted in various parts of 
the country associated with one opposition party or another. The Alavanyo disturbances 
were soon followed by the emergence in Accra of the Ga movement known as Ga Shifimo 
Kpee which posed a threat to CPP control in Ghana’s capital city. These developments at 
the very embryonic stage of the nation were considered by the CPP as a recipe for the 
emergence of dangerous ‘sub-nationalisms’. The response of the government was to 
establish firm control over localities by introducing draconian laws such as the Avoidance 
of Discrimination Act of 1957 designed to proscribe political parties formed on a regional 
basis.4 The government was systematic in its resolve to push chiefs out of local government 
and party politics and cow opposition elements into submission.5
The CPP strategy during the anti-colonial movement, according to Rathbone, was to 
make the party attractive to groups opposed to the established traditional system of 
authority by vilifying chiefs and labelling them as agents of colonialism.6 After 
independence, this strategy changed to associating chiefs with opposition parties. In the 
then Gold Coast, there had been a large number of destoolments and attempted
3 West Africa, 5 January, 1957, p. 5. See also Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 361..
4 For the debate o f  this bill in parliament in December 1957, see K. A. Busia, G hana’s Struggle fo r  
Democracy and Freedom  (Accra, 1979), p. 51-59.
5 For a catalogue o f  cases o f harassment o f chiefs in the southern Ghana, see Rathbone, Nkrumah and the 
Chiefs, p. 32-46.
6 Ibid, p. 37.
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destoolments directed against chiefs. Destoolment charges were framed up in 1957 against 
Nene Matekole, an important chief in the Krobo region of the Gold Coast, as well as 
reported murmurings of allegations against the Asantehene, whose person until then was 
regarded as almost sacred.7 We also see in 1959 the imprisonment of Bafour Akoto, the 
okyeame of the Asantehene, for his alleged role in supporting the opposition.8 Similarly, in 
the Trans-VoltaTogoland region, ‘there was arbitrary destoolment of chiefs who were 
opposed to the policies of the CPP’.9 Brown notes the resolve of the CPP to enstool chiefs 
in Kpando who were receptive to the government, a development which led to chieftaincy 
disputes.10
It did not appear to British officials at the time that the actions taken against chiefs in 
particular were centrally inspired. Nkrumah was said to have discouraged overt intervention 
by the CPP in the attacks on chiefs.11 Though the party stated that it was not its policy to 
attack chiefs, it admitted that ‘when they occurred, they were the direct results of the bad 
behaviour of individual chiefs’.12 According to British sources, there appeared to be a surge 
of genuine popular feeling against the political role played by chiefs in central and local 
government.13 The British view was that the attainment of independence and the 
assumption of power by the CPP abandoned the chiefs to the ‘wolves’, as the protection the 
latter had enjoyed under the colonial system was no more.14
Be that as it may, the pronouncements by leading members of the CPP and the headlines 
in the Evening News critical of chiefs gave credence to the view that the attempts by the
7 NA CO 96/824/4, Gold Coast Opposition to Dr Nkrumah, April 1957.
8 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 150.
9 RHC/H, Minutes o f  the Volta Region House o f Chiefs, December, 1966.
10 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 327.
n NA CO 96/824/4, Gold Coast Opposition to Dr Nkrumah, April 1957.
12 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 33.
13 Ibid.
14 tu:^
270
CPP government to extricate itself from the attacks on chiefs was a camouflage meant to 
placate the general public.15 Tapping into the exuberance of the youth, the CPP grew 
militant in its opposition to chiefly authority and to dissenting views from individuals and 
groups. Its youth wing, the Ghana Young Pioneers Movement (GYPM), formed in 1960, 
and the so-called ‘verandah boys’ were used to attack traditional values and propagate 
socialist ideals.16 These groups represented attempts by nationalist parties in Africa to 
create what Apter refers to as ‘overarching political parties, voluntary associations, and 
governmental forms that bridge older parochialism’.17 In Kpando, for instance, Brown 
observed that between 1957 and 1960 the CPP supporters ‘used the coercion resources 
available to them from central government to bring about the imprisonment, exile,
1 Rconversion or capitulation of the Ablode activists’.
In Ewedome, the conflict between the CPP and the chiefs in every nook and cranny of 
the territory remained tense well after the 1956 plebiscite. We have seeen that the campaign 
for and against Togoland integration had drawn every chief in Ewedome into active politics 
and brought most of them into direct confrontation with the CPP. Furthermore, the 
integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast and then independent Ghana did not 
end the desire of many Ewes on both sides of the border for unification with their kith and 
kin. Pockets of resistance were manifestly visible in big towns such as Ho, Hohoe and 
Kpando as well as smaller villages and towns such as Dzolo, Akome, Dedome, Kpedze,
15 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 46.
16 Ibid, p. 34. ‘Verandah boys’ formed what is referred to as ‘the grassroots constituents’ o f the CPP. See 
Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa: The Colonial Economy o f  Decline in Ghana 
(London, 1991), 75.
17 David Apter, ‘The Role o f  Traditionalism in the Political Modernization o f Ghana and Uganda’, World 
Politics, XIII (1960), p. 45.
18 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 230.
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Anoe, Honuta, Dogblome, Awiesu in the Ho district.19 Inhabitants both in Ghana and in 
French Togo were disappointed that ‘Ghana’s independence had in fact made the frontier 
far more rigid’.20 Again, the alliance between the Togoland Congress and the opposition 
NLM and NPP was provocative so far as the CPP was concerned. For example, the CPP 
was quick to attribute a disturbance in the rural areas of Asante in 1957 to the influence of 
the Togoland Congress 21 In consequence, Ewedome, which was the stronghold of the 
Togoland Congress, had to be swept clean of any anti-Nkrumahist elements.
Parliamentary debates on the situation in the Trans-Volta Togoland Region in 1958
9 9documented a catalogue of government’s reprisals against the opposition in Ewedome. 
The Preventive Detention Act (PDA), approved by cabinet in January 1958, gave the 
government power to ‘imprison without trial people whose actions were deemed to be
9  ^prejudicial to the state’s security.’ In Ewedome, this drove many of the chiefs and their 
elders who professed ablode into exile in French Togoland. The leadership of the Togoland 
Congress, including S.G. Antor and Kojo Ayeke, were sentenced to three years 
imprisonment in 1957 for their alleged involvement in the disturbances in Alavanyo.24 Such 
tough actions were aimed at preventing opponents of the party from becoming ‘the basis of 
opposition politics’ 25
19 Interviews conducted with Togbe Debrah IV o f Logba Vuinta, 20 April 2006 and Togbe Adai Kwesi VI, 
paramount chief o f Awudome, 14 June 2006.
20 West Africa, 9 November 1957, p. 930.
21 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 107.
22 Parliamentary Debates, Parliament House, 1958.
23 Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1957. For a vivid description o f the CPP government’s reprisal in 
Have in the East Dayi Local Council area, see Kwaku, ‘Tradition’, p. 83. This is also supported by interview 
with C.F.Y. Dekavie, a retired educationalist, Hohoe, 15 July 2007; Mr George Feakpi, a retired civil servant 
whose father also went into exile in French Togo, 8 August 2007, and Mr C.K. Kudor, Sohefia and a retired 
civil servant at Dzolokpuita, 24 December 2005.
24 Interviews with Mr Bob Antor, son o f Mr S.G. Antor (Secretary o f the Togoland Congress), Logba 
Alakpeti, 1 July 2007; PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/144, East Dayi Local Council, Report on Violence in East Dayi 
local council area, September 1957.
25 Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics o f  Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991 (Berkeley, 1993), p. 79.
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Added to this was a widespread rumour that prominent chiefs in Ewedome opposed to 
the CPP had acquired local guns from Alavanyo in readiness to take on the government in 
their bid to secede from Ghana. A list of such chiefs from Akome, Dzolo, Ho, Kpedze, 
Dzolopuita, Kpando-Aloyi, Alavanyo, Kpando-Kwanda, Hohoe and other towns was said 
to have been presented to the government by leading CPP members in the territory. 
Rumours of such a list, fuelled by the newly passed Preventive Detention Act, was enough 
to send some prominent chiefs and their elders running to French Togoland where they 
were to remain until the overthrow of the CPP in 1966. Some of those chiefs and their 
elders included Togbe Komla Tei, chief of Kpando Aloyi, Gabusu of Hohoe and Joshua 
Aborbor, a Linguist of Dzolo.26 By 1961, organised opposition in Ewedome had been 
weakened. The merging of the Togoland Congress, the NLM, the NPP and the Ga Shifimo 
Kpee to form the United Party in 1957 had diverted attention from local and regional 
issues, which were of most concern to local communities, to parliamentary and national
2 7issues.
Development projects in the territory continued to be channeled to towns and villages 
which supported the CPP.28 Funds for some of those development projects such as market 
stalls and post offices were generated through taxes paid by all the inhabitants irrespective 
of their party affiliations. Yet, the allocation of those projects became a tool in the hands of 
party officials who used local councils to allocate projects based on party considerations. 
According to Ken Kwaku, Have-Etoe ceased to be the market centre of the whole of Have
26 Interview with Madam Agnes Takyi, wife o f Togbe Tei o f  Kpando Aloi, 31 May 2007.
27 West Africa, 16 November 1957, p. 1081.
28 The practice was common in other parts o f the country as well. See Amonoo, Ghana, p. 161.
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division because of its opposition to the CPP.29 In its place, the East Dayi local council 
relocated the market to pro-CPP Have-Aklame.30 When the people of Etoe built their own 
market, Kwaku noted that it was destroyed by the local authority police.31 At Kpedze in the 
Yingor Local Council area, the decision by the CPP activists to site a new market at 
Kpedze-Todze for political reasons led to a row between the paramount chief of Kpedze 
and the local council. The council was unable to reach an agreement on the site for the 
market for which it had received a government grant of £2,000.32
In 1963, a proposal was made by the regional commissioner to move the headquarters of 
Yingor Local Council from Dzolokpuita to Kpedze. Kpedze was a larger town, had a 
large market, a bank and a police station as well as better amenities to accommodate 
visitors. But this proposal was rejected by the government on the account of Dzolopkuita’s 
support for the CPP.34 The Ho West constituency of the CPP held its meetings at 
Dzolopkuita. During one of his campaign tours of the territory in 1956, Nkrumah had to 
take refuge at Dzolopkuita to avoid an alleged attack on him by ablode exponents.35 As a 
reward, Dzolokpuita was made a district headquarters of an enlarged local council in 1963
"Xf\with jurisdiction covering Abutia and Awudome.
29 Kwaku, ‘Tradition’, p.82. Nugent also made the point that communities which supported the CPP received 
special consideration in the allocation o f grants. See Paul Nugent, ‘An Abandoned Project and History in 
Ghana’s Volta Region’, Journal o f  Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 37-38 (1996), p. 212.
30 Kwaku, ‘Tradition’, p. 82.
31 Ibid.
32 RAG/H RAO/C. 1087, Yingor Local Council, Kpedze Affairs, 19 March 1958.
33 RAG/H LG.12/V.5/2089, Proposals for the Delimitation o f Parliamentary Constituencies, Regional 
Minister, Ho, to the Ministry o f  Justice, Accra, 10 September 1963.
34 Interviews with Cephas Kudor, youth leader and a retired civil servant, Dzolokpuita, 5 October 2006; 
Anthonio Asinyo, a prominent migrant farmer at Dzolopkuita, 1 December 2005; Mr Alifo Henry, Abutia 
Elder and a retired educationalist, Abutia Kloe, 15 September 2007.
35 Interviews conducted with the linguist o f Dzolokpuita and Mr Nelson Tsahey, a retired Post Office Master 
at Dzolokpuita, 20 December 2006.
36 RAG/H, Speech by Mr Ottu Dake to Dzolopkuita Local Council, 1963. Interview with Mawusinu Dogoe, 
the daughter o f Lawyer Dogoe, a member o f parliament from Yingor Local Council area in 1963, 4 
September 2007.
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Chieftaincy Reforms
The CPP observed that any attempt to reform local government and entrench itself in the 
local areas would be meaningless unless the umbilical cord attaching the institution of 
chieftaincy to local councils was completely broken. Obviously, the CPP was distraught by 
the spectre of ‘divided sovereignty’ which was very much in evidence throughout the 
country.37 According to Donal Ray, contemporary African states suffered from divided 
sovereignty because chiefs drew their legitimacy and authority from pre-colonial roots
•5 0
while the new states were created by colonial rule. As we have seen, until the 1940s, 
‘African political expression was traditionally structured through the office of the chiefs.’ 
The transition from colonial rule to independence in many African states was, however, 
punctuated with tension between the new ‘modernising’ nationalists and traditional 
authorities.40 Chiefs were now seen not only as competitors for power within the new state, 
but also as representatives of the old colonial order that was a stumbling block in the way 
of change.41 Rathbone traces the root cause of the tension between Nkrumah and the 
traditional authorities to the insistence of some chiefs ‘that the pre-colonial kingdoms were, 
in effect, sovereign powers’.42 He noted futher that the unreformed traditional authorites 
constituted an obstacle against the ‘modernising agenda espoused by the CPP.’43 
Nonetheless, as note earlier, chiefs’ engagement with local politics had a long tradition
37 Donal I. Ray, ‘Divided Sovereignty in Ghana’, Journal o f  Legal Pluralism, 37-38 (1996), p. 198
38 Ibid, p. 181.
39 Harriet B. Schiffer, ‘Local Administration and National Development: Fragmentation in Ghana’, Canadian 
Journal o f  African Studies, 1 (1970), p. 59.
40 See Emile A. B. van Rouveroy Van Nieuwaal, ‘Chiefs and African States’, Journal o f  Legal Pluralism and  
Unoficial Law, 25-26 (1987), p. 3.
41 Ray, ‘Divided Sovereignty’, p. 198; Van Nieuwaal, ‘Chiefs and African States’, p. 3.
42 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 32.
43 Ibid, p. 150. It is on record that the Asanteman Council was instrumental in organizing the opposition 
National Liberation Movement. See Apter, ‘The Role o f  Traditionalism’, p. 45; Charles Adorn Boateng, The 
Political Legacy o f  Kwame Nkrumah o f  Ghana (New York, 2003), p. 92.
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which pre-dated the emergence of political parties. Therefore, though the CPP sought to 
dislodge chiefs from their position of local power, it recognised the impossibility of 
completely obliterating the institution in view of the interest that people continued to show 
in traditional authorities.44
Until 1958, chiefs in Trans-Volta Togoland region had not been organised as one 
definite body. Chiefs in the Colony and Asante and the Nothem Territories had territorial 
councils where they met and discussed matters affecting the welfare of chieftaincy and of 
the country as a whole. The Joint Provincial Council which sat at Dodowa in the Colony 
and the Asanteman Council had been appropriate platforms for consultation between the 
government and the chiefs in those regions. As far back as 1955, the TVT Council 
petitioned the government to set up a territorial council of chiefs for the region 45 This 
demand was not met at the time because of the government’s preoccupation with the 
integrationist struggle and the uncertain political climate in the territory. Furthermore, in a 
territory mired in chieftaincy disputes, all chiefs who were Jiaga of divisions (divisional 
chiefs) wanted to have a seat on the council, which would be a recipe for chaos in view of 
their sheer numbers. Government found out that there were some 103 divisional chiefs in 
Trans-Volta Togoland and it would cost a colossal amount to elevate all chiefs to 
paramount status. Therefore, the formation of such a council had to proceed tactfully to 
avert re-enacting the drama that characterised the amalgamation process under Lilley in the 
1930s.
The CPP government set up the Van Lare Committee in November 1956 to undertake a 
full study of chieftaincy in Ewedome in particular and the region as a whole and to
44 Nugent, ‘An Abandoned Project’, p. 212.
45 RAG/H TVTC 103/ V.3/23, Minutes o f the Third Session o f  the TVTC, Ho, 26 September 1956.
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recommend to government how the regional council o f chiefs should be constituted. The 
Van Lare report was published in July 1957 and government, acting upon the report, 
elevated some divisional chiefs to paramount status while others retained the designation of 
divisional chief.46 Protests erupted throughout the region, particularly in Ewedome. One 
shortcoming of the report was that the committee used the most recent population census of 
1948 and registration figures for local council elections as one of the yardsticks for up­
grading a chief to the status of a paramount chief47 Meanwhile, the absence of amenities 
and job opportunities in some areas had caused many people to migrate, swelling the 
population of other places before the census was taken. The real population of each town or 
village could only be ascertained if all inhabitants of a state were asked to go to their 
various divisions before the census. Even then, the population of a state was not an 
appropriate criterion for determination of the status of a chief. As some chiefs noted, ‘you
A O
can not change or reduce the age or the ration of an old person because he is short’.
In Ewedome, the traditional political set-up, as noted in chapters 1 and 2, was such that 
every division having a territorial claim and jurisdiction had a fiaga  or an omanhene. In the 
normative sense of the title, there was no difference in status between a fiaga  or an 
omanhene of one division and the other, though in reality, some stools were of higher status 
because of feats during war time and other factors. The alteration in the pre-colonial 
political organisation was due to the policy of amalgamation by the colonial government in 
the 1930s which gave the title of paramount chief to three chiefs in Ewedome while others
46 W. B. Van Lare Report on Chieftaincy in the Trans-Volta Togoland Region, 1957. This policy was reversed 
later by the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree 112 by the National Liberation Council in 1966.
47 Van Lare Report, 1957, p. 15. It is important to note that the report was not released to the public but the 
reforms carried out by the government were based on the recommendations contained in the report. See Van 
Lare Report and RAG/H, Minutes o f the TVT Council, Address by Hon. C.H. Chapman, Regional 
Commissioner, 11 March 1958.
48 RAG/H, Petition from Dufiaga o f  Fievier against the Regional House o f Chiefs Bill, 28 June 1958 (Not 
filed).
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were made subordinates. What the Van Lare report and the House of Chiefs Act of 1958 
did was to complicate the issue further by using population and political affiliation with the 
CPP to promote some divisional chiefs as paramounts, making them permanent members of 
the Regional House of Chiefs, while all others were to retain the title of divisional chiefs.49 
This brought the total number of paramount chiefs in the TVT Region to 38 in 195 8.50
The interpretation of the title ‘paramount chief in the Chieftaincy Act showed the 
government’s own misunderstanding of the issue. According to the act, ‘a paramount chief 
means a chief who is not subordinate to any chief other than Asantehene’.51 This implied 
misleadingly that every paramount chief in Ghana was subordinate to the Asantehene.52 To 
give legal backing to government’s act of willfully creating and destooling paramount 
chiefs, a Chieftaincy Recognition Act was passed in 1959. This act gave the government 
the mandate to withdraw its recognition of any chief and ‘even prevent the chief from
53residing in a specific area’.
Tongu area with about twenty divisions was allocated seven seats on the Regional 
House of Chiefs and this was seen as an attempt by the government to sow seeds of discord 
among the Tongu confederacy.54 In Ewedome, some prominent chiefs were denied 
paramount status. For his persistent refusal to amalgamate with Akpini state, the Fiaga of
49 Van Lare Report, 1957; House o f Chiefs Act, Section 4, Fifth Schedule, 1958. At the first sitting o f  the 
house, Nana Akpandza 111 o f Buem was elected the first president. See TVT Region House o f  Chiefs Minutes, 
4 November 1958.
50 See RAG/H, Petition, Working Committee o f  the Interim House o f Chiefs TVT on behalf o f  Fiagas o f  
Awatime and Ho, 11 July 1958 (Not filed).
51 Chieftaincy Act, Section 68, 1961.
52 This interpretation was withdrawn after persistent protest; the new interpretation read ‘Paramount chief 
means a chief who is not subordinate to other chiefs; and in Asante, a chief who is not subordinate to any 
other chief other than the Asantehene’. See Minutes o f  the Regional House o f  Chiefs, Ho, 13 April 1962.
53 K. Boafo-Arthur, ‘Chieftaincy and Politics in Ghana since 1982’, Unpublished Paper presented at 
Chieftaincy and Development Conference, University o f  Ghana, Legon, February 2000.
54 Petition, Dufiaga o f Fievier, 28 June 1958. The total number o f  seats in the Regional House o f  Chiefs was 
38 in 1958. See RAG/H Petition, Working Committee o f  the Interim House o f  Chiefs TVT on Behalf o f  
Fiagas o f Awatime and Ve, Ho, 11 July 1958. (not filed).
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Ve, Togbe Delume, was not recognised as a paramount chief.55 One of the towns in Ve 
area, Golokwati, was the headquarters of the infamous Atando Native Authority which later 
became the headquarters of the defunct East Dayi Local Council.56 Ironically, Togbe 
Gabusu, the paramount chief of Gbi towns, and Togbe Hodo, Fiaga of Anfoega, were 
among those chiefs who were recognised as paramount chiefs and accorded permanent 
seats on the Regional House of Chiefs, even though they also refused to be amalgamated.57 
In Hokpe State, which included seven Awatime divisions and ten Ewe divisions, one 
paramount chief was to be elected to represent the state.58
Protests also came from Buem state to the north of Ewedome. The grouping of chiefs 
within the Buem state for the purpose of electing representatives to the Regional House of 
Chiefs fell short of the aspirations of several ethnic groups, particularly the Akpafus and 
Bowiris.59 Indeed, the supplement to the Gazette allocated a permanent seat to the 
omanhene of Buem. All the other chiefs from Jasikan, Teteman, Kudje, Guaman, Bowiri 
and Akpafu were to elect one member to the house on rotational basis. Undoubtedly, the 
grouping looked irregular considering the fact that Bowiri and Akpafu were ethnically and 
linguistically different from the Buem-Lefana. A second group of non-Ewe speaking people 
made up of Likpe, Lolobi, Nkunya and Santrokofi were also allocated one seat even though
55 RAG/H, Petition from Togbe Delume o f Ve against the Regional House o f  Chiefs Bill, 5 July 1958(not 
filed).
56 East Dayi Local Council was subsumed in the Kpandu District Council as part o f  the reorganisation o f  local 
councils in Ewedome in 1958.
57 RHC/H, Minutes o f the Regional House o f Chiefs, Ho, 13 April 1962; Interview with Mr W. K. Ahiabo, 
Registrar, Regional House o f Chiefs, Ho, 16 September 2007. Togbe Hodo was recognised as paramount 
chief by the CPP even before the Van Lare Report was ready.
58 The head chiefs o f other divisions were raised to the status o f paramount chiefs because o f  their support for 
the CPP government. Interview with Mr Henry Akatsi, Research Officer, Regional House o f  Chiefs, Ho, 16 
September 2007.
59 See Ghana Gazette, Section 4 (5), 21 June 1958. (Not Filed). See also petitions from Liati division, 19 July 
1958.
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they had no common language or customs. It was no wonder that they too vehemently 
opposed the House of Chiefs Act of 1958.60
For the CPP, the setting up of the Regional House of Chiefs was a perfect opportunity to 
‘cage’ chiefs by diverting their energies from local government issues into a body which 
had no real political power.61 The function of the regional body was mainly ‘to determine 
all matters of a constitutional nature involving paramount chiefs within the region’.62 The 
House of Chiefs Act of 1958 effectively restricted chiefs’ access to local government 
administration.63 This was not surprising because earlier in that year, the government had 
announced its intention of reducing the number of chiefs on all municipal, urban and 
district councils to one 64 On the occasion in 1958 of the dissolution of the Joint Provincial 
Council, Nkrumah stated that
the time had come,...when it is no longer necessary or desirable 
for chiefs to be concerned with the executive duties of government.
Houses of chiefs would assist the government in matters of customary 
law in safeguarding traditions and customs. The government now even 
believe that traditional members should be withdrawn from local 
councils, since their experience was no longer necessary on them.65
60 See RAG/H TVT10/SF. 2, Petition from Likpe Traditional Area, 27 August 1958; RAG/H, Memorandum 
by the omanhene o f  Santrokofi to the Minister o f Local Government, 20 July 1958.
61 For detailed examination o f  the gradual subordination o f  chiefs to central government control and their final 
exclusion from local government, see Kwesi Jonah, ‘The Electoral Response o f Ghana’s Traditional Rulers to 
their Subordination and Alienation in Local Government’, in Amposah and Boafo-Arthur, Local Government 
in Ghana, p. 209; Apter, Ghana, p. 121; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 377.
62 House o f Chiefs Act, 1958. Its establishment brought the total number o f  houses o f chiefs in Ghana to five: 
Eastern, Western, Northern and Ashanti with headquarters at Koforidua, Cape Coast, Tamale and Kumasi 
respectively. See West Africa, 1 November 1958, p. 1095.
63 House o f Chiefs Act, Section 17a, 1958; Interview conducted with Togbe Tam Tia, paramount chief o f  
Todome, at Ho, 5 September 2007.
64 RAG/H, Press Release No. 79/58, Traditional Members Serving on Local Government Council, 18 
February 1958 (not filed).
65 West Africa, 29 November 1958, p. 1129.
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This threat by Nkrumah to remove chiefs from local council was indeed carried out in 
1959 by the CPP.66 This was followed by the Local Government Act of 1961 and the 
Chieftaincy Act of 1961, both of which made no provision whatsoever for chiefs to be 
included in the working of local councils, except to elect paramount chiefs as ceremonial 
presidents of the councils. What Nkrumah did, van Nieuwaal writes, was to set the 
parameters for traditional authority so that by the end of the CPP regime, chieftaincy had 
‘come to the edge of the grave’.67 The various acts passed by parliament were designed to 
rid chiefs of real political power because Nkrumah saw traditional authorities in league
zo
with the opposition as ‘subversive’. In this respect, Nugent was right when he stated that 
the house of chiefs ‘was important to those who sat in it- and maybe to those who thought 
they should sit in it- but it impinged comparatively little upon popular consciousness... and 
that the centre of gravity lay in the villages rather than at the higher tiers’.69 Thus, events in 
Ewedome fit well into Rathbone’s analysis of the erosion of chiefly authority in Asante and 
the Colony under Nkrumah’s regime. The reforms were, however, not complete without the 
creation of 40 Traditional/Joint Traditional Councils on 30 November 1962.70 It is worthy 
of note that the creation of Joint Traditional Councils was not dissimilar to the policy of 
amalgamation during during the colonial era. It was the Regional House of Chiefs at its 
meeting of 28 February 1959 which recommended that the name of the region should be 
changed from Trans-Volta Togoland Region to the Volta Region based on allegations that
66 Interview conducted with Mr Akatsi, Research Officer, Volta Region House o f Chiefs, Ho, 2007. This point 
was also made in Paul Nugent, Africa Since Independence (New York, 2004), p. 123.
67 Van Nieuwaal, ‘Chiefs and African States’, p. 4; Boateng, Political Legacy o f  Kwame Nkrumah, p. 91.
68 Apter, ‘The Role o f  Traditionalism’, p. 57.
69 Nugent, ‘An Abandoned Project’, p. 215.
70 Chieftaincy Act o f  1961, Section 69. See also VR/HC.5584, Clerk, Volta Region House o f Chiefs to the 
Regional Administrative Officer, Ho 17 February 1969.
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the government of the French Togoland was planning to annex the region.71 Consequently,
7 9the National Assembly changed the name to the Volta Region in 1959.
An important innovation in the institution of chieftaincy in Ewedome was the 
introduction of the position of Nyonufia, literally meaning ‘women’s chief but mistakenly
73referred to as Queen Mother. Until this point, Akan-style queen mothers were not known 
in Ewedome. By virtue of the patrilineal system of inheritance, the institution of chieftaincy 
among the Ewes was an all-male affair. Though both women and men were equal before 
the law, the patrilineal system made men the head of nuclear and extended families as well 
as lineages. The institution of queen mother therefore did not evolve with chieftaincy 
among the Ewes.74 Even in Akan areas, in exception to Yaa Asantewaa, the queen mother’s 
role did not go beyond the nomination of a successor to the stool. Consequently, women in 
Ewedome did not form part of the administration of the NA system because they did not fit 
into the scheme of indirect rule. Although there was no deliberate colonial policy to 
exclude women from local government, the parameters of indirect rule inadvertently meant 
a complete exclusion of women. In this respect, local government became ‘a citadel of male 
political power and domination’.75
It was only in the early 1940s that the situation began to change in Ewedome. Many 
women became educated and got employment in such occupations as nursing, teaching and
71 Minutes o f the Regional House o f Chiefs, 28 February 1959.
72 Ibid.
73 The title ‘queen mother’ is a contested one. There seems not to be any agreement among historians and 
anthropologists as to whether women chiefs among the Ewes could rightly be referred to as queen mothers. 
Lynne Brydon refrained from the use o f the term in her works on the Ewes because o f  its contested nature.
She preferred the title ‘women ch ief instead. See Lynne Brydon, ‘Women Chiefs and Power in the Volta 
Region o f Ghana’, Journal o f  Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 37-38 (1996), p. 227-247. The queen 
mother among the Akans could be the mother, aunt or sister o f  the chief or King. Indeed, the current queen 
mother of Asante is the biological mother o f the present Asantehene, Osei Tutu II.
74 The role o f Queen Mothers in the nomination o f chiefs in Akan areas is outlined in Beatrice Attah-Mensah, 
‘Gender and Local Government in Ghana: The Case o f the 2002 District Level Elections’, in Amposah and 
Boafo-Arthur (eds.), Local Government in Ghana, p. 139.
75 Ibid.
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telephone operation. Since then, women began to take a more active part in local politics 
and local government. During the struggle for integration, some women from Ewedome 
became active participants in the Togoland Union.76 They organised themselves and sent 
deputations to non-Ewe areas of British Togoland to campaign for unification.77 In Kpando 
District Council, the first woman councillor was elected in I960.78 Women also controlled 
a great proportion of the retail trade and the organisation of ‘flourishing markets at every 
main centre’.79 Most of them traded in foodstuffs, cloth and other imported items.80 Their 
market tolls constituted a major source of revenue for local authorities. Despite this change 
in the orientation and improvement in the status of women, many of them migrated in the 
late 1930s to such towns as Accra, Tema, Takoradi and Koforidua in the Gold Coast.
In the days of the NAs, attempts were made by some chiefs to stem the tide by evoking 
fetish upon those women who left for the Gold Coast to force them to return. A typical 
example was the case involving Togbe Tenkoloe Kwaku II and one Affua Dei of Sokode. 
In a letter to the District Commissioner at Ho, the Chief of Sokode stated that he had 
evoked the fetish in his division upon the women to force them to return.81 Affua Dei, who 
refused to return home, was banished from the town and she had to relocate to Ho.82 There 
was therefore the view that the institution of women chief would provide leadership that 
would address the concerns of women and help stem the high incidence of migration of 
women into the big towns.
76 Togoland Report to the UN, 1953, p. 24.
77 Ibid.
78 RAG/H LC.21/SF.2, Kpandu District Council, Meetings and Minutes, 1960.
79 Togoland Report to the UN, 1953, p. 52.
80 Ibid.
81 RAG/H File No.31/29, Sokode Affairs, 12 June 1946.
82 Ibid.
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In Ewedome, the first generation of queen mothers started as ‘market queens’ assisting 
the local councils in fixing the times during which a market might be held. Later on, their 
roles were regularised as queen mothers. Most people interviewed gave credit to the CPP 
for creating the office among the Ewes in order to provide leadership to the women’s wing 
of the party and to give women the chance to participate in party politics. The first queen
Of
mother of Gbi state, Mama Dewotonyo I, was enstooled on 27 August 1969. Since the 
office did not evolve with the institution of chieftaincy, there was no established procedure 
for nominating Nyonufia. Initially, women who were active in the CPP and showed 
organizational ability were eligible for nomination. There were also instances where some 
women who went to the Gold Coast and were impressed with the status and role of queen 
mothers in Akan areas came back to introduced the practice in their villages. A typical 
example was Mama Agbalisi I (the first Nyonufia of Kpando) who was credited with the 
introduction of the office in Akpini state.86
By the late 1960s, the office became fully integrated into the institution of chieftaincy 
and eligibility was based on integrity, patriotism and to a lesser extent on wealth.87 The 
Nyonufia then became a member of the kingmakers and her enstoolment was accompanied 
with elaborate ceremony and rituals. On official duty, the Nyonufia was accompanied by a 
retinue of women. On the occasion of the enstoolment of a new chief, it was the duty of the
83 Interviews conducted with Mama Dusi, queen mother o f  Kpandu Tsakpoe and retired educationalist, 
Kpando, 7 July, 2007; Mama Amasewa II, queen mother o f  Hohoe Bla, 1 October 2007.
84 The CPP was noted for its ‘politicisation o f  women’ in the country. See Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the 
Rawlings Factor (London, 1992), p. 162; Biswal, Ghana, p. 73.
85 Before the enstoolment o f the queen mother, one Mama Agoi from Tokoni acted as queen mother 
mobilizing market women in Hohoe. Interview with the paramount queen mother o f Hohoe, Mama 
Dewotonyo I, Hohoe, 9 December 2007.
86 Interview conducted with Mama Agbalisi II, paramount queen mother o f  Kpando, 27 November 2007.
87 Among some divisions the Nyonufia was selected from the stool father’s family.
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Nyonufia to tie abotsri (traditional beads) around the hand of the chief.88 This ritual 
signified the acceptance of the new chief by the women folk. She also accompanied the 
chief to official ceremonies. That notwithstanding, Nyonufia wielded no real political 
power as compared to her counterpart among the Akans.
Local Government Reforms under the CPP
On assumption of office, the CPP began to extend centrol over local government. The 
first major step in this direction in 1957 was the replacement of Chief Regional Officers 
with representatives of central government who were to be referred to as Regional
OQ #
Commissioners. District and regional commissioners were appointed by the president and 
they replaced Government Agents and Regional Officers respectively.90 Nkrumah then 
moved on to abolish Regional Assemblies for what it termed ‘an unnecessary and 
extravagant interference with efficient government’.91 Within the CPP hierarchy, ‘a small 
majority of opposition men in two of the Regional Assemblies could still hold up any 
change’ that was intended to reform local government.92 With two-thirds majority in the 
National Assembly and opposition seriously weakened in Ewedome by 1958, all was set 
for the CPP to initiate reforms in accordance with its own whim and imperative.
The government appointed A. F. Greenwood, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of 
Local Government, to enquire into the causes of the stagnation of local councils. The 
commission observed that local councils were established in the country in 1951 with haste
88 Interview with Mama Mawokpor, a retired educationalist and Nyonufia o f Kpando Tsakpoe, 6 July 2007. 
The name abotsre is an Akan word that entered the Ewe language.
89 Until 1957, all Chief Regional Officers were British officials.
90Nsarkoh, ‘Development o f Local Government in Ghana’ p.79.
91 West Africa, 1 November 1958, p. 1958.
92 Ibid.
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and that due diligence was not taken in determining their size.93 In Trans-Volta Togoland, 
the report noted that there were seven local councils for areas with population of less than 
10,000 and that the biggest council had a population of 34,000.94 Local councils in 
Ewedome, it judged, were in many cases too small and unwieldy to make efficient units of 
local government, and there was an urgent need to create local councils with size, 
population and wealth commensurate with the functions and responsibilities which the 
government expected them to undertake.95 Amalgamation, according to the report, would 
have been appropriate in forming larger local council areas and thereby avoiding the 
proliferation of councils.
Once again, this report was no different from amalgamation policy adopted by the 
colonial officers in creating the NAs in the 1930s. However, due to strong local feelings, 
the inhabitants wanted councils to coincide with the area of jurisdiction of traditional 
divitions. Amalgamation was still seen by many people of Ewedome as an obnoxious 
policy foisted on them by the colonial government, and that the achievement of 
independence meant ‘casting aside all forms of local administration established in the past 
fifteen years and reverting to small independent units’.96 The report also blamed the 
deplorable financial situation of the councils on the government’s increase of salary of its 
employees in 1956.97 This led to a huge financial deficit in the councils to the tune of 
£440,262.98 It was further observed that despite the million pounds made available for the 
development of Trans-Tolta Togoland, there was the need for additional funds if the
93 A.F. Greenwood Commission Report, 1957, p. 2.
94 Ibid.
95 Greenwood Report, 1957. For the relevance o f  size in the efficient performance o f  local government units, 
see J. R. A. Ayee, ‘Decentralisation and Local Governance: The Ghanaian Experience’, in Amposah and 
Boafo-Arthur (eds.), Local Government, p. 21.
96 Greenwood Report, 1957, p. 5.
97 Ibid, p. 4.
98 Ibid.
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councils in the region were to continue to function. This observation was made at the time 
when the national budget ‘showed a balance of payment deficit of £14 million for the 
second year running’ and a rise in recurrent expenditure from £47 million in 1957 to £51 
million in 1958." The only link which the report established between traditional authorities 
and local councils was the same old provision of appointment of a paramount chief in each 
council area as a ceremonial president with no voting power.100 This happened to be one of 
the major criticisms against the report by some chiefs.
Enlarged local councils were created in Ewedome in 1958.101 For example, Dzigbe, 
Adaklu, Anyigbe and Dutasor local councils and Ho urban council were amalgamated to 
form Ho District Council. Then Dzolokpuita District Council was created to cover Abutia, 
Sokode and part of Awudome. In May 1961, a new local government act was passed. The 
new act consolidated the provisions in the existing local government and municipal council 
ordinance and made provision for all-purpose local councils.102 The year started with ten 
urban and 54 local councils, making a total of 64 councils in the entire country; a number 
which was increased to 65 by the end of the year. The reform took no cognisance of the 
recommendations of the Greenwood Report. Even though the report recommended the 
creation of large local councils thereby reducing their number, the government lacked the 
political will to stick to the recommendation. Pressure from CPP party activists in 
Ewedome forced the government to split the councils once again and increase their 
number.103 For example, Akpini Local Council which was dissolved in 1958 because of a
99 West Africa, 5 July 1958, p. 648.
100 Ibid, p. 6-7.
101 RAG/H LG.46, Address by Hon C.H. Chapman, Regional Commissioner, TVTR to the Anlo District 
Council, Keta, 11 March 1958; RAG/H. 46, Re-organization o f  Local Government in TVTR, March 1958.
102 Local Government Act, No. 54, May 1961.
103 Callaway, ‘Local Politics’, p. 139. Amonoo, Ghana, p. 159.
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complete collapse of its finances was reconstituted by the government in 1962.104 
Divisional parochialism drove some chiefs to make requests for local council boundaries to 
be coterminous with their traditional authority boundaries. Callaway noted that the Ho area, 
which had only one local council in 1958, was split into three local councils in 1965.105 In 
1959, no election of councillors were held in Ho. The CPP simply nominated its party 
loyalists to the councils.106
Fragmented localized political idenitities clearly remained salient. Therefore the 
government felt that it was not politically practicable to reduce the number of local councils 
in the region, and that the problems identified in the Greenwood Report could not be solved 
just by reducing the number of local councils. Efficiency, it said, would be gained by 
gradually transferring some local council functions to district councils.107 As of 1962, 
however, the only function which had been transferred to district councils was the 
construction and maintenance of trunk roads to enable the local councils to concentrate
1 ORmore on improvements to feeder roads in their areas.
The real problem which the CPP faced in merging small councils in Ewedome was 
political affiliation. A council might be predominantly pro-CPP and its neighbour anti-CPP 
and the two would not cooperate in an enlarged local council.109 In addition, the 
government decided in 1963 that the large local council areas should also constitute 
constituency areas for electoral purposes.110 All of this led to the proliferation of local
104 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 335
105 Callaway, ‘Local Politics’, p. 121-144.
106 Ibid, p. 138.
107 RAG/H, Enquiry into the Structure o f  Local Government in the TVT 1964 (not filed); RAG/ERC 1/1/17, 
Enquiry into the Structure o f  Local Government in TVT, 1958.
108 The district councils gave work on trunk roads to the Public Works Department in 1962
109 Greenwood Report, 1957, p. 5.
110 Report o f the Commission o f  Enquiry into Electoral and Local Government Reforms (Siribo Report), 
Accra, 1963, part III. See also RAG/H, Correspondence from Togbe Kofi Adzi 11, Attikpui Traditional Area,
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councils and provided patronage to CPP functionaries ‘with which to satisfy alienated rank 
and file supporters, to soothe local traditional demands and to ease central-local 
tensions’.111 Unlike the 1951 local government system, these reforms were carried out and 
imposed on the people without their consent. One of the factors necessary for community 
development, according to Sautoy, was local initiative that was not imposed from above.112 
Local councils were expected to provide that ‘complex administrative machine without 
forgetting the individuals whom it is intended to benefit’.113 In Ghana, government’s 
propensity to impose ideas from above was the bane of a successful local government
114system.
Local Government Councils in Ewedome in 1965
Council Population
Adaklu/Anyigbe 32,000
Anfoega 15,000
Awudome 30,928
Dayi 48,000
Dutsor 29,000
Ho Urban 18,000
Hohoe 40,514
Kpando 71,000
Yingor 33,949
to the Minister o f Justice on Review o f Electoral District, 17 July 1964(not filed); RAG/H LC.12/V.5/2089, 
Proposal for the Delimitation o f  Parliamentary Constituencies, 10 September 1963.
111 Harriet B. Schiffer, ‘Local Administration and National Development: Fragmentation and Centralisation in 
Ghana’, Canadian Journal o f  African Studies, 1 (1970), p. 73.
112 Peter Du Sautoy, Community Development in Ghana (London, 1960), p. 3.
1,3 Ibid, p.175.
114 Ibid, p. 5.
289
Another significant reform that the CPP government introduced was the setting up of 
town and village committees. In his address at the first seminar of the Winneba Ideological 
Institute in February 1962, Nkrumah noted that even though local government in the 
country had been organised at the village level, it was done only by grouping a number of 
villages to form an administrative unit.115 According to Nkrumah, ‘the internal life of 
particular villages, therefore, remained substantially unadministered, and the time had come 
for the problem to be tackled in a forthright manner by organising the life of the community 
right at the village level’.116 It is worthy of note that the idea to set up town and village 
committees was contained in the Coussey Report but for ten years it was not
117implemented. The Coussey Committee felt that by bringing local government down to 
the level of the smallest unit it would not only close the gap that existed between many 
local authorities and the inhabitants at the village level but would also harness local 
energies towards useful ends. The thinking was that much of the opposition to the payment 
of annual rates during the era of the NAs was attributable to the lack of contact between 
local authorities and the people at the village level. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
people would take a more active interest in local government in general and in their local 
councils in particular if they were brought more effectively into the picture.
The establishment of the Area Committees had been dictated by the overriding need to 
have each represented on a District Council by at least one representative councillor. In
115 RAG/ H AD/C.291 LG.1/V.3, Appendix D, Press Release, Speech by Dr Kwame Nkrumah to the Winneba 
Ideological Institute, 3 February 1962.
116 Ibid.
117 Local Government Ordinance, Section 44, 1951. The delay was due to the general opinion that it would be 
a premature step to set up such committees. RAG/HEM, Hyde Clerke, Permanent Secretary, Accra, to the 
Regional Minister, Ho, 17 July 1952.These committees were however set up in the Anlo and Tongu districts 
on pilot basis since 1953, but the policy was not extended to the former British Trust Territory until 1963/4.
See RAG/H LG.0285/8, Government Agent, Keta, on Village and Town Committee Establishment under 
Local Government Ordinance, Keta, 17April 1953; RAG/H LG. 0242/s.f.4, Minute o f  Members o f the 
Legislative Assembly from the TVTR, Ho, 3 February 1953.
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effect, ACs differed considerably in size and varied in population between 500 and 
5,000.118 It was doubtful whether many of the ACs, especially the larger ones, constituted 
adequate machinery for extending local government into the villages, stimulating local 
interest and facilitating wider contacts and consultation.119 As we have seen, in the past 
some of the best ‘local government’ works had been done by the villages themselves: 
deciding what development projects they wished to carry out, agreeing on contributions of 
money and labour and then going ahead to complete the work. This form of local self-help 
which had been harnessed by the colonial officials under the NA system could be made to 
play out in the new local councils.
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm with which the CPP began to embrace the idea stemmed 
largely from its desire to use the town and village committees to build its party structures 
and to ensure that its ideology of a one party-state was firmly grounded at the local level. In 
announcing the decision to set up the committees, Nkrumah was categorical when he stated 
that members of the village and town committees ‘would comprise CPP party 
representatives at the village level’.120 From 1962, councillors were elected to local 
councils on account of them being ‘staunch members of the CPP’ and they were addressed 
as ‘comrades’.121
In addressing councilors and officers of the Yingor Local Council at Dzolopkuita in 
1963, the DC stated that
as you are aware, our socialist government headed by our illustrious
118 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/253, Organization o f  Local Authorities in TVTR, 1958; RAG/H D.A/C.355, Re­
organisation o f Local Government 1958; RAG/H LG.12(JT), Minutes o f the Administrative Officers 
Conference, Ho, 24 May 1958.
119 RAG/H LG.12(TJ), Minutes o f the Administrative Officers Conference, Ho, 6 May 1958.
120RAG/ H AD/C.291 LG.1/VOL.3 Appendix D, Press Release, Speech by Dr Kwame Nkrumah to the 
Winniba Ideological Institute, 3 February 1962.
121 RAG/H, Yingor Local Council, Speech by Mr Ottu K. Dake, D.C. to Councillors at Dzolokpuita, 26 
October 1963.
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president, and our people’s Socialist Party; the Convention People’s 
Party, under the dynamic leadership of Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah, 
are one and the same thing and therefore councils are integral part and 
parcel of the CPP being important organ of it.. .Comrades, I have to 
ask you that all your actions, activities, programmes and policies must 
be directed in a way only to stabilise the CPP and to give it the fullest 
possible assistance.122
At Kpando, the DC, Rob Johnson Addo, made a similar statement to the councilors: ‘as 
comrades you are members of Osagyefo’s great family elected on the ticket of the dynamic 
party and your election neatly fitted well into the claim for a one-party state’.123 As in 
Zambia and many other African countries, ‘membership of the ruling party became a form 
of citizenship’.124 In other words, party card replaced local council service ‘as the best
1 n r
strategy for those with ambitions for office’. The degree of politicisation of local 
government structures in Ewedome did not only alienate non-partisan elements but also 
became a spectre that haunted the councils following the demise of Nkrumah’s first 
republic. Contracts for projects were awarded to relatives of council members, who often 
failed to execute the project or produced shoddy works. Specific powers were conferred 
on village and town committees, including the ability o f the chairman to call meetings at his 
discretion.127 In addition, they were to collaborate with the council revenue collectors to
122Yingor Local Council, Speech by Mr Ottu K. Dake, DC to Councillors at Dzolokpuita, 26 October 1963.
123 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/146, Akpini Local Council, Address by DC 1 October 1962.
124 Qoute taken from Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa 
(Cambridge, 2008), p. 50.
125 Ibid, p. 43.
126 Interviews with Mr George Feakpi, a retired public servant, Dzolo, 1 September 2007; Rev E. Dake, 
Educationist, Peki, 17 September 2007; Dr Ababio, a member o f parliament o f the fourth republic, 20 
December 2000. See also Nugent, ‘An Abandoned Project’, p. 214.
127 RAG/H RAO/C.30 LG.20/V.15, Village and Town Committee Regulations, 1962.
292
ensure that all taxable persons paid the rates regularly, encouraged self-help projects as well 
as served as a two-way channel of information between the inhabitants and the local 
authorities.128 It was not considered desirable for a village committee to raise funds on its 
own account, because this would derogate from the rating powers of the councils. A village 
or town committee could, however, apply to the local councils for the imposition of a 
special rate in that particular village or town for a project for the exclusive benefit of the 
inhabitants in such a village or town.129
To avert the likelihood of members of the committees unilaterally imposing arbitrary 
rates on the inhabitants, any application for special rates had to indicate the nature of the 
project or service which it intended to finance.130 The application should be clear as to 
whether the project was to be executed by contract or directly by the local councils through 
hired or unpaid communal labour. Again, the cost of the project and how much self-help 
funds, if any, were expected from the Department of Social Welfare and Community 
Development and the estimated time of completion of the project had to be clearly spelt out 
before the final approval of the project. Subsequently a separate account should be opened 
in the local authority’s books for such a rate so that it would be clear how much the special
101
rate produced. Proceedings of the committees were informal -  no staff was employed by 
any committee, no allowances paid to members and the committees had no right of access
1 39to any authority higher than the parent council.
The functions conferred on village and town committees were laudable, but the local 
government structure from the town/village and area committees to local councils were
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid
131 Ibid.
132 RA/H RAO/C.30 LG 20/V.15, Village and Town Committee Regulation, 1962, Apendix A.
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virtually besieged by party members whose influence became a burden on the whole 
system. This phenomenon, which intensified after the proclamation of the Republic of 
Ghana in 1961, meant, according to Schiffer, ‘the end to rational organised, autonomous 
local authorities’.133 Abuse of power by councillors, most o f whom were CPP functionaries, 
led to frequent suspension of council sittings thereby eroding the confidence which people 
had in the councils. The CPP-dominated councils became theatres of ‘frequent and flagrant 
abuses of authority’.134 Akpini Local Council was suspended on 14 January 1958 for this 
reason.135 From 1963, Ho District Council, for instance, found it difficult to form a quorum
1 ' j / r
for the transaction of business. Right from independence, decisions of local councils 
followed the dictates of the CPP, while ‘the implementation of council policies was placed 
in the hands of CPP activists or their nominees’.137
The willingness of chiefs to cooperate with the local councils since the abolition of the 
old NAs showed that chiefs were not out of tune with the exigencies of the time. They were 
prepared to adapt their institutions to suit the changing conditions of the country. By the 
late 1950s, chiefs no longer constituted a bunch of illiterate traditionalists. A new 
generation of chiefs who emerged in Ewedome were men with proven abilities who, on 
their own personal merit, could be entrusted with important national duties.138 The 
institution of chieftaincy in Ewedome, as in the whole of Ghana, was being enriched by 
educated men.139 The problem which chiefs had with the town/village committees was that
133 Schiffer, ‘Local Administration and National Development’, p. 74.
134 Ibid, p. 91.
135 RAG/H, Minutes o f  Akpini Local Council, 15 March 1958. The point was also made in Rathbone,
Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 123; Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 304-306.
136 PRAAD/A ADM 39/1/511, Asogli Local Council, Meetings and Minutes, 1 March 1963.
137 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpando Area’, p. 273.
138 Nii Anyetei Kwakwranya II, ‘Participation in Local Government: The Role o f Traditional Authorities’, 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation Seminar Series (Accra, 1975), p. 148.
139 Ibid, p .150.
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party chairmen, who were also chairmen of the town/village committees, put themselves in 
charge of the important responsibility of organizing and executing self-help projects and 
providing a forum for the discussion of common problems of the community.140 In fact, 
some chairmen went to the extent of beating the gong-gong without the consent of the 
chiefs.141
Chiefs who wanted to become chairmen of the village/town committees argued that the 
CPP’s goal of building a socialist society was grounded in indigenous culture and 
conditions and that there was nothing in the institution of chieftaincy that was incompatible 
with the party ideology. On the contrary, the communal approach to all aspects of life in the 
villages and towns was in keeping with socialism.142 Therefore, chiefs could help to mould 
the customs and the traditions of their committees to the general principles of socialism. In 
December 1963, the government responded to the request of the Regional House of Chiefs 
by relaxing the rules governing the composition of the village and town committees. Chiefs 
who decided to compromise their political neutrality by openly joining the CPP became 
chairmen of some of the committees.143
Some of those chiefs soon found themselves caught up in conflicts of interest. They 
used their positions as chairmen to drag the committees into holding arbitrations contrary to 
the tenets of the Local Courts Act of 1958.144 By dabbling in partisan politics and accepting 
a particular ideology, some chiefs lost their dignity. The image of village and town
140 Minutes o f the Regional House o f Chiefs, 25 January 1963.
,41Interviews with Mr J. A. Xexetro, District Assemblyman o f  Hohoe, 7 July 2007, and Mr A. Malm, 
Education Officer, Regional Office Ho, 8 July 2007.
142 Minutes o f the Regional House o f  Chiefs, 24 January 1963.
143 Other parts o f the country, especially Northern Ghana, had since 1958 witnessed the mass defection o f  
chiefs and prominent people to the CPP. See P. Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics o f  
Regionalism in Northern Ghana (London, 1979), p. 168.
144 Address by the Nana Agyeman Badu to the Regional House o f  Chiefs, December 1963; Local Courts were 
established in the region in 1960 to replace existing Native Courts. See Local Courts Act, 1958.
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committees also sunk to its lowest ebb due to the collection of illegal fees for stray animals 
seized and impounded. Such collections constituted a criminal offence under section 18 of 
the Local Government Act of 1961. An exception to the litany of failures of village 
committees during the period under review was Ziavi village committee which in January 
1966 acted in concert with the people to collect 10/- a man and 5/- a woman to build a 
school.
In April 1963, cabinet decided that local council police forces in the country should be 
abolished.145 Government’s view was that if the newly formed village committees were 
properly organised, it would no longer be necessary to apply force in future to compel 
people to pay their rates. The committees were to be in a position to provide reliable 
information about taxable population in their areas so that there would be no difficulty in 
picking out defaulters for prosecution. The weakening effect of the withdrawal of local 
authority police on rate collection campaign was enormous. Ghana police could not take 
over those duties of local council police which were not part of normal police commitments 
such as rate collection. Those extraneous duties definitely required the presence of 
enforcement officers which could equally drive unwilling rate payers to attend to their civic 
duties. As the paramount chief of Kete-Krachi pointed out: ‘if there is no local authority 
police, then there is no local council’.146 In November 1962, it was observed at 
Dzolokpuita, the headquarters of Yingor Local Council, that Sisala migrants from Northern 
Ghana engaged in a charcoal production refused to pay taxes imposed on them by the
145 RAG/ERG 1/1/17, Local Government Police,1963; RAG/H LC.13/V.4/208, Circular, Disbandment o f  
Local Authority Police Service, 3 April 1963.
146 RAG/H, Petition by Nana Akroasohene o f  Kete Krachi to the Minister o f Local Government, 7 March
1963.
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council. Attempts by the council officials to enforce the payment of the taxes resulted in a 
serious clash between the charcoal drivers and the officials.147
Moreover, the peace and tranquility in remote areas where Ghana policemen were not 
stationed deteriorated. There were instances where warrants were often not executed 
against those who failed to attend court. The enforcement of the whole of the councils’ bye- 
laws had become a huge problem. Following persistent appeal from local councils, in 
November 1963 government directed that local government policemen who were not 
absorbed into the Ghana police force should not be laid off but should be appointed as 
‘enforcement officers’. It was impossible, however, for the councils to absorb a substantial 
portion of the rejected local council policemen, for many of them were too old to be re­
engaged. In 1962, there was a total of 255 local authority policemen in the region, 65 of 
whom were selected for training and subsequently absorbed into the national police force. 
The remaining 199 were not enough to fill the void left. In 1963, the regional commissioner 
lamented the poor state o f revenue collection in local councils in the region.148 This he 
attributed largely to the absence of local authority police force.
In the midst of all these problems, in 1964 the CPP drew up a grandiose Seven-Year 
National Development Plan which aimed at accelerated industrialization and the creation of 
a welfare state.149 Local authorities were expected to assist by contributing towards the 
build-up of infrastructure.150 Out of £540 million non-central government investment 
provided for in the national plan, £100 million was expected to be contributed through
147 Ibid.
148 RAG/H, Minutes o f the Regional House o f Chiefs 26 October 1963.
149 Dan-Bright S. Dzorgbo, Ghana in Search o f  Development: The Challenge o f  Governance, Economic 
Management and Institution Building (Aldershot, 2001), p. 151.
150 RAG/H, Government o f Ghana, Seven-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development, 1964.
The Seven-Year Development plan was referred to as the ‘Socialist Blueprint’. See Dzorgbo, Ghana in 
Search o f Development, p. 154-155.
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direct labour investment.151 A substantial portion of the non-central government investment 
was expected to be realised through the development activities of local councils. Councils 
had to draw up their own development plan to cover the seven-year period and to ensure 
that they bore proper relationship to that of the central government.152
The national development plan covered such key areas such as agriculture,
• 153communications, education, health, industry, water supply, housing and town planning. 
The local council programmes were expected to feed into the national plan which aimed at 
the production of cheap food and industrial raw materials through the mechanisation of 
agriculture and the establishment of state farms. The government also intended to double 
the country’s primary school enrolment which stood at one million at the time and the onus 
was on councils to construct and maintain new school blocks to accommodate the planned 
intake.154
One major obstacle was the inability of the local councils in Ewedome to raise 
additional revenue through taxes in order to execute various projects.155 There was a 
general deterioration in the efficiency of the work of local authorities as revenue plunged 
precipitously. In Yingor, Dutasor and Kpandu local councils the cost of revenue collection 
far exceeded the total amount of revenue collected in I960.156 In 1964, for instance, 
Kpandu District Council collected only £2,803 out of expected revenue of £ 46,000.157 In
151 Details o f  the plan are contained in the report the local government report o f 1958; RAG/H RAO/C.24, 
Draft Report o f  Local and Municipal Councils Secretariat, Accra, 1958. The amounts quoted are in Ghana 
pound.
152 Ibid; RAG/H RAO/C.24 LG.20/Vol.3, Role o f Local Authorities in the Execution o f  the 7-Year Plan,
1964.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 RAG/H RAO/C.23/V.4, Local Government Matters, Cabinet to the Regional Officer, Ho, 20 December 
1960.
156 Ibid.
157 RAG/H LC.23/SF.4, Kpandu Local Council Meetings and Minutes 1963/64.
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1965, Ho Urban Council collected only £97,346 instead of expected revenue of 
£179,189.158 Local authorities had reached the limit of taxation and they began 
contemplating a system of local property rating as an alternative source of revenue.159 
Underlying these difficulties was the central government’s insistence on local authorities 
taking on functions which they were not capable of performing with a minimum standard of 
efficiency.160
Thus, the problems that confronted local councils during the CPP regime in Ewedome 
were not only frequent restructuring and politicisation but also unrealistic development 
programmes. Their financial administration was also precarious. There were many cases of 
misappropriation of cash by treasurers and revenue collectors. A case in point was Mr F. O. 
K. Agbettoh, the Akpini Local Council Treasurer, who misappropriated various sums of 
money to the tune of £950.161 Revenue collectors were in some cases allowed to hold their 
collections over long periods, contrary to required procedures. It was observed also that 
much of the indifference shown by local authorities towards the question of expenditure 
control was due to the ease with which approval of application for supplementary provision 
was obtained.162 Many of the councils spent considerable sums of money on development 
works of various kinds given out on contracts with the hope that applications for 
supplementary provisions would be approved as a matter of course.
Furthermore, contract procedures laid down in the financial memoranda were not always 
followed in awarding contracts.163 Tenders were not invited, initial advances to contractors
158 Calaway, ‘Local Politics’, p. 138.
159 Ibid.
160 The view that local authorities in developing countries can not undertake an unlimited range o f  functions is 
note in Nsarkoh, Local Government in Ghana, p. 202.
161 Brown, ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area’, p. 299-300.
162 RAG/H, Local Government Estimate, 1965-66. See again, Schiffer, ‘Local Administration’, p. 72
163 Schiffer, ‘Local Administration’, p. 72.
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were often in excess of the percentage stipulated and yet the councils were reluctant to 
enforce the penalty clauses in the agreements where contractors failed to complete the jobs 
according to schedule. The Regional Community Development Funds Allocation 
Committee set up in 1959 to provide advice for the distribution of government grants to 
councils added to the bureaucratic bottlenecks that impeded the smooth flow of funds to the 
local councils.164 From 1965, funds were allocated to councils in bits and pieces which 
stifled long-term planning.165 In most cases, members of the committee retained part of the 
funds at the regional office for what they called ‘regional projects’.166 Misapplication of 
funds by party functionaries became a common feature. A classic example was ‘the 
diversion of £G21,193 meant for local authorities in the region to construct a rest house at
1A7 •Kpedze’. It is interesting to note that Kpedze was the home town of the then regional 
commissioner.168
By the beginning of 1965, the zeal with which the government dealt with the concerns 
of the local councils began to diminish. Amanoo noted that local government annual rate of 
expenditure between 1960 and 1966 remained less than 1 percent of the gross domestic 
expenditure of the country.169 The period also witnessed a steady fall in local government 
grants from 1.2 million pounds in 1960 to only 200,000 pounds in 1966. Analysing the 
expenditure of local authorities from 1951 to 1960, Schiffer concluded that the local 
councils during the Nkrumah regime failed to bring qualitative development to local
164 RAG/H, Local Government Estimate, 1965-66. See again, Schiffer, ‘Local Administration’,p. 72.
165 Ibid.
166 Schiffer, ‘Local Administration ’, p. 73.
167 Ibid,
168 The rest house was built during the 1964/65 financial year. Interview conducted with Mr Hans Kofi Boni, 
the Volta Regional Commissioner during the Nkrumah regime, 2 December 2007.
169 Amonoo, Ghana 1957-1960, p. 171.
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communities.170 Party supporters began to express openly their disillusionment at the 
inability of local councils to meet the development needs of the citizens.
Local Government after 1966
The 1966 coup that overthrew Nkrumah and the CPP was widely welcomed in 
Ewedome, partly because anti-Nkrumahist feeling continued to linger on after the plebiscite 
in 1956. But most importantly, the coup provided the opportunity for those Ewedome 
fugitives who went into exile in Togo to return home. In the heat of anti-Nkrumahism in the 
aftermath of the coup, most local councils in Ewedome were subjected to massive 
destruction. Documents were burnt or destroyed at the headquarters of local councils in a 
bid to destroy everything Nkrumahist. The 1966 coup dealt a heavy blow to most local 
councils which were created for political reasons and owed their infrastructural 
development to their support for the CPP. Moreover, many projects which Nkrumah had 
put on the drawing board for the development of the headquarters of the local councils were 
proscribed together with the CPP. It was the plan of Nkrumah to build a police district 
headquarters, a modem sports field and a district hospital at Dzolopkuita, for example, but 
the 1966 coup aborted these projects.171 Since the overthrow of the CPP, no development 
project of any significance has ever been undertaken in the Nkrumahist stronghold of 
Kpando. Thus the political support that formed the core around which some of the local 
councils revolved was broken.
The National Liberation Council (NLC), which took over the affairs of the country 
following the coup, appointed a commission in 1967 under the chairmanship o f Justice
170 See Schiffer, ‘Local Administration’, p. 59.
171 Interviews with Mr Lawson Addo, a retired treasurer o f  Yingor Local Council, Akome, 15 June 2004; Mr. 
Christian Adabrah, a former registrar o f the traditional council, Dzolopkuita, 4 August 2006.
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G.C. Mills-Odoi ‘to consider and make recommendations on certain matters concerning the 
structure and remuneration of the public services’.172 The commission focused part of its 
work on local government. It observed the abysmally ineffective local government structure 
based on units which were too small to be viable, ridiculing ‘the credibility of the system 
from the point of view of administrative efficiency’.173 It condemned the excessive 
centralization of the machinery of government in Accra and called for a major reform of the 
local government system. In effect, the report stated that local councils had lost that very 
important ingredient of local self-help and initiative. It proposed that the basic unit of local 
government should be a district authority which in its view could be ‘reasonably viable 
technologically’ and at the same time ‘not too remote from local communities to ensure 
effective local participation’.174
Another report known as the Siribo Report published in 1968 revisited the idea of a 
three-tier system of local government based on regional, district and local councils as the 
most workable system for the country. It described the state of local government in the 
country as chaotic and stated that ‘the reputation of local authorities had reached its 
nadir’.175 Based on these reports the NLG government passed the Local Government 
Interim Administration (Amendment) decree of 1968 (known as the NLC D 229), which 
made changes to the structure and composition of public institutions including urban and 
local management committees to include chiefs.176 This was followed up after the return to 
civilian rule in 1969 by the Local Administrative Act of 1971 passed by the Progress Party
172 Mills-Odoi Commission Report, 1967, p. 1
173 Ibid, p.3.
174 Ibid, p.4. It also recommended the merger o f  local government service with the civil service. See also 
Local Government Year Book 1970-1971, p. 5-7.
175 Siribo Commission Report, 1968, part 3.
176 Ibid; Nsarkoh, ‘Development’, p. 81.
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government led by K. A. Busia. The new act sought to rejuvenate the whole local 
government system. It set up local, district and regional councils with the latter as
i n n
supervisory and coordinating bodies in the regions.
It is important to note that while the centralizing, modernizing and socialist rhetoric of 
the CPP was inherently hostile to chieftaincy, the opposing so-called ‘Danquah-Busia 
tradition’, as previously manisfested in the NLM, was always more comfortable with 
‘traditional’ structures. Consequently, on assumption of power, the Busia government tried 
to reverse some of the policies of the Nkrumah regime with regard to chieftaincy. The new 
structure tried to revisit the 1951 local government system by introducing traditional 
elements into the district councils. Two-thirds of the members were to be elected, while 
one-third were to be chosen from among chiefs.178 Members of regional councils were also 
to be elected from district councils, while representatives of chiefs were drawn from the 
Regional House of Chiefs.179 The Chieftaincy Act o f 1971 in turn repealed the CPP 
Chieftaincy Act of 1961. The act sought to bring the institution of chieftaincy in line with 
the provisions of the new 1969 constitution.180 It established the National House of Chiefs 
and gave it the mandate to exercise ‘appellate jurisdiction in any matter relating to 
chieftaincy’.181 The Busia government thus decided to distance itself from chieftaincy 
matters and to give chiefs that legal leverage to manage their own affairs. Local councils 
were to be retained as the basic units of local government composed of a mixture of elected
177 Ghana Local Government Series on ‘Your New Local Authorities’ 1977, p. 9. According to Ladouceur, the 
wording o f the Act ‘Local Administration’ instead o f the usual ‘Local Government’ was reflective o f  the 
transfer o f  local government functions from local councils to district councils. See Ladouceur, Chiefs and 
Politicians, p. 235.
178 On the northern region o f Ghana, see Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, p. 234.
179 Nsarkoh, ‘Development’, p. 81.
180 Preamble o f  the Chieftaincy Act o f 1971.
181 Ibid, Clause 22(1).
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members and representatives of chiefs.182 Soon after establishing democratic credentials,
1 8^however, the Busia government in turn ‘quickly became authoritarian’. The appointment 
of party faithful as Regional Chief Executives and Chairmen of district councils showed the 
new regime’s desire to control local government structures in much the same way as the 
CPP had done.
The most dramatic development that led to a further drastic decline in the performance 
of local councils in Ewedome under the Busia government was the ill-fated Alien 
Compliance Order of 18 November 1969. In order to solve the employment problem in the 
country, Busia’s government expelled, without right of appeal, all foreign nationals with
1 84the exception of certain selected businessmen. By early 1970, over one million Africans 
were expelled to neighbouring countries such as Mali, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina 
Faso).185 Ewedome and indeed the whole of the Volta Region was hardest hit by the policy 
because of the large number of foreign nationals, particularly Ewes and Kabres from Togo, 
Hausas and Anagos (people from Nigeria were all referred to by the Ewes as Anagotowo).
One feature particular to many of these foreign nationals in Ewedome was that they did 
not put up permanent buildings.186 Most of their houses were built with mud and roofed 
with thatch and leaves. Others were seasonal migrants who came during the cocoa season 
and went back to Togo and Dahomey when the sales period was over. This kind of 
movement formed part of the internal migration of people within Africa which dated back
182 The number o f chief was not to exceed one-half o f the number o f  elected members. See Ibid.
183 Quote taken from Ray, Ghana: Politics, Economics and Society, p. 15.
184 N.O. Addo, ‘Migration into Ghana: Some Social and Economic Implications o f  the Aliens Compliance 
Order o f 18 November 1969’, Ghana Journal o f  Sociology, 1 (1970), p. 33-34.
185 Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor, p. 18.
186 Magaret Peil, ‘Expulsion o f West African Aliens’, Journal o f  M odem  African Studies, 9 (1971), p. 217. 
Interview conducted with Togbe Atsridom IV, paramount chief o f Kpedze, 16 September 2007.
187 Interviews with Mr C.K. Anyomi, Retired civil servant, Ho, and Togbe Fiado VI, Dzolopuita, 2 August
2005.
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to pre-colonial times and continued during the colonial period. As we have seen from 
previous chapters, the migration of foreign nationals into the Ewedome area was due not 
only to the ethnic affinities of the people across the border but also to the boom in the cocoa
1 o o
industry in the early twentieth century.
The coming into power of the CPP government saw a further intensification of 
migration into Ghana. Nkrumah’s industrialization and development programmes made 
Ghana a magnet for the influx of people. Moreover, to give practical meaning to his pan- 
African agenda, Nkrumah set up the Bureau of African Affairs in Accra which played host 
to ‘freedom fighters’ from other parts of Africa.189 In 1963, an attempt was made by the 
CPP government to regulate the inflow of foreign nationals into Ghana. All aliens were 
required to carry a passport, travel documents and residence permit.190 But these regulations 
were hardly enforced on ordinary African immigrants.191 The deportations that occurred 
during the early days of the Nkrumah regime targeted foreigners who were perceived to be 
supporting the Moslem Association Party and the NLM, parties opposed to the CPP.192
The pandemonium that greeted the 1969 order to quit brought in its wake massive 
destruction of property and in some cases, loss of lives.193 It was more chaotic in the Volta 
Region because citizenship was not easy to define or identify in this part of the country, for 
as Peil puts it, ‘there were some people who were bom in Ghana but grew up in Togo and 
vice versa.’194 Out of the total number of 827,000 immigrants in Ghana in 1960, 34 percent
188 For a historical outline o f migration into Ghana, see Addo, ‘Migration into Ghana,’ p.20-24.
189 Kwesi Armah, Peace without Power: Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966  (Accra, 2004), p. 9.
190 Alien Regulations, LI 265, section 3, sub-section 2, 1963; Legislative Instrument 553 o f  1965.
191 It is stated that ‘there were over 100,000 each o f  Togolese, Voltaics and Nigerians’ who lived in Ghana at 
the time. See Peil, ‘Expulsion’, p. 208.
192 See Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 106-107; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 377.
193 Ibid.
194 Peil, ‘Expulsion’, p. 224. It is important to note that this was not peculiar to the Ewes. Other ethnic groups 
in the north o f Ewedome had similar ethnic ties with Togo.
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of them were from Togo.195 In addition, the uncertainty that characterised the struggle for 
independence in Togo in 1959-60 created political unrest and Togolese sought refuge in 
Ghana. The Zongo communities throughout the Volta Region became desolate as some of 
the foreign nationals pulled down their structures out of despondence and anger. In defiance 
of warnings by government, Ghanaians in the rural areas molested farm labourers while 
others took advantage of the confusion to steal farm produce.196 There was a general 
misconception that all Muslims and anybody wearing flowing gowns, popularly known as 
batakari, were aliens. Such people were unnecessarily harassed, called aliens and in some
1 0 7cases forced to leave the country.
The markets that formed the main source of income for the local councils dwindled in 
size as Hausa and Togolese traders departed.198 Foreign goods, which had been common in 
the markets, all but disappeared.199 Annual rate of attendance at the local council clinics 
reduced considerably.200 At the same time, political developments in the Republic o f Togo 
were working in favour of the Kabres. Following the assumption of power by Gnassingbe 
Eyadema in a military coup in 1967, the Kabre people of the north began to gain 
recognition in that country. Many therefore sought to return home as favourable conditions 
awaited them and their departure created a labour problem for the councils. They were 
employed to do menial jobs such as the collection of ‘night soil’, considered by locals as 
the preserve of the lower class or the down-trodden in society. A good number o f them
195 Addo, ‘Migration into Ghana’, p. 20-24.
196 D aily Graphic, 9 December 1969, p. 12.
197 Ibid.
198 Peil, ‘Expulsion,’ p. 211-213.
199 Most o f the itinerant traders in the territory came from countries such as Nigeria, Togo and Dahomey. See 
Togoland Report, 1953, p. 53.
200 Peil puts the reduction o f patient attendance at hospitals in the country following the departure o f foreign 
nationals at 40%. See Peil, ‘Expulsion,’ p. 220; Interview with Miss Mercy Afenu and Miss Delali Akoe, 
Nursing Officers who once served at Dzolokpuita Clinic, 20 July 2007.
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were engaged in the construction and maintenance of feeder and trunk roads were from the 
Republic of Togo. The problem of how to get replacements for those immigrant labourers 
was long to haunt the councils.
In 1972, the increasingly corrupt Busia regime was overthrown in a military coup led by 
Lt. General I. K. Akyeampong. To address the labour shortage in the road sector, the new 
Supreme Military Council government changed policy towards road construction and 
maintenance in the country in 1974.201 Government’s policy as regards roads changed from 
direct labour to private contract.202 The road camps that had been built in every local 
council area were closed down except those located on first class roads. This policy had a 
telling effect on the maintenance of roads linking most local councils. A number of vehicles 
that plied these roads withdrew their services thereby affecting the mobility of people, with 
commercial activities reduced considerably. The deterioration of roads was also indicative 
of the accelerating economic collapse that the country experienced in the 1970s.
In spite of the numerous commissions set up from 1967 to 1971, local government 
remained far from being effective. Most of the recommendations in the 1971 Local 
Administration Act which aimed to strengthen local government structures were not 
implemented because of the 1972 coup which overthrew the Busia regime. According to 
Nsarkoh, one drawback was the inability of successive governments to define clearly the 
functions of agencies operating at the local level. This resulted in what he called 
‘duplication and overlapping of functions, operational inefficiencies and unnecessary waste 
of material and human resources’.203 The pervasiveness of these problems in the face of
201 Interview conducted with Mr S.A. Nkansa, retired Director o f Ghana Highways Authority, Ho, 20 July 
2006.
202 Ibid.
203 Narkoh, ‘Development’, p. 82.
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increasing popular expectations and a rapid rise in population put tremendous pressure on 
the government.204 Besides, local councils in the country as a whole had been enfeebled by
205being requested to undertake functions for which they had little or no expertise. Added to 
the above was the fact that local councils in Ewedome, as in many other parts of the 
country, never had the privilege of being staffed by qualified workers.
In the light of the failure of local councils to meet the developmental needs of local 
areas, the Supreme Military Council introduced the Local Administration (Amendment) 
Decree 258, 1974. The new structure sought to abolish the distinction between local and 
central government and to create one monolithic structure - District Councils - which had 
responsibility for the totality of government activity at the local level.207 The new structure 
was supposedly designed to take away from Accra the decision-making functions in respect 
of matters of a purely local significance and to move them to the local areas where the 
decisions were to be implemented. Yet, the functions assigned to the district councils were 
not accompanied by a transfer of competent staff and resources.208 Implementation of local 
government projects was left to bureauracts in Accra, while the regions became additional 
administrative bottlenecks in the way of the district councils.209
Members of the councils were composed of representatives from the various town and 
village committees and they held meetings once a month 210 Development projects such as 
dressing stations, school buildings, markets, public latrines, and small feeder roads were to
204 Ibid, p. 83.
205 J. A. Boateng, Your New Local Authorities (Accra, 1977), p. 10; Ministry o f  Local Government and Rural 
Development Bulletin, November 1996, p. 4.
206 Samuel N. Wood, Making the District Assemblies Work (Tema, 1989), p. 10.
207 Ghana Local Government Series, 1974, p. 2.
208 Ibid., p. 5.
209 Ibid; Ministry o f Local Government and Rural development, November 1996, p. 5.
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be implemented and maintained by district councils.211 Meanwhile, the new structure of 
local government had increased the total number of district councils in the country from 49 
in 1972 to 65 in 1974.212 The underlying philosophy behind the creation of the district 
councils was to ensure that units of local governments were sufficiently large enough to be 
viable213 A Local Government Boundary Commission set up in 1972 took into 
consideration factors such as communication and accommodation facilities, accessibility to 
the different parts of the area, the level of economic and industrial activity214 
Consequently, the district councils had to embrace a number of villages and towns 
regardless of traditional affiliations and historical or ethnic differences. This reflected a 
return to the shift from fragmentation to the old colonial policy of amalgamation in the 
1930s. But the new local government system became a breeding ground for corruption and 
financial indiscipline. Under the 1974 Act, central government took over the payment of all 
remunerations of all staffs of the district councils. This led to the employment of relatives 
of councilors and the bloating of the payroll of councils.215
The abolition of local councils led to a loss of interest in local government by chiefs and 
their subjects. The new local councils and village committees failed to function as a result 
of a general apathy. Many people expressed the view that local councils were not 
commercial entities established to make profit. Therefore, the fact that they were cash 
strapped was not a good enough reason for them to be abolished. With their abolition, the
211 Ibid. It must be noted that the district councils became the sole rating authorities.
212 Ibid; Report o f  the Local Government Boundary Commission, 1972; Supplementary Report o f  Local 
Government Boundary Commission, 1972. See also Government White Paper on the Boundary Commission 
Report, 1972; Ministry o f Local Government and Rural Development Bulletin, November 1996, p. 4.
213 This was a reverse to the Greenwood report.
2,4 Ibid.
215 Interview, Mr Elias Mensah, Assistant Principal Secretary, Regional Coordinating Council, Ho, 20 July 
2007; Mr E.Y. Kotobridza, Budget Officer, Hohoe District Council, 26 July 2007. Mr Harry Biscof, Research 
Officer, Kpando District Assembly, 27 July 2007.
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structural relationship which had existed to extend development programmes beyond the 
district capitals became nonexistent. Such extreme centralization led to unequal distribution 
o f public expenditure, much to the disadvantage of pauperized rural folk. In evaluating 
the 1974 local government structure, Saaka concluded that ‘for all intent and purposes local 
government has ceased to exist in Ghana’.217 He stated that ‘the problem was not so much 
the frequency of the radical structural changes as to the ‘minimum consultation with the 
people affected by it’.218 This view was corroborated by Callaway, who pointed out that 
‘political efficiency at the local level’ was necessary for the attainment of national political 
goals in Africa.219 One indication of political effectiveness at the local level, she observed, 
occurs when people at the local level feel that they have a stake in the activities of 
government.220 The 1974 local government reform took away from the people at the local 
level their right to participate in the administration of their local communities, a right which 
was central to the decolonization effort.
Local Government to the Present
The present local government system in operation in Ghana was initiated in 1989 by the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), a military government led by FI. Lt. J. J. 
Rawlings who seized power in Ghana (for the second time) in December 1981. Rawlings 
aimed to restructure the old local government system which had been in hibernation since 
1974. Very early in its administration, the PNDC realized that the political organizational
216 Details about how post-colonial African states created inequalities, see Jean-Frangiois Bayart, The State in 
African: The Politics o f the Belly (Cambridge, 2009), p. 64-265.
217 Yakubu Saaka, Local Government and Political Change in Northern Ghana (Oxford, 1978), p. 58.
218 Ibid. p. 49.
219 Callaway, ‘Local Politics’, p. 121.
220 Ibid.
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structure under which it was operating could not be sustained.221 Its much vaunted 
philosophy of ‘participatory democracy’ needed to be given practical meaning by way of 
establishing formalised political structures at the local level that would allow local 
constituents to participate in the decision-making process. But more importantly, it wanted 
to give the government a strong support base at the grass-roots level. While the government 
appeared to be desirous of giving the masses a say in the administration of the country, it 
wanted a system of government without political parties - a system that was reminiscent of 
Acheampong’s failed ‘UNIGOV’ ideology.222 Therefore, as early as 1982, the PNDC 
established the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) headed by Justice D.F. Anang. 
The NCD was tasked with the responsibility of assessing how best the government was 
responding to the expectations of the people, to educate the people about the objectives of 
the PNDC in relation to ‘real democracy’ and, above all, to formulate for the consideration 
of government a programme for a more effective realization of ‘a true democracy in 
Ghana’.223 After touring all the regions, the NCD came out with a document on the creation 
of district political authority (District Assemblies) after it had tried to persuade the 
Ghanaian public that it was not necessary to import a western type of democracy. It also 
spelt out the modalities for district level elections which aimed to create District 
Assemblies through what it called ‘a democratic process’.
In 1987, the NCD was given additional responsibility of creating 110 districts, 
registering voters and conducting elections and referenda.224 This culminated in the
221 Herbst, Politics o f  Reform, p. 88.
222 Interview conducted with Mr J. B. da Rocha, a founding member o f  the New Patriotic Party, Accra, 5 July
2006.
223 NCD, Report presented to the PNDC on Evolving a True Democracy, 23 March 1991.
224 Interviews conducted with Dr Afari-Gyan, Chairman o f  the Electoral Commission o f  Ghana, Mr Kwame
Arhin, Deputy Chairman, EC, Accra, 7 August, 2006.
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compilation of a nation-wide voters’ register in 1988. Subsequently, District Assembly 
elections were held in 1989.225 Only two-thirds of the members of the assemblies were 
elected; one-third of them were appointed by the PNDC. In an echo of Nkrumahism, chiefs 
were once again debarred from election to the DAs because government’s ‘revolutionary’ 
slogan of ‘power to the people’ was directed at established authorities such as the 
institution of chieftaincy.226 The DAs were the highest administrative authorities in the 
district. They had oversight over decentralised departments and agencies within the districts 
in addition to raising revenue.227 They also had the added advantage of formulating local 
development programmes. DA areas were sub-divided into zones and units with a 
population of 500 to 1,500 people forming unit committees. The unit committees assisted 
the DAs in revenue collection by keeping record of taxable persons and property.228
The new wave of democracy which blew throughout sub-Saharan Africa at the end of the 
Cold War in 1989 saw the return to a civilian government in Ghana in 1992, and the 
transformation of the PNDC into the civilian National Democratic Congress. Following the 
coming into force of the 1992 constitution, the Local Government Law, 1988, PNDCL 207 
was repealed and replaced by the Local Government Act 462, 1993. Though the district 
assembly concept was aimed at decentralization, its implementation was a sham. According 
to the NCD’s document, the DAs would culminate in the establishment of Regional
99QAssemblies and a National Assembly, the supreme legislative body in the country.
226 Two chiefs from the Regional House o f  Chiefs were, however, represented on the Regional Coordinating 
Council.
227 There were 22 decentralised departments under each DA. See Ibid, p. 20.
228 See detail in Kwame A. Ninsin, Ghana’s Political Transition 1990-1993 (Accra, 1996), p. 82.
229 Interviews conducted with Mr Dan Abodakpui, NDC Minister o f Trade and Industries, Dr Kwamena 
Adjei, Chairman o f the NDC and Mr Asiedu Nketia, Member o f the Consultative Assembly that drew the 
draft 1992 constitution o f Ghana and the General Secretary o f  the NDC, Accra, 5 July 2006.
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Interestingly, the regional and national assembly concepts never materialised.230 In place of 
the regional assembly, a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) was created with no policy 
making powers.231 Throughout PNDC rule, decision-making was centred on Rawlings and 
his immediate lieutenants.232 The appointment of one-third of the members of the DAs 
ensured that the assemblies would ‘be beholden to the central government rather than 
responding to constituents’ 233 District assemblies were supposed to evolve through a 
democratic process. Yet, the law establishing them was non-partisan. Therefore, what the 
whole concept sought to do was to establish a localised non-party system that could give 
the PNDC government control at the local level. Most significantly, the 1992 constitution 
debarred chiefs from taking part in ‘active party politics’ 234
In Ewedome, no new local councils were created in 1989. The old district councils 
which existed from 1974 to 1988 were simply designated as DAs with heaquarters at 
Hohoe, Kpando and Ho. The only changes noticeable were the creation of Unit Committees 
and Town/Area councils. The establishment of DAs did not cure the ills that befell the 
previous district councils. The three DAs created in Ewedome have been found to be too 
big and too remote from the local citizens. Centralization of fiscal control in Accra 
continued to make the decentralization concept a mirage. The sub-district structures such as
230 For details about the abortion o f the regional and national assembly concept, see Shillington, Ghana, p. 
169-173.
231 For details about the composition o f  the RCC and its functions, see Ministry o f  Local Government and 
Rural Development Bulletin N ovem ber 1996, p. 11; Joseph R.A. Aryee, ‘Decentralisation and Local 
Government under the PNDC Rule’ in E. Gyimah-Boadi (ed.), Ghana under PNDC Rule (Dakar, 1993), p. 
119.
232 Chazan Noami. Anomalies o f Continuity: Perspectives on Ghanaian Elections since Independence’ in 
Fred Hayward (ed.), Elections in Independent Africa (Westview, 1987); Paul Nugent, Big Men, Small Boys, 
and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden o f  History, 1982-1994 (London, 1995), p. 176.
233 Herbst, Politics o f  Reform, p. 90.
234 The Fourth Republican Constitution o f Ghana, Article 276 (1), 1992. Chiefs protested against restrictions 
on their participation in the new democratic process but to no avail. See K. Ansah-Koi, ‘Walking a Political 
Tightrope: Chieftaincy and the 1996 Elections’ in J. R. A. Aryee (ed.), The 1996 General Elections and 
Democratic Consolidation in Ghana, Accra, 1998), p. 144.
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unit committees and Town/Area committees have not been developed and empowered. Unit 
committees were to elect members to the assembly every four years, but lack of motivation 
discouraged qualified citizens from standing for election to the assemblies.
Since their establishment in 1989, the DAs in Ewedome have not been able to advance 
the development of the region. Revenue for the assemblies was derived from the same old 
sources such as levies, stores and market tolls, lorry parks, tourist attractions and property 
rates. Non-local sources of revenue included District Assembly Common Funds, District 
Development Fund and funds from donors such as the EU for specific projects. Ewedome 
is poorly endowed with natural resources such as minerals and timber. The lack of 
industries coupled with the destruction of the cocoa farms since bushfires ravaged the Volta 
Region in the early 1980s meant that the financial base of the DAs has become weak. 
Since the 1980s, the few cocoa farms in Ewedome were converted into food crop farms. 
Therefore, the national cocoa output which multiplied due to the transformation of 
economic policy by the government from 1983, did not produce any significant result in the 
Ewedome region. Most of the educated youth looking for employment and better living 
conditions have migrated to Accra and other cities. The consequence of this is that the 
markets which constituted one of the major sources of income to the DAs in Ewedome 
have dwindled in size. Therefore, the assemblies are unable to raise enough revenue locally. 
Apart from the district headquarters that have relatively big market centres, many adjoining 
towns have small or no markets at all. Even in Ho District, the market only operates once in 
every five days. The DAs in Ewedome now have to depend largely on District Assembly 
Common Found disbursed by Parliament. The process of disbursement is cumbersome 
preventing funds from getting to DAs in time.
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In 2004, the New Patriotic Party government (the current ‘heir’ to the established 
‘conservative’ Danquah-Busia tradition) found the DAs in Ewedome and other parts of the 
council too big and decided to address the problem by carving two more DAs out of the 
previously existing three DAs. The new DAs were South Dayi District Assembly (this was 
carved out of Hohoe and Kpando District Assemblies) with its heaquarters at Kpeve and 
Adaklu-Anyigbe District Assembly (carved out of Ho District Assembly) with its 
heaquarters at Kpetoe. Ho and Hohoe were declared Municipal Councils. Kpando was 
made an Urban council.235 According to councillors and inhabitants, this move was only for 
political expediency. This notwithstanding, the apathy of people towards local government 
remained unchanged. The new assemblies were bereft of resources, from office 
accommodation to basic item such as stationery.
Most assembly members interviewed deplored the lack of skills development 
opportunities for assembly members and the inability of government to empower the DAs 
to promote local economic development. The revenue base of the councils remained weak 
with the number of revenue collecting staff of Kpando Urban Council, for example, 
reduced to seven in 2000 237 For many years now, none of the councils in Ewedome has 
been able to collect property rates.238 Even basic rate collection was poor in all the councils 
due to the high cost of rate collection, which most often far exceeded the amount collected.
Most disturbing was the alienation of competent personnel from the DAs. As noted 
earlier, the DA concept was not aimed at democratizing local government along the lines of
235 Population was the criterion used in elevating DAs. An area o f  population o f  over 250,000 qualified to be 
promoted to the status o f a Metropolitan Assemble. A town with a population o f over 95, 000 qualified for a 
Municipal Council while areas with population o f over 75,000 was made a DA. See The Ministry o f  Local 
Government Brochure on Ghana: The New Local Government System, (Accra, 1996), p. 11-12.
236 Interview, Mrs N.Offie, educationalist, South Dayi District Assembly, 21 October 2007.
237 Interview with Mr David Kumah, Revenue Supervisor, Kpando Urban Council, 22 August 2007; Mr Harry 
Biscoff, Record Officer, 27 July 2007.
238 According to my informants, this was due to lack o f punitive measures against defaulters.
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party politics. No political parties or organised groups were allowed to take part in the 
elections. People who contested the elections to become assemblymen and women did so as 
individuals. It is observed that the operational style of the PNDC government which 
introduced the DAs was to deny political expression because it feared that political 
liberalization would generate opposition. Thus the whole district assembly concept was 
mired in controversy. Most professional bodies and the most capable individuals boycotted 
the district assembly elections.
With the return to multi-party democracy in 1992, the law which established the DAs 
should have been amended to allow political parties to be involved in local government. 
Multi-party politics is a defining feature of liberal democracy and the agitation that led to 
Ghana’s transition to democracy after years of military rule was shaped largely by the 
people’s desire to see a return to party-politics. Yet the DAs in their present form remain 
peripheral to the main democratic process in the country. The inevitable consequence is the 
loading of the DAs with people loyal to the party in government.239 Officers at the DAs are 
seen as agents of the party in power who sit at the pleasure of the president. So there has 
been difficulty in harnessing the support of all the people in the districts. In effect, the 
process amounted to reconfiguration of political institutions and the narrowing of the range 
of those entitled to political office.240 With these constraints, the DA system has been 
unable to restore a ‘sense of local civil responsibility’ associated with the old NAs among 
rural people in Ewedome.241 In Ewedome, people have become disillusioned about local
239 The District Chief Executive and the Presiding Member are norminated by the President and approved by 
two-thirds o f the members o f o f the DAs. See Ministry o f  Local Government Bulletin, Novermber 1996, p.
10 .
240 This view is also expressed in an interpretive analysis o f  the weakness o f the state in Africa. See Bates, 
When Things Fell Apart, p. 52.
241 Shillington, Ghana, p. 164.
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government. There was little evidence that local government reforms in the past produced 
any achievements which might have made subsequent attempts more effective and long 
lasting. There was therefore much in local government reforms that people in the region 
subverted and inverted.
Conclusion
Local government in Ewedome came under tremendous pressure at independence. The 
territory was one area that was actually convulsed by violent conflict right at the time that 
independence was obtained. This situation shaped the relationship between the ruling CPP 
government and the inhabitants of Ewedome. Thus, the local government reforms carried 
out by the CPP government came against the backdrop of lack of popular support for the 
party in the territory. The haste to rid local government o f the influence of chiefs and to 
control local political structures led to a series of reforms. While the reforms succeeded in 
rendering opposition elements in Ewedome ineffective, they failed to improve the work of 
local councils. The creation of local councils became a resource for political patronage and 
a regular feature in the strategy of governing local people by divide and rule. The many 
structural changes were not accompanied by detailed planning of local government services 
and the multiplicity of councils only served to make units of local councils unwieldy and 
inefficient. Government functionaries’ influence became a burden on local councils. The 
situation deteriorated to the point that by 1974, local councils ceased to exist altogether.
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CONCLUSION
This study has examined the evolution of local government in Ewedome from the 
formal beginning of British rule in 1922 through the era of the creation of Native 
Authorities in the 1930s to the moment of genuine democratic possibility in the period
1951-7 and on to the shambles that it became under the corrupt and authoritarian regimes 
that followed. It has investigated a number of developments relating to the pre-colonial and 
colonial political structure in Ewedome and participation in local governance. It has 
become evident that participation in the day-to-day administration of the NAs was initially 
limited exclusively to the chiefly class. We do see evidence of Akan political culture such 
as stools, secular rulers, and military formation in pre-colonial Ewedome. However, British 
colonial rule represented an attempt at further ‘Akanization’: that is, the construction of 
suitably-sized states under ‘paramount chiefs’ through amalgamation. The newly created 
paramount chiefs accumulated more authority under the Native Authority Ordinance of 
1932 than they had in the pre-colonial period. Nevertheless, the participation of commoners 
in self-help projects such as the construction of roads, the building of schools, markets, and 
clinics showed the active involvement of all the inhabitants in the working of the NAs.
The application of the policy of indirect rule in Ewedome was particularly intriguing 
because of the territory’s historical antecedents: the fragmentation into small chiefdoms and 
the effect of German colonial rule which made villages the basic units of administration. 
The fragmentation and the complex heterogeneity o f Ewedome were made manifest by the 
dialect peculiarities of the various Ewe groups, as well as the cultural and historical 
uniqueness of each Guan and Central Togo minority groups. This made amalgamation the
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only viable option for the establishment of NAs when Britain formally took over the 
administration of the territory in 1922. Amalgamation was aided by the adoption of 
‘standard Ewe’ as a tool for proselytization and education by the missionaries. In 
Ewedome, missionary education had created a small literate group by the early twentieth 
century before formal colonialism. This served to begin the process towards fostering a 
wider Ewe identity.
Nevertheless, the creation of Akpini, Asogli, Awatime (and later, Atando) states under 
the policy of amalgamation was not received easily. Every chief began jostling for the 
position of a paramount chief. This created social and political disequilibrium, with serious 
ramifications for chieftaincy in Ewedome to the present day. The British officials already 
had their own preferred choices and could no longer hold themselves as neutral arbiters of
r) A ‘J
conflicting interests and claims. As protests against the policy grew, the flexibility of its 
application became an important philosophy, paving the way for the formation of the 
Atando NA in 1949. Amalgamation in Ewedome thus provides insights into the difficulties 
that British colonial officials faced in their bid to introduce indirect rule in British colonies 
in Africa. The reforms introduced into the NA system since the 1930s shows that, far from 
being despotic, the NAs were willing to change their policies to meet the expectations of 
the inhabitants, whose non-cooperation and protests could impede the execution of 
development programmes. It is obvious that critics of indirect rule often overstated the 
power of the colonial state and overstretched the gullibility of rural folk.
The structure of the NA system had been the supporting prop of the chiefs’ newly 
acquired power and authority. From the mid 1940s, as increasing numbers of ‘youngmen’ 
in particular were more and more dissatisfied with limitations to their socio-economic 
242 This view is also expressed by Berman, ‘Ethnicity’, p. 317.
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advance under the NA system, colonial rule began creaking and the ‘invincibility’ of chiefs 
and their influential position was brought into question. This fuelled the demand for radical 
change, which had a profound effect on the institution of chieftaincy and the means of 
acquiring political power. The ordinary people could and did express their opposition to 
policies which did not meet their needs. The deficiencies notwithstanding, the NAs had by 
1950 laid the foundation for the new local councils that succeeded them.
The transition to local councils in Ewedome was intimately shaped by the question of 
Togoland unification from 1951 to 1956. The administering authorities had been haunted 
by the spectre of the possibility of Togolanders making a demand for the unification of the 
two Togolands. Various policies pursued by the British since 1922 aimed at forging 
cooperation between British Togo and the Gold Coast. The entrenched positions of the 
Togoland Congress and the diarchy government of the Gold Coast made integration a 
burning issue, which could only be resolved by a plebiscite in 1956. Local councils were 
divided between integrationists and unificationists. This had a retardative effect on the 
proper functioning of local councils and the overall development of Ewedome.
Since independence, local government has lacked serious political direction. Attempts 
by successive governments to reform local government were dictated largely by their 
obsession for the control of structures at the local level. This led to the proliferation of 
small inefficient local councils in Ewedome. Successive governments introduced an 
alteration in the traditional political structure that saw government party functionaries 
acting as the rallying point of the people in the rural areas instead of chiefs. In effect, the 
opportunity presented by the 1951 Local Government Ordinance to marry traditional form 
of local administration and the ‘modem’ system of local government was completely
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abandoned. Yet, as the thesis has demonstrated, the history of self-help projects has shown 
that local government administration in the rural areas was closely bound-up with the 
institution of chieftaincy. Despite the socio-political transformations taking place in the 
territory, the villages and towns continued largely to be governed by indigenous norms and 
values. Chiefs thus represented that critical link between modem forms of local government 
and the time-honoured pre-colonial system of authority. The rural communities still looked 
up to chiefs for leadership and direction. Therefore the marginalization of chiefs in the day- 
to-day administration of their villages became the missing-link in the successful 
development of local government. Since 1988, attempts to decentralise local government 
and facilitate local level participation through DAs have so far proved unsuccessful. The 
DAs have turned out to be more politicised than their predecessors. The excessive 
politicization and over-centralisation alienated many people and give a confused image of 
local government to this day.
The importance of this study lies in the fact that local government was the means by 
which governments - both colonial and post-colonial - became visible to rural people. Local 
government structures and policies since the colonial era have shaped identities, 
transformed indigenous political systems and influenced the cultural values and mores of 
rural folks in scores of ways. Indirect rule varied in its application from territory to 
territory. Therefore, the contribution of this thesis to the on-going debate on colonial rule 
through chiefs is that a comparative examination of NA administration and the ‘modem’ 
post-colonial system of local government (on a case-by-case basis) provides a more 
objective understanding of indirect rule than the broad narrative has so far presented.
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